Given the many environmental crises challenging the sustainability of the planet—including climate change, excess plastic waste, and biodiversity loss [
1]—understanding predictors of pro-environmental outcomes is a global priority. One well-studied category of predictors of pro-environmental behavior is environmental values (see [
2,
3]). Values are overarching ideals or principles that transcend circumstance in guiding a variety of human behaviors and decision-making processes [
2,
4,
5]. Environmental values, specifically, are the ideals or principles that an individual holds in reference to the health, status, and importance of the natural environment. Individuals endorsing pro-environmental values recognize the natural environment as important and valuable, and such endorsements predict pro-environmental outcomes (e.g., [
6]).
However, there is nuance in the relationship between valuing the natural environment and pro-environmental outcomes [
7]. Research has consistently shown that the reasons underlying people’s valuing of nature—dubbed environmental value-bases (VBs)—uniquely influence pro-environmental intentions and behavior (see [
8]). Reviews of the literature and discourse surrounding the reasons people value nature have revealed at least three bases for valuing nature (see [
9,
10,
11,
12,
13,
14,
15]): (1) valuing nature for its benefits to people based upon anthropocentric, means-to-an-end, or people-based reasons (i.e., an
instrumental basis for valuing nature; Instrumental VBs); (2) valuing nature for its own sake based upon biocentric and ethical reasons or based upon its inherent value (i.e., an
intrinsic basis for valuing nature; Intrinsic VBs); and (3) valuing nature as a participating member of the human–nature relationship or for cultural, collective, or community-oriented reasons (i.e., a
relational basis for valuing nature; Relational VBs; see [
8]).
Despite its long history (e.g., [
5]), much of the quantitative research on VBs and many of the empirical measures that capture the different reasons for valuing the environment have neglected Relational VBs (see [
8]). Even so, recent conceptual work has stressed the importance of relational reasons for valuing nature (see [
16]), and global policy has begun to recognize the importance of the relationship between people and nature. For example, in 2020, the UN Secretary-General ended his speech on the state of the planet by stating, “Now is the time to transform humankind’s relationship with the natural world” [
17], and land-mark policy documents, such as the Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework [
18] and the recent IPBES Transformative Change Assessment [
19], have emphasized the role of people’s relationship with nature and place in addressing environmental crises (see [
20] for a review of similar policy interest). Thus, there is growing recognition that relational elements of the human–nature relationship—including Relational VBs—are an important sustainability target [
20]. There is also a clear need to include Relational VBs in quantitative investigations, since the way we relate to nature is central to why and how different cultures encourage sustainable practices [
21]. For example, knowing which VBs different communities endorse is relevant to successfully matching policies to communities’ reasons for valuing nature, which may enhance the effectiveness of those policies in that the given community [
22]. This matching inherently requires ways of documenting which VBs are most important in different contexts. Finally, beyond trends in the discourse and practical considerations for informing policy, empirical research using a recently validated measure of the three VBs has highlighted Relational VBs as an essential pro-environmental predictor [
8]. Thus, additional investigations into the role of Relational VBs in predicting pro-environmental outcomes are well-warranted, especially in non-Western contexts where Relational VBs might be a more prevalent basis for valuing nature [
13].
The primary purpose of this research is to facilitate such investigations by testing whether the three VBs manifest similarly in a globally diverse sample. Specifically, we aim to test whether the three-factor framework for understanding environmental VBs generalizes outside of the US context in which it was quantitatively validated. Accordingly, we test whether the latent constructs captured by the Environmental Value-Bases Scale are invariant across five cultural regions: two from Eastern cultures (Japan and Taiwan) and three from Western cutlures (Italy, France, and the USA). The cultural variability across these regions (e.g., differences in collectivism, which is found more frequently in Eastern than in Western countries [
23,
24]) allows us to robustly test whether the three-factor framework of environmental VBs generalizes under conditions of considerable cultural variability which may contribute to fundamental differences in the empirical structure of VBs. Thus, demonstrating the validity of this framework, which distinguishes between these three VBs, in regions with vastly different values fills two research gaps: (1) it documents, for the first time, the consistency of such distinctions across cultural regions and (2) advances our practical capacity to study these three VBs by allowing the common use of a single measure in different cultures, making research more comparable across contexts. With regard to the first gap, knowing whether environmental VBs can be treated as reflecting the same three underlying factors, even when using a diverse sample, is an important theoretical contribution that supports further investigating into the potential universality of such a three-factor framework. With regard to the second gap, we demonstrate how a common measure across different regions can be used to answer other research questions, including comparisons of the relative endorsement of the three VBs within and between different cultural regions. Additionally, building upon the considerable work demonstrating that people’s relationship with place [
25] and planet [
26] are important targets for sustainability [
18,
19,
20], we also test whether and how environmental VBs predict place attachment.
1.2. Associations Between Environmental VBs and Pro-Environmental Outcomes
Empirical investigations into the relationship between environmental VBs and pro-environmental outcomes suggest that different reasons for valuing nature have unique effects on pro-environmental outcomes. When tested simultaneously with Instrumental VBs, Intrinsic VBs (e.g., biospheric concern, biocentric values) frequently have a significant, positive association with pro-environmental outcomes [
43,
44,
45,
46,
47,
48]. In contrast, when tested simultaneously with Intrinsic VBs, measures of Instrumental VBs focusing on the self (e.g., egoistic environmental concern, egoistic environmental values) frequently show a negative [
43,
47,
48] or non-significant [
44,
45,
46,
48] association with pro-environmental outcomes. Moreover, measures of Instrumental VBs focusing on other people (e.g., altruistic environmental concern, altruistic environmental values) show inconsistent associations with the same outcomes. Specifically, in some studies, altruism-based measures of Instrumental VBs show non-significant associations [
43,
44,
47,
48], while others show negative [
46,
48] or even positive effects [
43,
45]. Thus, the literature generally indicates that (a) Intrinsic VBs are a strong, positive predictor of pro-environmental outcomes and (b) Instrumental VBs are, at best, an inconsistent predictor of pro-environmental outcomes.
Possibly because there had not been an empirically validated measure of Relational VBs until recently, only one paper has reported the association between Relational VBs and pro-environmental outcomes. In this study, Relational VBs demonstrated a consistent positive association with pro-environmental outcomes across all three studies—even when tested alongside Instrumental VBs and Intrinsic VBs [
8]. In contrast, in the same models, Instrumental VBs showed a consistent negative association with pro-environmental outcomes, and Intrinsic VBs demonstrated an inconsistent association with pro-environmental outcomes [
8]. Thus, these recent results not only reaffirm the differential effects of pro-environmental VBs (i.e.,
why we value nature matters), but also highlight that Relational VBs—which accounted for more than double the variance captured by Intrinsic VBs [
8]—may be especially important pro-environmental VBs worthy of future study, including in other cultures. Accordingly, understanding whether the extant measures can be used to capture the same latent constructs across multiple cultural contexts is vital to supporting such research.
1.3. Primary Research Questions
While the Environmental Value-Bases Scale was developed in the US, the three VBs have been of interest across countries and cultures [
9,
13,
14,
33]. Yet, any time there is cross-cultural interest in a construct that has been validated in only one culture, there is the necessary question of whether that construct generalizes to other cultures or is merely idiosyncratic to the culture in which it was validated (see the early work on basic human values; [
4,
49]). This is no less true in this instance.
While some of the founding conceptual work proposing these three distinct VBs implies that they are globally applicable (see [
9,
14]), there are arguments that relational values, in particular, are inherently place-based and culturally bound—and therefore would not manifest similarly across cultures (see [
50]). Furthermore, while distinguishable into relatively discrete conceptual categories, the three VBs exist on a continuum. Thus, in practice, their boundaries may not be as sharp as implied by the three-factor framework—even given the statistical evidence that they are [
8]. This may be especially true across cultures with vastly different values. It therefore becomes necessary to confirm that these three factors remain distinguishable in diverse cultural contexts if one wishes to propose that these three ways of valuing nature apply globally. At present, however, no work has considered (a) whether the three-factor structure of environmental VBs implied by the conceptual literature (see [
51]) exists in contexts other than the US, let alone (b) whether the
same three-factor structure that applies to the US likewise applies to other vastly different cultural contexts (e.g., non-Western cultures).
Here, we address this gap and focus on whether the three-factor framework validated in the US extends to a more diverse sample of cultural regions: Japan, Taiwan, Italy, France, and the USA. Specifically, we investigate whether the three VBs can be captured effectively and with the same latent structure across different cultural regions by using muti-group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to test the extent to which the latent constructs captured by Relational VBs, Intrinsic VBs, and Instrumental VBs remain invariant across the sampled cultural regions [
52,
53,
54,
55] (see [
56]). We consider three types of measurement invariance: configural, metric, and scalar invariance (see [
55]).
Configural invariance indicates that scale items form the same set of factors across different groups (i.e., all groups have the same number of factors comprised of the same sets of items). In our case, configural invariance would suggest that the items measure
similar constructs across cultural regions [
53,
55] because, much like the evidence used to claim that Schwartz’s Basic Human Values are universal [
4,
49], all of the items tend to be situated in the same
general structure across sub-samples. A failure to find configural invariance suggests that the Environmental Value-Bases Scale has a different factor structure in at least one cultural region and does not measure similar constructs [
53]. For example, we would not likely find configural invariance if some regions reflected the expected three-factor structure while others reflected a one-factor structure where the three VBs are not distinguishable. Such a failure to find configural invariance would preclude further tests of invariance [
55] and would also potentially suggest that the VBs employed outside the US are qualitatively different from the established three-factor framework. Conversely, evidence of a three-factor structure that is present across all regions would be largely consistent with the notion that these values are applicable to a wide range of contexts.
Metric invariance indicates that item loadings are similar enough across different groups that they can be treated as equivalent (i.e., constrained to be equal). Thus, not only would each factor have the same set of items across cultural regions (which would be established via the test of configural invariance), but metric invariance further implies that each factor is reflected by those items in an effectively identical manner because they have the same factor loadings in all groups [
52,
53]. This type of invariance is a prerequisite for comparing regression slopes [
52,
54] because it indicates that the latent construct is measured the same way in each group [
53]. Put colloquially, whereas configural invariance points to the factor distinctions being shared across groups, metric invariance indicates that each of those factors has the same “shape” across groups. A failure to find metric invariance would suggest that the latent constructs assessed by the Environmental Value-Bases Scale are reflected differently in at least one cultural region. A failure at this step precludes any further tests of invariance [
55]. Importantly, this test of metric invariance holds not only methodological and practical value but also represents an important theoretical question. That is, in conjunction with configural invariance, metric invariance represents a test of whether there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the same three latent constructs are captured similarly across groups and with the same structure. In other words, this analysis tests whether the latent constructs of Relational, Instrumental, and Intrinsic VBs generalize to contexts beyond the US.
Finally, scalar invariance indicates that the scale item intercepts are similar enough across groups to be treated as equivalent—meaning that observed item scores are influenced by the same degree of response bias in each group (see [
52]). This type of invariance is necessary for making mean comparisons between groups [
54], especially when comparing observed composite means [
52]. A failure at this step means that any detected group-mean differences across cultural regions
might be due to artifacts such as cultural differences in systematic response biases rather than differences in the underlying latent construct [
52]. In other words, a lack of scalar invariance would make it difficult to know whether any given mean differences among cultural regions are due to meaningful variations in the latent constructs or if they are, instead, due to some systematic bias (e.g., the way one culture uses scale points or methodological differences [
52,
54]). In the event of a failure to produce evidence of full scalar invariance, researchers
can pursue partial scalar invariance by allowing some intercepts to be estimated freely [
52,
55]. However, it is important to note that, even with partial scalar invariance, comparing the observed mean (i.e., based on composites of observed variables) differences between groups is ill-advised, and more advanced comparisons using SEM—in order to compare differences using latent variables—are likely necessary if one wishes to interpret mean differences without concerns about the influence of systematic response biases (see [
52]).
Together, these three research questions represent the first test of whether Relational, Instrumental, and Intrinsic VBs remain distinguishable across cultural contexts, and whether they manifest similarly between Eastern and Western cultures. Based on the initial validation of this scale (see [
8]) and the state of extant research (see [
33]), we expect the same three-factor structure to emerge across sub-samples despite their vast cultural differences. Thus, this research presents a critical theoretical step toward understanding the potential universality of environmental VBs (c.f., Schwartz’s investigations of the universality of human values; [
4]). However, this research also fills a second, more practical gap in the literature. Specifically, a lack of common measurement is one of the factors identified as contributing to the lack of coherence that has been noted within the study of valuing nature (see [
57] for a discussion of this gap). Thus, by potentially providing a measure of all three VBs that can be used across a wide range of cultural contexts, we fill this practical gap, thereby advancing the study of relational and pluralistic VBs toward a more coherent theoretical framework.
1.3.1. Contingent Research Questions
The above research questions test the theoretically and practically important question of whether the latent constructs reflecting Relational, Instrumental, and Intrinsic VBs are generalizable to contexts outside of the US. However, assuming we find evidence of measurement invariance, we have two additional areas of interest: (1) cross-cultural variation in endorsements of the VBs and (2) the relationship between the VBs and place attachment.
Cross-Cultural Variation
While quantitative cross-cultural comparisons in the endorsements of Relational, Intrinsic, and Instrumental VBs have not yet been explored, there is reason to expect the three VBs to vary both between and within cultures. First and foremost, just as there are cross-cultural variations in the importance of human values (e.g., [
4,
58]), there may be cross-cultural differences in the importance of environmental VBs. For example, focusing on Instrumental VBs and Intrinsic VBs (i.e., the instrumental–intrinsic dichotomy; [
34]) to the exclusion of Relational VBs has been the prominent approach in Western cultures [
8]. In contrast, the Nature Futures Framework [
15,
59]—which was derived from a global analysis of discourses surrounding valuing nature that deliberately incorporated the perspectives of indigenous communities—includes a relational perspective alongside the traditionally Western Instrumental and Intrinsic VB perspectives (see also [
13,
14,
15,
59]). The very fact that relational reasons for valuing nature have only emerged when considering a diverse representation of people across cultures and countries implies that there may be cultural variation in the relative importance attributed to the three VBs. That is, in the West, Instrumental and Intrinsic VBs seem to have been so important as to dominate the entirety of the Western discourse. In contrast, Relational VBs were important enough in other parts of the world that they were identified by a global review of the reasons that people value nature [
9,
13,
14].
Second, in addition to conceptual reasons to expect variation in VB endorsements, empirical research provides both direct and indirect evidence to support cross-cultural variations. For example, a qualitative analysis of environmental values in Colombia indicated that relational values were far more prevalent amongst Colombian participants than either instrumental or intrinsic values, which were exceptionally low [
34]. This provides direct evidence that relational values are more important in some cultures than others (and also that they may be differentially important within cultures, as noted below). Indirectly, research suggests that factors routinely differing between cultures, such as collectivism, are associated with endorsements of a broad range of values (e.g., [
60]); if collectivism varies between cultures, then values likely will as well. Similarly, self-construals, which are likewise routinely recognized as culturally bound, are also significantly correlated with environmental values specifically (e.g., [
61]). It therefore stands to reason that there may be cultural differences in the environmental VBs as well. Accordingly, assuming that we can establish invariance (i.e., partial or full scalar invariance), we planned to explore whether there were between-culture differences in the endorsements of Relational VBs, Instrumental VBs, and Intrinsic VBs.
Additionally, as implied above, the long-standing neglect of Relational VBs in Western science until the perspective of non-Western cultures was considered suggests that the relative importance of Relational VBs may be stronger in non-Western cultures (e.g., in our samples, Taiwan and Japan relative to the United States, France, and Italy). For example, collectivism, which tends to be higher in Eastern cultures [
62], is more strongly associated with relational orientations than individualism [
58], which tends to be higher in Western cultures [
62]. Such a pattern, while indirect, suggests that Eastern cultures might more strongly endorse relational environmental VBs than other environmental VBs, whereas Western cultures might show a different within-culture pattern. Practically, if there are cultural differences in the endorsements of environmental VBs, policies—or more general persuasive appeals—emphasizing certain reasons for valuing nature might be accepted differently across cultures [
22]. Therefore, understanding whether and how cultures differ in their endorsements of VBs (both at the between and within levels) is critical for informing how such values should be situated in national and international policy. Thus, assuming measurement invariance, we also plan to explore cross-cultural variations in the within-culture relative endorsements of the VBs.
While we anticipate the structure of the environmental VBs to hold across sub-samples, we expect mean differences across countries, with Relational VBs being higher in Eastern cultures (where collectivism is more prominent, as outlined above).
Place Attachment
Although Relational VBs are quantitatively underexplored, there are related constructs that have been examined more extensively. One such example is place attachment—the bond between people and the places with which they engage [
63]—which is a popular topic of study within environmental social sciences and correlates robustly with pro-environmental behavior (see [
25] for a meta-analysis evidencing the robust place attachment–pro-environmental behavior association). While there is no extant evidence linking place attachment to environmental VBs directly, given that place attachment is associated with a variety of pro-environmental constructs—including pro-environmental attitudes [
64] and concern for the environment [
65]—it is reasonable to expect measures of environmental VBs to predict place attachment.
Moreover, there is reason to expect Relational VBs to be more closely related to place attachment than Instrumental VBs and Intrinsic VBs. First, both Relational VBs and place attachment explicitly focus on the
relationship between humans and the environment, whereas Instrumental VBs and Intrinsic VBs are more narrowly focused on either humans
or the environment, respectively. Furthermore, based upon the association between VBs and constructs similar to place attachment (e.g., other place–self relationship constructs), there is also indirect evidence that Relational VBs and place attachment should be strongly associated. For example, past research has identified differential associations between the three VBs and nature connectedness—the closeness of one’s relationship with nature based upon the extent to which nature is included in one’s sense of self [
20,
66,
67]. Specifically, while the original validation of the Environmental Value-Bases Scale showed that nature connectedness and Relational VBs are, indeed, distinct constructs, Relational VBs had a particularly strong association with nature connectedness—one that happened to be the strongest out of the three VBs [
8]. Accordingly, to the extent that place attachment and nature connectedness represent similar environment–self constructs, we anticipate Relational VBs will be a stronger predictor of place attachment than Instrumental VBs and Intrinsic VBs.
Place attachment, however, is a multidimensional construct with two of its more commonly recognized dimensions being
place identity—the affective attachment one has formed with a place—and
place dependence—one’s sense that the place is able to support one’s achievement of goals and needs (see [
68]). While we generally expect Relational VBs to be associated with both dimensions of place attachment, there might be differences across the dimensions. For example, the affective attachment emphasized in place identity is more similar to the notion of relationships with nature and might be more strongly associated with Relational VBs. In contrast, the emphasis on the achievement of goals and needs found in place dependence may reflect an underlying focus on how nature benefits oneself, which would be more consistent with Instrumental VBs.
Regardless of the ultimate nature of the associations, knowing whether and how place attachment and environmental VBs are related is relevant for both policy and theory. For one, in light of the growing recognition that the relationship between people and nature is a critical target for sustainability (see [
20] for a review of policy documents with such emphasis; see also [
17,
18]), these analyses represent an important test of whether and how environmental VBs shape our relationship with place and the planet. Additionally, they will inevitably inform the discourse surrounding Relational VBs, given that a key conceptual assertion of the proponents of recognizing Relational VBs is that they are inherently place-based (e.g., [
16]). To the extent that this assertion is true, one would expect particularly strong associations between Relational VBs and place attachment. Thus, assuming we can establish the necessary evidence of invariance, we explore whether there are unique associations between the three VBs and the two dimensions of place attachment.