To Be or Not to Be? Strategic Analysis of Carbon Tax Guiding Manufacturers to Choose Low-Carbon Technology
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
3. The Basic Model
3.1. Producing Technology and Cost
3.2. Demand Function
3.3. Event Sequences and Profit Functions
4. Analysis
4.1. Nash Equilibrium
- (i)
- When the market volume is large (), if the carbon tax , then the equilibrium is ; if the carbon tax , then the equilibrium is ; if the carbon tax , then the equilibrium is .
- (ii)
- When the market volume is small, and the efficiency of the low-carbon technology is high, that is and , if the carbon tax , then the equilibrium is ; if the carbon tax , then the equilibrium are or ; if the carbon tax , then the equilibrium is .
- (iii)
- When the market volume is small, and the efficiency of the low-carbon technology is low, that is and , if the carbon tax , then the equilibrium is ; if the carbon tax , then the equilibrium is .
4.2. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
5. Extensions
5.1. Imperfect Substitute
- (i)
- When the market volume is large (), if the tax , then the equilibrium is ; if the tax , then the equilibrium is ; if the tax , then the equilibrium is .
- (ii)
- When the market volume is small (), and the efficiency of the low-carbon technology is high (), if the tax , then the equilibrium is ; if the tax , then the equilibrium is or ; if the tax , then the equilibrium is .
- (iii)
- When the market volume is small (), and the efficiency of the low-carbon technology is low (), if the tax , then the equilibrium is ; if the tax , then the equilibrium is .
5.2. Price Game
6. Conclusions and Future Research
Supplementary Materials
Author Contributions
Funding
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Profit Functions of the Retailers and Manufacturers | Retailer2/Manufacturer2 | ||
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Low-Carbon Technology L | |||
Retailer1 /Manufacturer1 | Common technology C | ||
Low-carbon technology L |
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Equilibrium |
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Equilibria |
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Equilibria |
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Mu, Y.; Niu, F. To Be or Not to Be? Strategic Analysis of Carbon Tax Guiding Manufacturers to Choose Low-Carbon Technology. Sustainability 2022, 14, 15272. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142215272
Mu Y, Niu F. To Be or Not to Be? Strategic Analysis of Carbon Tax Guiding Manufacturers to Choose Low-Carbon Technology. Sustainability. 2022; 14(22):15272. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142215272
Chicago/Turabian StyleMu, Yanfen, and Feng Niu. 2022. "To Be or Not to Be? Strategic Analysis of Carbon Tax Guiding Manufacturers to Choose Low-Carbon Technology" Sustainability 14, no. 22: 15272. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142215272
APA StyleMu, Y., & Niu, F. (2022). To Be or Not to Be? Strategic Analysis of Carbon Tax Guiding Manufacturers to Choose Low-Carbon Technology. Sustainability, 14(22), 15272. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142215272