Next Article in Journal
Is Your Privacy for Sale? An Experiment on the Willingness to Reveal Sensitive Information
Previous Article in Journal
Ransomware and Reputation
Previous Article in Special Issue
The Signaling Value of Punishing Norm-Breakers and Rewarding Norm-Followers
Open AccessArticle

The Power of Requests in a Redistribution Game: An Experimental Study

1
ITCS Abba Ballini, via Tirandi 3, 25128 Brescia, Italy
2
IIS Luigi Einaudi, via F.lli Sirani 1, 25032 Chiari (BS), Italy
3
Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ICREA), Passeig de Lluís Companys, 23, 08010 Barcelona, Spain
4
Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2019, 10(3), 27; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030027
Received: 27 March 2019 / Revised: 15 May 2019 / Accepted: 11 June 2019 / Published: 1 July 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norms and Games)
In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ by the requested amount of sharing of privately known random endowments (tips), with one player never receiving any endowment. Using a hurdle model, we find no significant difference in free riding between the three sharing rules, but strong differences in positive contributions which, however, are lower than the rules prescribe. Furthermore, the average positive contribution remains stable over time, while free riding tends to increase. View Full-Text
Keywords: redistribution; ethics; deontological values; social norms; non-enforceable rule; equity; tip pooling; hurdle model redistribution; ethics; deontological values; social norms; non-enforceable rule; equity; tip pooling; hurdle model
Show Figures

Figure 1

MDPI and ACS Style

Pedersini, R.; Nagel, R.; Le Menestrel, M. The Power of Requests in a Redistribution Game: An Experimental Study. Games 2019, 10, 27.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Access Map

1
Back to TopTop