4. Discussion
The k-means results identify two, statistically supported structural regimes. This indicates that the energy–economy system has undergone meaningful structural change.
Cluster 1 (2000–2016) is characterized by lower renewable energy share (42.6%) and higher energy intensity (4.99 MJ/USD), while Cluster 2 (2017–2021) shows higher renewable energy share (61.5%) and lower energy intensity (4.26 MJ/USD), broadly consistent with the documented expansion of solar photovoltaic and wind generation in Honduras following the 2007 regulatory framework and subsequent project commissioning from 2013 onward [
5,
6,
7]. The PELT-detected structural breaks (2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016) do not map cleanly onto this two-cluster boundary, suggesting that shorter-term volatility in specific indicators (particularly renewable share and CO
2 per capita) and the longer-run structural grouping captured by clustering reflect different, complementary temporal scales of change rather than a single, sharply demarcated transition.
This two-to-three-year lag between the last PELT-detected break in CO2 per capita (2014) and the k-means cluster boundary (2016/2017) is plausibly substantive rather than merely a methodological artefact. PELT identifies the point at which the mean and variance of a single series shift, which can register the initial effect of a specific policy or investment decision (e.g., the commissioning of individual renewable projects) as soon as it measurably alters the emissions series. Clustering, by contrast, groups years by their joint position across all four variables simultaneously, and will only reassign a year once renewable share, energy intensity, and the GDP–CO2 relationship have jointly moved enough to dominate the multivariate distance metric. A 2–3-year gap is therefore consistent with a delay between the initial regulatory or investment decision and its full diffusion into system-wide energy intensity and renewable share, rather than indicating that the two methods are simply responding to noise. This interpretation is necessarily descriptive, since the annual panel is too short to formally test the mechanism.
The EKC results provide robust statistical support for an inverted-U relationship between GDP per capita and CO2 emissions per capita (β2 = −3.012, p < 0.001; adjusted R2 = 0.766), with an estimated turning point of USD 2388 per capita (95% CI: USD 2156–2644, delta method). Honduras’ 2023 GDP per capita (USD 2527, Panel A) marginally exceeds the point estimate but falls within the 95% confidence interval, and this comparison constitutes an out-of-sample extrapolation beyond Panel B’s estimation window (maximum: USD 2448. Unlike in some prior illustrative analyses, the Durbin–Watson statistic here indicates no significant serial autocorrelation (DW = 1.947, p = 0.290), strengthening confidence in the validity of the standard errors underlying this result.
This levels-based EKC specification rests on the assumption that ln(GDP per capita) and ln(CO
2 per capita) are cointegrated; as reported in
Section 3.4, this assumption receives only mixed support—the Phillips–Perron test on the regression residuals rejects the null of no cointegration (
p = 0.022), but the ADF test on the same residuals does not (
p = 0.188). Because this evidence is moderately rather than conclusively supportive, both the quadratic coefficient (β
2 = −3.012) and the derived turning point (USD 2388) should be read as consistent with, rather than definitively established by, a stable long-run equilibrium relationship. If the true data-generating process were instead a spurious levels regression, the standard errors reported in
Table 6—already conservative given the Newey–West correction—could still understate the true uncertainty, and the turning point’s 95% confidence interval (USD 2156–2644) should accordingly be treated as a lower bound on the true estimation uncertainty rather than a complete accounting of it. This caveat does not overturn the EKC finding, since the Phillips–Perron test, generally preferred for short samples, does support cointegration, but it is a material qualification that should temper how confidently the turning point is used as a basis for policy inference.
However, descriptively crossing an EKC turning point is not equivalent to demonstrating that income growth is the active mechanism reducing emissions, nor that this positioning will translate into sustained absolute decoupling; the EKC is, at most, a necessary but not sufficient condition, and the temporal-precedence evidence presented below argues for caution in attributing any future emissions decline to income growth per se.
The Granger causality results are, in this respect, the most consequential. None of the five tested temporal relationships, including renewable energy share Granger-causing CO
2 emissions, reached statistical significance at conventional levels (all
p > 0.05). This directly contradicts the renewable-energy-driven decoupling narrative that might otherwise be inferred from the EKC result alone, and underscores the methodological point raised by Zilio and Caraballo [
19] that EKC evidence for Latin America should be interpreted cautiously and triangulated against other indicators. The absence of significant Granger causality should not, however, be over-interpreted as proof that no causal relationship exists; with
n = 22 and first-differenced series, the statistical power of these tests is limited, and a Type II error (failing to detect a real but modest effect) cannot be ruled out. The appropriate interpretation is that the available data do not provide statistically robust evidence for temporal precedence in either direction, which is itself an informative and policy-relevant finding.
The Random Forest results corroborate and extend this picture. GDP per capita is overwhelmingly the dominant predictor of CO2 emissions levels (%IncMSE = 31.47), while renewable energy share contributes negligibly (%IncMSE = 0.16) to out-of-sample predictive accuracy. Read alongside the Granger results, this suggests that income is both the structural determinant of emissions levels and shows no detected temporal precedence effect from renewable deployment on emissions changes, a combination that, taken together, offers little statistical support for the proposition that Honduras’ renewable energy expansion has, to date, been the proximate driver of any emissions moderation. This is an important corrective to narratives, common in policy and some academic discourse, that treat renewable energy capacity expansion as automatically equivalent to decoupling; the present evidence for Honduras does not support that equivalence.
The co-existence of an estimated EKC turning point and the absence of a renewable-energy-driven decoupling signal reflects two distinct mechanisms. The EKC captures income-driven structural change in the aggregate GDP–CO2 relationship: as per capita income has grown, the emissions intensity of growth has declined—an income effect. The Granger and Random Forest analyses address whether the timing and scale of renewable deployment adds independent information about emissions, conditional on income. The absence of a significant signal is consistent with Honduras’ renewable expansion being dominated by large hydropower subject to hydrological variability, and intermittent capacity that does not generate a detectable monotonic emissions-displacement trajectory over a 22-year annual panel.
The annual Tapio index reinforces this more cautious reading. Once the two mathematically extreme years (2001 and 2019, driven by near-zero GDP growth denominators) are appropriately flagged rather than allowed to distort the analysis, the annual elasticity series shows a volatile, non-monotonic pattern with recurrent episodes of expansive coupling interspersed with weak and strong decoupling, rather than a clear secular trend toward decoupling. Cluster 2 (2017–2021) registers weak decoupling (e = 0.621), and the full 1990–2023 period registers weak decoupling overall (e = 0.292); a meaningfully different and more modest characterization than a narrative of strong, renewable-driven decoupling would suggest.
This classification for Cluster 2, however, warrants a specific caveat. The period comprises only five annual observations, one of which—2020—reflects an exogenous COVID-19 shock that produced a simultaneous contraction in both GDP and CO
2 emissions, qualitatively distinct from the endogenous energy-system transition that clustering is designed to capture. As a sensitivity check, we recomputed the elasticity using only the pre-pandemic sub-trend (2017–2019): GDP grew 2.70% and CO
2 grew 3.66%, yielding e = 1.357—expansive coupling, the opposite classification from the e = 0.621 (weak decoupling) obtained using the full 2017–2021 endpoints (
Supplementary Table S4). Cluster 2’s decoupling classification is therefore highly sensitive to the inclusion of the pandemic year and should be treated as provisional rather than as evidence of a stable structural tendency. This sensitivity does not affect the study’s central full-period conclusion (weak decoupling, e = 0.292, 1990–2023), which averages across 34 years and is not driven by any single anomalous observation.
The spatial eco-efficiency exercise (
Supplementary Figure S1 and Table S3), presented as an explicitly exploratory illustration given the absence of official departmental statistics, is consistent with the well-documented concentration of Honduran economic activity in Cortés and Francisco Morazán. This concentration implies that any future climate and energy policy aimed at improving eco-efficiency should consider territorial differentiation, though confirming this quantitatively requires official subnational GDP and emissions data that are not currently available.
Overall, the findings indicate that Honduras has likely crossed the EKC income turning point, and that its electricity mix has diversified toward renewable sources, particularly from the mid-2010s onward. However, the statistical evidence assembled here, specifically, the absence of significant Granger causality from renewable energy share to emissions, the overwhelming dominance of GDP per capita as a Random Forest predictor, and the volatile rather than monotonically improving annual Tapio series, does not support a confident claim that renewable energy deployment has, to date, produced robust, sustained decoupling in Honduras. This is a more conservative conclusion than might be drawn from the EKC result in isolation, and it illustrates the methodological value of triangulating multiple, complementary empirical approaches rather than relying on any single test.
This study also has limitations beyond those already noted. First, the complete four-variable panel is limited to 22 annual observations, substantially restricting the statistical power of the EKC, Granger, and Random Forest analyses; results from these methods should be regarded as indicative rather than conclusive, and replication with longer or higher-frequency series is strongly encouraged as data become available. Second, Granger causality identifies temporal precedence, not structural or counterfactual causality; failure to reject the null hypothesis does not establish the absence of a causal relationship. Third, Random Forest results are explicitly exploratory given the small sample. Fourth, the departmental eco-efficiency results rely on estimated proxies and must be validated using official subnational GDP and emissions inventories once available. Despite these limitations, the triangulation of clustering, structural breaks, EKC modelling, Granger tests, machine learning, and Tapio classification, each method’s strengths compensating for another’s weaknesses, provides a methodologically transparent and statistically grounded basis for assessing Honduras’ low-carbon development trajectory.
5. Conclusions
This study assessed whether Honduras has decoupled economic growth from CO2 emissions during 1990–2023, using verified primary data from the World Bank and the Global Carbon Project and integrating k-means clustering, PELT structural break detection, EKC modelling, Granger temporal precedence tests, Random Forest analysis, and the Tapio decoupling index. Because complete four-variable coverage is available only from 2000 onward, the analysis explicitly distinguishes a 34-year GDP–CO2 series from a 22-year complete panel used for the multivariate analyses, avoiding both data imputation and silent exclusion of incomplete years.
The main empirical findings are fourfold. First, cluster analysis identifies two statistically preferred structural regimes (2000–2016 and 2017–2021), reflecting lower renewable energy share and higher energy intensity in the earlier regime and the reverse pattern in the more recent one. Second, the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis is empirically supported (β2 = −3.012, p < 0.001; adjusted R2 = 0.766), with an estimated turning point of USD 2388 per capita (95% CI: USD 2156–2644), which Honduras’ 2023 GDP per capita marginally exceeds as an out-of-sample extrapolation. Third, Granger causality tests find no statistically significant temporal precedence in either direction between GDP per capita, renewable energy share, and CO2 emissions per capita (all p > 0.05), and Random Forest analysis confirms that GDP per capita (%IncMSE = 31.47) vastly outweighs renewable energy share (%IncMSE = 0.16) as a predictor of emissions levels. Fourth, the annual Tapio index reveals a volatile rather than monotonically improving decoupling pattern, with the full 1990–2023 period classified as weak decoupling (e = 0.292).
Taken together, these results indicate that while Honduras has likely surpassed the EKC income threshold and has diversified its electricity mix toward renewable sources, the available statistical evidence does not support a confident narrative that renewable energy expansion has been the proximate, temporally precedent driver of emissions moderation. GDP per capita remains the dominant structural determinant of emissions levels.
From a policy perspective, these findings require a stratified response that distinguishes between income-related decoupling mechanisms and the limited statistical evidence of renewable-driven emissions reduction. The specific instruments proposed below extend beyond what this study’s econometric and machine-learning results can directly test: only the general direction implied by the two central findings—that income-driven structural change appears underway, and that renewable capacity expansion alone has not been shown to drive an emissions reduction—follows from the results themselves. The specific instruments (time-of-use tariffs, electric-vehicle incentives, minimum energy performance standards) are grounded in the broader energy-policy literature rather than in this paper’s own estimates, and are presented as the authors’ policy judgement about how those two findings could be operationalized, not as conclusions that follow mechanically from the empirical analysis. The EKC result suggests that Honduras may be entering a stage in which economic growth can be accompanied by lower emissions intensity, but this outcome should not be interpreted as automatic. To prevent rebound effects, policy should prioritize end-use energy efficiency, demand-side management, and sector-specific standards. In the residential and commercial sectors, visible energy-efficiency labels for high-consumption equipment, particularly air-conditioning systems, should be strengthened because cooling demand is a major electricity load in warm regions of the country. Time-of-use tariffs, which are a widely documented instrument in developing-country electricity systems [
38] and have been found in a survey of 15 experiments to reduce residential peak demand by roughly 3–6% [
39], should also be evaluated as a promising instrument to shift consumption away from peak periods, reduce system stress, and support more efficient electricity use.
The absence of a robust renewable-energy-driven decoupling signal implies that renewable capacity expansion alone is insufficient. Renewable generation should be coupled with grid integration measures, electricity-loss reduction, battery storage, flexible demand, and electrification of final uses that currently depend on fossil fuels. In the transport sector, which represents the largest final energy use, policy should combine short-term measures such as eco-driving programmes with medium- and long-term incentives for hybrid and electric vehicles, renewable-powered charging infrastructure, and battery-supported charging systems. This would allow renewable electricity to displace oil consumption rather than merely increase installed capacity.
In the industrial sector, policy should move beyond regulation alone. Although Minimum Energy Performance Standards for electric motors have been established, their effectiveness will depend on implementation, enforcement, and economic incentives for replacing inefficient motor systems. Government-supported replacement programmes, concessional financing, or fiscal incentives for high-efficiency motors would help reduce electricity demand, improve industrial competitiveness, and reinforce the emissions-intensity reductions suggested by the EKC result. Overall, the evidence indicates that Honduras’ low-carbon strategy should not rely only on renewable electricity expansion, but on an integrated package of renewable energy, energy efficiency, transport electrification, tariff reform, and targeted end-use policies.
The study also highlights the importance of territorial differentiation and of further methodological work. The exploratory spatial eco-efficiency results, based on estimated proxies, suggest that national decoupling patterns are unlikely to be evenly distributed across departments, reinforcing the need for official subnational energy and emissions data. Future research should prioritize the construction of longer, higher-frequency, and sub nationally disaggregated datasets for Honduras and other Central American economies, both to confirm or revise the present findings and to support increasingly granular, evidence-based climate governance.