1. Introduction
Electricity is one of the most fundamental and important energy sources in modern society. It directly or indirectly affects the operation of almost all economic sectors. Historically, the electricity industry was usually organized as a vertically integrated monopoly operated by governments or state-owned utilities [
1]. Under this structure, electricity prices were set administratively and remained largely fixed, resulting in low operational efficiency and insufficient incentives for investment in the power sector. Over the past three decades, more than half of the countries worldwide have introduced electricity market reforms to promote competition, improve allocative efficiency, and enhance the overall performance of power systems [
2,
3]. These reforms have gradually shifted price formation from administrative regulation to market-based mechanisms, with the expectation that more efficient prices can improve resource allocation and support a more flexible and sustainable power system [
4]. This issue has become increasingly important in the context of low-carbon power transition, where renewable energy plays a central role in reducing carbon footprints and supporting progress toward carbon neutrality targets [
5]. Efficient spot prices can help integrate variable renewable energy by reflecting the changing value and balancing needs associated with renewable output variability [
6], while also providing operational and investment signals for storage and other flexible resources [
7]. Such price signals can also encourage demand response by guiding consumers to adjust electricity use across time and reduce pressure during peak or scarcity periods [
8]. Moreover, by improving the coordination between renewable generation, flexible resources and electricity demand, efficient price signals can help reduce reliance on fossil-fuel generation and support emission reduction [
9]. This makes the assessment of electricity market efficiency important for improving market design and supporting the sustainable transition of the power sector [
10].
With the deepening of electricity market reform, market efficiency has become a major concern for both regulators and researchers. Market efficiency reflects whether market prices can incorporate available information in a timely and accurate manner [
11]. A large body of literature has examined the efficiency of electricity markets in different countries and regions. Some studies are grounded in the efficient market hypothesis and assess weak-form efficiency by testing whether electricity prices follow a random walk. For example, Arciniegas et al. examined electricity markets in California, New York and Pennsylvania and found that, although market efficiency improved as markets matured, substantial differences across markets remained [
12]. Filipiak and Filipiak used an autoregressive model to analyze the time series of Polish electricity spot prices and showed that the Polish spot market was inefficient [
13]. Morales and Hanly further reported that even some of the most developed electricity markets in Europe, including those in the UK, Nord Pool and Germany, did not fully satisfy weak-form efficiency [
2]. Khan used the Ljung–Box statistic to test the efficiency of the New England electricity market and found that efficiency was lower in winter but higher in summer [
14]. Hirsch and Ziel tested whether fundamental information could predict returns in the German intraday power market and found that renewable forecast changes and outage information were largely priced in, indicating consistency with weak-form efficiency [
15]. Similarly, Nickelsen and Müller found that weak-form efficiency in the European continuous intraday market can be tentatively confirmed as a useful characterization of market properties [
16]. In addition, some studies have evaluated market efficiency by examining potential arbitrage opportunities across different market segments [
12,
17]. The persistence of such opportunities suggests that available information is not fully reflected in prices. Therefore, market efficiency can also be assessed by testing the convergence between day-ahead and real-time electricity prices.
Another strand of the literature emphasizes that electricity prices are more complex than those of many other commodities because they exhibit strong seasonality [
18], time dependence [
19] and nonlinearity [
20]. Traditional linear econometric tests may therefore be insufficient to fully capture the dynamics of electricity price formation. Based on this view, a growing number of studies have evaluated electricity market efficiency from the perspective of the fractal market hypothesis. For example, Karahan et al. analyzed European electricity spot and futures markets using the Hurst exponent and fractal dimension and found that market efficiency improved after structural and regulatory changes [
4]. Čurpek estimated the time-varying Hurst exponent of hourly returns in the Czech electricity market using detrended fluctuation analysis and found clear mean-reverting behavior across different time scales [
21]. Gorjão et al. also applied detrended fluctuation analysis to EPEX spot prices and showed that the persistence properties of price series differed across market segments, indicating complex memory structures in electricity price dynamics [
22]. Castro et al. applied multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis to the Brazilian electricity market and found that the efficiency of different submarkets evolved over time [
18]. Similarly, Ali et al. reported significant multifractal behavior in U.S. electricity markets and identified substantial differences in market efficiency across regions [
19]. More recently, Ock et al. applied multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis to the Korean electricity market and showed that multifractal scaling behavior differs between peak and off-peak periods, reflecting the complex dynamics of electricity price formation [
23]. These studies suggest that electricity market efficiency is not a simple static property. Instead, it is shaped by market structure, supply and demand volatility, institutional arrangements and pricing mechanisms.
However, despite these advances, two major gaps remain in the literature. First, many existing studies rely on a single estimation technique, such as weak-form efficiency tests, price convergence tests or fractal-based measures. Although these methods provide useful evidence, they usually capture only one dimension of market efficiency, such as linear price predictability, inter-market price coordination or multi-scale dependence. This may lead to an incomplete assessment, especially in emerging spot markets where price formation is affected by market rules, demand fluctuations, renewable output variability and institutional constraints. Second, most existing studies focus on relatively mature electricity markets in Europe and North America, while systematic evidence on China’s electricity spot markets is still limited. Moreover, studies on China’s electricity reform have mainly focused on broader reform outcomes, such as improvements in energy efficiency [
24], the development of renewable energy [
25], or reductions in system costs [
26], rather than directly examining whether electricity spot prices efficiently incorporate market information. To address these gaps, this study adopts a multi-method empirical framework combining weak-form efficiency tests, day-ahead and real-time price convergence tests, detrended fluctuation analysis and sample entropy. This framework allows us to assess whether China’s provincial electricity spot prices efficiently incorporate market information from complementary perspectives. The observed cross-provincial differences are further interpreted in relation to intraday load patterns, generation mix, market structure and market design.
To further promote the marketization of the power industry, China launched a new round of power sector reform in 2015 [
27]. The construction of electricity spot markets has become a central component of China’s power-market reform. These spot markets are mainly organized at the provincial level and are designed to improve short-term price discovery, resource allocation and system balancing. In terms of market design, most pilot regions in China have adopted a pool-based market structure [
28]. The clearing process generally follows the merit-order principle, as shown in
Figure 1. Generation companies (GenCos) submit bid prices and quantities to the Independent System Operator (ISO). The ISO ranks bids from the lowest to the highest price and accumulates offered quantities until electricity demand is satisfied [
29,
30]. Most pilot spot markets include both day-ahead and real-time markets. The day-ahead market provides a forward schedule based on expected load, generation availability and renewable output. The real-time market then adjusts this schedule in response to load fluctuations, generator outages and other deviations [
31]. The sequential operation of day-ahead and real-time markets can improve balancing efficiency, but it also requires prices to respond quickly to changing system conditions. Therefore, whether spot prices can incorporate available information in a timely and complete manner is a key issue in evaluating both market efficiency and the effectiveness of market design.
Against this background, this study investigates the efficiency of China’s electricity spot markets through three representative provincial cases. It aims to assess whether provincial spot prices provide efficient and informative price signals, and to identify the system and market conditions associated with cross-provincial differences in market efficiency. This study makes three main contributions. First, it provides direct empirical evidence on the efficiency of China’s provincial electricity spot markets and thus extends the literature on electricity market efficiency in the context of emerging power market reforms. Second, rather than treating market efficiency as a single property, it evaluates price formation from multiple empirical perspectives, including weak-form efficiency, day-ahead and real-time price convergence, fractal characteristics and sample entropy. Third, it relates the observed cross-provincial differences to intraday load patterns, generation mix, market structure and market design, thereby showing how the quality of price signals in electricity markets is associated with underlying system and market conditions. These findings provide policy-relevant insights for improving market design and supporting the sustainable development of power systems.
4. Discussion
To further interpret the differences in market efficiency, this section discusses the intraday load patterns, generation mix, market structure and market design in the three provincial markets.
4.1. Intraday Load Patterns and Market Efficiency
To examine whether demand-side conditions help explain cross-provincial differences in market efficiency, this study compares the normalized average daily load curves of Shandong, Shanxi and Guangdong. The hourly average load of each province is normalized by the maximum value of its own average daily load curve, so that the comparison emphasizes intraday load shape rather than absolute load size. This allows a clearer comparison of peak–valley structure across provinces.
Figure 7 shows noticeable differences in intraday load patterns across the three provinces. Shandong displays a pronounced two-stage pattern, with load rising rapidly in the morning, falling back around midday, and then increasing again toward the evening peak. Shanxi has a relatively smoother profile overall, although its load still increases steadily in the late afternoon and evening. Guangdong exhibits the deepest early-morning valley and a steep rise from the morning to the daytime plateau, followed by another increase toward the evening peak. These patterns suggest that the three provincial systems face different forms of intraday balancing pressure.
These differences may help explain part of the observed variation in market efficiency. More uneven intraday load movements, especially sharp ramps and distinct peak transitions, can increase the difficulty of real-time balancing and make prices more sensitive to short-term scarcity. In this sense, the more volatile intraday profile in Shandong may contribute to less stable price formation. At the same time, Guangdong’s market performs relatively better in the efficiency tests despite also showing substantial intraday variation. One possible explanation is that Guangdong has a larger share of gas-fired generation, which generally offers greater operational flexibility and can respond more quickly to short-term demand changes. This suggests that demand-side load patterns alone cannot fully explain cross-provincial differences in market efficiency. The ability of the market to absorb and respond to such variation through supply flexibility also plays an important role.
As power systems integrate more variable renewable energy, the ability to accommodate steep ramps and intraday fluctuations becomes increasingly important. Efficient markets should translate these system conditions into stable and informative price signals, which are essential for guiding flexible generation, storage and demand response. Therefore, strengthening market design and operational flexibility is an important complement to the low-carbon transition in electricity markets.
4.2. Generation Mix and Market Efficiency
In addition to intraday load patterns, differences in generation mix may also help explain cross-provincial variation in market efficiency.
Figure 8 shows that Shandong and Shanxi relied heavily on coal-fired generation during 2022–2024, with coal-fired power consistently accounting for more than 80% of total generation. By contrast, Guangdong exhibited a more diversified generation structure, with a lower share of coal-fired power and higher shares of gas-fired and nuclear generation. Such a generation mix may be associated with different price formation and balancing conditions, because gas-fired units are generally more flexible while nuclear generation provides stable baseload supply. At the same time, the shares of PV and wind generation increased gradually in both Shandong and Shanxi, indicating a growing role of variable renewable energy in these two provincial power systems.
These differences in generation mix are relevant to market efficiency because they shape supply-side flexibility and the cost structure of price formation. The increasing penetration of PV and wind generation may further complicate price formation. Renewable generation has low marginal cost and uncertain output, which can compress prices during high-output periods [
6] and increase balancing pressure when output declines [
51]. Therefore, higher renewable integration increases the importance of flexible resources and effective short-term price signals. In a system dominated by thermal generation, price adjustment may be less flexible when demand or renewable output changes rapidly within the day. This is because thermal units often face operational constraints under variable operating conditions [
52]. By contrast, a more diversified generation mix, especially one with more flexible generation resources, can help the supply side respond more smoothly to changing system conditions [
53]. This may reduce predictable price patterns and improve the quality of price signals.
In this sense, generation mix provides a possible perspective for understanding cross-provincial variation in market efficiency. A more diversified generation structure may improve the ability of the power system to absorb demand fluctuations and output variability, while a heavier reliance on thermal generation may be associated with a less flexible adjustment process under changing system conditions. From the perspective of a flexible and low-carbon power system, a more balanced generation mix can contribute to more adaptive system operation and, potentially, to more efficient price formation.
4.3. Market Structure and Market Efficiency
Market efficiency is influenced not only by supply–demand conditions, but also by market structure. In electricity spot markets, the ownership distribution of generation assets affects the intensity of competition. To provide additional context for the efficiency differences observed across provinces,
Figure 9 compares the installed-capacity shares of the five major power generation groups in Shandong, Shanxi and Guangdong.
The results show clear cross-provincial differences in market structure. In Shandong, the combined installed-capacity share of the top five generation groups (the top 5 generation groups in China are China Huaneng Group, China Huadian Corporation, China Datang Corporation, China Energy Investment Corporation and State Power Investment Corporation) reaches 50.5%, indicating a relatively high degree of concentration. In Shanxi, the corresponding share is 41.2%, which suggests a moderate level of concentration. Guangdong shows the lowest share, with the top five groups accounting for only 31.4% of total installed capacity, while other market participants account for 68.6%. This implies that Guangdong has a more diversified ownership structure on the generation side.
Ownership concentration can affect market efficiency by changing competitive pressure in the bidding process [
54]. When a large share of generation capacity is controlled by a small number of firms, competitive pressure may be weaker and market outcomes may become more susceptible to the strategic behavior of large participants [
55]. Under such conditions, clearing prices may deviate more easily from short-run marginal system conditions, which can reduce the informational content of market prices. By contrast, a more dispersed ownership structure can strengthen competition among generators and make clearing prices more responsive to changes in demand, fuel costs and renewable output. From this perspective, market structure provides a possible explanation for part of the observed variation in market efficiency across provinces. The higher ownership concentration in Shandong may contribute to less competitive price formation, while Guangdong’s more diversified ownership structure may help explain its relatively better market efficiency. A more competitive market structure can therefore improve the quality of price signals, which is important for the efficient coordination of flexible resources and the integration of low-carbon energy.
4.4. Market Design and Market Efficiency
Market design could also be an important institutional source of market inefficiency. China’s power market reform has made substantial progress, but the construction of provincial electricity spot markets is still characterized by pilot-based development and gradual rule refinement [
56]. Existing studies also suggest that China’s electricity market creation is shaped by political–economic and institutional constraints, including the need to coordinate market competition with system security, regulatory oversight and regional interests [
57]. In this context, price formation may not fully reflect all available information on demand, fuel costs, renewable output and system scarcity. The coordination between day-ahead and real-time markets is still evolving, which may weaken the convergence between forward scheduling and real-time balancing. In addition, mechanisms related to imbalance settlement, ancillary services and interprovincial trading are still being developed and coordinated within China’s evolving power-market framework [
27]. Recent international studies further show that market-design arrangements can shape the strategic behavior of market participants, including strategic bidding by variable renewable generators and operating strategies adopted by prosumers in local electricity markets [
58,
59]. These institutional features may weaken the transmission of short-term system conditions into market prices, and their effects may differ across provinces depending on local demand patterns, generation mix and supply-side flexibility. Therefore, market design should be viewed not only as a common reform background, but also as a mechanism that may amplify or mitigate provincial differences in market efficiency.
Price regulation may further affect market efficiency. In the three provincial spot markets examined in this study, market-clearing prices are subject to explicit upper and lower bounds. Evidence from Guangdong’s spot-market pilot shows that the price floor caused measurable market distortion and generated a welfare transfer from consumers to generators [
60]. These price limits can play a stabilizing role during the early stage of market reform, because they help prevent excessive price spikes and protect market participants from extreme outcomes. However, they may also weaken the informational content of prices. When prices approach the upper bound, scarcity conditions may not be fully reflected in market-clearing prices [
7]. When prices approach the lower bound, excess supply or high renewable output may also be only partially reflected. In both cases, price movements are constrained by regulatory rules rather than determined solely by supply and demand fundamentals. Therefore, price regulation may affect market efficiency both as a general institutional constraint and as a factor that interacts with local supply–demand conditions.
5. Conclusions
This study evaluates the efficiency of China’s provincial electricity spot markets using Shandong, Shanxi and Guangdong as representative cases. The results show that none of the provincial spot markets satisfies weak-form efficiency. Most hourly price series are stationary, indicating that electricity prices remain predictable to some extent. The convergence test also reveals limited consistency between day-ahead and real-time prices, with the shares of convergent hours being only 29%, 33% and 25% in Shandong, Shanxi and Guangdong. Moreover, the Hurst exponents of both daily and hourly return series are significantly below 0.5, indicating anti-persistent and mean-reverting behavior rather than a random walk. Taken together, these findings suggest that market information is not yet fully and efficiently incorporated into spot prices.
The discussion suggests that these differences are partly associated with cross-provincial variation in demand conditions, generation characteristics, market structure and institutional design. Shandong exhibits relatively more pronounced intraday load transitions, which may increase balancing difficulty and make prices more sensitive to short-term scarcity. Guangdong shows a more diversified generation mix and a less concentrated ownership structure, which may support smoother price formation and relatively better market efficiency. Institutional factors, including evolving market rules and regulatory price limits, may further influence the extent to which market-clearing prices reflect short-term system conditions. These factors provide potential explanations for the observed cross-provincial differences in market efficiency.
From a policy perspective, improving market efficiency requires better price formation mechanisms and stronger coordination between the day-ahead and real-time markets. It also requires greater operational flexibility and market arrangements that can better absorb demand fluctuations and renewable output variation. More efficient and informative prices can better support flexible generation, storage and demand response and thereby improve the efficient integration of low-carbon energy. Therefore, strengthening market design and operational flexibility, while promoting a more balanced generation mix and a more competitive market structure, is important for both market efficiency and sustainability. In practical terms, the framework used in this study may serve as a useful reference for regulators and market operators to monitor price predictability and assess day-ahead and real-time market coordination. It may also be further applied to track market performance across regions and over time. In addition, the Chinese case also provides useful lessons for other regions undergoing electricity market reforms. The comparisons of Shandong, Shanxi and Guangdong show that regional markets may exhibit different efficiency levels even under a broadly similar reform framework. This suggests that market design should be adapted to local generation structures, demand patterns, renewable integration conditions and regulatory constraints, rather than relying only on uniform institutional arrangements.
Due to data availability constraints, this study has several limitations. First, it cannot explicitly model interregional power flows, transmission constraints or neighboring-market interactions, which may affect residual demand and real-time balancing conditions. Second, although this study identifies temporal changes in market efficiency, it cannot fully distinguish their underlying drivers. Future research could incorporate bidding behavior, unit-level operating constraints and a broader set of provincial markets to better evaluate and explain market efficiency in different regions.