Choices in the 11–20 Game: The Role of Risk Aversion
AbstractArad and Rubinstein (2012, AER) proposed the 11–20 money request game as an alternative to the P beauty contest game for measuring the depth of thinking. In this paper, we show theoretically that in the Nash equilibrium of the 11–20 game players are more likely to choose high numbers if they are risk-averse rather than risk neutral. Hence, the depth of thinking measured in the 11–20 game is biased by risk aversion. Based on a lab experiment, we confirm this hypothesis empirically. View Full-Text
Share & Cite This Article
Li, K.K.; Rong, K. Choices in the 11–20 Game: The Role of Risk Aversion. Games 2018, 9, 53.
Li KK, Rong K. Choices in the 11–20 Game: The Role of Risk Aversion. Games. 2018; 9(3):53.Chicago/Turabian Style
Li, King K.; Rong, Kang. 2018. "Choices in the 11–20 Game: The Role of Risk Aversion." Games 9, no. 3: 53.
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.