Incentive Mechanisms and the Allocation of Local Government Attention: A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 36 Townships in China

Abstract

In governance systems that face multiple tasks and limited administrative capacity, the allocation of governmental attention is central to policy implementation. Existing studies emphasize institutional constraints and resource scarcity. However, the influence of incentive mechanisms on attention allocation remains insufficiently explored. This study examines how different configurations of incentive mechanisms shape governmental attention. It uses data from veterans affairs in 36 townships in District X between 2020 and 2025. Drawing on official documents, performance rankings and in-depth interviews, the study applies fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to identify patterns of attention formation. The analysis identifies three configurations of incentive mechanisms that generate high levels of attention concentration. A competition-driven configuration combines value incentives, ranking incentives and performance incentives. An honor compensatory configuration connects honorary recognition with value incentives. This configuration continues to function effectively even when promotion incentives or performance incentives are not available. A configuration that combines honorary recognition, promotion opportunities, value incentives and performance incentives forms the most stable pattern of attention concentration. This combination strengthens officials’ motivation in several dimensions and ensures consistent behavioral responses across different contexts. These results show that governmental attention arises from combinations of incentive mechanisms instead of single instruments. This study examines incentive mechanisms that influence governmental attention allocation. It develops a configurational explanation that integrates attention at the organizational level and at the individual level. The study further proposes a design approach for incentive structures that can improve the efficiency of attention incentives and support effective policy implementation.

1. Introduction

Government attention is a finite cognitive resource in public administration. The allocation of this resource across competing policy issues shapes governance outcomes [1]. In many governance contexts, officials encounter multiple demands and priorities. They must determine which issues receive attention and which issues are delayed or overlooked [2]. As a result, understanding the factors that influence government attention has become a central topic in public policy and public administration.

Existing studies on government attention allocation mainly highlight structural factors such as institutional pressures and resource constraints [3]. The pressure-based governance model argues that mandates and performance targets from higher authorities guide local governments toward policy priorities [4]. Limited fiscal and human resources constrain the capacity of governments to address all issues, which results in difficult prioritization choices [5]. These perspectives pay limited attention to the diverse incentive mechanisms that operate at the same time. Few studies explore how multiple incentive types interact as configurations to influence the direction and distribution of governmental attention. This gap matters because public officials often experience overlapping political, administrative, and symbolic incentives rather than a single motivating force.

This study addresses this gap by conceptualizing government attention as the outcome of configurations of multiple incentive mechanisms. It distinguishes political, administrative, and symbolic incentives and examines how different combinations of these incentives shape attention to specific policy issues. The study applies fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to identify complex causal pathways and to show how conditions combine to generate high levels of government attention. This configurational perspective moves beyond single-factor explanations and recognizes equifinality, which describes how different combinations of incentives can produce similar attention outcomes. The study has a clear objective. It identifies the configurations of incentive mechanisms that generate high levels of government attention to the target policy issue.

2. Theory and the Research Context

2.1. Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations of Governmental Attention

Governmental attention refers to the focused allocation of cognitive effort and organizational resources to selected issues while other matters receive limited consideration. The concept draws on the principle of bounded rationality, which states that public officials cannot process all problems simultaneously and must select priorities [6]. Attention-allocation theory explains how such priorities emerge within administrative settings. At the individual level, decision-makers notice, encode, and interpret cues and invest their attention in areas where signals and incentives are strongest. At the organizational level, structures, routines, and rules guide collective attention toward specific problems and feasible solutions [7]. Research on the politics of attention shows that political and administrative institutions process information in uneven ways [8]. These institutions may sustain long periods of limited focus and then show rapid increases in attention once cues align and an issue reaches a threshold of salience [9]. Agenda-setting studies show that windows created by problem recognition, policy proposals, and political signals guide attention and shape resource commitments [10]. Focusing events can trigger rapid shifts in how top officials allocate their time and effort [11]. In this context, understanding how limited governmental attention is directed toward specific policy domains becomes a central concern for public governance.

2.2. Analytical Strands in the Literature on Governmental Attention

Existing research on governmental attention can be grouped into four analytical strands. These strands explain how governments notice issues, set priorities, and convert attention into administrative behaviour and outcomes (Table 1). Reviewing these strands helps to clarify current knowledge on attention dynamics and the questions that remain. It also highlights how incentive arrangements may guide attention in multi-task environments such as township government.

The first strand studies how attention is formed and how it is allocated. Behavioural studies show that attention shifts when managers observe performance shortfalls. When outcomes fall below aspiration levels, managers initiate a problemistic search and direct attention to weakly performing areas [12]. Negative feedback receives more weight than positive cues. This pattern reflects a well-documented negativity bias in managerial attention [13]. Performance regimes also shape these patterns. Monitored indicators tend to attract attention and action. Narrow targets may create goal displacement or gaming that improves metrics without improving services [14,15]. Organizational research shows that symbolic attention may diverge from substantive action when signals are not supported by resources or routine adjustments [16]. High-performing systems rely on organizational culture, budgeting rules, and oversight arrangements to serve as error correction mechanisms that guide attention toward public priorities over time [17]. This strand shows that performance signals and monitoring systems influence attention. It offers limited insight into how specific incentive packages shape the ways in which local officials distribute their scarce attention across competing policy tasks.

The second strand identifies institutional constraints as factors that shape governmental attention [18]. Formal rules, regulatory requirements, and resource structures influence officials’ discretion and set the boundaries of what can be noticed and acted upon [19]. Rigid procedures may reduce frontline flexibility, whereas clear mandates and sufficient resources support more responsive action [20]. Institutional arrangements thus create the structural context in which attention is filtered and allocated. However, existing studies seldom clarify how these structural features interact with specific incentive tools when township governments respond to multiple directives from upper-level principals.

The third strand examines incentive mechanisms. Existing research shows that rewards and sanctions can align individual behaviour with organizational or policy goals [21]. Drawing on principal-agent theory and managerial reforms, this literature explores how performance indicators, contracts, and related tools motivate compliance and strengthen accountability [22]. Empirical studies indicate that well-designed incentives improve efficiency. Poorly aligned incentives may create unintended effects such as short-termism or goal displacement [23]. Many studies examine single instruments or treat incentives as separate elements [24]. These studies give limited attention to the ways in which different incentives are combined in practice and how such configurations shape the distribution of attention within local governments.

The fourth strand draws on research in normative ethics and care ethics. This perspective argues that public officials act under the influence of intrinsic motivations, professional norms, and ethical commitments, alongside formal rules and incentives. Many officials make decisions based on a sense of duty, compassion, and concern for the well-being of service users. Studies in this tradition identify care as an important governance resource. Rodela developed a care-centred governance framework for sustainable cities and find that attention to relationships and well-being supports innovative governance practices [25]. Frontline workers in healthcare and social services often exceed formal requirements due to strong normative commitments. This pattern shows how ethical values shape administrative attention. These findings suggest that non-material motives interact with incentive schemes in shaping administrative attention. The nature of this interaction in routine administrative settings remains unclear.

Table 1. Summary of Analytical Strands in the Literature on Governmental Attention.

Theoretical Lens	Focus and Methods	Main Findings	Limitations	Representative References
Attention Formation and Allocation	Behavioral and organizational studies; performance data; qualitative cases	Attention shifts with performance cues; negative feedback is more salient	Limited cross-level integration	Nielsen et al. (2014) [12]
Institutional Constraints	Institutional analysis; organizational theory	Rules and resource structures shape discretion and attention	Empirical work often fragmented	Yang et al. (2023, 2025) [15,18]
Incentive Mechanisms	Performance management; principal–agent designs	Incentives align behavior but risk goal displacement	Overemphasis on extrinsic drivers	Zhang et al. (2022) [21]
Normative and Care Ethics	Normative theory; frontline qualitative studies	Ethical duty and care shape attention beyond material incentives	Limited generalizability and integration	Rodela et al. (2025) [25]

Table 1. Summary of Analytical Strands in the Literature on Governmental Attention.

Theoretical Lens	Focus and Methods	Main Findings	Limitations	Representative References
Attention Formation and Allocation	Behavioral and organizational studies; performance data; qualitative cases	Attention shifts with performance cues; negative feedback is more salient	Limited cross-level integration	Nielsen et al. (2014) [12]
Institutional Constraints	Institutional analysis; organizational theory	Rules and resource structures shape discretion and attention	Empirical work often fragmented	Yang et al. (2023, 2025) [15,18]
Incentive Mechanisms	Performance management; principal–agent designs	Incentives align behavior but risk goal displacement	Overemphasis on extrinsic drivers	Zhang et al. (2022) [21]
Normative and Care Ethics	Normative theory; frontline qualitative studies	Ethical duty and care shape attention beyond material incentives	Limited generalizability and integration	Rodela et al. (2025) [25]

These strands provide useful insights. Several important questions remain unresolved. First, current research rarely examines incentive arrangements as multi-type configurations. Many studies focus on single factors such as institutional pressure or resource constraints. They often treat these effects as additive. This approach overlooks equifinality. It limits the ability to detect synergies or trade-offs among different drivers of attention. Second, cross-level interactions remain insufficiently studied. Existing studies offer limited evidence on how macro-level incentive regimes interact with micro-level values and patterns of attention. This gap restricts understanding of how institutional settings shape local officials’ discretion. It also limits knowledge of how their responses influence implementation contexts. Third, empirical examinations of integrated models remain scarce. Many analyses rely on single-factor designs or small samples and lack systematic comparison. As a result, the combined influence of multiple conditions has not been assessed in a consistent manner.

In township governments, these unresolved issues create a concrete practical problem. Township officials face dense task lists, multiple principals, and frequent policy initiatives from higher-level authorities [26]. New mandates often include diverse incentive tools such as performance rankings, honours, and material rewards. These instruments compete for limited attention [27]. Existing research offers little guidance on how specific configurations of incentives direct township attention toward new policy domains or keep them at the margins of daily work.

This study addresses this problem by examining how different incentives jointly shape attention allocation in a specific policy domain at the township level. It analyses how incentive configurations guide township governments as they allocate scarce attention in response to new policy requirements from higher-level authorities. The empirical analysis uses fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). This method can handle multiple causal conditions within a single framework. It also allows several causal pathways to lead to the same outcome. The method is suitable for configurational analysis of incentive arrangements. fsQCA incorporates factors at multiple levels, including organizational arrangements and individual motivations. This feature links macro-level institutions with micro-level behaviour. By comparing several township cases, fsQCA provides a systematic tool to identify combinations of conditions that produce high or low levels of governmental attention. Building on the strands of research discussed above, Table 1 summarises the unresolved issues and introduces the research question and the conceptual framework.

2.3. Determinants of Government Attention

In public administration, “incentive configuration” refers to a structured set of rewards that function at the individual and organizational levels [28]. It aims to align officials’ behavior with institutional goals. Scholars classify incentives along two main axes. Intrinsic incentives arise from task characteristics that generate personal satisfaction, including autonomy, task meaning, and recognition. Extrinsic incentives consist of external rewards, including salary, bonuses, and benefits. Incentives can be material or symbolic [29]. Material incentives include monetary compensation and other tangible benefits. Symbolic incentives involve honor, prestige, and a sense of mission. Public agencies combine these elements through pay and non-pay schemes [30]. Based on this framework, this study treats the individual level and the organizational level as the two core dimensions of the incentive configuration (Figure 1). At the individual level, the analysis focuses on honorary recognition, promotion opportunities, and value incentives. At the organizational level, the analysis focuses on ranking incentives and performance incentives. These five types of incentives serve as empirical indicators of the two core dimensions in the subsequent analysis.

2.3.1. Individual-Level Incentive Mechanisms

Government officials’ attention priorities are shaped by incentive mechanisms that influence their personal interests and career expectations. Honorary recognition represents a distinct form of incentive that affects how officials allocate attention. Honors and awards, including model city titles or official commendations, enhance officials’ prestige and signal administrative competence. These rewards direct attention toward activities likely to generate public recognition [31]. As a result, officials tend to emphasize highly visible or politically salient policy domains where achievements are more likely to receive recognition.

Promotion opportunities form another major incentive that affects attention allocation. From a principal–agent perspective, officials act as rational actors who focus on tasks that generate career benefits [32]. In contexts such as China, promotion outcomes rely on performance criteria set by higher authorities, including economic indicators and key policy tasks [33]. These incentives lead officials to concentrate on indicators included in performance evaluations while reducing attention to issues outside the assessment framework.

Value incentives further shape individual attention patterns. Many public servants hold stable value commitments, such as concern for environmental protection or social welfare, and these commitments influence their behavioral orientations. When such values are salient, officials may devote attention to related initiatives even without external rewards. This pattern illustrates that personal ideals and a sense of mission can guide attention allocation alongside formal incentive structures [34].

At the individual level, honorary recognition, promotion opportunities, and value incentives constitute the primary drivers of attention allocation. These mechanisms shape personal preferences and behavioral choices, forming the micro-foundations of governmental attention distribution.

2.3.2. Organizational-Level Factors

At the organizational level, government attention is shaped by institutional arrangements and collective incentive structures. Ranking incentives constitute a major mechanism that directs attention across policy domains. In contexts such as China, higher authorities or third-party evaluators rank local governments based on performance in areas such as environmental protection or public service delivery. These incentives create pressure for local governments to improve performance relative to peer jurisdictions. Local leaders therefore direct organizational attention and resources to issues included in ranking systems to improve their standing [35]. Achieving a high rank or avoiding a low rank may bring material or political benefits to local leaders. As a result, ranking systems guide attention toward evaluated indicators and reduce attention to issues that are not measured.

Performance incentives represent another important organizational mechanism and are institutionalized through formal evaluation systems. Higher-level governments set explicit targets for subordinate governments, such as economic growth rates or pollution reduction goals. These targets link to rewards and sanctions that influence budgets, the career prospects of local leaders, and governmental reputation [36]. Performance incentives prompt local governments to allocate substantial attention to mandated targets. For example, if reducing air pollution is a key indicator, a city government will prioritize that agenda and mobilize departments and resources accordingly [37]. This target-driven approach can generate progress on focal issues but may lead to neglect of areas that are not included in evaluations.

In summary, organizational-level factors, including ranking incentives and performance incentives, shape the context in which government attention is allocated. These incentives often interact with individual-level motivations. A local government may give high priority to an issue when a leader’s personal interest aligns with a strong performance mandate. Conversely, if an issue is valued by officials but is not institutionally rewarded, it may receive inconsistent attention. This dual-layer influence highlights the need to examine attention allocation through configurations of multiple factors rather than any single factor alone. A configurational approach, such as fsQCA, is therefore suitable for analyzing how individual and organizational incentives interact to produce outcomes. The following section outlines the methodology used to examine these relationships.

Building on these insights, this study identifies five core dimensions of incentive mechanisms that shape the allocation of attention within governments: honorary recognition, promotion opportunities, value incentives, ranking incentives, and performance incentives (Figure 1).

3. Research Design

3.1. Research Method

Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis is a configurational method that examines how combinations of conditions relate to an outcome through set relations among cases. This study applies fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) for three main reasons. First, the allocation of governmental attention arises from the interaction of several incentive elements rather than a single factor. Traditional regression techniques have difficulty capturing complex causal structures that involve multiple interactions and causal asymmetry. fsQCA is suitable for this setting because it identifies causal configurations and treats causality as conjunctural and asymmetric [38]. Second, fsQCA is designed for medium-sized samples that include about 10 to 50 cases. This range matches the number of township governments examined in this study. The analysis treats all township governments in District X as cases within a common institutional and policy environment. This design ensures basic comparability across cases. At the same time, the townships differ in their incentive configurations and in the level of governmental attention they receive. This combination of a medium-sized number of comparable cases and meaningful variation within the sample is consistent with fsQCA’s small-N and configurational focus. It also strengthens the coherence and replicability of the analysis. Third, fsQCA can identify several functionally equivalent pathways that lead to the same outcome. This feature corresponds to the mechanism of multiple drivers and differentiated responses that shapes the allocation of governmental attention. It also improves the generalizability of the findings, because different incentive combinations can generate similar patterns of governmental attention [39].

As shown in Figure 2, the analysis follows standard fsQCA procedures and proceeds in six steps. First, we select the cases and construct the condition–outcome dataset. Second, we calibrate all variables into fuzzy sets. Third, we construct the truth table. Fourth, we set the frequency and consistency thresholds and resolve contradictory configurations. Fifth, we derive and interpret the intermediate and parsimonious solutions. Sixth, we conduct robustness checks by adjusting the calibration anchors and thresholds to assess the stability of the configurations.

3.2. Data Sources

District X is an economically important district in Shanghai Municipality. Shanghai is a provincial-level municipality that holds a central position in China’s administrative system. District X governs 36 township-level units across 1429.67 square kilometers and has nearly 100,000 registered veterans. The large veteran population creates significant administrative workload and places veterans affairs at the center of local goverance. The establishment of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs in 2018 marked the beginning of a policy field that has remained institutionally fluid. This institutional fluidity increases the reliance of local governments on incentive arrangements during policy implementation. Townships in District X vary in economic development and administrative capacity, but they function under the same regulatory framework. This combination of internal heterogeneity and institutional consistency improves the comparability of township cases and strengthens the external validity of the findings. These features are common among large urban districts in China. Taken together, these features make District X a suitable and information-rich case for studying veterans affairs governance and the allocation of governmental attention [40].

The study draws on multiple data sources collected from 2020 to 2025 to improve reliability and identify the mechanisms of attention allocation. These sources include official documents, performance statistics, public information released through government websites and media channels, interviews with more than fifty district and township officials, and participatory observations during fieldwork. The combination of documentary evidence, assessment records, and qualitative materials allows for cross-validation among sources. This triangulated strategy enhances the robustness of empirical interpretation and supports the validity of the conclusions.

3.3. Variable Calibration and Data Triangulation

This study applies the fsQCA principle of mixed-data triangulation to strengthen methodological rigor and construct validity. Each core condition is calibrated with at least two complementary sources of evidence. The data sources include official documents, performance rankings, budget records, bonus reports, and interviews with township officials.

Table 2. Variables and primary data sources.

Variable	Data Source
Individual attention focus	In-depth interviews (staff/managers); personal reports (e.g., diaries, work logs); meeting minutes
Organizational attention focus	In-depth interviews; strategic plans; meeting minutes
Honorary recognition	Official award lists/bulletins; media reports of honors; interviews with honorees/officials
Promotion opportunities	Personnel promotion records; promotion policy documents; interviews on career paths
Value incentives	Mission/vision statements; value-oriented training materials; interviews about values
Ranking incentives	Published performance rankings; evaluation reports; interviews on ranking systems
Performance incentives	Bonus budget/reports; performance appraisal criteria; interviews on incentives

reports the primary data sources for each condition and explains how documents and interviews inform the coding decisions. This design improves the transparency of the calibration procedure and supports the replication of the analysis.

3.4. Variable Design

3.4.1. Outcome Variable

In this study, attention focus is defined as the outcome variable. It reflects the intensity and persistence of governmental engagement in sectoral task implementation. To capture the differentiated logic of attention allocation, the outcome variable is divided into two dimensions. These dimensions are individual attention focus and organizational attention focus (

Table 3. Variable and indicator design.

Variable Type	Dimension	Variable	Category	Value
Causal Condition	Incentive Techniques	Honor Recognition	Staff member receives municipal honor or model award;	1
			Staff member receives district honor or model award;	0.67
			Staff member receives township honor or model award;	0.33
			Staff member receives no honor or award.	0
		Promotion Opportunities	Two staff members in the township are promoted for outstanding departmental performance;	1
			One staff member is promoted for outstanding departmental performance;	0.5
			No staff member is promoted for outstanding departmental performance.	0
		Value Incentives	Work in this sector brings a strong sense of achievement and recognition;	1
			Work in this sector brings a moderate sense of achievement and recognition;	0.5
			Work in this sector brings no sense of achievement or recognition.	0
		Ranking Incentives	Township ranks as “very excellent” in departmental assessment;	1
			Township ranks as “excellent”;	0.5
			Township ranks as “good” or below.	0
		Performance Incentives	The sector leader’s evaluation within the leadership team improves significantly;	1
			The sector leader’s evaluation improves moderately;	0.5
			The sector leader’s evaluation shows no change or declines.	0
Outcome Variable	Attention Focus	Individual Focus	Officials show strong and sustained attention and engagement in sectoral work (interviews/logs);	1
			Officials show moderate participation and responsiveness;	0.5
			Officials show dispersed attention or low engagement.	0
		Organizational Focus	Township performs outstandingly in task implementation, with improved assessment scores or completion rates;	1
			Township performs moderately, completing tasks without notable improvement;	0.5
			Township performs poorly, with low completion or failure to meet standards.	0

).

(1)

Individual attention focus

This dimension evaluates how deeply and consistently individual officials focus on sectoral affairs. When an official repeatedly highlights the importance of veterans affairs in interviews or work logs and shows steady engagement and active involvement, the case is classified as fully in the set with a membership score of 1.0. If an official shows limited participation or irregular responsiveness and lacks stable long-term commitment, the case receives a membership score of 0.5, which marks the crossover point between full and non-membership. When an official shows scattered attention, minimal involvement, or passive responses to sectoral tasks, the case is fully out of the set with a membership score of 0.0.

(2)

Organizational attention focus

At the organizational level, this dimension assesses how township governments perform in implementing veterans affairs tasks. Calibration relies on assessment scores, task completion rates, and horizontal performance rankings. Townships with strong performance, reflected in higher scores, high completion rates, and top rankings, are treated as full members of the set and receive a membership score of 1.0. Townships that meet basic requirements and show average performance without clear strengths are coded as 0.5, which reflects a moderate level of attention. Townships that underperform, with declining scores or low completion rates, are treated as non-performing cases. These cases receive a score of 0.0, which indicates non-membership in the organizational attention focus set.

3.4.2. Causal Conditions

In this study, the causal condition “incentive techniques” refers to the ways in which governments shape individual behavior and organizational performance through various incentive mechanisms in the process of attention allocation. This variable consists of five core dimensions: honorary recognition, promotion opportunities, value incentives, ranking incentives, and performance incentives. Each dimension reflects a separate pathway through which incentives influence the patterns of attention allocation within governments.

Honorary recognition is an essential element of incentive mechanisms. It represents the formal acknowledgment of individual performance and provides symbolic rewards. Different levels of honors correspond to different degrees of motivational intensity [41]. Municipal-level honors reflect the highest level of institutional recognition and generate the strongest motivational effects. The membership score is 1.0. District-level honors generate weaker effects and still lead to a positive influence. The membership score is 0.67. Township-level recognition exerts a limited motivational effect. Its membership score is 0.33. When individuals receive no honors, the situation is treated as a lack of incentives. The membership score is 0.0. This calibration logic shows that differences in honor levels generate differences in motivational intensity. These differences shape individual cognition and behavior. They also influence governmental attention.

Promotion opportunities constitute an important element of the incentive mechanism and refer to the likelihood that staff members receive rank advancement due to strong performance. This indicator reflects the effectiveness and fairness of an organization’s internal incentive system [42]. When two staff members in a township obtain promotions on the basis of their performance, the promotion channel is comprehensive and the incentive mechanism operates effectively. This situation corresponds to a membership value of 1.0. If only one staff member receives promotion, promotion opportunities are limited and the incentive effect is moderate, which corresponds to a membership value of 0.5. When no staff member is promoted for strong performance, promotion opportunities are absent and the incentive mechanism does not function. This situation corresponds to a membership value of 0.0. This variable highlights the role of individual incentives in shaping how officials allocate attention during departmental task implementation.

Value incentives constitute the intrinsic dimension of the incentive mechanism. They emphasize the subjective experiences of accomplishment and value identification among departmental staff. The effectiveness of this dimension depends on external rewards and sanctions, as well as the extent to which employees gain psychological satisfaction and a sense of meaning from their work [43]. When frontline staff show a strong sense of achievement and value identification, the incentive is regarded as highly effective and receives a membership value of 1.0. Moderate levels of accomplishment or identification correspond to a membership value of 0.5, which reflects partial effectiveness. When staff lack these feelings, the incentive is regarded as ineffective and receives a membership value of 0.0. This dimension highlights the importance of intrinsic motivation in sustaining individual attention and long-term engagement.

Ranking incentives rely on the relative position of township governments in the annual performance assessment. This position reflects their effectiveness in securing attention from higher-level authorities. It also shows the level of attention that each township can attract from higher authorities. These incentives create external competition and influence officials’ sense of honor and organizational commitment [44]. When a township falls into the “very outstanding” category, the effect of external competition reaches its highest level and its membership score is coded as 1.0. The “outstanding” category represents a medium level of incentive strength and its membership score is coded as 0.5. The “good” and lower categories reflect limited competitive pressure and their membership score is coded as 0.0. Through these rules, ranking incentives integrate external competition with internal performance evaluation and guide organizational members to focus their limited attention [45].

Performance incentives form the final dimension of the incentive mechanism. They are assessed through the influence of the department’s principal cadres in collective leadership evaluations. A significant rise in the evaluation of the responsible cadre signals stronger upward performance communication by the department. This rise reflects a clear attention-focusing effect [46]. It corresponds to a membership score of 1.0. A limited rise corresponds to a score of 0.5. It represents a moderate level of incentive effectiveness. If the evaluation remains unchanged or declines, the incentive mechanism is regarded as ineffective. It receives a score of 0.0. This dimension shows how performance assessments shape the distribution of attention.

This calibration approach is grounded in theoretical reasoning and empirical practice. It establishes clear membership thresholds, including full membership, the crossover point, and full non-membership. These thresholds provide a systematic basis for the subsequent QCA analysis. Honorary recognition, promotion opportunities, and value incentives capture incentive effects at the individual level. Ranking incentives and performance incentives reflect the operation of incentive mechanisms at the organizational level. Through this multidimensional analytical framework, the study demonstrates the complexity and diversity of incentive techniques in shaping the allocation of governmental attention.

3.5. Data Processing

During the research design stage, the study applied established quantitative coding rules to code, aggregate, and calibrate raw data from the 36 townships. The calibrated data were transformed into membership scores ranging from 0 to 1. These membership scores were then used to generate the truth table for the fsQCA analysis (Appendix A).

The calibration process required the identification of three thresholds: full membership, the crossover point, and full non-membership. These thresholds were defined through theoretical justification and empirical observation. The causal conditions were calibrated through several approaches, which included direct calibration, mean-value calibration, standard-deviation calibration, and percentile calibration. These approaches were adopted to maintain methodological rigor and ensure comparability in membership classification [47]. In this study, the outcome variable of attention focus was calibrated with the mean-value method in a three-level discretization scheme. All causal conditions followed the same trichotomous principle.

To improve analytical rigor, the outcome variable was calculated with an average value method. The membership scores of individual attention focus and organizational attention focus were averaged for each case. For instance, if a case had an individual attention score of 1.0 and an organizational attention score of 0.501, the outcome value was (1.0 + 0.501)/2 = 0.7505. This method keeps all outcome values within the 0 to 1 range. It reflects each case’s degree of membership in the outcome set and reduces bias that may result from reliance on a single dimension [48].

In calibrating the causal conditions, the thresholds of 0.499 and 0.501 were used to define the crossover point. In fsQCA, calibration distinguishes degrees of set membership through these thresholds. Small variations near the 0.5 boundary can determine whether a case falls inside or outside the set. Ragin notes that fuzzy-set analysis stresses the methodological importance of crossing the crossover point. The use of the 0.501 and 0.499 thresholds in this study reflects the methodological sensitivity and precision that characterize the fuzzy-set approach. A membership score of 0.501 indicates that a case is slightly above the crossover point and more likely to belong to the set. A score of 0.499 indicates slight non-membership.

4. Data Analysis and Empirical Results

4.1. Necessity Analysis

This study used fsQCA 3.0 to examine whether specific conditions related to governments’ attention focus meet the criteria for necessity. Consistency and coverage served as key indicators in the assessment. Consistency indicates the extent to which a condition appears in cases where the outcome is observed, while coverage captures its empirical scope within the outcome set. A condition is treated as necessary when its consistency reaches 0.90 or higher, and when consistency ranges from 0.80 to 0.90, it may operate as a sufficient factor in some contexts. The results in

Table 4. Analysis of necessary conditions.

Condition	High-Level Attention Focus
	Consistency	Coverage
High honor recognition	0.837	0.776
Low honor recognition	0.385	0.605
High promotion opportunities	0.441	0.974
Low promotion opportunities	0.809	0.641
High value incentives	0.845	0.807
Low value incentives	0.440	0.660
High ranking incentives	0.655	0.724
Low ranking incentives	0.535	0.661
High performance incentives	0.738	0.886
Low performance incentives	0.535	0.608

show clear variation in consistency and coverage, indicating that the influence of different incentive elements on governments’ attention focus differs across cases.

The results of the univariate necessity analysis show that value incentives (consistency = 0.845) and honorary recognition (consistency = 0.837) fall slightly below the strict necessity threshold. They still show strong supportive effects under conditions of high-level attention focus. This finding suggests that spiritual and symbolic incentives have an important role in sustaining the concentration of government attention. Performance and ranking incentives do not reach the consistency threshold for necessity. Their coverage values remain high. These results show that these conditions appear in many cases and may act as complementary factors in specific configurations. The identification of key single factor effects shows the need for further configurational QCA analysis. This analysis helps examine how multiple incentive elements interact through different pathways to shape the configuration patterns of government attention allocation.

4.2. Configurational Analysis of Conditions

QCA produces three types of solutions when assessing causal pathways: the complex solution, the parsimonious solution, and the intermediate solution. The intermediate solution provides strong explanatory power and avoids model oversimplification. It reduces redundancy and limits potential bias in the causal configurations. This study adopts the intermediate solution as the basis for reporting the analytical results (

Table 5. Configurational effects of governments’ attention focus.

Conditional Factors	High-Level Attention Focus
	Competition-Driven Incentive	Honor–Value Compensatory Incentive	Comprehensive Incentive
Honor recognition		●	●
Promotion opportunities		○	●
Value incentives	●	●	●
Ranking incentives	●
Performance incentives	●	○	●
Raw coverage	0.524	0.348	0.337
Unique coverage	0.186	0.135	0.048
Consistency	0.880	0.918	0.966
Overall consistency	0.895
Overall coverage	0.738

Note: ● indicates the presence of a condition; ○ indicates the absence of a condition; blank cells denote conditions that are neither necessary nor absent (non-core or neutral conditions).

). QCA further distinguishes between core conditions and peripheral conditions. Core conditions are variables that appear in both the complex and parsimonious solutions and exert a decisive influence on the outcome. Peripheral conditions appear in specific configurations and serve as supplementary factors that shape the contextual features of causal pathways. Based on these distinctions, the analysis identifies three configurational pathways that shape governments’ attention in China: the competition-driven incentive pathway, the honor compensatory incentive pathway, and the comprehensive incentive pathway.

4.2.1. Competition-Driven Incentive Path

When value incentives, ranking incentives, and performance incentives appear together, governments tend to maintain a strong focus on sectoral tasks. This combination of incentives reinforces administrative priorities and strengthens officials’ motivation to align their efforts with sectoral goals.

First, Value incentives highlight the social importance and public value of policy tasks. They activate officials’ intrinsic identification and sense of public mission. These effects help build a self-driven mechanism of voluntary attention focus [49]. As one township cadre remarked during an interview, “Working on veterans’ services really makes me feel that my job is meaningful. Although there are many trivial matters, this is where we can actually do something for the veterans” (Interview 20241022-QY-01). This view shows how value identification generates intrinsic motivation. The attention-enhancing effects of value incentives are consistent with empirical findings from organizational attention studies in international settings.

Second, ranking incentives create a stable external competitive environment through quantified evaluations and horizontal performance comparisons. Quarterly and annual assessments form a “digital tournament” system that increases competitive pressure among townships. This system pushes grassroots organizations to allocate limited resources to meeting sectoral assessment requirements. As one township official explained, “Once the quarterly rankings are released, the pressure on those falling behind is enormous. Cadres will work overtime to make up the scores without much supervision from me” (Interview-Y-01). This observation shows how ranking competition produces an internalized disciplinary effect on organizational behavior.

Third, performance incentives within the leadership evaluation system strengthen organizational responsibility and heighten political pressure. A survey experiment by Ki, Kim, and Yoon shows that monetary bonuses and promotion opportunities increase work motivation among public officials with low public service motivation (PSM) [50]. One grassroots cadre described this process as follows: “If the sector’s work appears in district meetings, leaders start to pay more attention, and we follow their focus” (Interview-W-02). This example reflects an “attention spillover effect” produced by performance assessments. This pattern of performance-driven behavior aligns with recent research on governmental attention structures. It highlights the institutionalized nature of performance incentives in China’s pressure-based governance system.

The effectiveness of the competition-driven incentive pathway depends on the integration of three mechanisms: intrinsic value identification, horizontal ranking competition, and vertical performance pressure. These mechanisms together form a coupled logic that links internal motivation with external constraint. This integrated mechanism sustains behavioral engagement among individual officials and strengthens organizational execution under assessment pressure. As a result, it fosters a strong attention focus on sectoral tasks.

4.2.2. Honor–Value Compensatory Incentive Path

Under the configuration of “honorary recognition ×~ promotion opportunities × value incentives ×~ performance incentives,” governments show a high level of attention focus. This outcome is driven by the interaction between honorary recognition and value incentives. This interaction remains effective when promotion incentives and performance incentives are absent. The configuration shows an honor–value compensatory mechanism. In this mechanism, spiritual recognition and an internalized mission compensate for the lack of material incentives and performance incentives.

At the individual level, honorary recognition acts as a symbolic incentive that links value orientation with identity formation. Existing research shows that honors and awards in contemporary governance serve as institutionalized symbolic resources [51]. They influence officials’ motivation through value identification and emotional resonance. Symbolic rewards sustain intrinsic motivation and reinforce organizational commitment when resources are limited [52]. Interview data collected in this study support this mechanism. As one township cadre remarked, “Our township has limited resources, but being named a ‘Model Township’ last year made everyone feel their efforts were meaningful” (Interview 20250211-HJ-07). This form of recognition improved organizational morale. It offered emotional support and psychological compensation for continued engagement in an environment with few promotion incentives.

Value incentives influence officials’ understanding of the public mission and guide their limited attention to specific tasks. Ocasio’s attention-based view shows that attention allocation depends on “meaning frameworks,” and value-oriented narratives often activate these frameworks in daily governance. In practice, sectoral goals such as “serving veterans” or “maintaining stability” are often internalized as personal missions. This process increases officials’ willingness to commit effort. As one young cadre stated, “This work makes me feel valuable. When veterans’ families come to thank us, I am willing to devote more energy even without the prospect of promotion” (Interview LZ-01). Value recognition emerges from policy narratives issued by superiors and from the professional identity formed through routine work. This mechanism reflects a flexible governance strategy adopted by governments that face resource constraints.

Existing studies show that institutional refinement and flexible arrangements provide limited autonomy. These conditions allow governments to maintain operations through honor and value narratives when hard incentives remain weak. International research also finds that low-cost incentives can sustain organizational functioning [53]. Honor incentives and value incentives can therefore function as substitutes under weak institutional pressure. Field observations, however, show that this pathway faces risks. When honorary incentives become frequent and lose symbolic weight, they may lead to formalistic behavior and inflate reported performance. Field evidence shows similar patterns in several townships where early enthusiasm declined and policy quality did not persist.

This configuration shows that honor recognition and value incentives work together when promotion incentives and performance incentives are weak. The findings add to the theoretical understanding of incentive logics in governmental attention allocation. The results suggest that upper-level agencies may include honor recognition and value-oriented narratives in policy design to address weak incentives [54].

4.2.3. Comprehensive Incentive Path

Under the configuration “honorary recognition × promotion opportunities × value incentives × performance incentives”, these four conditions form an integrated system that links spiritual, material, intrinsic, and extrinsic motivations. This configuration shows the highest consistency (0.966) and limited coverage (0.337). The cases within this configuration are representative. The finding indicates that when multiple incentive conditions operate together, governments tend to form focused and stable patterns of attention allocation.

To begin with, the combination of honorary recognition and value incentives increases officials’ psychological motivation and reinforces their sense of value identification. Honorary recognition functions as more than symbolic acknowledgment. Public and ritualized communicative practices increase the perceived social significance of policy tasks and strengthen officials’ sense of organizational belonging [55]. As one cadre observed, “Public commendation is an individual distinction and signifies recognition of our team as a whole” (Interview-H-02). Value incentives connect policy goals with public interests. This connection helps cadres view sectoral work as a socially meaningful public endeavor. This mechanism aligns with insights from public service motivation research. When individuals internalize public affairs as a personal mission, their attention remains more focused and stable over time.

In the next step, promotion opportunities and performance incentives form a stable system of institutional constraints and concrete rewards. Promotion opportunities reflect potential career gains. They connect advancement channels with the distribution of organizational authority and serve as clear extrinsic motivators for individuals [56]. Performance incentives are implemented through performance appraisals and leadership evaluations. These mechanisms transform sectoral tasks into shared township responsibilities. They guide cadres to focus on key assignments when attention resources are limited. A township leader noted that “once the assessment is tied to performance, everyone shifts attention accordingly” (Interview-T-01). A frontline cadre explained that “this work provides a sense of accomplishment. The leader mentioned that strong performance may support promotion. The district assessment is strict, so we remain highly committed” (Interview-B-01). These accounts show how spiritual motivation, value identification, and institutionalized rewards reinforce one another.

Conceptually, this pathway aligns with the logic of conjunctural causation in organizational analysis. Schneider and Wagemann note that organizational behavior often emerges from the interaction of multiple conditions instead of a single factor. This study shows that the overlap among several incentive dimensions forms a key mechanism that generates consistent and stable patterns in governmental attention allocation. This finding expands the explanatory scope of attention theory in the public sector and aligns with recent work on hybrid incentive mechanisms [57]. However, this configuration shows low coverage, which suggests that the combined presence of honorary, promotional, value, and performance incentives is rare in actual governance settings. In townships with limited resources or weaker institutional constraints, it is difficult to sustain such comprehensive incentive systems. As a result, this configuration represents an ideal model that reflects the optimal form of attention allocation under fully developed incentive conditions.

Taken together, the integrated incentive pathway reflects a coordinated mechanism that guides attention. Honor-based incentives and value-driven incentives clarify the meaning of action, and promotion incentives and performance incentives introduce institutional constraints. The applicability of this pathway may remain constrained. Even so, it explains the internal logic for achieving focused attention within a mature incentive structure and offers insights for refining incentive design and improving policy implementation.

4.3. Robustness Test

The fsQCA method integrates qualitative and quantitative features. Its results may be influenced by parameter settings, case selection, and calibration strategies. A robustness test is required to confirm the credibility and stability of the findings. This study examines whether the identified configurations remain stable when alternative model specifications are used. The test assesses whether changes in parameters or case inclusion lead to notable shifts in configuration patterns or analytical outcomes [58]. Stable configurations after these adjustments indicate that the results do not depend on specific model assumptions. They reflect consistent causal relations. When the consistency threshold increased to 0.85, the three main configurations remained stable. The overall consistency (0.856) and coverage (0.822) also stayed within acceptable levels (Appendix A). The competition-driven and comprehensive-incentive pathways were fully reproduced. The honor–value compensatory pathway became slightly simpler but remained consistent in direction. These results show that the findings have strong robustness. They confirm that the fsQCA model used in this study passes the robustness test.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

5.1. Discussion

At a broader level, this study presents an integrated framework that synthesizes four theoretical perspectives on governmental attention. The findings clarify how attention emerges and how it is allocated. Administrative attention is not driven solely by performance cues or negative feedback. When multiple incentives converge on a shared policy objective, they realign officials’ priorities and direct limited attention across competing agendas [59]. Changes in attention arise from the combined configuration of incentives rather than the isolated effect of a single performance signal. These findings refine attention scarcity theory. Scarce administrative attention is shaped by configurations of different incentives instead of a single performance cue.

In this regard, the study advances the understanding of institutional constraints. Institutions are not static or solely external constraints. Their effects vary across different configurations of incentives. When institutional support is strong, incentives operate in a more coordinated manner. When institutional resources are constrained, symbolic or value-based incentives can partially offset structural shortcomings [60]. The institutional context presents differentiated effects because incentives interact with specific institutional arrangements.

More specifically, the study expands the analytical perspective on incentive mechanisms. The assumption that one incentive alone can shape implementation is analytically insufficient. Configuration analysis reveals several distinct pathways that lead to strong implementation. The logic of incentives is combinatory and complementary, and does not follow a linear or singular pattern [61]. Different combinations of incentives constitute the main explanatory structure and guide attention toward a broader set of incentive interactions, beyond the traditional emphasis on external incentives. This perspective refines the incentive–implementation framework by explaining how different mixes of incentives shape patterns of attention allocation during implementation [62].

In a similar vein, the study extends the analytical focus on norms and the ethics of care [63]. Value commitment and professional ethics occupy a central position within incentive structures [64]. When institutional or material incentives are limited, value-based incentives and symbolic recognition act as alternative sources of motivation. These ethical and normative elements operate within incentive configurations and create motivational effects under specific conditions.

Taken together, the study shows that governmental attention develops through configurational mechanisms. Institutions, incentives, performance signals, and value norms form stable causal linkages in multiple pathways. These pathways generate varied yet comparable outcomes in administrative behavior. The use of fsQCA reveals cross-level interactions and asymmetric causal relations among these elements. The analysis identifies several equifinal configurations that lead to similar patterns of attention and complements linear models of attention and incentives. It also provides a systematic integration of the four theoretical perspectives and presents a testable configurational framework for research on governmental attention.

5.2. Conclusions

This study examines how different incentive mechanisms jointly affect the allocation of governmental attention. The configurational analysis identifies three effective combinations of incentives. These combinations include competition-driven incentives, honor–value compensation incentives and integrated incentives. Each combination fosters a high level of focused governmental attention. They involve five incentive dimensions: honor rewards, promotion opportunities, value incentives, ranking incentives and performance incentives. These incentives operate at both the individual level and the organizational level.

This study offers three practical implications. At the outset, policymakers should adopt an integrated strategy that includes honor rewards, promotion opportunities, value incentives, ranking incentives and performance incentives. Second, the three incentive paths should be applied with flexibility to address the varying motivational structures of administrative personnel. These paths include competition-driven incentives, honor compensation incentives, value compensation incentives and integrated incentives. Third, incentive strategies that reflect contextual differences are essential for reducing attention constraints and improving policy implementation.

The configurational results enrich attention scarcity theory and the incentive–implementation framework. The findings suggest that attention constraints ease when incentive elements create coherent signals across individual and organizational levels. The results further show that implementation outcomes depend on the combination of incentives rather than the strength of a single element. The fsQCA results reveal several equifinal incentive configurations that lead to similar patterns of attention. These patterns enhance theoretical understanding of how incentives translate into implementation-oriented attention allocation.

This study has several limitations that inform future research. The empirical analysis uses a cross-sectional fsQCA design based on data from township governments in an eastern coastal region. This geographic scope restricts the representativeness of the sample and may influence the calibration of perception-based conditions. The configurations identified here may not extend to regions with different institutional settings or resource endowments. Future research can use longitudinal data and contextual variables. It can also conduct cross-regional or cross-sector comparisons to examine the dynamic evolution of incentive configurations and governmental attention allocation. The present design captures set relations between incentives and attention but does not model the strategic interaction between upper-level agencies and township governments. Subsequent studies may complement configurational analysis with formal game theoretic models that describe how actors adjust their strategies under different reward and punishment structures [65]. Recent studies on safety regulation and blockchain-based governance illustrate this evolutionary game approach and provide a methodological reference for future research on governmental attention allocation [66].