Next Article in Journal / Special Issue
The Effects of Social Exclusion and Group Heterogeneity on the Provision of Public Goods
Previous Article in Journal
Choices in the 11–20 Game: The Role of Risk Aversion
Previous Article in Special Issue
Cooperation and Strategic Complementarity: An Experiment with Two Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Games with Interior Equilibria
Article Menu

Export Article

Open AccessArticle
Games 2018, 9(3), 54;

Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game

Economics Department, University of Marburg, Universitätsstraße 25, D-35037 Marburg, Germany
Institute for Applied Microeconomics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 25 May 2018 / Revised: 10 July 2018 / Accepted: 24 July 2018 / Published: 30 July 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Good Games)
Full-Text   |   PDF [327 KB, uploaded 30 July 2018]   |  


We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we observe a high degree of individuals’ punishment type stability. However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments. View Full-Text
Keywords: peer punishment; strategy method; type classification; public goods game; coordination game; weakest link game peer punishment; strategy method; type classification; public goods game; coordination game; weakest link game

Figure 1

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).

Supplementary material


Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Albrecht, F.; Kube, S. Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game. Games 2018, 9, 54.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics



[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top