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Sustainability
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2 March 2022

Implementation and Early Adoption of an Ethereum-Based Electronic Voting System for the Prevention of Fraudulent Voting

Liberal & Arts College, Anyang University, Anyang-si 14028, Korea
This article belongs to the Special Issue Sustainable and Human-Centric E-Commerce

Abstract

Today’s online voting systems pose security concerns and cannot be used for public elections, while offline voting costs significantly more. As a result, a decentralized electronic voting system is emerging, backed by blockchain technology. With blockchain technology applied to online voting, the system can guarantee transparency and confidentiality because individual voter information and aggregate information are stored in a distributed fashion. Due to its decentralized nature, a blockchain-based voting system is more secure than the existing central server-based online voting system. In this study, an Ethereum-based electronic voting system was developed. This system resolves the issue of fraudulent voting by enhancing the safety and reliability of the electronic voting system.

1. Introduction

While information technology has brought about many changes to our daily lives, our democracy requires the adoption of electronic voting to progress further. Centralized electronic voting methods emerged as an alternative to paper voting, resolving the problem of the low voting rate, as voters are not restricted by time or physical location. However, as it is relatively easy to tamper with and manipulate data, the integrity of online voting cannot be guaranteed during the counting process due to arbitrary manipulation or third-party attacks.
At its core, a blockchain-based decentralized form of electronic voting applies distributed ledger technology (DLT) [1]. Every voting participant becomes a member and maintains the integrity of the voting results by possessing one’s voting data and synchronizing them. In other words, the system operates in a way in which voting data do not exist in a centralized repository. Therefore, the system makes it difficult to tamper with and manipulate voting data and prevents invalid or illegal votes, guaranteeing voting integrity and ensuring high reliability [2]. However, this method eventually requires the disclosure of the voting information of all users because it matches users one-to-one with an account address and records the account address and transaction details as a transaction history in the block. Therefore, this method cannot be applied to anonymous voting, as it violates the principle of confidentiality.
Electronic voting is a digitized voting method in which election processes, such as voter registration, voting, and ballot counting, are conducted online [1]. Since voters are not required to visit a specific location to cast a vote, costs can be minimized, and the participation rate can be increased because the system provides greater convenience to voters. Hence, many countries and institutions are paying ever-increasing attention to adopting an electronic voting system. Despite its benefits, the current electronic voting system is rarely adopted in practical use cases due to its security and reliability issues [2].
Therefore, in this study, a blockchain-based online voting system was developed by applying distributed ledger technology as an alternative to the existing server-based online voting system. In this study, the Ethereum platform was selected among the different blockchain technologies, and the voting system was developed using smart contracts based on Solidity, Ethereum’s programming language.

3. Design of Electronic Voting Systems Based on Blockchain

Follow My Vote is a blockchain-based electronic voting system implemented online that uses blockchain to prove to voters and observers that votes have not disappeared from the ballot box. Since the launch of Follow My Vote, Zhao and Chan proposed a Bitcoin lottery-based system. By eliminating the need for a central authority to decrypt the votes after the election period, this new approach does not need to encrypt votes and uses a random number value to hide the voting behavior and the voter’s relationship. It was verified to determine the authenticity of the votes. Most recently, Bistarelli et al. proposed an electronic voting protocol using Bitcoin. This divided the election organization into two entities, one for authentication and the other for token distribution that grants voting rights [27].
The aforementioned Bitcoin blockchain-based electronic voting system could not implement the functions of a complete voting system, such as validating voters and restricting administrative access, due to the Turing-incomplete characteristic of Bitcoin. Instead, the blockchain was partially used. On the other hand, in the case of Ethereum, which supports a Turing-complete language, it was possible to use smart contracts to verify the voters and to implement the entire voting system [28].
In this study, we designed an electronic voting system based on Ethereum blockchain technology. We configured a blockchain network and developed an electronic voting contract (based on Solidity) to facilitate the storage of voting results in a distributed manner. As such, this study resolved the issue of trust and security through distributed storage that maintains consistency in the aggregate voting results [29].
The system consists of five separate modules (USER, CONTRACT, FILE, TRANSACTION, and MAILING). The USER module is categorized into createUser, getUser, login, modifyUser, and deleteUser. The CONTRACT module is categorized into addContract, and findContract. The FILE and MAILING modules are configured alone. The TRANSACTION module is categorized into createTransaction, getSenderTransaction, getRecipientTransaction, and acceptTransaction. In this study, we designed and configured the APIs and models according to each module above [30].
The system configuration uses a blockchain-based Interplanetary File System (IPFS) storage method. Figure 3 indicates the system configuration [31]. This system adopted the node.js server to maximize the system performance and used Ethereum to support a blockchain-based distributed computing network. The blockchain-specific storage system IPFS was used for smart contract document storage and allowed access to the documents based on the application programming interface (API) provided by the IPFS [10]. For transferring documents on the IPFS, web3.Js was used. On an Ethereum virtual machine (EVM), byte code was used to enable mutual transferring between smart contracts. As this system manages contracts via blockchain, it enables the secure and trustworthy management of online contracts. While managing a contract by registering a transaction on this platform does not have the same legal effect as reporting to an institution, managing a contract on this platform can in itself have the effect of notarization. Therefore, using this system can prove that the company makes its contracts transparent to customers who wish to use its services. Moreover, from the customer’s point of view, fraud can be prevented just by signing a contract with a company that manages its contracts in this system.
Figure 3. System architecture.
Figure 4 shows a flowchart of a blockchain-based electronic voting system. The block stores voter authentication and voting records, and voters store voter information and voting records through wireless communication. The stored block is safely stored in the block through an encryption key, and voters receive voter confirmation through the voter list server. The authenticated voter transmits the voting result to the voting server, and the recorded information provides the voting result through the voting result server. To build such a stable system, the Election Commission proposes policies, and these policies are stored in the voting server. Each server is stably managed and processed through an encryption key.
Figure 4. Flowchart of block-based electronic voting system.
  • Voting Counting Server: Counts the result of the voter.
  • Voting Counting Result: Visualizes and provides the results of the voting counting server.
  • Voting Server: Server that determines the voting recorded information of the voter.
  • Voter List Server: Server that certifies whether the voter has authority.
  • Voter List: Voter performs personal authentication and votes using a smartphone or PC.
  • Key: Voter is authenticated through an encryption key when storing information in a block or voting. Information sharing between all servers is activated through an encryption key.
  • Block: Stores Ethereum-based voter information.
Step 1. The voter verifies the voter’s identity information in the block of the blockchain.
Step 2. The block information is obtained from the voter list server.
Step 3. When a voter casts a vote, it is stored in a block and the voting result is sent to the voting server.
Step 4. The voting server results are sent to the voting counting server.
Step 5. The voting counting server visualizes the settled result and displays it on the screen.
Figure 5 shows a flowchart of the system configuration diagram. The Ethereum platform was adopted for the development of the blockchain electronic voting system. To test this system, a web page based on Express.js was built. The blockchain was controlled in an RPC-based test net environment, and the linkage between the front-end and the blockchain system was done through the Web3.js module.
Figure 5. Flowchart of system structure.

4. Implementation of the Electronic Voting System

In this study, we selected the Ethereum platform to develop the blockchain for the electronic voting system. To test this study, we built a webpage based on Express.js. The blockchain was controlled on an RPC-based test net environment, while the front-end and blockchain system integration was conducted via the Web3.js module.
Figure 6 displays a part of the voting source in the smart contract. The task of opening a vote is conducted by deploying a smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain network. A distributed contract consists of a unique contract owner (contractOwner), an array of candidates (candidateList), and the number of votes received per candidate (votesReceived). When a voter casts a vote for a specific candidate in a web browser, the voteForCandidate function of the smart contract is called. The alreadyVoted function determines whether the voter has cast a vote, and the votesReceived value increases according to the result. When the vote ends and the results need to be aggregated, the totalVotes for the function is called.
Figure 6. Example of smart contract source.
This study proposes a new way to guarantee confidentiality based on a database. This application generates a new account address using the member ID and password that a voter has initially input during the sign-up process. To ensure confidentiality, we encrypted the accounts and stored them in a database along with the member ID values. For encryption, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption algorithm of the Crypto-js API was used. The AES encryption algorithm is a block cipher using a symmetric key and is widely used worldwide due to its high safety and speed. In this system, the AES encryption algorithm is used in consideration of the safety of the improvement of blockchain-based transaction processing and the prevention of forgery. The encryption key uses a password. The voter can initially sign up and log in to access the system. During login, the stored value in the database is called back and decrypted to obtain the account address, which is set as the session value. During the vote, the session value is set as the transaction’s departure address to proceed with the vote.
Figure 7 shows the result screen according to the voting procedure. Through voting, a smart contract is generated, which is then stored in a new block. To be stored in a new block, a certain gas fee must be paid.
Figure 7. Interface of electronic voting result.
Figure 8 indicates the smart contract that was generated from the vote. The functions of an online voting smart contract include voting (vote()), confirming vote (voteClosed()), counting votes (voteCount()), and so forth. When a voter votes, the candidate name must be input into the voter account, whereby the vCount of the voter is counted. To prevent multiple votes from the same voter, the system records the account of a voter who already voted (msg.sender) as true to mark the count. In the contract owned by each account, no more votes can be cast due to the “true” value recorded if the vote was already done (voteClosed()). As a confirmation of the vote count (voteCount()), the system can return the current vote count (vCount) by entering the candidate name. While the study has intentionally made the count status private for visibility purposes, the verification can be made public for confirmation.
Figure 8. Generated smart contract.
However, there are still problems to be solved in blockchain-based electronic voting. Electronic voting in this system complies with the principle of universal and equal elections but is weak in terms of the principle of direct election. According to the principle of direct election, voters must directly participate in voting activities without going through a third party by giving an authentication code to participate in the election through the voter’s personal information (e-mail, etc.) corresponding to the election. However, it is impossible to check whether the voters themselves participated in the voting activities in a movable place other than the designated place, as the voting activity is out of the control of the monitoring body. In addition, there is a risk of proxy voting due to personal information theft and coercion, as each must participate in voting using their own communication devices.

5. Characteristics and Contributions of the Electronic Voting System

Electronic voting and paper voting methods are technically unreliable and make it difficult to guarantee the principle of secret elections. In this study, we implemented an electronic voting system that safely stores voting details in a blockchain and guarantees the principle of secret elections.
The main characteristic of this method is that it is a network-based distributed system that operates without a central institution acting as an intermediary for transactions. Therefore, all transaction details are open and shared, so traceability is possible and information transparency is maintained. In a system using blockchain, once data or information is included in the blockchain, forgery and tampering are impossible, so the safety of the information is guaranteed. Due to the development of this system, the physical limitation of direct voting, which is difficult for everyone to participate in, has been overcome, and more citizens have participated in policy decision-making. The voting process was simplified, which resulted in a reduction in voting costs. In addition, unlike the existing paper voting system, it is easy to participate anytime, anywhere, so the overall turnout has increased.
(1) Privacy
There is no correlation between the identity of the voter and the address of the blockchain, and in the process of authentication and granting voting rights, the certification body cannot link the identity of the voter with the blockchain address of the voter derived from the random seed. Therefore, the voter’s voting results cannot be tracked, thus protecting the privacy of voters.
(2) Accuracy
The start function of the voting contract can only be executed during the voting period, and only votes cast within the voting period are counted in the blockchain. In addition, if you do not have a token, you cannot participate in voting, and the transfer function used for the token transfer uses two required functions to prevent illegal token transfers to ensure voting accuracy.
(3) Fairness
Voting results can only be viewed after the time defined through the setTime function has passed; if the getCount and getResult functions are executed before the end time, the required function is executed and the contract is terminated. Through this, the fairness of voting is ensured by preventing the leakage of the results of voting by authorized persons.
(4) Eligibility
The addresses of voters who do not have tokens because they are not stored in the contract cannot participate in voting.
(5) Verifiability
Because the contract is distributed through the public blockchain Ethereum, anyone can verify the transaction, and data forgery is difficult due to the characteristics of the blockchain.
(6) Robustness
In the blockchain system, Ethereum miners independently verify blocks, and in the case of a voting system composed of smart contracts included in the blocks, forgery is difficult due to the characteristics of the blockchain. In addition, the voting period can be set only once by the voting manager, and while voting is in progress, the manager cannot perform any actions that may affect the voting system, such as inquiring and changing the voting results through the verification of the voting period.
(7) Safety against soundness, duplicate voting, and forced ticketing
If a person who has already participated in voting through the variable doubleVote wants to vote, the update function that can vote again is executed. This makes it impossible to vote for two candidates, and when re-voting, the number of votes cast for the existing candidate decreases and the number of votes for the newly selected candidate increases. Accordingly, even if a ticket is purchased by force, only the results of the re-voting are reflected in the end. In addition, re-voting attempts are recorded on the blockchain and can be detected through future audits.
(8) Safety of Voting Claims (Receipt Freeness)
By configuring the private key that constitutes the blockchain address so that it cannot be leaked or damaged, the public blockchain address and specific voter information alone do not allow voters to claim that they voted for a candidate.

6. Comparative Analysis

To develop an online voting system based on the Ethereum platform, we implemented an online voting contract and deployed it on the voter’s electronic voting. Table 1 presents a comparison and analysis of the blockchain-based electronic voting system and the existing voting method. Through the implemented Ethereum platform environment and the self-developed online voting contract, this experiment tested whether the role of distributed ledger in a blockchain-based online voting system can guarantee voting credibility. Compared to offline voting, e-voting and blockchain-based e-voting contributed to the improvement of turnout of disabled people and people with reduced mobility. E-voting was able to prevent a drop in voter turnout due to long-distance travel. Election costs can also reduce many incidental costs, including labor costs, compared to the existing paper voting method. A number of previous studies have developed an electronic voting system using Ethereum-based smart contracts, which change the cost per voter according to changes in the Ethereum price and gas price and expand the maximum number of voters due to gas restrictions per block There are gender restrictions [30]. In the case of McCorry et al., assuming that the gas price is fixed at 0.00000002 ether when the price of 1 ether is at the peak of $1100, the cost per voter is close to $73, and the price as of the end of February 2019 If a level of $135 is applied, the cost per voter is $9 [31]. In addition, in order for the blockchain to be operated in a decentralized way, each node must store all votes recorded in the blockchain method. also no Therefore, a proof-of-work consensus algorithm that consumes a lot of energy like Bitcoin and requires economic compensation for block generation when operating a voting system is not suitable. It was developed based on previous research on how to distribute and how to agree, that is, how to generate blocks sequentially so that there is no collision between blocks [30]. In terms of counting errors, the electronic voting method can be manipulated due to the change of mind of the server administrator and by hackers, but this is not possible in the blockchain-based electronic voting method. Finally, the blockchain-based electronic voting method improves voting reliability by making votes practically impossible to manipulate or forge. The cryptographic complexity is higher in Bitcoin-based electronic voting than in Ethereum-based electronic voting, which results in performance degradation. In the existing electronic voting, the encryption complexity is very high, and on the contrary, the encryption complexity is not required for offline voting. In Ethereum-based electronic voting, confidentiality is not required at all, whereas, in other methods, confidentiality is very high. In particular, only the Ethereum-based electronic voting method is very highly extendable compared to the other methods. In the case of extendability, the existing E-Voting system has limited extendability due to the increase in the number of management servers and TTPs(Tactisc, Techniques, Procedures) for the increasing number of voters, resulting in SPoF(Single Point of Failure) and interdependence issues, and in the case of a Bitcoin-based system, separate Bitcoin blocks. Due to the use of cryptographic technology that is not compatible with the chain, all participants need to install a separate program, so there is a limit to the extendability.
Table 1. Comparison and analysis of other voting methods.

7. Conclusions and Future Challenges

Out of the blockchain technologies, we selected Ethereum upon which to develop an online voting system. A Solidity-based smart contract was implemented and deployed among voters to validate whether the credibility of vote counting can be maintained to develop the online voting system. However, future difficulties may arise in system maintenance because it is impossible to modify a contract once a Solidity-based smart contract is deployed to a blockchain account. In the future, we aim to propose a method to increase the accessibility and maintainability of smart contract development by analyzing the difference between Ethereum’s smart contract programming language—Solidity—and the existing development languages by researching the conversion algorithms among them.
In any voting, it is critical to ensure the confidentiality of the vote content, the credibility of the vote results, and the transparency of the voting process. Such confidentiality, credibility, and transparency factors require a high level of security in the voting system. This program adopted highly secure blockchain technology to develop an online voting system with minimum location constraints to guarantee credibility in the voting process and its results among voters. The study was conducted by applying the most actively adopted mechanism behind cryptocurrency transactions—blockchain technology. The server provides voting coins to the voters; the voters cast their vote using the voting coins and return the coins afterward. The server that receives the voting coins stores the voting results in a database and moves the results to the voting result database. The voters can monitor this entire process on a real-time basis, thereby gaining a high level of credibility in the voting process and its results. Consequently, with a high level of security achieved in the electronic voting system and a high level of credibility in the votes, voters will further trust the idea of online voting. This system will facilitate online voting and encourage voting participation, thereby contributing to higher voter turnout, and enabling a more democratic method of making decisions for our present-day society.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The study did not report any data.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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