Routing-Proofness in Congestion-Prone Networks
AbstractWe consider the problem of sharing the cost of connecting a large number of atomless agents in a network. The centralized agency elicits the target nodes that agents want to connect, and charges agents based on their demands. We look for a cost-sharing mechanism that satisfies three desirable properties: efficiency which charges agents based on the minimum total cost of connecting them in a network, stand-alone core stability which requires charging agents not more than the cost of connecting by themselves directly, and limit routing-proofness which prevents agents from profitable reporting as several agents connecting from A to C to B instead of A to B. We show that these three properties are not always compatible for any set of cost functions and demands. However, when these properties are compatible, a new egalitarian mechanism is shown to satisfy them. When the properties are not compatible, we find a rule that meets stand-alone core stability, limit routing-proofness and minimizes the budget deficit. View Full-Text
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Juarez, R.; Wu, M. Routing-Proofness in Congestion-Prone Networks. Games 2019, 10, 17.
Juarez R, Wu M. Routing-Proofness in Congestion-Prone Networks. Games. 2019; 10(2):17.Chicago/Turabian Style
Juarez, Ruben; Wu, Michael. 2019. "Routing-Proofness in Congestion-Prone Networks." Games 10, no. 2: 17.
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