Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game
AbstractWe elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we observe a high degree of individuals’ punishment type stability. However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments. View Full-Text
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Albrecht, F.; Kube, S. Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game. Games 2018, 9, 54.
Albrecht F, Kube S. Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game. Games. 2018; 9(3):54.Chicago/Turabian Style
Albrecht, Felix; Kube, Sebastian. 2018. "Peer-Punishment in a Cooperation and a Coordination Game." Games 9, no. 3: 54.
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