Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
I thank Françoise Forges, Atsushi Kajii and Toru Suzuki for comments on earlier drafts, and Rajiv Vohra for suggesting some relevant reading.
Games 2019, 10(1), 14; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10010014
Received: 13 February 2019 / Accepted: 10 March 2019 / Published: 14 March 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Norm and Risk Attitudes)
Agency may be exercised by different entities (e.g., individuals, firms, households). A given individual can form part of multiple agents (e.g., he may belong to a firm and a household). The set of agents that act in a given situation might not be common knowledge. We adapt the standard model of incomplete information to model such situations. View Full-Text►▼ Show Figures
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Newton, J. Agency Equilibrium. Games 2019, 10, 14.
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Newton J. Agency Equilibrium. Games. 2019; 10(1):14.Chicago/Turabian Style
Newton, Jonathan. 2019. "Agency Equilibrium." Games 10, no. 1: 14.
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