Blockchain Variables and Possible Attacks: A Technical Survey
Abstract
1. Introduction
Objectives and Methodology
- Identify and categorize key blockchain design variables.
- Map these variables to major attack vectors.
- Analyze how variable manipulation influences vulnerability through empirical examples and simulations.
- Propose mitigation strategies and design recommendations for future blockchain systems.
- -
- Ganache is a private Ethereum environment used for controlled simulation of blockchain transactions.
- -
- Bitcoin Core validates transaction chains through consensus, ensuring only legitimate blocks are accepted while enhancing decentralization, privacy, and user security.
- -
- Python 3.12.3 with Matplotlib 3.9.2 used for data modeling and visualization [15].
- -
- Mythril and Slither are Ethereum smart contract analysis tools. Mythril 0.24.2 applies symbolic execution and taint analysis to detect vulnerabilities such as overflow and reentrancy, while Slither 0.10.4 performs static code analysis and identifies optimization opportunities within frameworks like Truffle and Hardhat. A schematic representation of the Slither algorithm is shown in Figure 1.
2. Literature Review
3. Blockchain System
- -
- Previous hash which links to the preceding block.
- -
- Transaction details that records processed transactions.
- -
- Nonce which is a random cryptographic number ensuring uniqueness.
- -
- Block hash which is a unique 256-bit identifier generated via hashing.
3.1. Types of Blockchain
3.2. Properties of a Blockchain
4. Key Blockchain Variables
- (a)
- Block size which determines data capacity per block. Larger sizes increase throughput but also propagation delays and vulnerability to forking or selfish mining. Bitcoin addressed this with SegWit and the Lightning Network.
- (b)
- Block interval is the time between block creations affects transaction speed and security. Short intervals raise fork risks, while long ones slow confirmations.
- (c)
- Consensus algorithm defines network security and efficiency.PoW—secure but energy-heavy and prone to 51% attacks.DPoS—fast but relies on few validators, risking collusion.
- (d)
- Network topology and latency. The peer-to-peer structure and communication delays impact consensus reliability. Poor connectivity can enable eclipse attacks by isolating nodes.
4.1. Blockchain Design Variables and Their Effects
4.2. Blockchain Layers
- (a)
- Network layer
- (b)
- Consensus layer
- (c)
- Data layer
- (d)
- Execution layer
- (e)
- Application layer
4.3. Platforms of Blockchain
- (a)
- Hyperledger Fabric
- (b)
- Hyperledger Sawtooth
- (c)
- Ethereum
Emerging Blockchain Protocols with Advanced Cryptographic and AI Techniques
- (a)
- Neural Fairness Blockchain Protocol using Elliptic Curve Lottery
- (b)
- Neural Networks and ECC for Secure Communication:
5. Common Blockchain Attacks and Related Variables: Case Studies of Main Significant Attacks from 2016 to 2024
5.1. The Main Attack Types
- (a)
- 51% Attack:
- (b)
- Sybil Attack:
- (c)
- Double-Spending Attack:
- (d)
- Eclipse Attack:
- (e)
- Smart Contract Exploits:
5.2. Blockchain Ecosystem Possible Attacks
- (a)
- Block data—stores raw transaction details. Compromises threaten data integrity, confidentiality, and availability.
- (b)
- Networking protocol—governs node communication. Attacks may drop, delay, or modify messages, or perform eclipse attacks that isolate nodes.
- (c)
- Consensus algorithm—ensures ledger agreement (e.g., PoW, PoS) but remains vulnerable to 51% and Sybil attacks, undermining system trust.
- (d)
- Smart contracts—self-executing code subject to vulnerabilities such as reentrancy (DAO hack) or flawed logic, causing fund loss or freezing.
- (e)
- Decentralized applications (DApps)—built atop smart contracts, DApps face logic flaws, integration errors, and library exploits affecting deployed services.
- -
- 2016–2018: The DAO hack ($60 M ETH loss) and Parity wallet flaw ($150 M ETH locked).
- -
- 2019–2021: Increasingly complex incidents, including the 2020 KuCoin hack ($281 M stolen) and the 2021 Poly Network exploit ($600 M stolen, later mostly returned). The Colonial Pipeline ransomware case (2021) also underscored cryptocurrency’s role in ransom payments (75 BTC; [51]).
- -
- 2022–2024: Major cross-chain breaches included the 2022 Ronin Network hack ($620 M) and Harmony’s Horizon Bridge theft ($100 M), both linked to North Korea’s Lazarus Group. According to a 2023 FBI report, $60 M in stolen ETH was laundered via the RAILGUN protocol and partially frozen through cooperation with virtual asset service providers [13,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60]. The remaining Bitcoin was later traced to multiple new addresses.
| Bitcoin Address |
|---|
| 1BK769SseNefb6fe9QuFEi8W4KGbtP8gi3 |
| 15FcqYRbwh2JsRUyBjvZ4jJ2XAD3pycGch |
| 1HwSof6jnbMFpfrRRa2jvydYdopkkGB4Sn |
| 15emeZ7buVegqhYh9PekH7cwFEJcCeVNpS |
| 3MSbCJCYtx5sj1nkzD4AMEhhvvviXBc8XJ |
| 17Z79rZpkk8kUiJseg5aELwYKaoLnirMUn |
| bc1qp2vvntdedxw4xwtyd4y3gc2t9ufk6pwz2ga4ge |
| 3P9WebHkiDxCi8LDXiRQp8atNEagcQeRA3 |
| 37fnBxofDeph2fpBZxZKypNkwdXAt9nT6F |
| 185NxhFAmKZrdwn9rVga3kqbvDP4FkbTNw |
| 12283Cq1pJ3f1gXwqi6K3bRf5LZb8Bkm6g |
6. Mapping Blockchain Variables to Attack Vectors
6.1. Potential Vulnerabilities
6.2. Variable Manipulation in Blockchain
- Example 1: Double-spending (Transaction data)
- Example 2: Consensus manipulation (PoS control)
- Example 3: Timestamp manipulation
- Block 1: Transaction A → Andrew to Jane (12:00 PM)
- Block 2: Transaction B → Andrew to Adrian (12:01 PM)
- -
- Gain majority mining power.
- -
- Mine blocks faster than the rest of the network.
- -
- Publish a longer, alternative chain.
- -
- Network accepts the attacker’s chain, invalidating the original.
7. Mitigation Techniques and Design Guidelines
- (a)
- User education—promote phishing awareness, private key best practices, and hardware wallet use for secure storage.
- (b)
- Strengthened protocols—employ multi-signature wallets, decentralized identity frameworks, and conduct regular smart contract audits to minimize vulnerabilities.
7.1. Best Practices and Mitigation
7.2. Risk Evaluation
- (a)
- Blockchain security framework
- (b)
- Data encryption
- (c)
- Identity and access management (IAM)
- (d)
- Network segmentation
- (e)
- Monitoring protocols
- (f)
- Layered defense strategy
- (g)
- Quantitative risk assessment
7.3. Cyber Security Risk and Threats
7.4. Basic Framework: Blockchain Variable Quantitative Risk Framework
8. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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| Consensus | Description |
|---|---|
| Decentralized | Users independently run their own Bitcoin Core full nodes, enforcing identical rules to evaluate and validate the blockchain. |
| No voting | No voting occurs; all full nodes individually apply mathematical rules to decide the valid blockchain. |
| Type of Blockchain | Access Level | Consensus Mechanism | Typical Use Cases |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public blockchain | Open to anyone | PoW, PoS | Bitcoin, Ethereum, public DeFi platforms |
| Private blockchain | Invitation only | Controlled internally | Supply chain, internal enterprise solutions |
| Consortium blockchain | Group of organizations | Pre-selected nodes | Banking, healthcare, cross-org platforms |
| Hybrid blockchain | Mix of public & private | Custom (hybrid models) | Government and enterprise collaboration |
| Sidechain | Attached to main chain | Varies (depends on parent chain) | Asset transfers, scalability solutions |
| Permissioned blockchain | Restricted (by roles) | Pre-approved consensus methods | Enterprise use, identity management |
| Permissionless blockchain | Fully open | PoW, PoS | Crypto, NFTs, decentralized platforms |
| Property | Description |
|---|---|
| Anonymity/Pseudonymity | Transactions without real identities. |
| Decentralized | Distributed control. |
| Smart contracts | Self-executing code. |
| Secured | Cryptographic protection. |
| Distributed ledger | Copies on every node. |
| Trusted | From protocols and consensus. |
| Transparent | Visible transactions in public chains. |
| Consensus | Agreement via PoW/PoS. |
| Immutable | Unalterable data. |
| Tokenized | Digital representations of value. |
| Variable | Description | Example (Platform) | Security Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Block size | Data capacity per block | Bitcoin (1 MB), BSV (128 MB) | Affects propagation and forking |
| Block interval | Time between block creation | Bitcoin (10 min), Ethereum (12 s) | Influences finality and double-spending |
| Consensus mechanism | Method for reaching agreement | PoW, PoS, DPoS | Resistance to 51%, Sybil |
| Network topology | Peer node structure | Random graph, Mesh | Exposure to eclipse attacks |
| Node identity system | Node authentication method | None (Bitcoin), DID (Polkadot) | Sybil resistance |
| Smart contract layer | Executable logic layer | Ethereum, Solana | Bugs, gas limits, flaws |
| Year | Estimated Losses (USD) | Notable Incidents |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | $60 million | The DAO Hack |
| 2017 | $150 million | Parity Wallet Bug |
| 2020 | $275 million | KuCoin Hack |
| 2021 | $600 million | Poly Network Exploit |
| 2021 | $4.4 million | Colonial Pipeline Ransomware |
| 2022 | $620 million | Ronin Network Hack |
| 2022 | $100 million | Harmony Horizon Bridge Attack |
| 2023 | — | MOVEit Data Breach (93.3 million individuals affected) |
| 2023 | $400,000 (approx.) | British Library Cyberattack |
| 2025 | $1.5 billion | ByBit Exchange Hack |
| Potential Vulnerability | Mapped Attack Vectors | Example Incidents |
|---|---|---|
| Manipulation of block production/voting | 51% attack, forking, nothing-at-stake | Ethereum Classic 51% attack (2020) [4,12,30] |
| Logic errors, lack of verification | Reentrancy, integer overflow, oracle attacks | The DAO Hack (2016) [45], bZx Oracle Attack (2020) [8] |
| Node isolation, message delay | Eclipse, partitioning, routing attacks | Bitcoin eclipse attacks (2015–2018) [47] |
| Weak/outdated cryptography | Signature forgery, collision attacks | Bitcoin transaction malleability (2014) [6] |
| Inadequate trust model | Sybil attack, eclipse attack | Sybil simulations in Bitcoin (2016) [45] |
| Resource abuse | Gas limit abuse, transaction flooding | Ethereum congestion (2017) [65] |
| Untrusted external inputs | Oracle manipulation, front-running | DeFi price oracle exploits (2020–2023) [10] |
| High storage cost | State bloat, history rewriting | Ethereum state growth (ongoing) |
| Vulnerability | Prevention Technique |
|---|---|
| 51% attack | Decentralize, checkpoint |
| Sybil attack | Identity binding, staking, or CAPTCHAs |
| Eclipse attack | Peer randomness, inbound connections |
| Double spending | Multi-confirmation, fraud detection systems |
| Smart contract bugs | Formal verification, code audits, use safe libraries |
| No. | Step | Action |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Find Risks | Connect blockchain settings to risks. |
| 2 | Measure Risks | Set probability, impact, and control strength. |
| 3 | Score Risks | Calculate Risk = Probability × Impact × to rank threats. |
| 4 | Test Settings | Ganache to test settings or risks like double-spending. |
| 5 | Apply Fixes | Adjust settings based on scores. |
| 6 | Monitor and Update | Check risks every three months using Chainalysis Hexagate. |
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Bordeianu, A.A.; Popescu, D.E. Blockchain Variables and Possible Attacks: A Technical Survey. Computers 2025, 14, 567. https://doi.org/10.3390/computers14120567
Bordeianu AA, Popescu DE. Blockchain Variables and Possible Attacks: A Technical Survey. Computers. 2025; 14(12):567. https://doi.org/10.3390/computers14120567
Chicago/Turabian StyleBordeianu, Andrei Alexandru, and Daniela Elena Popescu. 2025. "Blockchain Variables and Possible Attacks: A Technical Survey" Computers 14, no. 12: 567. https://doi.org/10.3390/computers14120567
APA StyleBordeianu, A. A., & Popescu, D. E. (2025). Blockchain Variables and Possible Attacks: A Technical Survey. Computers, 14(12), 567. https://doi.org/10.3390/computers14120567

