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Article

The Internal and External Factors of Environmental Destructive Behavior in the Supply Chain: New Evidence from the Perspective of Brand-Name Products

by
Tao Xie
1,2,
Jianguo Du
1,*,
Kofi Baah Boamah
1,3,*,
Lingyan Xu
1 and
Mingyue Ma
1
1
School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
2
School of Economic and Management, Nanjing Institute of Technology, Hongjing Ave., Nanjing 211167, China
3
Department of Banking and Finance, University of Professional Studies, Accra 23321, Ghana
*
Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2023, 15(5), 4605; https://doi.org/10.3390/su15054605
Submission received: 6 February 2023 / Revised: 26 February 2023 / Accepted: 27 February 2023 / Published: 4 March 2023
(This article belongs to the Section Economic and Business Aspects of Sustainability)
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Abstract

:
Frequent environmental incidents in the supply chains of brand-name products have dire consequences on the ecological environment and in terms of social development. There have been few considerations of supply chains and enterprise characteristics included in previous research. This paper focuses on the supply chains of brand-name products, and systematically identifies principal factors that influence environmentally destructive behaviors in the supply chain of brand-name products from internal and external viewpoints of the supply chain. Considering the characteristics of the polluting industries, 416 valid questionnaires were obtained by investigating the supply chain of brand-name products in chemical, mechanical, food, and agricultural products, the light industry, and other industries. The results show that: (1) environmentally destructive behavior is differently exhibited in different industries among the investigated supply chains of brand-name products; (2) the enterprises’ attitudes, policies, and investments in pro-environment approaches play a fundamental role in the environmental management of the brand-name products supply chain; (3) environmental legislation and public supervision have significant effects on the environmental management of the brand-name products supply chain; (4) only when environmental regulation is combined with environmental legislation and public supervision is a restriction of environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products triggered. Thus, we suggest that the attribution and sharing mechanisms of environmental responsibility in the supply chain of brand-name products should be established; a “push-pull-anchor” mechanism and coordinated co-governance supervision system for environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products should be built.

1. Introduction

In recent years, there has been public outcry regarding the environmental destructive behavior issues in the supply chain of brand-name products. Brand-name products, such as Zara, Apple, Calvin Klein, Procter and Gamble, and Schaeffler, have reoccurring incidences of environmentally destructive behavior within their supply chain, further highlighting the need for pro-environmental behaviors, public supervision, and tighter regulations in the supply chain of brand-name products [1]. Brand-name products are well loved by consumers and are characterized by high market shares and profitability due to their high popularity and excellent services [2]. Although enterprises in the supply chain exhibit environmentally destructive behavior during the production of brand-name products, it may be difficult to expel such brand-name products in terms of market competition due to factors pertaining to environmental information asymmetry and consumers’ chasing effects [3,4]. Furthermore, there are a lot of members with complex relationships in the supply chain of brand-name products, all of which have strong social networks and marketing impacts. As such, it is difficult for governments to supervise and rebuke the environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products.
Recently, researchers have addressed the topic of environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products. Koplin et al. determined that brand-name product enterprises must take environmental responsibility for suppliers when reporting to stakeholders [5]. This finding was supported by Hartmann et al., who noted that consumers usually hold the brand-name product enterprises responsible for the environmentally destructive behavior of their upstream partners due to “chain liability”, using data from four vignette-based survey experiments [6]. This affirms that the environmental destructive behaviors in the supply chain of brand-name product enterprises have a negative impact on their reputation and market attractiveness. Brand-name product enterprises are often regarded as the core of supply chain operations, amplifying why increasingly more brand-name product enterprises are adopting a supply chain perspective pertaining to pro-environmental behavior management through the regulation of upstream and downstream enterprises [7,8]. Huang et al. stated that core enterprises could have a positive impact on their social responsibility performance through supply chain management [9]. This was vehemently supported by research by Niu, which showed that the environmental behavior of brand-name product enterprises directly affects the environmental behavior of their upstream and downstream enterprises [10]. It has been determined that the environmental management of brand-name product enterprises can impact suppliers’ emission reduction behaviors in two ways: purchase volume allocation and emission-reduction subsidies for suppliers to reduce emissions, driven by brand-name product enterprises [11]. Moreover, Rasheed et al. stated that the personal barriers of supply chain managers could significantly influence intentions to act pro-environmentally, and these intentions could then predict their actual behavior. However, the private green behaviors of supply chain managers did not spill over into their workplace. Furthermore, they also found that organizational-level barriers and subjective norms might reverse green intentions [12].
In addition, the restrictive role of external factors, such as government regulation, subsidies, and public supervision pertaining to environmental behaviors in the supply chain has also been actively discussed by researchers [13]. Zuo focused on the game model of cluster supply chain environmental governance and government supervision [14]. Researchers have argued that the cost of legal supervision by the government, the loss of reputation caused by the misconduct of environmental regulations, and the fines imposed by the government on the emission of byproducts from core enterprises have consequential impacts on the firms and their operations [14,15]. Chen et al. analyzed the impact of consumer preferences and government subsidies on the decision-making mechanisms of a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain. Their research indicated that when consumers have a high degree of recognition regarding the functional quality of remanufactured products, then governments prefer to enact subsidy measures; otherwise, governments prefer to enact taxation measures [16]. Furthermore, Wen et al., Sun et al., and Yu et al. demonstrated that the government’s subsidy strategy and green food certification have significant impact on the green supply chain when the green preferences of consumers are considered [17,18,19].
In summary, environmentally destructive behaviors in the supply chain of brand-name products is not only related to the brand-name product enterprises and their upstream and downstream enterprises, but are also subject to the supervision and restriction of related external stakeholders. However, most of the existing literature has only focused on the environmental behaviors of firms without highlighting the internal and external factors relevant to the enterprises. Furthermore, most studies have ignored the interplay between these factors and the underlying characteristics of enterprises involved in the supply chain (such as enterprise size, industry attributes, ownership, strategy targets, decision-makers or managers, and capital). Therefore, this study specifically explores these influential mechanisms from the perspective of the supply chain considering both the internal and external factors on the environmentally destructive behaviors of brand-name products in the supply chain. Furthermore, this study focuses on the supply chain of brand-name products in terms of chemical, mechanical, food, and agricultural products, the light industry and other heavy polluting industries, all of which are taken as the investigation objects. Accordingly, theoretical implications and management suggestions for effectively governing environmentally destructive behaviors in the supply chain of brand-name products are provided.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and hypothesis, which describes the research hypotheses and the proposed conceptual model. Section 3 outlines the research design and methodology, focusing on the data and variables. Section 4 presents the test results and analysis, focusing on the reliability and validity tests, confirmatory factor analysis, structural equation model fitting analysis, as well as an analysis of the interaction effects of internal and external factors and a difference test of characteristic variables. Section 5 outlines the discussion and implications.

2. Literature Review and Hypothesis

2.1. The Concept of Environmentally Destructive Behavior in the Supply Chain of Brand-Name Products

The pro-environmental behavior of enterprises refers to the general measures taken by enterprises to protect the environment according to their operation targets and development strategies in the face of pressure from the government, markets, and the public [20,21]. Holt investigated the environmental responsibility management status of 149 British companies from the perspective of supply chain management, and found that the larger the company or the company in the high-risk industry, the more inclined they were to choose supplier access restrictions to ensure the overall environmental responsibility level of the company, rather than training suppliers. Due to the limitations of professional technology and supervision costs, many enterprises are often unable to directly supervise the environmental behavior of their suppliers, and can only evaluate the environmental performance of their suppliers based on audits conducted by external professionals [22].
From the perspective of the supply chain, both an enterprise’s pro-environmental and environmentally destructive behaviors are affected by the interactions of the internal and external factors in the supply chain. In particular, the core of the supply chain brand-name products of the enterprise would be affected by the environmentally destructive behavior of their upstream and downstream enterprises through chain liability. Thus, to maintain a good brand reputation, high market shares, and profitability, brand-name product enterprises should manage and supervise the environmentally destructive behavior of their upstream and downstream enterprises from the perspective of supply chain management. Generally, environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products refers to environmental violations and environmental penalties during the production and operations of the supply chain of brand-name products.

2.2. Internal Environmental Management in the Supply Chain

Internal environmental management, or internal supply chain environmental management, refers to the activities of brand-name product enterprises to supervise and manage the environmental behaviors of enterprises in the operation of the supply chain [23]. As Albino and Dangelico determined, through a survey of CEOs of the world’s largest companies, that to most CEOs, sustainable development issues were too extensive and complex, and companies should cooperate with multiple stakeholders to solve problems in sustainable development and achieve sustainable development goals [24]. In the practice of supply chain management, core enterprises may impose strict environmental management requirements on upstream and downstream enterprises. Huang and Shih conducted green supply chain management research from the perspective of pro-environmental behavior and pointed out that strict environmental management requirements can both improve the green supply chain system and also effectively protect the environment, conservation social resources, and generate certain ecological benefits [25]. Vachon and Klassen [26] and Holt [22] incorporated the idea of “green environmental protection” into the supply chain management process to improve the level of environmental management of the supply chain through the selection of suppliers by core enterprises and evaluation, guidance, education, and the supervision of suppliers. Therefore, the following hypothesis were developed:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a).
The more stringent the environmental management of internal enterprises in the supply chain by brand-name product enterprises, the fewer environmental violations will occur in internal enterprises.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b).
The more stringent the environmental management of internal enterprises in the supply chain by brand-name product enterprises, the fewer environmental penalties will be sustained by internal enterprises.

2.3. Enterprises’ Interests in the Supply Chain

Profit accumulation and appropriation among enterprises in the supply chain refers to the distribution of profits obtained by cooperative enterprises in the production and sales links of the supply chain [27]. It has been demonstrated that there are significant differences in the profit accumulation and appropriation among enterprises in the supply chain, which has a significant impact on the willingness of enterprises to carry out environmental responsibilities, improve environmental performance, and achieve pro-environmental management of the supply chain [28]. Varying profit appropriation plans lead to diversities in enterprise resources investment in the supply chain; thus, a reasonable profit-sharing plan can promote an enterprise’s cooperation in the supply chain [29,30]. Through pro-environmental supply chain management, brand name firms can coordinate the environmental management activities of upstream and downstream enterprises, monitor environmental violations, and achieve a win-win situation in terms of environmental performance and reasonable profit shares [31]. Thus, if the incentives of environmental protection are adopted during the profit share in a pro-environmental supply chain, the enterprise’s environmental investment and their environmental performance will be high, as well as a high profit being obtained. Therefore, this study made the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a).
The more profit allocated to pro-environmental enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products, the fewer environmental violations will occur in internal enterprises.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b).
The more profit allocated to pro-environmental protection enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products, the fewer environmental penalties will be sustained by internal enterprises.

2.4. Characteristics of Polluting Enterprises in the Supply Chain

Enterprise characteristics refer to enterprise size, industry attributes, ownership, strategy targets, decision-makers or managers, and capital, among others [32]. Enterprise environmental strategy is based on managers’ understanding of ecological environment and environmental issues, depending on whether managers regard environmental pressure as an opportunity or a threat [33]. Firstly, managers’ environmental attitudes and consciousness are the key influential factor in the pro-environmental behavior of enterprises, in which environmental knowledge is a necessary condition for their decision-making [34]. Secondly, support from middle and senior managers has a significant positive effect on pro-environmental behavior and environmental performance [35,36]. Thirdly, the more an enterprise invests in environmental technology, the more environmental technology patents and pollution control capabilities will be obtained, and accordingly, emissions of pollution will significantly decrease [37,38]. Therefore, it is necessary to actively guide managers to implement pro-environmental behavior, enhance environmental innovation and technology investment, and balance the relationship between environmental performance and economic profits [39]. As such, this study built the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a (H3a).
The more substantial the characteristics of polluting enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products, the more environmental violations will occur in internal enterprises.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b).
The more substantial the characteristics of polluting enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products, the more environmental penalties will be sustained by internal enterprises.

2.5. Environmental Legislation

Environmental legislation refers to the relevant laws and regulations promulgated for the prevention and treatment of undesirable environmental behaviors [40]. Zhang et al. found that implementing urban environmental legislation could significantly improve an enterprise’s green total factor productivity [41]. Environmental legislation can regulate enterprise environmental violations from both positive and negative perspectives [42,43]. On the one hand, the government promotes the implementation of environmental management by enforcing mandatory laws and regulations, such as compulsory measures of sewage taxes and administrative penalties, which can effectively prevent the excessive use of environmental resources and environmental pollution by enterprises [44,45]. On the other hand, the government can also adopt fiscal measures of incentive regulations, such as subsidies, taxes, government procurement, and industrial policies to positively impact enterprise environmental management [46]. Since 2015, the revised “Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China” has come into effect; environmental legislation and standards have been increasingly strict and improved, which have effectively promoted the government’s guidance and supervision of enterprises’ pro-environmental behavior. Thus, this study proposed the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4a (H4a).
The clearer the environmental legislation, the fewer environmental violations will occur in internal enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products.
Hypothesis 4b (H4b).
The clearer the environmental legislation, the fewer environmental penalties will be sustained by internal enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products.

2.6. Environmental Regulation

Environmental regulation refers to government supervision, punishment, incentives, and other measures for the environmental behavior of enterprises in the chain, as well as the timeliness and implementation strength of the measures [47]. Several researchers have asserted that strong environmental regulations by governments can impact environmental behavior and convert the internalization of environmental external costs into production costs [48]. However, because of negative environmental externalization, enterprises are less proactive in implementing green environmental management. A government’s regulatory power is touted to be mainly achieved through feedback of environmental information, requirements, and expectations of the enterprises [49]. Enterprises could make optimal decisions under conditions of government regulations to achieve a win-win outcome for both pro-environmental performance and profit enhancement [50]. However, in practice, enterprises often ineffectively comply with environmental regulations. If there is lax enforcement of environmental regulations, enterprises might not exhibit pro-environmental behavior. Therefore, governments should adopt stricter regulations, financial support, and policy incentives to regulate enterprises to exert pro-environmental behavior when there is inconsistency between the government and enterprises in terms of pro-environmental cognition. Based on the above analysis, this study hypothesized the following:
Hypothesis 5a (H5a).
The stricter the government regulations, the fewer environmental violations will occur in internal enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products.
Hypothesis 5b (H5b).
The stricter the government regulations, the fewer environmental penalties will be sustained by internal enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products.

2.7. Public Supervision

Public supervision refers to the citizens and other organizations having the right to complain and report to the ecological environment department when they find that enterprises have polluted the environment or damaged the ecology [51]. The environmental awareness and supervision activities of residents in the surrounding communities put great pressure on the polluting enterprises, which prompts enterprises to proactively communicate with community residents regarding environmental information as well as their initiatives for environmental management [52]. As the public’s awareness of pro-environment initiatives grows, there will be more incidences of public participation in environmental management in the supply chain, and thus enterprises will experience increasing pressure in terms of environmental violations [53]. When there is inherent interest, the public has greater enthusiasm for pro-environmental behaviors and pollution supervision than other stakeholders [54,55]. Additionally, news media disclosure of environmental pollution could impose immense pressure on the government and polluting enterprises, which would evolve into an informal environmental regulation [56,57]. Furthermore, environmental protection organization’s interests in ecological pro-environment will also increase the possibility and initiative of enterprises to actively implement pro-environmental behaviors [58]. Accordingly, this study put forward the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6a (H6a).
The higher the degree of laxity of public supervision, the more environmental violations will occur in internal enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products.
Hypothesis 6b (H6b).
The higher the degree of laxity of public supervision, the more environmental penalties will be sustained by internal enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products.
Based on the above analysis, the conceptual model proposed in this study is shown in Figure 1.

3. Research Design and Methodology

3.1. Sample and Procedures

The research data used in this study were collected from February 2021 to August 2021, which consisted of preliminary and formal investigations. This study conducted a typical sampling research strategy based on the definition of brand-name products by the State Economic and Trade Commission of China and General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine of China. Accordingly, this study focused on chemical, mechanical, food, and agricultural products, the light industry and other industries with characteristics of polluting to investigate the enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products when considering their product quality, market share, reputation, economic profits, and other factors to verify the above hypothesis. This study also conducted a stratified sampling research strategy to sample enterprises in different industries. The questionnaires were distributed online, by mailing, and in the field to personnel of middle and senior management, staff in environmental departments, and sales departments in the investigated enterprises, who had good knowledge of enterprises’ environmental behavior.
To ensure the correctness and applicability of the measurement scale, a preliminary investigation of the questionnaire was carried out by 30 enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products before the formal investigation by field investigation, and the questionnaire items and language expressions were modified according to the preliminary investigation to form the initial scale, and Cronbach’s α coefficient, which is also referred to as a internal consistency coefficient, was used to test the reliability of the initial scale. The formal investigation was conducted by the means of mailing and online, which finally collected 440 questionnaires, consisting of 224 electronic questionnaires and 216 paper questionnaires, while 24 invalid questionnaires were eliminated because of missing data. Then, the total number of remaining valid questionnaires was 416. Among the valid samples surveyed, the number of brand-name product enterprises in various industries was relatively even. The top four industries were the chemical industry (15.87%), the mechanical industry (14.9%), the food and agricultural product industry (12.02%), and the light industry (9.23%); the enterprises with an operating life of over 20 years accounted for 49.04% in the survey; the enterprises with a staff number more than 1000 accounted for 48.56% in the survey.

3.2. Measurements

The questionnaire in this study consisted of two parts, and responses to each item were made on a five-point scale (1 = completely disagree, 5 = fully agree).
Control variables. The first part of the questionnaire included questions related to control variables, such as industry attributes, enterprise size, and operating life. Because the industry attributes of brand-name product supply chains are different, and their environmental management requirements and standards are accordingly different, the enterprise size and operating life also affected the polluting characteristics of enterprises, which in turn affected the environmental management of brand-name products in the supply chain. With reference to Jiangsu Province brand-name industry classification, this study divided the industry attributes of brand-name products into 12 categories, such as electronics, textiles, chemicals, and machinery, etc. The enterprise size was divided into four categories consisting of 1–100, 100–500, 500–1000, and more than 1000 staff; the operating life of enterprises was divided into four stages, including less than 5 years, 6–10 years, 11–20 years, and more than 20 years.
Dependent variables. The second part of the questionnaire included dependent variables and independent variables. The dependent variables were divided into environmental violations and environmental penalties based on the connotation of environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products. ① According to the “Technical Guide for the Evaluation of Enterprise Environmental Behavior” (2005), environmental violations (EV) were defined as illegal activities in the production and operation activities of enterprises in the supply chain, the failure to provide environmental liability and compensation for ecological environmental damage obligations, etc.; ② environmental penalties (EP) were defined as actions which were punished by environmental violations, warnings, order corrections, fines, and the suspension of production. EV and EP were measured by four items, respectively, and a sample item of the EV read: “The enterprise in the supply chain had an illegal discharge of waste”; while a sample item of the EP read: “The enterprise in the supply chain was condemned by the public for environmental pollution”.
Independent variables. Independent variables consisted of internal factors, such as environmental management (EM), enterprise interests (EI), characteristics of polluting enterprise (CPE), external factors including environmental legislation (EL), environmental regulations (ER), and public supervision of environment (PSE). ① The construct of EM was measured by five items developed by Grimm [59] and Huang [9]. A sample item of EM read: “Brand-name product enterprise requires enterprises in the supply chain to attain ISO14001 certification”. ② EI was measured by five items developed by Zhu [60] and Stafford [61], one of which read: “Brand-name product enterprise would reduce orders or terminate cooperation with those enterprises who had environmentally destructive behavior records”. ③ CPE was measured by five items developed by Cordano et al. [62] and Du [63]; one of the samples read: “Managers of the enterprise in the supply chain are indifferent to environmental laws and regulations”. ④ EL was measured with three items developed by Potoski [64], Valentin [46], and Zhu [65], and one sample read: “The government has set pollution standards for enterprises in the supply chain”. ⑤ While ER was measured with three items developed by Potoski [64] and Zhu [65], and one sample read: “The government explicitly requires enterprises in the supply chain to be responsible for the surrounding environment”. ⑥ With reference to the research results of Gabriel [66] and Lin [67], PSE was measured by three items, in which one sample read: “The news media has low exposure to environmental pollution of enterprises in the supply chain”. Measure of the research scales could be seen in Appendix A.

4. Analysis and Results

4.1. Reliability and Validity Tests

The structural equation model was adopted in this study for empirical research, and the statistical tool SPSS 22.0 was used to analyze the descriptive statistics of the samples, test the reliability and validity of each scale, and demonstrate the correlation between variables. The statistical tool AMOS 22.0 was used to analyze the full model and for hypothesis testing. The reliability of the formal scale is shown in Table 1. It is shown that the reliability of each scale is above 0.7, indicating that the internal consistencies of the scales are high and have valid reliability.
In order to test content validity, the scales adopted in this study should be tested by a pre-test and a trial test. Thus, the survey data were randomly divided into two parts, and each was subjected to exploratory factor analysis (208 samples) and confirmatory factor analysis (208 samples) to test the structural validity of the scales.
Before conducting exploratory factor analysis, the correlation of data were tested by Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) sample measurements and Bartlett’s spherical test. By testing, the KMO of the internal factors scale, the external factors scale, and the environmentally destructive behavior scale were 0.862, 0.837, and 0.935, respectively, which were all higher than 0.8; the significant P values of Bartlett’s spherical test were 0.000, which met the criteria of less than 0.05. Therefore, this sample was suitable for factor analysis. Then, orthogonal rotation through the maximum variance method was conducted for factor analysis, which showed that the components with initial eigenvalues greater than 1 in the three scales of internal factors, external factors, and environmentally destructive behavior were 3, 3, and 2, respectively, which indicated that there were 3, 3, and 2 common factors extracted by three components factor analysis. It was also shown that the observed variables converged on a common factor, and that the factor loads after rotation were all greater than 0.5. Accordingly, the cumulative interpretation of the overall variance was 67.349, 74.657, and 85.168, respectively, which were all over 50%, indicating that the analysis results could be acceptable, and the scales had good internal structure.
The load of environmental management in the supply chain on EM1~EM5 was 0.735, 0.815, 0.844, 0.755, and 0.6, respectively; the load for enterprises’ interests on EI1~EI5 was 0.667, 0.705, 0.755, 0.8, and 0.799, respectively; and the load on CPE1~CPE5 was 0.777, 0.777, 0.841,0.865, and 0.726, respectively. The environmental legislation of ER1~ER3 had loads of 0.785, 0.851, and 0.676, and the environmental regulation of GR1~GR3 had loads of 0.672, 0.847, and 0.869; the public supervision of PSE1~PSE3 had loads of 0.758, 0.866, and 0.756. The load of environmental violations on EV1~EV4 was 0.704, 0.878, 0.667, and 0.682, respectively, and the load of environmental penalties on EP1~EP4 was 0.845, 0.783, 0.859, and 0.83. Based on the above results of exploratory factor analysis, the research data in this paper had good reliability and validity.

4.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

The convergence validity test was conducted using the statistical tools SPSS and AMOS. This study followed the research by Fornell et al. [68], in which the evaluation criteria for convergence validity was described as the standardized factor load should be greater than 0.5, the composite reliability (CR) should be greater than 0.8, and the average variance extracted (AVE) of latent variables should be greater than 0.5. The convergence validity test results are shown in Table 2.
As seen in Table 2, the combined reliability of the “environmental legislation” was 0.771, which was close to 0.8, while other dimensions’ combined reliability were greater than the standard of 0.8. It was also shown that the average variance extraction of each dimension was greater than 0.5, indicating that all the items could consistently explain the variable and the relative measurement error was small. In summary, it was confirmed that the observation indicators of each dimension in the model could be explained to some extent by the corresponding factors, which implied that each dimension in this paper had a certain convergence validity.
Then, a discriminant validity test was conducted in this study by calculating the correlation coefficients and errors between the factors in the subscales. The results showed that correlation coefficients (errors) among the three internal factors were 0.622 (0.05), −0.3 (0.04), and −0.279 (0.02); correlation coefficients (errors) among the three external influential factors were 0.523 (0.03), 0.448 (0.05), and 0.644 (0.01); and correlation coefficient (errors) between the two factors of environmentally destructive behavior was 0.847 (0.05). According to the suggestion of Anderson et al. [69], the results of discriminant validity test met the criterion for which the correlation coefficient between pairwise factors should be less than 0.85, and the interval of each correlation coefficient does not contain 1.0; thus, there were significant differences among the factors.

4.3. Structural Equation Model Fitting Analysis

Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a comprehensive statistical approach to testing hypotheses regarding relations among observed and latent variables. The essence of SEM is to analyze the covariance of two variables, which can handle the relationship between multiple groups of variables at the same time, which is helpful for researchers to carry out exploratory analysis and confirmatory analysis. When the theoretical basis is weak and the relationship between multiple variables is not clear, the relationship between factors cannot be confirmed. Exploratory analysis could be adopted to analyze the relationship between variables. When the research has theoretical support, validation analysis could be applied to verify whether the relationship between variables exists and the influence coefficient of the existing path [70]. The fitting test on the model should be conducted to verify the matching degree between the survey data and theoretical model. The model fitting indicators and results are shown in Table 3. Hypothesis tests and path coefficients are shown in Figure 2.
As can be seen from Table 3, the values of CMIN/DF(χ2 = 868.506, df = 444), IFI, CFI, and RMSEA all satisfy the criterion standard, while the values of RMR, NFI, GFI, and AGFI are close to the criterion standard, although they are smaller than 0.90. From the above fitting indexes, the overall fitting effect of this model could be acceptable.
Testing of the full model (see Figure 2) was accomplished through structural equation modeling using the statistical tool Amos. As shown, in terms of internal influential factors, Hypothesis 1b was supported, which was consistent with the previous research findings [71], indicating that the more stringent the environmental management by brand-name product enterprises in internal enterprises in the supply chain, the fewer environmental penalties, such as public opinion, resident complaints, and administrative penalties, would be imposed on internal enterprises. In addition, Hypotheses H3a and H3b were also supported, which meant that the more significant the characteristics of polluting enterprises, the more environmental violations and penalties would be imposed on internal enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products. This was also demonstrated by Zhang et al. [72], who found that the characteristics of enterprises in the supply chain, such as environmental culture, the environmental protection attitudes of managers, technological innovation, and environmental investment, had great impacts on supply chain environmental management. However, Hypothesis H1a was not supported, which indicated environmental management was not significantly related to environmental violations of enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products. This might be related to the fluke mentality of enterprises, in which, although environmental violations would occur, they might not necessarily be punished, because the profit of enterprises would decrease when the profit of environmental management was less than their cost. The results also showed that Hypotheses H2a and H2b were not supported, which confirmed that although profit of the supply chain was beneficially divided into pro-environmental enterprises, their environmental violations and environmental penalties would not decrease. This may be related to the fact that profits in the supply chain are mainly concentrated in brand-name product enterprises; thus, pro-environmental enterprises fail to compensate their environmental costs, and they even gain a little more profit sharing, while enterprises are willing to take risks in terms of environmental violations and penalties in order to chase more profit.
While in terms of external influential factors, Hypotheses H4a, H4b, H6a, and H6b were supported, H5a and H5b were not supported. Among them, Hypotheses H4a and H4b were supported, which may be because the more perfect the environmental laws and legislations, the more detailed the punishment for environmentally destructive behavior and incentives for pro-environmental behaviors, and the stronger willingness of enterprises to abide by environmental laws and legislations. Hypotheses H6a and H6b were supported, which was consistent with the research findings by Shen [73] and Zhang et al. [74]. They held the opinion that enterprises’ environmental behavior would be affected by multiple stakeholders in the business process, in which the public played a strong role in monitoring and restricting their environmental behavior. However, H5a and H5b were not supported, which might due to the lack of enforcement in environmental supervision by the government during the past few decades, which has led to the low cost of illegal violations in terms of environmental pollution.

4.4. Interaction Effects of Internal and External Factors Analysis

Considering that environmental legislation, government regulation, and public supervision may have interactions with the environmentally destructive behavior of enterprises, and the effects of these interactions may reveal richer management connotations; thus, this study adopted the distribution analysis method proposed by Wen et al. (2014) [75] and the statistical tool Mplus7 to analyze the interaction effects of internal and external factors on the adverse environmentally destructive behavior of enterprises. The detection results of the path are shown in Table 4.
According to the results in Table 4, there was a significant association between the interaction of environmental legislation and environmental regulation on environmental violations in the supply chain, indicating that the more precise and straightforward the environmental legislation and the more stringent the environmental regulation, the fewer environmental violations there would be. In addition, the interaction of environmental legislation, environmental regulation, and public supervision could significantly affect environmental penalties for enterprises in the supply chain. Comparing the results of Figure 2 and Table 4, it can be deduced that if the interaction is not considered, the influence of environmental regulation on the environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products is obviously insufficient; however, if it is adopted in combination with environmental legislation and public supervision, it can play a significant restraining role.

4.5. Difference Test of Characteristic Variables

The method of single-factor variance analysis was conducted to analyze the influence of control variables, such as industry attributes, operating life, and enterprise size, on the environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products. It was found that there were significant differences in industry attributes (F = 2.178, p < 0.1) and enterprise size (F = 2.479, p < 0.1), while no significant difference was found in operating life (F = 0.165, p > 0.1) caused by environmental violations. Comparatively, there was only significant difference in industry attributes (F = 1.687, p < 0.1), while there was no significant difference in enterprise size (F = 1.431, p > 0.1) and operating life (F = 0.109, p > 0.1) by environmental penalties. When comparing the average values, it can be found that the average values of environmental violations and environmental penalties of enterprises in the machinery, chemical, and building materials industries were 2.829, 2.705, 2.684, and 2.823, 2.931, 2.986, respectively, which were significantly higher than those of other industries.

5. Discussion and Implications

5.1. Conclusions

This article constructed a structural equation model of internal and external influential factors on environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products. Through empirical research on brand-name product enterprises and enterprises in their supply chains, the theoretical model and hypothesis were tested. The following conclusions were obtained: (1) environmentally destructive behavior was differently exhibited in different industries among the investigated supply chain of brand-name products; (2) the enterprises’ attitudes, policies, and investment toward pro-environment approaches play a fundamental role in the environmental management of the brand-name products supply chain; (3) environmental legislation and public supervision have significant effects on the environmental management of the brand-name products supply chain; (4) only when environmental regulation is combined with environmental legislation and public supervision can it play its role in restricting environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products.

5.2. Discussion

Through the empirical study of brand-name enterprises and their upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain, this paper constructed a theoretical model and hypothesis for the internal and external influential factors of environmental destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products. This study employed the full model test to reveal their respective influential mechanisms. Consequently, this study extended previous research [5,6] by exploring the impact mechanism from the perspective of the supply chain considering internal and external factors on environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products. Additionally, this study focused on the supply chain of brand-name products in the chemical, machinery and equipment, food and agricultural products, the light industry, and other heavy polluting industries which were conducted in the investigation. Hence, this study not only explicitly revealed the influential factors and mechanism of environmentally destructive behavior from the perspective of the supply chain, but also provided some theoretical support for the management of environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain by brand-name product enterprises and practical recommendations for effective government regulations.
As found in this study, the correlation between environmental regulation and environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products was not significant, which is inconsistent with the research results of Zhang et al. [42]. However, when environmental regulation was adopted in combination with environmental legislation and public supervision, their interactions had a significant effect on environmentally destructive behavior. This result was supported by Wu et al. [76], who suggested that the improvement of regional environmental quality not only required local governments to adopt environmental investment, legislation, and law enforcement, but also required the coordination of government environmental governance and public participation. This paper, therefore, provides comprehensive discussions of the interaction between internal and external factors regarding the influence of environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products.

5.3. Implications

This study was comprised of a framework which attempted to explore the interaction effects of internal and external influential factors on environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products. There were three important key effects revealed by this present study.
Foremost, this study demonstrated that when enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products attach more importance to pro-environmental behavior, pay more attention to environmental legislation, and invest more on pro-environmental technology and innovation, less environmental destructive behavior and penalties are imposed on brand-name product enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to fully enhance their environmental awareness of managers and producers in the supply chain and implement the concept of pro-environmental behavior. At the same time, pro-environmental technologies and facilities of enterprises in the supply chain should be achieved through environmental regulations and subsides from the government and brand-name product enterprises.
Furthermore, this study revealed that a government’s environmental legislation and regulations, and environmental constraints imposed by brand-name product enterprises on enterprises in the supply chain, were important incentive factors for exhibiting pro- environmental behavior. Therefore, it is important to enhance the current reward and punishment measures for the environmental behavior management of enterprises, to achieve clear and fair rewards and punishments. It is also of great importance to actively implement the environmental disclosure system of enterprises, and to effectively protect the fairness of eco-compensation by brand-name product enterprises to pro-environmental enterprises in the supply chain.
Meanwhile, public supervision of consumers, residents, news media, and environmental NGOs would constrain the environmentally destructive behavior of enterprises in the supply chain of brand-name products from different angles. As public supervision has the characteristics of being low cost and having strong effectiveness, it should be encouraged and gradually adopted. On one hand, the public’s environmental awareness and participation should be strengthened by pro-environmental educations; on the other hand, a platform for public participation in environmental supervision should be constructed.
Based on the above analysis, three management recommendations for the management of environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products are provided.
Firstly, the attribution and sharing mechanism of environmental responsibility in the supply chain of brand-name products should be established. Enterprises’ environmental behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products is not only decided by their own behavior, but it is also influenced by the brand-name product enterprise. Therefore, it is reasonable for brand-name product enterprises to play leading roles in taking environmental responsibility for environmental management in the supply chain. Brand-name product enterprises could take measures pertaining to incentives and subsides for pro-environmental production in the supply chain, allocate pro-environmental costs among the enterprises in the supply chain according to the order quantity and profits, and enhance the penalties of environmental violations.
Secondly, a “push-pull-anchor” mechanism for environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products with a social forces should be built. This could be achieved through the pushing force of external entities (government, media, NGO, etc.), pulling power (consumer market, etc.), anchoring power, including the market competitiveness of brand-name products and the impact of brand-name product enterprises in the supply chain. These three mechanisms could form a multilateral check and balance mechanism for environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products.
Thirdly, a coordinated and co-governance supervision system for environmentally destructive behavior in the supply chain of brand-name products should be constructed. The first is to strengthen the effective supervision of local governments, avoiding collusion between governments and enterprises through random checks and regular assessments by upper governments. Furthermore, it is urgent to perfect the existing environmental responsibility of enterprises and public participation in environmental legislation. Additionally, it is fully necessary to activate the media to participate in environmental supervision, in order to supervise the joint responsibility of environmentally destructive behavior by brand-name product enterprises and upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain.

5.4. Limitations and Prospects

Based on the above results, there are still some important extension studies that can be carried out in the future. First, a robustness test could be carried out by adding control variables, substituting variables, etc., in the future. Second, other factors should also be considered, such as the green preference of consumers, enterprise reputation, etc., as influencing factors.

Author Contributions

T.X. and M.M. collected the data and drafted the manuscript; J.D. and K.B.B. designed the study and revised the manuscript; L.X. and M.M. performed the data analysis and finalized the manuscript. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research was funded by the National Social Science Foundation of China (No. 22AGL028); National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72174076 and 71974081); Social Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (No. 22GLA007 and 21GLB016); Special Research Project of Emergency Management School in Jiangsu University: KY-A-04 and KY-C-05.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

Measure of the Research Scales
Environmental Violations (EV)
1. The enterprise in the supply chain had illegally discharge of waste.
2. The enterprise in the supply chain had environmental pollution incidents, and the prevention and control facilities had not been rectified as scheduled.
3. The enterprise in the supply chain took pollution control tasks but not completed as scheduled.
4. Brand-name product enterprise hasn’t control over environmental pollution in the supply chain.
Environmental Penalties (EP)
1. The enterprise in the supply chain was condemned by publics for environmental pollution.
2. Brand-name product enterprise was under the public pressure because of environmental pollution by enterprises in the supply chain.
3. The enterprise in the supply chain was effectively complained by the publics.
4. The enterprise in the supply chain was punished for environmental violations.
Environmental Management (EM)
1.Brand-name product enterprise requires enterprises in the supply chain to attain ISO14001 certification.
2. Brand-name product enterprise requires enterprises in the supply chain strictly observe the environmental protection law.
3. Brand-name product enterprise requires enterprises in the supply chain for clean production
4. Brand-name product enterprise requires enterprises in the supply chain to meet pollutants emission standards.
5. Brand-name product enterprise monitors the environmental behavior of enterprises in the supply chain.
Enterprises’ Interests (EI)
1. Brand-name product enterprise would reduce orders or terminate cooperation with those enterprises who had environmentally destructive behavior records.
2. Brand-name product enterprise would increase orders or enhance cooperation with enterprises in the supply chain who actively adopt green environmental behavior.
3. Brand-name product enterprise would offer green subsidies to enterprises in the supply chain who actively adopt green environmental behaviors.
4. Enterprises who adopt green environmental behaviors in the supply chain are more likely to gain more market share.
5. Enterprises who adopt green environmental behaviors in the supply chain are more likely to gain the focus and favor of consumers.
Characteristics of Polluting Enterprise (CPE)
1. Managers of the enterprise in the supply chain are indifferent to environmental laws and regulations.
2. Managers of the enterprise in the supply chain don’t care about the clean production technologies.
3. Environmental protection equipment are relatively simple in the enterprise of the supply chain.
4. The enterprise in the supply chain are not active in the development of environmental protection technology.
5. The enterprise in the supply chain haven’t set up environmental funds.
Environmental Legislation (EL)
1. The government has set pollution standards for enterprises in the supply chain.
2. The government regularly levies sewage charges, border taxes and deposits on the enterprises in the supply chain.
3. The government has taken penalties for environmental pollution by enterprises in the supply chain.
Environmental Regulation (ER)
1. The government explicitly requires enterprises in the supply chain to be responsible for the surrounding environment.
2. The government regularly monitors the environmental behavior of enterprises in the supply chain.
3. The government provides subsidies, tax incentives and technical guidance to enterprises in the supply chain who actively adopt green environmental behavior.
Public Supervision of Environment (PSE)
1. Public’s pressure on environmental pollution of enterprises in the supply chain is weak.
2.The news media has a low exposure to environmental pollution of enterprises in the supply chain.
3. Environmental NGOs rarely complain or sue enterprises in the supply chain for environmental pollution.

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Sustainability 15 04605 g001 550
Figure 1. Research Framework.
Figure 1. Research Framework.
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Sustainability 15 04605 g002 550
Figure 2. Results of full model testing.
Figure 2. Results of full model testing.
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Table
Table 1. Reliability test results of formal scales.
Table 1. Reliability test results of formal scales.
ScalesNumber of ItemsCronbach’s α
Internal factors in the supply chainInternal Environmental Management (EM)50.8690.7130.825
Enterprises’ interests (EI)50.861
Characteristics of polluting enterprises (CPE)50.867
External factors in the supply chainEnvironmental legislation (EL)30.7670.877
Environmental regulation (ER)30.856
Public supervision of environment (PSE)30.820
Environmental destructive behaviorEnvironmental violations (EV)40.9260.963
Environmental penalties (EP)40.951
Table
Table 2. Convergence validity test results.
Table 2. Convergence validity test results.
DimensionItemsFactor LoadingCronbach’s αCRAVE
Internal environmental managementEM10.630.8690.8790.597
EM20.84
EM30.90
EM40.78
EM50.68
Enterprises’ interestsEI10.820.8610.8520.538
EI20.85
EI30.69
EI40.61
EI50.67
Characteristics of polluting enterprisesCPE10.580.8670.8570.553
CPE20.60
CPE30.82
CPE40.93
CPE50.73
Environmental legislationEL10.690.7670.7710.530
EL20.78
EL30.71
Environmental RegulationER10.660.8560.8660.688
ER20.96
ER30.84
Public supervision of environmentPSE10.720.8200.8330.632
PSE20.97
PSE30.66
Environment
Violation		EV10.790.9260.9260.759
EV20.79
EV30.95
EV40.94
Environment
penalties		EP10.930.9510.9530.834
EP20.85
EP30.96
EP40.91
Table
Table 3. Model fitting index.
Table 3. Model fitting index.
Fitting IndicatorsCMIN/DFRMRGFIAGFINFIIFICFIRMSEA
Criterion standard<3<0.05>0.90>0.90>0.90>0.90>0.90<0.08
Full model1.9560.1520.7910.7520.8390.9140.9130.068
Table
Table 4. Interaction effects.
Table 4. Interaction effects.
PathRelationshipPath CoefficientS.E.Est./S.E.Two-Tailed p-Value
ER × GR→EV−−0.6150.220−2.7990.005
ER × PSV→EV+0.5270.4971.0610.289
GR × PSV→EV−−0.1610.431−0.3740.708
ER × GR × PSV→EV−−0.2190.150−1.4650.143
ER × GR→EP+0.4310.3201.3460.178
ER × PSV→EP−−0.2550.484−0.5260.599
GR × PSV→EP+0.1500.5300.2840.776
ER × GR × PSV→EP+0.6600.3451.9140.056
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Xie, T.; Du, J.; Boamah, K.B.; Xu, L.; Ma, M. The Internal and External Factors of Environmental Destructive Behavior in the Supply Chain: New Evidence from the Perspective of Brand-Name Products. Sustainability 2023, 15, 4605. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15054605

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Xie T, Du J, Boamah KB, Xu L, Ma M. The Internal and External Factors of Environmental Destructive Behavior in the Supply Chain: New Evidence from the Perspective of Brand-Name Products. Sustainability. 2023; 15(5):4605. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15054605

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Xie, Tao, Jianguo Du, Kofi Baah Boamah, Lingyan Xu, and Mingyue Ma. 2023. "The Internal and External Factors of Environmental Destructive Behavior in the Supply Chain: New Evidence from the Perspective of Brand-Name Products" Sustainability 15, no. 5: 4605. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15054605

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