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Article

A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Large Poisson Elections with Multiple Alternatives

Department of Economics and Finance, Gordon S. Lang School of Business and Economics, University of Guelph, 50 Stone Road East, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada
Games 2020, 11(1), 2; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010002
Received: 6 June 2019 / Revised: 21 October 2019 / Accepted: 18 November 2019 / Published: 23 December 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Economy, Social Choice and Game Theory)
Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We also assume that this is a Poisson voting game with population uncertainty. The question is whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently so that the correct alternative is elected with probability tending to one when the number of voters tends to infinity. The previous literature shows that the CJT holds for large elections with two alternatives, but there is also an example of a large election with three alternatives that has an inefficient equilibrium. We show that there always exists an efficient equilibrium, independent of the number of alternatives. Under certain circumstances (informative types), it is unique in elections with two alternatives. The existence of inefficient equilibria in elections with more than two alternatives is generic. View Full-Text
Keywords: efficient information aggregation; simple plurality rule; Poisson games; condorcet jury theorem efficient information aggregation; simple plurality rule; Poisson games; condorcet jury theorem
MDPI and ACS Style

Goertz, J.M.M. A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Large Poisson Elections with Multiple Alternatives. Games 2020, 11, 2. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010002

AMA Style

Goertz JMM. A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Large Poisson Elections with Multiple Alternatives. Games. 2020; 11(1):2. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010002

Chicago/Turabian Style

Goertz, Johanna M.M. 2020. "A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Large Poisson Elections with Multiple Alternatives" Games 11, no. 1: 2. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11010002

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