Next Article in Journal
Fostering Social Sustainability through Intergenerational Engagement in Australian Neighborhood Parks
Previous Article in Journal
Analysis of Strength and Endurance Values in Schoolchildren Aged 7 to 10 Years in Tolú, Colombia
Open AccessArticle

Does Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

1
Institute of Ecological Civilization, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China
2
School of Public Finance and Public Administration, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2019, 11(16), 4434; https://doi.org/10.3390/su11164434
Received: 9 June 2019 / Revised: 10 August 2019 / Accepted: 13 August 2019 / Published: 16 August 2019
(This article belongs to the Section Economic, Business and Management Aspects of Sustainability)
  |  
PDF [2754 KB, uploaded 16 August 2019]
  |  

Abstract

To promote third-party environmental pollution control in China, it is necessary to dissect the mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. This study first discusses the acting paths of fiscal policies on third-party environmental pollution control in theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise is established. The replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability strategies, and numerical simulation of the behavior of the three participants are analyzed to further study the acting mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. In addition, the influences of other parameters on the implementation of third-party environmental pollution control are evaluated. The results show that the behaviors of the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise influence each other. Furthermore, strengthening the relevant fiscal policy, reducing the risks of the polluting enterprise and third-party enterprise, and improving the benefit to the local government are conducive to promoting third-party environmental pollution control in China. Based on these results, this study proposes the following policy implications: formulating fiscal policies for third-party environmental pollution control, implementing fiscal policies in a dynamic and progressive manner, improving the market mechanism of third-party environmental pollution control, and strengthening the environmental performance assessment of the local government. View Full-Text
Keywords: environmental pollution; third-party control; fiscal policy; evolutionary game environmental pollution; third-party control; fiscal policy; evolutionary game
Figures

Figure 1

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).
SciFeed

Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Zhou, C.; Xie, H.; Zhang, X. Does Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach. Sustainability 2019, 11, 4434.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics

1

Comments

[Return to top]
Sustainability EISSN 2071-1050 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top