State-Owned Equity Participation and Corporations’ ESG Performance in China: The Mediating Role of Top Management Incentives
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Research Hypothesis
2.1. Antecedents of Corporations’ ESG Performance
2.2. Complex Ownership Structure with State-Owned Equity Participation
2.3. State-Owned Equity Participation and ESG Performance
2.4. Top Management Incentives, State-Owned Equity Participation, and ESG Performance
2.5. Firm Size, State-Owned Equity Participation, and ESG Performance
2.6. Digital Transformation, State-Owned Equity Participation, and ESG Performance
3. Research Design
3.1. Sample Selection and Data Sources
3.2. Variable Definition and Measurement
3.2.1. The Dependent Variable
3.2.2. Independent Variables
3.2.3. Mediating Variable
3.2.4. Control Variables
3.3. Model Building
4. Empirical Results and Analysis
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.2. Hypothesis Testing
4.2.1. Main Regression Results
4.2.2. Mediating Effect: Top Management Incentives
4.3. The Impact of State-Owned Equity Participation and Enterprise Scale on ESG Performance
4.4. The Impact of State-Owned Equity Participation and Enterprise Digital Transformation on ESG Performance
4.5. Endogeneity and Robustness Test
4.5.1. Endogeneity Test
4.5.2. Robustness Test
5. Conclusions and Discussion
5.1. Research Conclusions
5.2. Contributions
5.3. Managerial Implications
5.4. Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Type | Variable Name | Symbol | Measure |
---|---|---|---|
Dependent variable | ESG performance | ESG | According to the evaluation system of the SNSI ESG, it is assigned a score of “9”–“1”, from high to low |
Independent variables | State-owned shareholding | State1 | The proportion of state-owned equity in the top ten shareholders |
Equity balance degree | State2 | The ratio of state-owned shares to non-state-owned shares among the top ten shareholders | |
Mediating variable | Top management incentives | Salary | The natural logarithm of the total compensation of the top three executives |
Control variables | Enterprise size | Size | The natural logarithm of the total assets |
Enterprise age | Age | The natural logarithm of the current year minus the year the company was founded | |
Assets–liabilities ratio | Lev | The ratio of total liabilities to total assets | |
Enterprise growth | Growth | The growth rate of the enterprise sales revenue | |
Separation of ownership and control | Sep | The difference between the control and ownership held by the ultimate controller | |
The first shareholding ratio | First | Direct controlling shareholder shareholding/total number of shares × 100 | |
Equity incentives | Inc | If there is an equity incentive plan in the current year, the value is 1; otherwise, it is 0 | |
Strategic Change Index | Tra | The sum of the six indicators related to strategic change | |
Regional nature | East | If the place of incorporation is in the eastern region, the value is 1; otherwise, it is 0 | |
Industry | Ind | Industry dummy variable | |
Year | Year | Year dummy variable |
Variable | Obs | Mean | SD | Min | p50 | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ESG | 14,758 | 4.022 | 1.152 | 1.000 | 4.000 | 8.000 |
State1 | 14,758 | 0.033 | 0.070 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.380 |
State2 | 14,758 | 0.041 | 0.099 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.612 |
Salary | 14,758 | 14.443 | 0.689 | 12.794 | 14.414 | 16.416 |
Size | 14,758 | 21.816 | 1.085 | 19.687 | 21.691 | 25.266 |
Age | 14,758 | 2.839 | 0.334 | 1.386 | 2.890 | 4.143 |
Lev | 14,758 | 0.370 | 0.191 | 0.0500 | 0.352 | 0.866 |
Growth | 14,758 | 0.349 | 0.842 | −0.776 | 0.139 | 6.078 |
Sep | 14,758 | 5.641 | 7.708 | 0.000 | 0.979 | 29.32 |
First | 14,758 | 40.759 | 16.142 | 10.750 | 39.335 | 80.350 |
Inc | 14,758 | 0.328 | 0.469 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Tra | 14,758 | −0.095 | 2.513 | −3.396 | −0.793 | 12.314 |
East | 14,758 | 0.767 | 0.423 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) |
---|---|---|---|
ESG | ESG | ESG | |
State1 | 0.3275 ** | ||
(2.3533) | |||
State2 | 0.2173 ** | ||
(2.2548) | |||
Size | 0.2240 *** | 0.2212 *** | 0.2218 *** |
(21.4581) | (21.0639) | (21.1607) | |
Age | −0.0379 | −0.0452 | −0.0447 |
(−1.2990) | (−1.5414) | (−1.5228) | |
Lev | −1.2810 *** | −1.2802 *** | −1.2810 *** |
(−22.0860) | (−22.0732) | (−22.0851) | |
Growth | 0.0400 *** | 0.0404 *** | 0.0404 *** |
(3.4237) | (3.4514) | (3.4519) | |
Sep | −0.0049 *** | −0.0050 *** | −0.0050 *** |
(−3.9339) | (−4.0431) | (−4.0302) | |
First | 0.0089 *** | 0.0092 *** | 0.0092 *** |
(15.0454) | (15.1585) | (15.1508) | |
Inc | 0.1634 *** | 0.1646 *** | 0.1648 *** |
(8.3057) | (8.3697) | (8.3774) | |
Tra | −0.0478 *** | −0.0478 *** | −0.0478 *** |
(−12.7082) | (−12.7073) | (−12.7073) | |
East | 0.1097 *** | 0.1132 *** | 0.1130 *** |
(4.9724) | (5.1257) | (5.1151) | |
Constant | −0.8926 *** | −0.8406 *** | −0.8513 *** |
(−3.5286) | (−3.3098) | (−3.3563) | |
Year | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control |
N | 14758 | 14,758 | 14,758 |
0.1129 | 0.1132 | 0.1132 | |
F | 56.01 | 54.69 | 54.69 |
Variable | Top Management Incentives | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Salary | ESG | Salary | ESG | |
State1 | 0.4100 *** | 0.2782 ** | ||
(5.3909) | (2.0664) | |||
State2 | 0.2711 *** | 0.1907 ** | ||
(5.0951) | (1.9806) | |||
Salary | 0.0982 *** | 0.0984 *** | ||
(6.0225) | (6.0511) | |||
Constant | 7.4060 *** | −1.5680 *** | 7.3924 *** | −1.5786 *** |
(53.7502) | (−5.6312) | (53.7065) | (−5.6776) | |
Controls | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control |
N | 14,758 | 14,758 | 14,758 | 14,758 |
0.3469 | 0.1155 | 0.3467 | 0.1154 | |
F | 206.51 | 54.49 | 206.46 | 54.48 |
Variable Name | Indirect Effects | Coefficient | 95% Confidence Interval | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Effect | SD | Lower Limit | Upper Limit | ||
State1 | Salary | 0.030 | 0.009 | 0.012 | 0.048 |
State2 | Salary | 0.020 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.033 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Large Enterprise | Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises | High DT | Low DT | |||||
ESG | ESG | ESG | ESG | ESG | ESG | ESG | ESG | |
State1 | 0.5212 *** | −0.0315 | 0.2880 * | 0.3889 | ||||
(2.9354) | (−0.1427) | (1.7363) | (1.5322) | |||||
State2 | 0.3352 *** | −0.0142 | 0.1973 * | 0.2458 | ||||
(2.7842) | (−0.0902) | (1.7171) | (1.3980) | |||||
Constant | −1.8802 *** | −1.9038 *** | −0.9050 | −0.9030 | −0.8348 *** | −0.844 *** | −0.7536 | −0.7657 |
(−4.0142) | (−4.0677) | (−1.6366) | (−1.6336) | (−2.7811) | (−2.8152) | (−1.5827) | (−1.6102) | |
Controls | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
N | 7339 | 7339 | 7419 | 7419 | 10,147 | 4611 | 10,147 | 4611 |
0.1037 | 0.1036 | 0.1331 | 0.1331 | 0.1181 | 0.1181 | 0.1123 | 0.1123 | |
F | 38.91 | 38.94 | 34.38 | 34.38 | 41.04 | 41.03 | 17.45 | 17.46 |
Variable | PSM | IV | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | First | Second | First | Second | |
ESG | ESG | State1 | ESG | State2 | ESG | |
State-m | −1.326 *** | −1.922 *** | ||||
(−11.364) | (−11.468) | |||||
State1 | 0.3200 ** | 4.9882 *** | ||||
(2.2994) | (3.2788) | |||||
State2 | 0.2139 ** | 3.4409 *** | ||||
(2.2191) | (3.2803) | |||||
Constant | −0.8046 *** | −0.8147 *** | −0.1079 *** | −0.1004 | −0.1162 *** | −0.2388 |
(−3.1598) | (−3.2034) | (−0.015) | (−0.2869) | (0.022) | (−0.7416) | |
Controls | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Under-identification | p = 0.00 | |||||
Weak identification | 47.53 > 16.38 | 131.517 > 16.38 | ||||
N | 14,726 | 14,726 | 14,758 | 14,758 | 14,758 | 14,758 |
0.1132 | 0.1132 | 0.124 | 0.0432 | 0.109 | 0.0441 | |
F | 54.58 | 54.58 | 59.78 | 51.38 |
Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Poisson | Lag Regression Results | |||||
ESG | ESG | ESG(t-1) | ESG(t-1) | ESG(t-2) | ESG(t-2) | |
State1 | 0.0807 ** | 0.5360 *** | 0.7363 *** | |||
(2.2998) | (3.3618) | (3.9728) | ||||
State2 | 0.0536 ** | 0.3429 *** | 0.4602 *** | |||
(2.2040) | (3.1015) | (3.5756) | ||||
Constant | 0.1580 ** | 0.1553 ** | −0.2814 | −0.3045 | −0.3013 | −0.3324 |
(2.4707) | (2.4320) | (−0.9448) | (−0.8723) | (−1.0130) | (−0.9534) | |
Controls | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
N | 14,758 | 14,758 | 11,771 | 11,771 | 9358 | 9358 |
0.0899 | 0.0802 | 0.0898 | 0.0799 | |||
F | 41.79 | 28.68 | 41.61 | 28.50 |
Variable | WIND ESG | HAC | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
ESG | ESG | ESG | ESG | |
State1 | 0.5031 *** | 0.3275 * | ||
(3.6502) | (1.8332) | |||
State2 | 0.3592 *** | 0.2173 * | ||
(3.6326) | (1.7652) | |||
Constant | 4.1829 *** | 4.1700 *** | −0.8406 ** | −0.8513 ** |
(16.8716) | (16.8574) | (−2.4195) | (−2.4530) | |
Controls | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Year | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Ind | Control | Control | Control | Control |
N | 8966 | 8966 | 14,758 | 14,758 |
0.144 | 0.144 | |||
F | 50.73 | 50.69 | 33.97 | 33.97 |
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Qian, T.; Yang, C. State-Owned Equity Participation and Corporations’ ESG Performance in China: The Mediating Role of Top Management Incentives. Sustainability 2023, 15, 11507. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151511507
Qian T, Yang C. State-Owned Equity Participation and Corporations’ ESG Performance in China: The Mediating Role of Top Management Incentives. Sustainability. 2023; 15(15):11507. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151511507
Chicago/Turabian StyleQian, Ting, and Caoyuan Yang. 2023. "State-Owned Equity Participation and Corporations’ ESG Performance in China: The Mediating Role of Top Management Incentives" Sustainability 15, no. 15: 11507. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151511507
APA StyleQian, T., & Yang, C. (2023). State-Owned Equity Participation and Corporations’ ESG Performance in China: The Mediating Role of Top Management Incentives. Sustainability, 15(15), 11507. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151511507