Flooding, Climate Change, and Indigenous Environmental Justice Issues in Subarctic Ontario, Canada: Treaty No. 9, the Establishment of “Reserves,” and Cultural Sustainability

Abstract

In Canada, Indigenous communities have been disproportionately flooded. Specifically, Fort Albany First Nation (FN) located on a flood plain near the mouth of the Albany River in subarctic Ontario, Canada, has been evacuated frequently due to flooding or the threat of flooding―even though dikes were constructed in the late 1990s to safeguard the community. Thus, a fundamental question needs to be asked: Why is Fort Albany FN located on a flood plain in the first place? We answer the question through an Indigenous environmental justice lens using document and archival research in the context of the treaty making process between Fort Albany FN and the British Crown, and the establishment of reserves. In brief, procedural issues were noted, as there was no transparency in reserve choice at the time of signing the treaty, and during the actual surveying of the reserve boundaries with certain types of land being excluded from reserve locations, unbeknownst to the FNs peoples. The Cree were also misled into believing that they would retain access to their whole traditional homeland―and not be confined to reserve land―the Cree believed that they only agreed to share the land. Historically, the Cree harmonized with the seasons and would not be residing in the Albany River floodplain during river freeze-up and during river break-up―adaptive behaviour to avoid flooding. Harmonizing with the environment had allowed the mobile Cree to live successfully with the annual flooding of the Albany River for millennia, until being forced to live permanently on reserve land by the colonial government. Nonetheless, the Cree still sustain their cultural worldview acknowledging the Cree cycle of life. The way forward for Fort Albany First Nation will be either relocation to high ground or trying to tame nature by reinforcing the existing dikes—or some novel combination of both based on two worldviews.

1. Introduction

1.1. Flooding

During the time period 1998–2017, floods negatively impacted the health and wellbeing of more than 2 billion people worldwide and resulted in heavy casualties and major economic losses [1,2]. Floods have been described as the “deadliest” of the natural hazards [2], and it has been suggested that climate change is one of the factors increasing the frequency and intensity of flood events [1]. In Canada, Indigenous (i.e., First Nations, Inuit, or Metis) communities were reported to be disproportionately flooded compared to non-Indigenous communities [3,4]. Floods can be related to natural processes (e.g., fluvial, pluvial, or coastal) or anthropogenic in origin (e.g., upstream dams and/or water control structures) [4].

1.2. Anthropogenic Flooding

During the period 2014–2024 for Indigenous communities across Canada, it was reported that the highest number of First Nations’ flood evacuees were in Ontario (17,374 evacuees including 267 long-term evacuees of greater than two months) and Manitoba (4187 evacuees including 2686 long-term evacuees) [5]. In Manitoba, First Nations downstream from dams and other types of water control structures are at greater risk of flooding and displacement of community members [4]. For instance, in 2011, the Government of Manitoba diverted floodwaters away from the downstream cities of Winnipeg and Portage la Prairie towards Little Saskatchewan First Nation and Lake St. Martin First Nation to protect the settler communities—and permanently displaced the two First Nations [4]. Additionally, the Government of Manitoba has a sordid history of hydroelectric development on First Nations homelands with the construction of dams that permanently flooded First Nations’ lands creating what has been termed sacrificial zones [6]—all in support of the “common good” of Manitobans—creating an environmental justice issue [5].

Similarly, river diversions and hydroelectric development have flooded First Nations’ land without consultation and consent in Ontario [7]. For example, in the 1930s, the Waboose Dam was constructed across the Ogoki River that flows northward to James Bay—part of the Albany River basin in northern Ontario—to reverse the flow of the river southward, and ultimately into Lake Superior, the largest freshwater lake in the world [7]. Likewise, the Long Lac diversion blocked the Kenogami River and reversed the flow of the river southward in a cut channel—this water flows into Lake Superior and eventually to Ontario’s hydroelectric-power-generating facilities at Niagara Falls [7]. Consequently, Marten Falls First Nation’s way of life and wellbeing were negatively impacted and 142 acres of the tiny Long Lake First Nation reserve were permanently flooded, and their cemetery destroyed [7]. The diversions also caused water quality issues with mercury in the Ogoki and Long Lac River watersheds [7]. Clearly, diversions and hydroelectric power generation projects negatively impact the health and wellbeing of First Nations people through flooding and associated outcomes.

1.3. Fluvial (Riverine), Pluvial (Rainfall Related), and Coastal (Sea-Level Related and/or Storm Surges) Flooding

In a Canada-wide study that utilized a 100-year flood map and socioeconomic census data to examine inequity in exposure to fluvial, pluvial, and coastal flood hazards, it was noted that certain vulnerable groups (e.g., Indigenous peoples, and other visible minorities) were at greater risk of flooding events [8]. In a related study of 985 Indigenous-reserve lands in Canada, approximately 81% had some flood exposure [9]. In the present study, we will be concentrating on the Albany River basin and more specifically, on Fort Albany First Nation located in the Far North of Ontario (Figure 1 [10]). It should be mentioned that even though Fort Albany First Nation is located near the mouth of the Albany River by the coast of James Bay, the shoreline has been emerging and it is projected to keep on emerging in the western James Bay region to the end of the 21st century, due to glacial isostatic adjustment even accounting for sea-level rise from global warming [11]; thus, coastal flooding will not be mentioned further.

Canada has a temperate climate and, from a non-Indigenous perspective, four distinct seasons (winter, spring, summer, and autumn/fall); while, from a First Nation Cree perspective there are six seasons (winter, spring, spring break-up, summer, fall, fall freeze-up). Water bodies including rivers typically undergo freeze-up during November and December, and break-up during late April and May [12]—and approximately a third of all flood events have been reported to be ice-related [13]. River ice break-up and jamming are governed by water flow, the thickness and sturdiness of the ice, and river morphology—some of these parameters are influenced by weather conditions and could impact the frequency and severity of river-ice jams [14]—and all ice jams are unique [13]. Further, river-ice jams are part of a natural process but are more complex and chaotic compared to open-water floods [13], and can occur during late fall–winter freeze-up or spring break-up. In the Far North of Ontario, spring flooding or the threat of flooding is an annual event, and evacuations have recently become more commonplace. Trends in spring river-ice breakup dates for Far North rivers showed weak, linear relationships with the calendar year, but relatively recent changes in break-up characteristics provided by Cree knowledge suggested rapid changes have occurred [15]. Thus, nothing definitive can be stated about future ice-jam flood risk as said risk is dependent on complex interactions of hydroclimatic factors [13].

1.4. Albany River Flooding

What we do know definitively is that for approximately 55 years, there have been several major river-ice jam events that have occurred on the Albany River resulting in major flooding in Kashechewan First Nation and/or Fort Albany First Nation—and evacuations of the communities have occurred during actual flood events and even during non-floods as a precautionary measure [16,17]. Actual flooding or the threat of flooding was a concern even after separate dikes were built to protect Kashechewan (on the north channel of the Albany River; Figure 2) and Fort Albany (on the south channel of the Albany River; Figure 2) from flooding: a ring dike was built in 1995 and encircled Kashechewan, but was not constructed in accordance to specifications and poses an “intolerable” risk to the community [18]; meanwhile, three dikes were constructed in 1997–1998 to safeguard Fort Albany, the Main Spill dike crossing the dry channel, and the Lake St. Anne North and South Dikes protecting Lake St. Anne [19]. Thus, from a western-centric engineering perspective, the dikes have not fully mitigated the risk of floods to either Kashechewan or Fort Albany, leaving the uncertainty of community evacuations each year hanging over the communities and a source of distress.

1.4.1. Kashechewan First Nation Flooding

In 2006, a Special Representative of the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada appointed by the Government of Canada to examine potential relocation options for Kashechewan and other community issues [20]. The special representative created five relocation options that “were not suggested by any government or political official nor by any member of Kashechewan,” even though Chief J. Solomon of Kashechewan First Nation let it be known that “he would have preferred a simple request to each community member to indicate their preferred location for a new community” [20] (p. 30). In the relocation survey, the Smooth Rock Falls option was the one to receive the most votes [20]. This spurred Chief and Council to conduct their own community survey whereby the majority of participants ≥ 12 years of age wished to move upriver and stay connected to the land to fulfill their “sacred responsibility to the land” [21] (p. 107). In 2016, Kashechewan’s perspectives of the nature of spring flooding and impacts were recorded—interviews and participatory flood mapping revealed that spring flooding has occurred for generations and not increased in frequency over time—but spring break-up was earlier and the scale of spring break-up had increased due to other factors (e.g., the downriver winter ice road that runs the width of the Albany River) [22]. However, Kashechewan’s adaptive capacity remains high even after having been evacuated numerous times to more than approximately 22 different urban, host communities across Ontario [23].

The Together We Work for Hope 2019 Framework Agreement [24] signed by Chief Leo Friday of Kashechewan First Nation, the Minister of Indigenous Services for Canada, and the Minister of Indigenous Affairs for Ontario built upon previous government agreements focused on improving the long-term sustainability and wellbeing of Kashechewan. The 2019 agreement had a mandate to “plan for the relocation of Kashechewan to higher ground at Site 5 [upriver]” with the caveat that the “Agreement is entered into in good faith, it does not create legally binding obligations for the Parties” [24] (pp. 3–4). Recently, Chief Gaius Wesley of Kashechewan First Nation has revealed that relocation discussions have been stalled by Fort Albany First Nation, because the Government of Canada wants Fort Albany to sign off on any relocation plans, since Kashechewan and Fort Albany were once one community before separating on religious grounds in the 1950s. Chief Elizabeth Kataquapit of Fort Albany First Nation points to the disrepair of the dikes supposedly protecting her community, and believes that any discussion of Fort Albany 67 Reserve and relocating communities due to flooding issues, should include Fort Albany First Nation as well as Kashechewan First Nation [25,26].

1.4.2. Fort Albany First Nation Flooding

Flooding has occurred in Fort Albany during spring break-up and occasionally during fall freeze-up [19]. The most severe flood in the community occurred during the 1985 spring break-up, where the whole community was covered in flood waters; however, water flow was not the highest on record, and higher flows were recorded in 1992 and 1996 with no major flooding [19]. In 2008, an ice jam on the north channel of the Albany River diverted its flow to the south channel, and because of the volume of ice and a partial ice jam downstream of Fort Albany, the dikes protecting Fort Albany were overtopped (Figure 3) and part of the community was flooded [16]. Since the Albany River around Kashechewan and Albany is multi-channelled, ice-jam predictive models are not sophisticated enough to deal with this complexity [19,27] even if there were sufficient real-time hydrometric data—and data for all the other variables that influence ice jams and flooding in the Far North region of Ontario. Thus, the Government of Ontario relies on the local knowledge of experienced field staff, as well as climate and streamflow monitoring data, close to real-time cameras, flight reconnaissance with First Nations’ Elders and community flood coordinators, and more recently satellite imagery [27,28]. Using these methods, when a flood risk is identified for communities like Fort Albany, evacuation of the community members proceeds—and since Fort Albany is a fly-in community, airborne evacuations are expensive and take a toll on the wellbeing of evacuees [27,28]. Thus, to enhance flood monitoring and risk assessment in the Far North of Ontario, the governments of Canada and Ontario entered into a partnership to acquire, process, and distribute advanced satellite imagery [27,28]. Others have suggested upriver, far-field control structures (e.g., ice booms, ice weirs) to control river ice and prevent flooding [16]. While it is commendable that a lot of time, effort, and money has been expended on the Albany River flooding problem, a fundamental question needs to be asked: Why are the First Nations located on the Albany River flood plain in the first place? If the First Nations were located on high ground and not on the flood plain, there would be no issue—saving hundreds of millions of dollars that have been spent on monitoring and evacuations, and sparing the people the stress of evacuations related to permanently living on a flood plain that has historically flooded every spring. In this paper, we will answer the posed question through an Indigenous environmental justice lens—in the context of the treaty making process, The James Bay Treaty—Treaty No. 9 [29] itself, and the establishment of reserves. We will also present Fort Albany First Nation perspectives of the 2008 flood to gain their insights into the flood and evacuation. Although our primary focus is Fort Albany First Nation, our results and discussion are also relevant for Kashechewan First Nation and other Treaty No. 9 First Nations’ signatories, where flooding or the threat of flooding is an almost annual event; and other Indigenous peoples experiencing flooding concerns related to colonial, community-siting issues.

2. Background

2.1. Indigenous Environmental Justice

Historically, the environmental justice movement emerged in the 1980s in relation to the proximity of hazardous-waste facilities to racialized neighbourhoods [30,31,32]. Environmental justice has evolved to include the core concepts of distributive justice (i.e., the sharing of environmental costs and benefits), and procedural justice (i.e., meaningful participation in transparent decision making with full access to and enough time to analyze the information) [33,34]. In Canada, although there is no widely accepted definition of environmental justice, it is often thought of as a concept involving the equal sharing of environmental costs and benefits, and/or addressing existing inequalities with respect to the decision-making process that has applications in different contexts [35]. Meanwhile, Indigenous environmental justice utilizes a recognition-based approach that highlights Indigenous worldviews including Indigenous laws and codes of conduct, between the animate and inanimate—that is, a reciprocal set of responsibilities—to maintain a harmonious or reciprocal balance [36]. In this context, the Earth is considered alive with a spirit; thus, the environment is not viewed as something to be owned, a commodity to be exploited and damaged (e.g., unsustainable resource development) and/or conquered (e.g., through the use of dikes) [36]. Furthermore, Indigenous homelands are considered places imbued with Indigenous laws, languages, and cultures, while also providing sustenance and healing to its peoples. This worldview is in stark contrast to the non-Indigenous worldview, where one space is the same as any other. These differing worldviews create a tension between the colonizers and the First Peoples of the colonized lands.

Lastly, there is a paucity of environmental justice studies related to flooding [8]. In a Canadian study, social disparities were significantly over-represented in inland flood risk neighbourhoods, while under-represented in coastal flood risk neighbourhoods, perhaps due to the high cost of owning coastal vacation property [8]. Meanwhile, Sheik et al. [37] framed flooding in Kashechewan First Nation as an environmental justice issue but provided limited data and analyses to justify their sweeping statements.

2.2. Treaty No. 9 and the Establishment of “Reserves”

Canada is governed by a federated system where there are two levels of government: the federal Government of Canada (formerly known as the Dominion of Canada); and regional, also known as provincial (e.g., Government of Ontario) or territorial (e.g., Yukon Territory) governments [38]. Each level of government first had their legislative powers specified in the British North American Act, 1867 [39], for example, the Dominion of Canada had legislative authority over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” (VI. Distribution of Legislative Powers, Section 91, Item 24). In 1867, at confederation, the land mass of the Dominion of Canada was only a small portion of its present size [40,41] but, in 1870, with the acquisition of Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory [42], present-day Canada was formed. Over the years, these land acquisitions would be partitioned by the federal government to become part of the provinces, with the remainder becoming the territories [11]. However, when provincial boundaries were extended north into the former Rupert’s Land and North-Western Territory, these “Indian” lands needed to be acquired by consent—that is, ceded or purchased according to British common law—because the British Crown recognized that Indians (now known as First Nations people) had rights to land in North America [38,43]. Thus, from 1870 to1930, the Government of Canada signed 11 treaties with different First Nations—these treaties would become known as the Numbered Treaties—and treaties were required for development on First Nations’ homelands [38]. Treaty No. 9 was unique among the Numbered Treaties, as it was the only one where a member of the Treaty Commission represented a province (i.e., Ontario) [44]. This accommodation was made because the Government of Canada required the concurrence of Ontario for any treaties to be made in the province post-1894, after Ontario won the St. Catherine’s Milling decision [45,46].

When the northern boundary of Ontario was extended in 1889 to the Albany River [40,41], because this land to the north had not been ceded by treaty, a treaty would be required with the First Nations’ peoples of this land [11]. Therefore, in 1905, the Treaty No. 9 commissioners were appointed: Daniel G. MacMartin representing the Government of Ontario; and Duncan C. Scott and Samuel Stewart representing the Government of Canada [44]. This Treaty No. 9 Commission travelled down the Albany River stopping at Hudson’s Bay Company fur-trading posts, to make treaty with First Nations groups [44]. Importantly, the creation of “reserves” (now known as First Nations) was part of the treaty-making process.

It should be emphasized that Treaty No. 9 was part of a larger Government of Canada agenda aimed at assimilating the Indigenous peoples of Canada into the dominant European society [34]. With the signing of Treaty No. 9, there came unsustainable development on the Indigenous homelands of northern Ontario, as well as the enactment of legislation that negatively impacted Indigenous subsistence activities (e.g., hunting, fishing, and trapping), and other facets of their cultural way of life (e.g., language, social interactions) [34,38]. Thus, our examination of the establishment of reserves in the context of flooding should be viewed as part of a larger set of detrimental impacts related to Treaty No. 9.

3. Methods

3.1. Study Area

The Province of Ontario has more than 1 million km² of land within its borders [47], being supported by a mixed sector economy (e.g., natural resources, hydroelectric power generation, agriculture, manufacturing, high-tech innovation) [47]. Population wise, more Indigenous peoples live in Ontario than any other province in Canada, making up 133 First Nations, with 13 distinct groups [10,48]. The major river basins in Ontario that drain into James Bay include the Moose, Albany, and Attawapiskat watersheds, while the Winisk and Severn Rivers drain into Hudson Bay [49]. These rivers have their headwaters in the Canadian Shield [49], with First Nations located near the mouths of the rivers.

The Albany River is the second-largest river in subarctic Ontario, and flows northward into the western James Bay basin, being characterized by discontinuous peatlands along its major channels and, towards the bay, the river is multi-channelled with the dominant north and south channels [50] (Figure 2). From approximately November to May each year, the Albany River is ice-covered, with river-ice break-up typically occurring in late April to early May, well before sea-ice breakup in James Bay; thus, ice jams occur upriver of the bay [50]. The James Bay coastal community of Kashechewan First Nation is located on the north shore of the north channel with a population of ~2000 Cree; while Fort Albany First Nation is located a short distance upriver on Sinclair Island, Anderson Island, and the south shore of the south channel with a population of ~1000 Cree. Fort Albany First Nation and Kashechewan First Nation were once one band, Albany Band, but split along religious lines in the 1950s; the community of Fort Albany is Roman Catholic, and Kashechewan is Anglican. Both communities are fly-in communities that are connected to more northern and southern communities by an ice road during the winter months.

3.2. Climate Change in Subarctic Ontario, Canada

In the Hudson–James Bay region, earlier sea-ice break-up and longer ice-free seasons have been reported [51,52]. In addition, increasing monthly mean air temperatures have been observed [52] and, for the period 1972–2021, the rate of warming was ~2.6 times higher in this region than the global rate [53]—and precipitation has been increasing [54]. During the winter months for the 1961–2014 period, significant decreasing trends in freezing-degree days, along with significant increasing trends of monthly averages of minimum temperatures, have been reported [55]. An investigation of trends in river discharge for 42 principal rivers draining northern Canada for the period 1964–2013 found that warming air temperatures and decreasing sea ice cover resulted in more precipitation leading to higher river discharge rates [56]. Relatedly, the Albany River has shown an interdecadal streamflow increase of ~10% [57].

Trend analyses of river ice break-up for the major river systems of the western James Bay region (i.e., Moose, Albany, and Attawapiskat), and major flood events for the period 1950–2014, revealed significant increasing trends over time for all three rivers [58]. It has been suggested that increased warming may be only one factor that has contributed to increased intensity and frequency of spring river-ice flooding events on the Albany River in recent years; the enhancement of the James Bay Winter Road to accommodate large transport trucks for the Victor Diamond mine may be another factor [58]. The winter road transverses several rivers and smaller waterways, muskeg, and forested regions along the western James Bay coast, including the north and south channels of the Albany River (Figure 4) [55]. To increase the strength and durability of the winter road, surface flooding is done by a water truck, and snow is packed and flooded to create ramps between land and water [58]. Ice bridges across major rivers require a minimum ice thickness of at least 1.09 m with a road width of 30–60 m to accommodate a gross vehicle weight of 55,000 kg; thus, ice thickness is recorded regularly [58]. Since the ice thickness of the freshwater waterways including the north and south channels of the Albany River have been artificially increased, the timing of river ice break-up downstream is impacted, and potentially contributes to the increased intensity and frequency of major spring flooding seen in recent years [58].

3.3. Data Collection and Analyses

3.3.1. Why Are the First Nations Located on the Albany River Flood Plain in the First Place?

To answer this question, following Tsuji and Tsuji [38] and Tsuji and Tsuji [46], we conducted an extensive document search at Library and Archives Canada (Ottawa, ON, Canada) and online at Archives of Ontario for Treaty No. 9 material. Other sources of material included academic databases, and other printed and online documents. Data were extracted from the following sources: Treaty No. 9, associated agreements, reports, correspondence, draft documents, memorandums, books, commissioner articles and diaries, reserve-survey correspondence, and available Indigenous oral history. Qualitative data analyses used a deductive thematic analysis, specifically a template organizational approach that included manual coding [46]. An inductive and iterative analysis followed, whereby themes emerged from the data itself.

3.3.2. Fort Albany First Nation Perspectives of the 2008 Flood

On 25 April 2008, during the annual spring break-up of the Albany River, an ice jam resulted in the flooding of Fort Albany First Nation, and a flood risk to Kashechewan First Nation—both communities were evacuated from 25–28 April [59]. To gain insights into how the people of Fort Albany viewed the flood and evacuation, the community members’ perspectives were collected to help guide the locally elected government (also known as the Band) with planning activities and to inform policy to improve flood response. The Band, Fort Albany First Nation Chief (A. Solomon) and Council requested the assistance of a university-based research team (L. Tsuji) with a long-time relationship with the community [59]. After oral consent by the participants, as is culturally appropriate, semi-directed interviews with open-ended questions were conducted using the conversational approach from 25 May 2008 to 4 June 2008 with the following people: the Chief and several Fort Albany First Nation Band Council members; Band staff; Peetabeck Health Services staff; James Bay General-Albany Wing staff; Albany flood committee members; and other community-at-large members. Of the 51 people interviewed, 49 were Cree, one was Ojibwe, and one was non-status; 51% were female. Qualitative analyses of the interviews were inductive and iterative where the themes emerged from the data itself. Results were given to Fort Albany First Nation leadership for their use. Additionally, data were used to further develop a conceptual model related to social learning in complex social–ecological systems—but using only high-level results in the context of the conceptual model, and no quotes were presented [59]. Herein, we will re-examine the unpublished, anonymized, secondary data and give voice to the community members by utilizing actual quotes.

4. Results and Discussion

The James Bay Treaty—Treaty No. 9, 1905 [29] has been described as being severely flawed in work by Treaty No. 9 scholars [11,38,46,60], perhaps due to the lack of oversight by the people who drafted the treaty and/or the British Colonial Office [46,60]. Moreover, the need for the concurrence of Ontario led to last-minute negotiations between Canada and Ontario which compounded the problem [38]. Initially, we posed the question: Why are the First Nations located on the Albany River flood plain in the first place? We will begin answering this question by first discussing the evolution of in-text stipulations in relation to “reserves.”

4.1. The Evolution of In-Text Stipulations in Relation to “Reserves” in Treaty No. 9

The original Treaty No. 9 letter from Canada to Ontario specified that the location of reserve lands would be chosen by the First Nations’ people:

“It is further proposed to set apart reserves of sufficient area in localities chosen by the Indians with special regard for their needs, which reserves should be held in trust by this Department [Indian Affairs], free of any claims by the Province for timber upon, or base or precious metals in upon or under the soil.” [61] (pp. 1–2)

This text appeared in item 2 of the draft Treaty No. 9, federal Order-in-Council sent to Ontario [62]. Order-in-Councils are legal instruments (or legal orders) recommended by elected Ministers of governments that become legal only after being signed by the appointed representative of the British Crown, the Governor General at the federal level [63], and Lieutenant Governor at the provincial level [64]. Thereafter, Ontario sent back to Canada a revised Order-in-Council that drastically altered item 2:

“The setting apart and location of reserves not greater than one square mile for each family of five, or in like proportion, at points to be chosen by the Commissioners negotiating the said Treaty, one of said Commissioners to be appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario in Council, and said selection to be subject to the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario in Council.” [65] (p. 2)

It is noteworthy that since the treaty commissioners would now be choosing the location of reserve lands, reserve land locations would have to be chosen at the time the treaty was signed—and approved by the Government of Ontario’s Treaty No. 9 commissioner and the Government of Ontario [63,66].

Just as importantly, on 23 June 1905, Treaty No. 9 was fundamentally changed from a single document into a treaty package with the specification that a new agreement between Canada and Ontario become part of Treaty No. 9:

“the advice of counsel…strongly advised that in order to prevent future litigation an agreement should be made between the Dominion and the Province defining the liability of the Province in respect to the Treaty…[Treaty No. 9] might be well to refer to the agreement between the Province and the Dominion in it.” [67] (pp. 1–2)

Of relevance to the present paper, the Agreement [68,69] specified that the Government of Canada would pay for the surveys to locate the reserves and contained the clause: “And further, that no site suitable for the development of water power exceeding 500 horse power shall be included with the boundaries of any reserve” [68] (p. 4). The inclusion of this clause severely impacted where reserves could be located and forewarned of Ontario’s hydroelectric development plan for the region [46]. It should be noted that in Canada, the provinces hold jurisdiction over waterpower generation and other types of natural resources [70]. Unsurprisingly, in 1906, the Government of Ontario entity named the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario was formed; and, after 1974, it was known as Ontario Hydro [71,72] and has had a lasting legacy in northern Ontario [73]. Furthermore, as northern Ontario is home to most of the potential waterpower sites in Ontario [74], Fort Albany First Nation has been constantly battling against hydroelectric power generation projects on the Albany River when they have not been properly consulted (e.g., the Kabinakagami River Waterpower Project) [75].

To finish this section, it must be stressed that there were no negotiations between the Treaty No. 9 Commissioners and the First Nations people during the treaty signing expedition, as the terms of Treaty No. 9 were fixed [46,60,76,77,78,79]. To the point, the Treaty No. 9 Commissioner could only present the terms of the treaty and gather signatures (or not), as they so aptly stated in their report:

“under the provisions of clause 6 [the Statute of Canada, 54–55 Vic., chapter V]…the terms of the treaty [No. 9] were fixed by the governments of the Dominion and Ontario; the commissioners were empowered to offer certain conditions, but were not allowed to alter or add to them in the event of their not being acceptable to the Indians.” [44] (pp. 1–2).

Since First Nations of Canada were never conquered [80], and First Nations were allies of the British (i.e., Canada) in battles and during the War of 1812, it would be expected that to uphold the honour of the British Crown, all treaties with their former allies would be negotiated in good faith, nation-to-nation, and the terms not dictated as if the First Nations had been conquered in battle.

4.2. What Did the First Nations Signatories of Treaty No. 9 Know of the Agreement?

When the Treaty No. 9 Commissioners (i.e., D.C. Scott and S. Stewart representing Canada and D.G. MacMartin representing Ontario) left for the field to travel the Albany River—the northern boundary of Ontario at the time— the version of Treaty No. 9 they had in their possession and signed during the 1905 expedition was without the Agreement, even though the Treaty No. 9 text specified that it be “hereto attached” [46]. It should be emphasized that the First Nations signatories at the time of Treaty No. 9 could not read or write, or converse in English, so Cree translators had to be used to convey the meaning of treaty text [60]. Indeed, D.C. Scott [81] (p. 578) in his Scribner’s Magazine article states that the First Nations signatories of Treaty No. 9 knew nothing of the Agreement and, hence, the waterpower stipulation, as noted by other scholars [60,82,83]:

“They [Indians] were to make certain promises and we [Government of Canada] were to make certain promises, but our purpose and our reasons were alike unknowable. What could they grasp of the pronouncement on the Indian tenure which had been delivered by the law lords of the Crown, what of the elaborate negotiations between a dominion [Canada] and a province [Ontario] which had made the treaty possible, what of the sense of traditional policy which brooded over the whole? Nothing. So there was no basis for argument.”

Further, there were no definitive writings in the Treaty No. 9: Commissioner’s diaries (or journals) [84,85,86,87] that suggests that the Agreement and/or waterpower reserve location restrictions were ever mentioned to the First Nation signatories, let alone discussed, during the treaty-making expedition [38,46].

Nonetheless, First Nations were noted to be apprehensive in relation to the signing of Treaty No. 9 [44,84,86]. For example, the official Treaty No. 9 Commissioner’s report recalled the following:

“Moonias [of Fort Hope], one of the most influential chiefs, asked a number of questions. He said that…he had never been given something for nothing…”Now,” he said “you gentlemen come to us from the King offering to give us benefits for which we can make no return. How is this?” Father Fafard thereupon explained to him…the Indians were giving their faith and allegiance to the King, and for giving up their title to a large area of land of which they could make no use…and that their reserves were set apart for them in order that they might have a tract in which they could not be molested, and where no white man would have any claims without the consent of their tribe and of the government.” [44] (paragraph 27)

Evidently, First Nations’ leadership was very suspicious of the treaty terms, especially what they would be relinquishing; they would be renouncing nothing from their perspective, as there was no “land of which they could make no use” in their homelands [88] (p. 2). As elucidated by present-day First Nation leadership, northern Ontario only appears untouched:

“A lot of people say it’s our last frontier. What the government instead should be doing is congratulating all of the First Nations…for keeping the land in its natural state” (Chief George Hunter of Weenusk First Nation) [89] (p. 956)

“The land up north is not an untouched land. Our people, my ancestors, travelled that land…We’ve been there for thousands and thousands of years…there are footprints all over the place in my territory, that signifies that my people were out in the land.” (Chief Jonathon Solomon of Kashechewan First Nation) [89] (p. 954)

“The legacy of our care is that our use has been next to invisible. To you, the lands look untouched. They aren’t. They’ve just been touched by the Anishnawbe in accordance with Anishnawbe laws and customs…Ontario is penalizing us because they’re saying that that land is untouched by us.” (Special Envoy Frank Beardy of Nishnawbe Aski Nation) [89] (p. 953)

4.3. Choosing of Reserves at the Time of Treaty Signing

Once Treaty No. 9 was signed, reserve lands were chosen according to its terms [44]:

“And His Majesty the [British] King hereby agrees and undertakes to lay aside reserves for each band, the same not to exceed in all one square mile for each family of five, or in that proportion for larger and smaller families; and the location of the said reserves having been arranged between His Majesty’s commissioners and the chiefs and headmen, as described in the schedule of reserves hereto attached, the boundaries thereof to be hereafter surveyed and defined, the said reserves when confirmed shall be held and administered by His Majesty for the benefit of the Indians free of all claims, liens, or trusts by Ontario.” [29] (paragraph 9)

The size of each reserve was a guesstimate, as there were no reliable census numbers for First Nations people in the Treaty No. 9 region [38,46,90]. Estimates were based on information provided by Hudson’s Bay Company personnel and Indian Agents of the Department of Indian Affairs [91,92].

All the same, very little has been described of the reserve selection process [76], even in the Commissioners’ report [44]. Despite an assertion that the Treaty No. 9 Commissioners never coerced First Nations in the choice of reserve location [93], the evidence shows otherwise [84,86]. Clearly, reserve selection was contentious during treaty deliberations. For instance, Robert Laurence, a Hudson’s Bay clerk, recounts the following:

“that the Mattagami Band had originally wanted a site east of the post that was good deer-hunting country, but James Miller, the local [Hudson’s Bay] Company manager, persuaded them that Kenogamissi Falls down river was a better choice because of its power potential. Since the commissioners ‘wouldn’t allow that,’ he added, Mr. Miller ‘got them the only place—where they eventually got’ because ‘he knew there was some good pine there.’” [76] (p. 46)

Lastly, reserve locations were not very well described in the Schedule of Reserves for Treaty No. 9, because no surveyor accompanied the commission in the field [46]. Specifically, the Fort Albany reserve was described as follows:

“In the Northwest Territories, beginning at the point where the North river flows out of the main stream of the Albany, thence north on the west side of the North river a distance of ten miles and of sufficient depth to give an area of one hundred and forty square miles.” [44] (Schedule of Reserves).

4.4. Surveying the Reserves: The Correspondence

The siting of reserves remained problematic even before the reserves were officially surveyed [46]. This is illustrated in a case where a clerical error led to a discrepancy between reserve location at Mattagami and what was described in the Treaty 9 report. This discrepancy was rectified when Ontario agreed to correct the reserve location but only after the province had secured timber rights to the reserve lands [94]. The location of reserves remained a contentious issue, as shown in the correspondence of W. Galbraith, land surveyor, when he entered the field to officially survey the Treaty No. 9 reserves [95]. At Osnaburgh, Galbraith [96] (p. 1) writes, “reserves expected by them [Chief and Council of Osnaburgh] do not agree with those specified in the Treaty,” and also the following:

“Mr. Jabez Williams [Hudson’s Bay Company agent]…who was a witness to the signing of the Treaty informed me that he understood this reserve was to extend to the eastward of the Post and not to the westward, and the Indians also appeared to hold this view.” [97] (pp. 1–4)

Thus, the surveying of the Osnaburgh reserves could not be completed [98,99] “as the Indians are not satisfied with the location according to the Treaty—they would not assist me to make the survey unless I made radical changes in the location of the Reserves.” [99] (pp. 1–2) At Fort Hope, First Nations’ leaders requested that Galbraith [98] (p. 4) “have the reserve limits moved.” At the end of the field season, due to logistical matters and the siting of reserve problems, Galbraith was unable to complete the surveys at Osnaburgh or Fort Hope [98]; shortly thereafter, Galbraith gave notice that he would not be returning next season.

J. Dobie, land surveyor, was the replacement, and his instructions were more extensive and explicitly stated compared to those for Galbraith:

“be careful to exclude by survey from all reserves where water-powers occur on a main river, a tract of about eighty acres… required to utilize the water power… roads for access to the said water-powers… roads for the public use across their reserves when they become necessary.” [100] (pp. 1–2)

Indeed, Dobie [101] (p. 5) followed his instructions faithfully, as shown in the following: “an area sufficient for the development of this [water] power was surveyed out [of the reserve boundaries].” So, it was not just the waterpower generation facility’s footprint that was impacting reserve selection but all the land required for associated infrastructure. The surveyors [97,101] also comment about other natural resources, like timber and the quality of agricultural land throughout their correspondence with the government. However, there is very little written about the selection of the location of the Fort Albany reserve.

4.5. The “Taken-Up Clause” and the Sharing of the Land

One cannot examine the reserve issue without discussing what has become known as the taken-up clause in Treaty No. 9:

“And His Majesty the King hereby agrees with the said Indians that they shall have the right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered as heretofore described, subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by the government of the country, acting under the authority of His Majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.” [29] (paragraph 8).

Extraordinarily, there exists no evidence that the taken-up provision was ever explained to the First Nation signatories [60], and scant evidence that future land use in their traditional homelands was explained to the First Nations [82]. However, the Treaty Commissioners knew exactly what the taken-up clause would mean for development, and they believed that reserve selection was beneficial to the First Nations peoples:

“For the most part the reserves were selected by the commissioners after conference with the Indians. They have been selected in situations which are especially advantageous to their owners, and where they will not in any way interfere with railway development or the future commercial interests of the country. While it is doubtful whether the Indians will ever engage in agriculture, these reserves, being of a reasonable size, will give a secure and permanent interest in the land which the indeterminate possession of a large tract could never carry. No valuable water-powers are included within the allotments…When the vast quantity of waste and, at present, unproductive land, surrendered is considered, these allotments must, we think, be pronounced most reasonable.” [44] (second-last paragraph)

The Government of Canada failed in its fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the “Indians” [34,101,102]. The “taken-up” clause of Treaty No. 9 and other types of public interest determinations in Canadian laws―prioritize the best interests of the Government of Canada and Canadians (or the Government of Ontario and Ontarians) over the best interests of the Cree―because Indigenous peoples, by definition, are not part of the general public [10,103]. Further, changes to the environment through development on Indigenous homelands, whereby the environment can no longer fully support Indigenous culture, is a form of colonial assimilation called environmental assimilation [34].

This is surprising, in that the Treaty No. 9 Commissioner’s reports and diaries unambiguously indicate that the First Nations peoples were told that reserve land was a place unencumbered from the white man, and that the signatories could move about freely in their traditional pursuits as they had always done:

“Missabay, the recognized chief…spoke, expressing the fears of the Indians that, if they signed the treaty, they would be compelled to reside upon the reserve to be set apart for them, and would be deprived of the fishing and hunting privileges which they now enjoy…informed that their fears in regard to both these matters were groundless” [44] (paragraph 27).

“The Indians asked several questions as to whether they would be compelled to live on the reserve to be set apart for them, and as to whether their fishing and hunting privileges would be curtailed…informed that they could continue to live as they and their forefathers had done” [86] (pp. 38–39).

“Chief White head then delivered an oration, in wh[ich] he said, pointing up and down the river that they were being cornered by not being allowed both banks of the River…When it was explained to them that they could hunt and fish as of old and they were not restricted as to territory, the Reserve, merely being a home for them where in which no white man could interfere, or trespass upon, that the land was theirs for ever; they gladly accepted the situation” [84] (pp. 56–57).

This is in agreement with Cree oral history that also indicated that the Cree were promised the continuation of traditional activities (e.g., hunting, trapping, and fishing) indefinitely, wherever they wanted to in their homeland [104,105]. Simply put, reserves were presented as places where the white man could not trespass and interfere, and where First Nations people would not be forced to live―as First Nations peoples would continue to live as they always had lived [88]. Thus, the actual locations of reserves were important but not imperative, as the First Nations people believed they would have unfettered access to their traditional homelands. Evidently, Treaty No. 9 was two treaties, one the official-written version of the governments of Ontario and Canada; and the other the oral one explained to First Nations signatories and part of First Nations’ oral history, as well as memorialized in the commissioner’s writings [88,104,105].

4.6. Environmental Justice

Looking through an environmental justice lens at Treaty No. 9, procedural aspects existed in that the treaty was only in English—and the First Nations people could not read, write, or speak English―and there were no real negotiations, as the terms were fixed. In addition, the Agreement was not part of the Treaty No. 9 package presented to the First Nations to be signed in 1905, so First Nation signatories of the treaty did not know of the Agreement prior to signing. Furthermore, there was an act of deception on the part of the governments of Ontario and Canada in that the Agreement was backdated to a date earlier than the treaty date [46]. Also, the setting aside of reserves near the Albany River for the sole use of First Nations peoples, and the promise of continued use of their larger traditional homelands made First Nations leadership suspicious of the terms of the treaty presented to them; they had never received something for nothing [44]. There was no transparency on the part of the commissioners, as there exists no definitive evidence that the Agreement was ever mentioned to the First Nations’ signatories [46]. It follows that the First Nations people had no knowledge of the hydropower generation stipulation and associated infrastructure requirement nor of the impact these parameters would have on the choice of reserve location.

Procedural elements were also noted after the signing of Treaty No. 9 in the choice of reserve location with certain shoreline locations being prohibited, and reserve locations being disallowed due to waterpower potential [44,76,84]. During the official surveying of reserves, the instructions to the surveyor, Dobie, from Indian Affairs were clear that potential waterpower sites, and the land required for associated infrastructure space, were to be excluded from reserve boundaries, which he did [46,100]. In brief, there was no transparency in reserve choice at the time of signing the treaty, with certain types of land being excluded from reserve locations, unbeknownst to the First Nations peoples―and likewise during the actual surveying of the reserve boundaries.

The taken-up clause of Treaty No. 9—and recent legislation passed by the Government of Ontario [106] and the Government of Canada [107]—gives unilateral decision making power to these governments to make development decisions on First Nations traditional homelands and reserves, all in the interest of the governments and/or in public interest, overriding constitutionally protected Indigenous and treaty rights [10,34,103]. There needs to be a balance between Indigenous constitutionally protected rights and economic benefits for governments and the public [10,103], or else procedural and distributive justice issues exist, whereby environmental costs and benefits will not be distributed equitably [10].

4.7. Indigenous Environmental Justice

4.7.1. Cree Worldview

The Far North of Ontario is a vast region that is often viewed by settler states, as a “hinterland” [108], the “last frontier,” an “untouched land” [89], an area to be tamed, developed, and exploited for its natural resource [46]. However, the Far North is not untouched, the whole area has been used sustainable by First Nations people for millennia according to Indigenous laws [89] and codes of conduct [12,109]; the Far North just appears to be untouched to non-Indigenous peoples [89]. Indigenous peoples from across Canada believe that they do not own the land―they are the guardians or stewards of the environment preserving the land for future generations―this responsibility has been described as an inherent right [89,110]. Relatedly, the concepts of guardianship and stewardship illustrate why the Cree of northern Ontario contend that they never owned the land [60,104]. The Cree are connected to the land, and the relationships with the land are reciprocal―as well, the Cree live harmoniously with the land [46].

From the Cree worldview perspective, they did not own the land; thus, the land could not be “surrendered” or “ceded” with the signing of Treaty No. 9 [46,60,104]. The “notion of ‘giving up’ or surrendering land was a totally foreign concept” [88] (Executive Summary). Furthermore, sharing is foundational to the Cree for social and cultural reasons [12,110,111]; and this is why the Cree maintain that they only agreed to share their homelands―excluding their reserve lands―with the signing of Treaty No. 9 [46,60,104].

4.7.2. Nomadic or Mobile?

Historically, the Cree did not live year-round on the western James Bay coast; they would travel upriver for most of the year and then spend some time in the summer closer to the coast [112]. In 1905, when Treaty No. 9 was signed, most Cree still did not live year-round on the James Bay coast―and, until the 1950s, most Cree spent only two weeks to a few months on the coast, on reserve or at the trading posts, before leaving in October for the bush, only to return in June after the trapping season was over [104]. The Cree cycle of life follows their six seasons: summer; fall; early winter when river freeze-up occurs; winter; early spring; and late spring when river break-up happens [12]. Their traditional activities are harmonized with the six seasons temporally [12,113] as well as spatially [104,112].

The western James Bay Cree have been described as nomads or nomadic. A nomad has been defined as being “a member of a people who have no fixed residence but move from place to place usually seasonally and within a well-defined territory” [114]; “a member of a group of people who move from one place to another rather than living in one place all of the time” [115]; and “a member of a community that moves with its animals from place to place” [116]. Meanwhile, the adjective nomadic has been defined as “roaming about from place to place aimlessly, frequently, or without a fixed pattern of movement” [114]; “moving from one place to another rather than living in one place all of the time” [115]; and “belonging to a community that moves with its animals from place to place” [116]. These definitions are not an apt description of the Cree and do them a disservice. Rather, mobile would be a better description, in that the Cree move with purpose harmonizing with the environment, in well-defined family traplines within the larger Cree traditional homeland, the Omushkegowuk Territory [109,117]. For instance, the Cree harvest game birds during specific times of the year at specific geospatial locations [111], and Cree harmonize with the seasons, moving from the coast inland to avoid river freeze-up and river break-up; this is not haphazard movement―it is adaptive behaviour. Historically, the Cree would not be residing in the Albany River floodplain during river freeze-up in early winter and during river break-up in late fall. The Cree harmonized with the seasons and accounted for the flooding risk associated with river freeze-up and break-up of the Albany River―that is, until the Cree were forced to live in the Fort Albany reserve in the 1950s by the Government of Canada. Harmonizing with the environment had allowed the mobile Cree to live successfully with the annual flooding of the Albany River for millennia, until being forced to live permanently on reserve land by the colonial government.

Non-Indigenous populations tend to want to control nature―rather than harmonize with it―so it is not surprising that the Government of Canada’s response to flooding at both Fort Albany and Kashechewan First Nations has been the building of dikes to protect the communities. The shortcomings of this approach are highlighted by the failure of the dikes and actual flooding of the communities or the potential of flooding leading to stressful evacuations that cost millions of dollars each year. The first dike built in Fort Albany did not even last a season. Fighting with nature is a losing battle, especially taking into account the uncertainty of weather and extreme events in a warming world; harmonizing with nature, that is, relocation of Fort Albany First Nation and Kashechewan First Nation to higher ground outside the Albany River flood plain but still within their traditional territory, would be a more rational response. Kashechewan have already made their choice, Fort Albany should also be given an opportunity for the community to decide their response.

4.8. Fort Albany First Nation Perspectives of the 2008 Flood

4.8.1. Our Cycle of Life: The Way We Live

The 2008 flood in Fort Albany was overwhelmingly described as just part of the normal seasonal cycle of the Albany River. Evidently, the Cree worldview has been sustained by Fort Albany First Nation community members, even in light of the Government of Canada’s historical assimilative agenda. Community perspectives included “Normal spring but there was a flood” (M25); “Just normal flooding event” (M23); “Normal part of the spring” (M24); “It happens” (F23); “Nothing different” (M6); “Nothing unusual” (M7, M14, M19, F5, F6, F11, F18, F19, F20); “Floods just happen” (F25); and the flood was not out of the “ordinary” (F16, M1, M8, M20). However, some people commented that the “Flood [was] unusual but normal” (M15, F3), in that they were “Surprised that the water came in from the lake side” (F10) and “Surprised from the lake side” (F26); other variations of this type of response included “through the lakes” (F22) and “water sort of went the same way but not exactly, but never does” (F21), that is, “Very different, coming back like in the 80s [before the dikes were built]” (F13).

In the same vein, some commented on how the flooding event was exaggerated: “The flood itself might have been overblown” (M3); “The flood was exaggerated” (M5); and one Elder described how this type of flooding event had happened before: in “1972 the water came that way back through the lake” (M13). Some pointed out that the Elders knew that nothing out of the ordinary would happen, but government “people did not listen to Elders” (M12), and it was “evacuation after the fact―why evacuate after break-up [and the flood] was over?” (M7) Fort Albany First Nations’ leadership was frustrated that their “input should have been respected … [and not] over-ruled by others … Ministry went ahead with evacuation even though it was over, ice and water had gone through (M25). It appears that the distress associated with flooding in Fort Albany First Nation is related not so much with the fear of the flood—as flooding was described as just part of the normal Cree cycle of life—the distress appears to be related to the evacuation response of the Canadian government representatives and them not listening to First Nation leadership, that is, a lack of respect for Cree governance, knowledge, and experiences.

As a further matter, community members suggested that “instead of evacuating out to different cities, people should have been sent out to high ground in the bush … might as well spend money in the community rather than spend all the money outside the community” (M11). In the past, the following happened:

“Used to have tent frames on high ground in case of flooding—could do this again using gravel to build high ground—but need a nurse to visit camps to look after sick people and check to make sure everything okay…Need gravel to build high ground…Winter tents need heat.” (M24)

Similar sentiments were expressed by others: “Should set up camps on high ground to evacuate to…people set up tent frames on high ground for when the river flooded” (M13); “Send them to spring camps” (M22); “Should have used camps on high ground. This option would be cheaper” (M1); old days “camp was on high ground, so flooding was not a problem” (M2); and “Camps on high ground with food for families should have been used…would be less disruptive” (M F3). Some community members suggested that “not all people have boats, so boats are needed in case of a flood” (M2) or “Need amphibian vehicles to get people in case of flood” (M5). In fact, a map of camps located on high ground was a fixture in the Band office for decades.

Of interest were responses that included the high ground solution historically utilized—the Cree, as well as the management of nature option through dike enhancement. For instance:

“relocate the communities [to high ground]…If you move the communities, the people would not have to go through this [evacuation] every year or finish the dikes and extend them―finish the dikes and extension and upgrades, and continue living here” (M17).

If the dike extension option was picked there would be a need to “use satellite imagery to improve monitoring…looking at effect of global warming” (M17). Others believed the following:

“The community should not have been evacuated. Should have used evacuation centre unless really serious…community hall [also purposed as an evacuation centre, needed]—more equipment…water purifiers, other things needed to deal a large number of people…build another building for accommodations” (M12).

Suggestions of the same type were made by others: “Should make the evacuation centre better―more money―operate year-round … Evacuation centre must be self-contained with a separate water supply, sewage system and emergency generator” (M23); “money should have been used towards upgrading the evacuation centre as that is why part of the new school was built where it is―part of the school was to function as an evacuation centre” (M4); “put money they spent on evacuation on evacuation centre” (M5); “government spent millions that went south, money could have stayed up here” (M13); and “The money spent on the flood evacuation could have went to different things” (M25).

Although some interviewees could not speculate on the cause of the flood (F1, F2, F4, F7, F12), the cause of the flood was succinctly described by others: “Some ice blocked the water in the river―water had to go somewhere” (M10); and “Large ice jammed in channel and caused the flood” (M2). Other factors for the flood were also postulated:

“Ice jam caused the flood this year [but]…winter ice road may have had some effect resulting in the flood since the winter road was thicker and wider than previous years, and the winter road was downstream of Fort Albany [see Figure 4]. [Ice-road workers] Drilled holes in the ice of the winter road but these holes appeared to be drilled randomly—there appears to be no set plan” (M3).

By contrast, one interviewee who was employed to work on the winter road believed that the “Winter road [had] no effect, [because we] drilled holes in the ice” (M24). Lastly, the “effect of global warming” (M17) or “global warming cause” (F8) contributing to the flooding was mentioned; while others reported on the unpredictability of the weather: “The weather could be bad and is unpredictable” (M18); and “Weather more unpredictable” (F8). To end with, one Fort Albany First Nation leader stated that “Too much emphasis on Kash[echewan] even though Fort Albany was flooding. In the media—all about Kash not Fort Albany and Kash not even flooded. Kash evacuated first then Fort Albany even though no water in Kash” (F12).

4.8.2. Water and Wellbeing

Allowing for the fact that the Albany River could potentially flood ever year, the Cree of Fort Albany First Nation were generally not fearful of break-up events in early winter or the spring, as these events remain part of the normal cycle of life that they have harmonized with for thousands of years—until relatively recently when the Cree were forced onto reserves to live in permanent communities. Historically, the Albany River was revered because water was instrumental for Cree wellbeing, and the river holds cultural history and language, and this has not changed. At present, the Albany River supplies sustenance for the Cree either directly (e.g., high quality water, fish) or indirectly, acting as a transportation network for important cultural activities (e.g., moose hunting; connecting with the land that includes the Albany River watershed) and reinforces social connections [75]. Chief A. Solomon [118] (p. 10) succinctly states that “The women of our First Nation are considered the water keepers … the connection between the land, water, and life is integral to our people.”

4.9. The Way Forward for Fort Albany First Nation

In 2025, both Kashechewan and Fort Albany First Nations declared states of emergency and had to evacuate their respective communities as flood waters threatened to breach the protective dike systems [119]. Chief Hosea Wesley of Kashechewan First Nation was frustrated, especially since the relocation option “has been on the table for years” [119] (p. 1). As forcibly espoused by Grand Chief Leo Friday of Mushkegowuk Council, the regional Omushkegowuk Cree (western James Bay) political organization, “We have enough studies, we have enough promises, now is the time for action. We need a strategy that will ensure the safety of all these communities and protect them from the threats of floods, we need the government of Canada to consider relocating these communities to higher ground” [119] (p1.). Although the Government of Canada and Kashechewan First Nation have completed studies on this matter, and agreements signed between the two parties, no studies or agreements exist for Fort Albany First Nation. Fort Albany First Nation needs community consultations to discuss all the possible options and then plan for a way forward.

What is surprising is that in the Canadian federal government report that included the issue of flooding and possible solutions for Kashechewan [20], and all the academic articles written about what to do about the Kashechewan flood problem, no one to our knowledge, has even mentioned the river break-up flooding of the Cree village of Winisk located in the transition zone between the subarctic and arctic in northern Ontario. Why this is important is because the flooding of Winisk, and the community’s subsequent relocation to Peawanuck, should be the starting point of any discussion of what to do about the communities of Kashechewan and Fort Albany. There has been a missed opportunity to learn from the Winisk experience, to improve the processes and outcomes for Kashechewan and Fort Albany, especially taking into account that several Winisk community members that were part of the process are still alive, and could be consulted.

The history of Winisk is similar to that of Fort Albany in that the Hudson’s Bay Company established a permanent trading post by the mouth of the major river in the area, the Winisk River in 1901, near to where the Cree traditionally gathered during the summer [120]. In 1930, First Nation leaders of the Weenusk Band signed the Adhesion to Treaty No. 9 [29] and the reserve system was introduced [121]. The permanent community of Winisk would later be established on the Hudson Bay flood plain, even though flooding occurred almost annually [120]. In 1966, a major flood occurred; afterwards, the Band began examining relocation possibilities and, irrespective of community concerns, the Canadian government put funding towards building more houses on the flood plain—and, in 1972, the community was severely flooded again [120]. In 1983, continuing where his predecessors left off, Chief George Hunter prioritized the relocating of his community to higher ground, and a site was selected that would become known as Peawanuck, ~32 km upriver from Winisk [120,122]. In 1984, a referendum on relocation was held, and Pewanuck was chosen by 80% of the people [120]. The Government of Canada scheduled relocation for 1991 [120] but, in May 1986, river break-up flooded and devastated Winisk, and there were two casualties [120,122]. Subsequently, a flurry of meetings led to action, and by mid-November of the same year, people were moving into the partly finished homes in Peawanuck—referred to as “the Promised Land” by Band members [120,122].

5. Conclusions

Historically, the Cree peoples’ ability to adapt to environmental change was centred on their strengths, such as harmonizing with the environment through mobility rather than leaving themselves vulnerable, by establishing permanent communities on a flood plain that floods annually. Obviously, the best adaptation is not to be there on the flood plain during the period of flooding, and this is consistent with the Cree worldview of harmonizing with nature. In contrast, the western worlds’ worldview is to tame and manage nature—build on a flood plain and protect the settlement with dikes—but this approach has its limitations, especially taking into account global warming [53] and more extreme and frequent extreme weather events, as well as other anthropogenic factors. To the point, Fort Albany First Nation located on a flood plain near the mouth of the Albany River has been evacuated frequently, due to flooding or the threat of flooding―even though dikes were constructed in the late 1990s to safeguard the community. Through it all, the Cree have been able to sustain their cultural worldview that floods are part of their cycle of life; thus, they do not fear the almost annual flooding event. However, this belief does not alleviate the stress of not being in control of evacuation activities and the disruption to their lives. The tension between the government flood representatives and Fort Albany First Nation’s Chief and Council was evident, embodied in their differing worldviews.

Moreover, Fort Albany First Nation was put in this precarious situation not by choice, but by the colonial treaty-making process whereby the Cree were deceived by the Government of Canada, the Treaty No. 9 Commissioner, and their representatives from the beginning, as we have detailed. Briefly, through an Indigenous environmental justice lens in the context of the treaty making process between Fort Albany First Nation and the British Crown, and the establishment of reserves, procedural issues were noted. For instance, there was no transparency in reserve choice at the time of signing the treaty, and during the actual surveying of the reserve boundaries with certain types of land being excluded from reserve locations, unbeknownst to the First Nations peoples. The Cree were also misled into believing that they would retain access to their whole traditional homeland―and not be confined to reserve land―the Cree believed that they only agreed to share the land. When the Cree were forced to live in these permanent settlements, they could no longer harmonize with the seasons and would be residing in the Albany River floodplain during river freeze-up and during river break-up, and unable to avoid flooding or the threat of flooding, impacting their wellbeing. Harmonizing with the environment had allowed the mobile Cree to live successfully with the annual flooding of the Albany River for millennia, until being forced to live permanently on reserve land by the colonial government. The way forward for Fort Albany First Nation will be either relocation to high ground or trying to tame nature by reinforcing the existing dikes—or some novel combination of both based on two worldviews. Perhaps the resolution to Fort Albany First Nation’s flooding issue may come sooner rather than later, because the Government of Canada recently passed into law An Act Respecting the Development of a National Strategy to Assess, Prevent and Address Environmental Racism and to Advance Environmental Justice (2024) [123] and “the Act reflects the Government’s commitment to implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which will be implemented in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous Peoples” [35].

Since it has been shown that Indigenous reserve lands in Canada face a disproportionate risk of flooding compared to lands occupied by the non-Indigenous population [124], there is potential in this new law to help Indigenous communities across Canada who experience flooding due to the location of their reserves. As with Fort Albany First Nation, this increased risk of flooding has to be examined in the context of colonial policies and treaties that established the permanent reserve settlements in flood plains in the first place, making the Indigenous peoples more vulnerable to seasonal hazards [125,126]. Cultural continuity has been identified as being foundational for community resilience to flooding [126]; thus, Indigenous cultural continuity must be viewed as a strength to be nurtured. Lastly, the siting of permanent Indigenous settlements on flood plains is not just an issue where treaties exist. In Australia, where there are currently no treaties between the colonial governments and Indigenous groups, similar situations exist as in Canada, such as with the Widjabul Nation of New South Wales (Leonee Nowta, personal communication).