3.2. The Seedbed for GIs in the 1970s–1980s
The seedbed for the first GIs lies in the 1970s, when the oil crises and anti-nuclear protests challenged the national government’s approach to energy. Previously, the energy sector had been monopolized and based on imported oil and coal and on domestic natural gas, the latter of which was quickly rolled out after the discovery of the Dutch gas reserves in Slochteren in 1959. Grid ownership and production was divided into regional monopolies of private companies, with provinces and municipalities as their majority shareholders. Energy policy was based only on economic considerations [
32,
33], which included large gas revenues that the state received. In the 1970s, the passive and economic approach of the government met with increasing societal opposition. The oil crises created awareness of the dependency on oil producing and the government’s discourse of utility maximization was challenged after publication of the 1972 “Limits to Growth” report [
34].
A second discursive challenge was formed by the fierce anti-nuclear protests. As a strategy to increase energy independence and thus secure energy supply, the government invested in nuclear power, but this led to ongoing and large protests. Despite the public opposition, the government did not abandon its nuclear strategy until the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, which left nuclear power politically unviable. However, the protests installed in community members the notion that energy policy could be contested and that communities could undertake action.
The first community action in the energy field thus emerged out of dissatisfaction with governmental energy policy. Communities and individuals started experimenting with alternatives such as private wind turbines. In broader innovative experiments, such as “De Kleine Aarde” (The Small Earth, est. 1972), community groups experimented with more sustainable and environmentally friendly living, energy and food production [
34]. However, these initiatives were met with a complete lack of regulatory fit: decentral grid access was prohibited, which rendered real GI activities in the energy field impossible.
The government started basing its policies on a broader discourse on energy that included energy security issues and environmental considerations [
35], and the first RE policy dates from 1979 (the Second White Paper on Energy [
36]). It envisioned only a modest role for RE, but enabled decentral grid access in 1980 with the aim to enable farmers to produce local energy and break the local utility monopolies, that had grown into a “cartel” and were united in the influential umbrella organization SEP. The monopolized market created little fit for new entrants, but the new decentral grid access formed a regulatory option that aligned with the discourse of local community action.
3.3. The First Wave: Pioneer Wind Cooperatives in 1985–1991
Despite the limited fit in the actor coalition and the unfavorable rules, a small number of pioneers started experimenting with individually owned small turbines, and united themselves in umbrella organization ODE (Organization for Renewable Energy). ODE started in 1979 as a network for “do-it-yourself turbine builders” and grew to become the umbrella organization for GIs for renewable energy. A small number of private turbines emerged, mostly owned by farmers as the costs were too high for other citizens. Soon, these wind power pioneers realized that citizen ownership was more feasible if organized through a cooperative or legal association that would pool their (financial and knowledge) resources. The first cooperatives were formed in the early 1980s to plan collectively owned and operated turbines, and in 1987 the first turbine was erected in Delft by the Cooperative Turbine Association Delft (Coöperatieve Windmolen Vereniging Delft).
Connected through ODE and inspired by initial successes, 25 wind cooperatives emerged in a time span of only five years, mostly in locations with available land and high wind potential [
37] (see
Figure 2). These GIs are all bottom-up, civil initiatives, although a few collaborated with farmers for e.g., access to land. This development took place outside of the political realm and even though the pioneers were inspired by the anti-nuclear movement, they did not seek political influence or actively challenge the arrangement. These GIs typically exploited (and often still exploit) a small number of local wind turbines and acted on a discourse that combined environmental concerns with a wish for local independence. The turbines are financed through shares upon which members receive interest. Unable to obtain a supplier permit, cooperatives sold their product to large suppliers and the cooperative’s members received interest over their shares. This business model was supported through the 1989 Electricity Act, which obliged energy suppliers to buy decentrally produced electricity for a standard price and guaranteed grid access [
37] (p. 216). The main focus of the Act was to break the regional monopolies by introducing some competition, and stimulate unbundling of production and supply [
38]. However, the intended competition remained weak as the SEP turned out to function as a cartel [
38]. The grid access and price guarantees, originally meant for farmers and small businesses, increased the regulatory and distributive fit for GIs.
Although these GIs were successful in their plans, the movement barely expanded in the 1990s and remained of little influence to policy makers. In the late 1990s the movement had around 2000 (mostly passive) members but was not seen as very influential or promising: “
this phenomenon would not really take off. The cooperative idea, that can be found in agriculture, is a lot weaker than in Denmark, and in the 1980s the electricity sector formed a mighty lobby that was not very fond of decentralized production of electricity” [
28] (p. 98). Nobody expected the citizens movement to expand the way it did later. The GIs themselves had fulfilled their own ambitions and did not intend to grow or expand their activities.
What stands out is that for these first wave GIs, the hypothesis that actors would seek to change their institutional environment and increase their position does apply. On the contrary, GIs found a niche in the sector and tailored their activities to fit within the possibilities. Institutional support was limited, although the 1989 Electricity Act provided some favorable regulations. The modest tariffs and profits however kept the activities reserved for environmental activists, although the profitability increased somewhat in the early 1990s. The government did not perceive GIs as a viable alternative and worked primarily with the established electricity sector, excluding GIs from political decision making (which they in turn did not seek). Moreover, the system indeed proved quite resistant to change, including to decentralization and to the introduction of competition and unbundling in the electricity sector. The system did not offer much relational or distributive fit for GIs, but the regulatory fit had improved somewhat through the decentral grid access and guaranteed prices. Lastly, the ongoing economic rationale of the government did not align with the environmental and local discourse of GIs.
3.4. The Second Wave: The Frisian Village Turbines in 1991–1997
The emergence of the second wave illustrates the importance of institutional fit at a decentral level. Where the momentum for GIs at the national level was small, nine village wind cooperatives emerged in Friesland province, with a rationale that was quite different from the first GIs (see
Figure 3). These turbines, erected between 1991 and 1997, were built by local village interest groups (some in collaboration with commercial project developers) not out of environmental concerns but also with the purpose of generating profits for the local community [
39]. This was successful: over the years, the village turbines in Friesland invested revenue from the turbines in local football clubs, church restorations, village fairs and more, also including other RE measures, such as solar panels on local schools [
40]. The goal of these associations was to enhance the quality of living in small, rural villages and the exploitation of the turbines is seen as a means to create revenue to invest locally.
The success of the Frisian turbines can be explained by large institutional fit and the absence of unsurpassable thresholds in each of the dimensions of the arrangement. The villages built a discourse coalition with the province and municipalities based on the shared aim of revitalizing the community, which was perceived as a legitimate and high priority aim. Based on this discursive and relational fit, the province made resources available and the collaboration with the province convinced local banks to contribute, creating distributive fit at the local level. Lastly, the rules that needed to be complied with were suitable for local wind projects, as the laws under which the first wave of GIs had developed were not altered. More than this local institutional fit, the GIs also benefited from some favorable local circumstances outside of the energy policy arrangement. The projects benefited from the tightness of the small, local communities in these villages, which are remote rural areas in which people know and trust each other. The local community had faith in the initiators and because revenues were invested in collective goods, the public acceptance of the turbines was very high. The turbine in Reduzum is for example lovingly called “us mûne” (our mill) by the local people [
40]. Moreover, a local learning effect occurred in which one village was inspired by a turbine in a neighboring village, and local learning took place, allowing for access to knowledge as a resource. Lastly, the initiators felt a high urgency to act because the villages faced poverty and depopulation, often leading to the termination of local facilities such as schools and libraries. Through the revenues of the turbines, these facilities could remain open, which was a strong motivation for the initiators [
41].
At the national level the institutional fit for GIs was still small. In reaction to the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and the 1987 Brundtland report, sustainable development was put on the national policy agenda and brought about an environmental discourse that was further strengthened by the founding of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) by the United Nations in 1988. These international ambitions translated into Dutch policy documents such as the 1989 National Environmental Policy Plan (NMP) that encouraged recycling and energy efficiency [
42]. The first wind plan was presented in 1991 and included goals and liberties for the seven Dutch provinces with the highest wind potential. This plan lacked a reinforcement mechanism though, and, from the aimed 1000 MW, only 437 MW was realized by 2000. This increase in discursive fit for GIs did not translate into opportunities in the actor constellation, as the national government partnered mostly with the SEP, which had merged into four large regional distribution monopolists [
36]. Provinces and municipalities had large financial interests in the SEP but little control, and the national government had few steering mechanisms and “
struggled with the climate targets” [
28] (p. 119). It was unclear which climate models should be followed, and economic growth and energy use reduction seemed impossible to reconcile. Here, the old and new energy discourses collided, and the economic considerations and lobby proved to be persistent: the government was hesitant to implement measures that would harm industrial development. The search for appropriate policy strategies was appointed to the Exploration Committee Energy Research, which fittingly called its 1996 report “
Search for directions in a maze”. In 1996, the government established the aim to achieve a 10% share of RE by 2020 [
43] and sought collaboration with the market, mostly because a new, major complication had been added to the already complex sector: the EU plan to liberalize the energy market.
3.5. Intermezzo: Liberalization of the Energy Market
The liberalization of the Dutch energy market was a transformative process that changed all dimensions of the arrangement through a very non-transparent and messy process, in other words: “
it led to a complete tilt in the energy sector, with new power relations, new players, and above all large insecurity about the future for all involved parties” [
34] (p. 114). This insecurity had a disruptive short-term impact on the developments of renewable energy in general and the involvement of GIs: actors waited until the dust settled. Agterbosch characterizes this era, starting with the first preparations in 1996, as an “interbellum” in which the monopoly powers were awaiting what would happen and the free market was not yet in place [
37] (p. 233). The process was shaped through a series of laws and White Papers, culminating in the 2004 free market for consumers and with some processes such as unbundling still ongoing.
The new situation of the liberalized market was a new “playing field” for GIs. The actor constellation became more internationally oriented, as the former SEP members could not compete with international energy conglomerates and were taken over (e.g., Nuon became part of Vattenfall and Essent was bought by German energy company RWE). A few years into the liberal market, small market players started to emerge with a distinct “green” signature, such as Greenchoice, Huismerk and VandeBron. For GIs, this provided more fit for collaboration than the international energy giants, which have little interest in non-market players and in the local level. The resource distribution also provides little fit: a liberalized market is characterized by competition and the potential of GIs to compete with more professional companies is limited. Lastly, the discourse became more market oriented, but environmental concerns appeared as a form of “branding” of some of the new companies, which offered discursive fit for GIs.
Domestic renewable energy production suffered under the liberalization. The chances for economically unviable technologies are small in an open market, which hinders experimentation. Moreover, increased international competition and international trade of green energy certificates led to large competition from, e.g., cheap Nordic hydropower. RE projects require relatively high investments and have long timeframes for return of investment [
37]. Since open markets have a tendency to favor short payback times and low prices over longer (more sustainable) investments, RE was not commercially interesting [
44].
Because of the high instability and unpredictability of the energy system during liberalization, GIs were notably absent. It was very unclear for GIs—and other investors—how the future would unfold, which caused actors to wait. The first two waves of GIs had been building wind turbines, something that requires a long time frame and future outlook. It is not surprising that the first GIs to emerge after the liberalization sought other, more easily attainable activities and technologies than wind power. Driven by a mix of dissatisfaction with the energy market, environmental concerns and financial motives, the first new citizens’ activities for RE started to emerge a few years after the liberalization was introduced.
3.6. The Third Wave: The New Pioneers in 2000–2008
In the liberalized market, the Dutch government embraced the RE transition as a policy goal, but through a broad and inconsistent approach. A series of experiments, subsidies, pilot projects and policy platforms occurred, but because of the many changes in government and the novelty of the RE challenge in a liberalized market, there was very little continuity and the investment climate was uncertain. For example, the 2003 MEP subsidy for RE projects was very popular but had to be capped when it became too costly. The overall energy policies in these years have been characterized as “jiggling” and a lack of continuity in policy aims, rules and subsidies and fuzzy distribution of roles and responsibilities [
45] have “
caused The Netherlands to be lagging behind [in the RE transition] for years” [
46]. Still, some of the goals were reached, such as the Kyoto protocol goals (through emissions trading) and the goals for offshore wind that were set for 2010, but the share of RE remained negligible. In 2008, net metering became allowed for private households, which strongly stimulated investment in solar panels, and a new subsidy called SDE (
Incentive Renewable Energy) became available for (GIs) energy projects.
The dominant discourse on energy policy of the national government was an ongoing difficult compromise between economic and environmental sustainability concerns, in which climate change concerns emerged as a new layer that was introduced through e.g., the “Stern Review on the Economic Impact on Climate Change” (2006), the IPCC reports on global warming (e.g., 2007) and Al Gore’s documentary “An Inconvenient Truth” (2006). The coupling of energy with anthropogenic climate change created momentum for RE in the national government. Locally, RE gained momentum as a method for branding, for example as “energy smart city” or “transition town”. This discursive fit for RE led to local awareness and budget for RE measures such as subsidies, local smart grids and heat pumps: in other words it created local distributive and regulatory fit.
In this institutional environment, which was still unpredictable but in which the RE transition gained discursive legitimacy, a group of new GIs emerged from broader NGOs and initiatives from adjacent fields such as neighborhood development, housing construction and existing collaborations between farmers and their neighbors. For example, the first collective solar roofs were developed in 2006 through Project “Farmer Seeks Neighbor” in which local people gave loans on solar panels to a local farmer, and received interest from the profits. In 2006 foundation Urgenda (urgent agenda) was founded by two Rotterdam academics, who presented an action agenda to become climate neutral by 2030. Another example, pioneer Kroetenwind, was established in 2002 in order to make a local newly built neighborhood in Breda sustainable through compulsory membership of all new plot owners. Similarly, projects emerged on business campuses (e.g., Bedrijvenpark Twentekanaal). Inspired by these new pioneers and by international examples such as the Danish island Samsø that appeared in the Dutch media, a new type of actor emerged: the broad energy cooperative. “New style” cooperatives such as Meewind, Texel Energie, AEC and Duurzaam Zwolle were founded in 2006–2009 and had a broad agenda for sustainability and a local approach, inspired by their predecessors like Urgenda.
These new GIs started with a much broader range of activities than the classical wind cooperatives, opting for less high risk and complex activities, and for more visible short-term results. These activities include resale of green electricity and collective purchase of privately owned solar panels and providing members with information about energy savings and production. In 2006, Urgenda was the first organization to organize a collective purchase for solar panels called We Want Solar (Wij Willen Zon), and the price of PV, which had already been declining due to (Chinese) technological improvements and increased production, dropped further because of the collective shipments and the success of the activity, which sold 50,000 panels to households between 2006 and 2010 and was repeated by other organizations. Another activity that quickly became popular was resale of green electricity, a white label construct through which local GIs offer RE supply, using the back office and supplier permit of a larger, for-profit RE supplier Consumers would buy e.g., ‘Grunneger Power’ that would be delivered through Greenchoice. This local branding of renewable energy made consumers enthusiastic, and the cooperative gained some profits from the resale. From these low hanging fruits, many GIs developed towards broader and more ambitious projects, whereas others were happy with modest activities. Organizing collectively owned production was now no longer the initial goal of a GI, but becomes a final activity which some would never (attempt to) reach.
These new and innovative activities are enabled by the dropping prices of solar panels and the net metering rules, but the creativity that GIs display also stems from a poor fit with the institutional arrangement. Even though innovation and a broad approach are beneficial for GIs, the system was too inscrutable and unstable for GIs to develop in the traditional fashion. The lack of regulatory and distributive fit stems partly from the inaccessibility of the energy system and the difficulty in obtaining permits and finances, but mostly from the unpredictability of the system, causing GIs to display risk averse behavior.
3.7. The Fourth Wave: Large Numbers of Followers in 2009–2015
Starting in 2009, the GIs movement grew from around 40 initiatives to over 360 initiatives, which were enabled by a liberalized market and net metering, and inspired by the new activities of the third wave pioneers. Our survey identified 360 GIs, including 185 cooperatives, 41 foundations, 21 associations, and many GIs in the process of formal registration. Combinations of legal forms also occur, e.g., cooperatives start a separate foundation for the development of a production facility. There are both rural and urban GIs, although the majority is situated in more densely populated areas. This section looks in more detail at the institutional setting of these new GIs and at their identity: their motivations, activities, and network connections.
3.7.1. Institutional Setting
The boom of GIs does not coincide with a better institutional fit, on the contrary: since 2010, the Dutch government cut down on investments for RE and implemented a retrenchment of R&D for innovation and subsidies for unprofitable projects or technologies, focusing only on large market parties and proven technologies. This largely reduced distributive fit for GIs and also questioned their legitimacy as small actors were not deemed relevant.
Current energy policies took shape in the 2013 Energy Agreement, which was designed by the national government, employers, business representatives and environmental groups. Despite this broad basis, the Agreement focuses on the economic attainability of the energy transition and discusses activities and goals in terms of employment opportunities, payback times and smart investments [
3]. The same focus is visible in the 2016 Energy Agenda, designed in reaction to the 2015 Paris Agreement. The Agenda was based on a series of debates (the Energy Dialogue) in which GIs were present, but the outcomes do not facilitate GIs. The urgency and necessity to stimulate the energy transition remain strongly framed in terms of economic benefits and compliance to international agreements, with climate change as a less dominant argument. The ambition is summarized as “
CO2 low, safe, reliable, and affordable” [
47]. This does not reflect the discourse of local action, inclusion and environmental concerns that GIs value. GIs were mentioned implicitly in the Energy Agenda, but only for their symbolic value and not their potential: “
locally produced renewable energy is more expensive and less cost efficient than large scale renewable energy production. Despite this, the Cabinet still supports the development of local renewable energy, because of its contribution to the societal awareness and public support for the energy transition” [
47]. The support of the Cabinet mostly means that GIs are not prohibited, but there are no measures to stimulate local RE in the Energy Agenda.
In the current Energy Agreement, one policy measure is directed towards GIs: the so-called “
zipcode rose project”, a case of distant net metering in which energy consumers get an energy tax deduction for the amount of energy they produce in a collective project (usually a solar roof), situated in their zipcode area or an adjacent area (hence the “rose” name, see
Figure 4). At first, the energy tax system made the projects unprofitable, but a heavy lobby of GIs interest groups finally resulted in an altered taxation. Despite the still modest profits, 38 zipcode rose projects were realized in 2016. Larger projects rather opt for a more profitable subsidy for RE that is targeted to companies (the so-called SDE+ subsidy), but this more difficult to obtain. The successful lobby and the inclusion of a policy measure for GIs demonstrate that some institutionalization did take place: the movement was able to push its political agenda and was included in the actor coalition for decision making and in the resource distribution. At the same time, the derogatory tone of the Energy Agenda displays that GIs lack discursive fit and are not seen as valuable contributors to the energy transition.
Provinces and municipalities are more supportive than the national government. Using the profits from selling their shares in the regional and local utilities, they installed subsidies for home-owners and support GIs with starting subsidies or loans, practical advice, and e.g., temporary office space. Moreover, municipalities and provinces have encouraged networks between GIs and wider sustainability activities, such as Power2Nijmegen (Nijmegen municipality) and the Community of Practice of energy cooperatives (Gelderland province).
3.7.2. Motivations of GIs
Whereas the traditional wind cooperatives had a strong environmental motivation, and the Frisian turbines were built to generate local revenue, the motivations for the third and fourth wave GIs are much more diverse and include various economic, environmental and societal arguments. The environmental motivation is still dominant for most GIs, and encompasses reasons such as sustainability; being environmentally friendly, leaving a better (green) world for next generations, reducing CO2 emissions and reversing climate change. Opposition to nuclear power plays a much smaller role than it did some decades ago. Economic motivations for GIs are on the rise. Initiators are often volunteers who are “in it for the environment”, but many passive members see GIs as a profitable investment. Interview respondents indicate that reducing the energy bill, offering a cheap or independent alternative to fossil fuels, and creating revenue for investors are strong motivations to attract members. Lastly, societal reasons are less prominent. Developing the region or community, improving the local landscape, and achieving independence as a community are often cited as secondary reasons. For “branding”, the local identity is very important, as Lochem Energy explains: “If people can buy Lochem energy, it makes them feel more connected than if they buy from a national company”. Most GIs brand themselves distinctively as local by using the name of their village, city or region. A handful of small projects are aimed more directly at revitalizing communities: these are mainly rural areas with problems of demographic decline and relative poverty. The combination of elements in the motivation is increasingly common, which is reflected in the common GIs catchphrase “samen lokaal duurzaam” (together, local, sustainable), emphasizing both sustainability and a community orientation.
New GIs were also hugely inspired by the success of the third wave pioneers and their visibility in e.g., the HIER Opgewekt national events, the popular documentary “Power to the People” [
48], and the media attention for Urgenda. “When I saw that on TV, I thought: that’s what I want too” explains a local initiator. Increasing networking and subsequent availability of practical information for starting cooperatives further enabled initiators. The economic crisis led to a relatively high unemployment rate among higher educated people, many of whom founded GIs, often with the active support of the municipalities, which co-founded many GIs or gave start-up subsidies. In short, the motivations form a broad mix of environmental, social and economic discourses that fit well with local governments, but form a poor fit with the national government, which focuses on large projects and economic gains.
3.7.3. Activities
The third and fourth wave GIs display a wide range of (new) activities. The boom of the fourth wave came prior to the zipcode rose and SDE+ subsidies, but was inspired by the introduction of a new activity by the third wave pioneers: collective purchase of solar panels. Because of technological developments in solar PV and economies of scale, the prices of (Chinese) solar panels had dropped steeply. With subsidies still in place, the net metering law of 2008, and with a number of provincial and municipal subsidies for home improvements regarding RE, the pay-back time for solar PV dropped from over 20 years to below 10 years, with even better deals if one bought solar panels through a collective. Led on by a number of high profile examples such as Urgenda, this activity was repeated by many new GIs. Especially with the government’s cutbacks since 2010, GIs became a popular alternative. The social acceptance of solar projects was high and they became a common sight in the built environment. Solar panels were also seen as a way to cut back on future expenses on energy, which was very appealing in these times of economic crisis.
The spectacular growth of GIs is nuanced somewhat if one looks at their activities. Since many GIs are very young, they are still in an early phase of development, and as it can take many years to realize a project for RE production or provision, this is not reached (yet) by most of the new initiatives. Even with popular collective purchase actions, almost a third of GIs does not display any activities beyond organizing information meetings for members and organizing the GI internally, with regards to communication, membership recruitment and developing business cases or projects (see
Table 1).
Table 1 shows that facilitation, the “low hanging fruit” is harvested by the majority of the initiatives. This ranges from organizing an evening on led-lighting to collectively purchasing and installing solar panels on private roofs. Only a minority moves beyond that to more laborious activities. Supply of green electricity is popular, mostly because some licensed suppliers actively seek collaboration with local GIs. For example, supplier NLD pays a fee to the cooperatives for each of their members who buys their electricity and invites cooperatives to become affiliated with them. These constructions are also seen with, e.g., Greenchoice, Eneco, Qwint and Huismerk Energie, sometimes with branding of the electricity as a product of the GI, sometimes as an affiliation.
The production of RE by GIs consists of a mix of technologies often supported by the SDE+ subsidy for wind parks and solar roofs. In 2015, 52 solar projects were built and 67 in 2016 (including the 38 zipcode roses). These solar projects range from very small (e.g., on a local school) to as large as 27,000 solar panels in Garyp. In 2016, 19 cooperatives have been founded specifically for a zipcode rose project, which means that despite the dominant signature of the fourth wave GIs as broad in activities, some “specialists” also arise [
1]. In this specialization we see a shift in technology from wind to solar PV, which was enabled by technological developments in solar panels but it also a consequence of the limited institutional fit for wind projects. Because of technological developments, wind turbines have increased in cost and as one wind pioneer explains: “without subsidies, it would be impossible to build cooperative turbines at present”.
3.7.4. Networks
In order to overcome regulatory, economic and political constraints, GIs increasingly connect among each other to exchange knowledge, marshal public support and forge political alliances. These connections take many shapes and sizes: there are national networks; networks regarding a specific technology; regional networks; and networks that include GIs and their partners such as municipalities, energy companies or local businesses. There are three large national umbrellas for GIs: ODE Decentraal, REScoop and HIER Opgewekt.
ODE Decentraal, founded in 1979, grew to become an important independent network and lobbyist. It merged in 2015 with E-decentraal, an umbrella for wind cooperatives, and is increasingly influential in lobby (e.g., it successfully lobbied for better tax rules in the zipcode rose). It also facilitates knowledge exchange among members and practical support for GIs.
HIER Opgewekt was founded in 2012 and is financed by the Dutch grid operators in order to strengthen local initiatives, connect people working on RE and support the realization of their ambitions. HIER Opgewekt functions as a platform to connect GIs and hosts a large annual national event for networking and knowledge exchange.
REScoop NL, the Dutch umbrella for 37 wind and solar cooperatives, was founded in 2013 following an EU project to form a network of energy cooperatives. REScoop NL primarily supports local production ambitions, mostly wind parks, through practical support in the project development phase, and sometimes through sharing in the financial risk. It works closely together with ODE Decentraal.
Regional alliances have also emerged in the past few years, such as US Kooperaasje in Friesland, GrEK in Groningen, Drentse KEI in Drenthe, NLD as a collaboration between the former three, VECG in Gelderland, VECB in Noord-Brabant, but also more local organizations such as Power2Nijmegen and Energy Made in Arnhem, both citywide umbrella platforms, and AGEM for the region Achterhoek.
Figure 5 maps the national and regional networks of GIs and demonstrates the increasing connectivities between GIs. These networks focus on knowledge exchange and GIs help each other with e.g., business cases and subsidy applications. Here, an increase in relational fit also improves the distributive fit for GIs, and the visibility of the movement strengthens the legitimacy of their actions. Furthermore, there are partnerships for electricity resale with energy companies such as Greenchoice and more recently DE Unie (which serves as an energy company for 24 local RE production GIs) and Huismerk Energie (three GIs). In addition, nearly all GIs cooperate with local organizations, such as municipalities, provinces, schools, provincial environmental organizations and local sports or cultural organizations.
Next to increasing networking, another trend becomes visible: increasing professionalization of a few GIs and frustration and waning enthusiasm among the others. The “low hanging fruits” of collective purchase activities have been harvested, which means that the target group of home owners that privately invest in their properties has been catered for, leaving GIs disillusioned that “creating a local energy transition” is not as easy as they initially hoped and the institutional fit for larger activities is very limited. There is a current stagnation in the growth of the number of initiatives. This can be explained by a saturation of the field—there are now over 360 initiatives in 390 municipalities—and by demotivation and waning enthusiasm among the initiatives that have difficulties in starting up projects. There seems to be a divide between strong projects that expand and thrive, and weaker projects that cease to exist. Umbrella organization ODE Decentraal expects that with the announced termination of net metering after 2020, new projects will become even less.
Professionalization and waning enthusiasm are in this case two sides of the same coin: the bar for projects is raised, and GIs that do make it through the first process steps of a new project will be strong, well-connected and visible local players that can play a significant role in the Dutch energy transition. The current generation of GIs has to professionalize, which means hiring personnel rather than depending on volunteers, and collaborating with other GIs, such as Spinderwind in Tilburg, in which ten cooperatives work together to build a four turbine wind park, and BRES Breda, where four GIs work together in a joint development cooperative. We expect that the number of GIs will stabilize or even drop as the market for the more easily attainable projects is saturated. Instead, some GIs will cease to exist where others will continue to professionalize and team up with each other in order to build larger scale projects, with a focus on wind and solar parks. The local, regional and national networks will become even more important as GIs activities scale up. For example, REScoop NL is setting up an investment fund that can share the financial risk of a wind park in early stages of the development, and ODE Decentraal is offering workshops “how to build your own wind park”. These types of support can prove very helpful for aspiring GIs.
Lastly, the increased networking and visibility of GIs leads to a stronger position in the political lobby of umbrella organization ODE Decentraal. Whereas the market parties still have a much stronger voice in the political debate, ODE Decentraal is increasingly present at meetings and consultations, which could lead to institutional barriers (such as limited net metering and unfavorable taxes) to at least be recognized and discussed as such in The Hague.