Abstract
Energy security has become a central policy challenge because decarbonisation must be achieved without weakening the reliability, affordability and resilience of national energy systems. This article examines whether and how energy transition policies contribute to national energy security, with particular attention to aggregate policy stringency, individual policy instruments, and renewable electricity deployment. The analysis uses a panel of 49 countries over 23 observed years between 2000 and 2023, excluding 2002, comprising 1127 country-year observations, and applies two-way fixed-effects models with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors. The aggregate Energy Policy Stringency Index has a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient in the contemporaneous model (0.421) and remains insignificant with one-, two- and three-year lags (0.187, 0.128 and –0.026, respectively). Renewable electricity generation is consistently positive and significant, with coefficients ranging from 0.071 to 0.090, indicating that actual renewable deployment is more closely associated with energy security than formal policy stringency. Policy-instrument decomposition shows that fossil fuel excise taxes have the strongest positive association, with coefficients from 1.554 to 1.082 in full-instrument models and from 1.614 to 1.077 in one-by-one robustness checks. Air emission standards have delayed positive effects, while some renewable-support and cross-sectoral tools show mixed results, indicating dependence on design and system readiness.
1. Introduction
Energy security has become one of the central challenges of contemporary energy policy, as its meaning now extends beyond the traditional protection of fossil-fuel supply to include natural gas systems, electricity networks and clean-energy supply chains [1]. This broader understanding is particularly important in the context of the global energy transition. Although renewable energy reached another deployment record in 2024, global consumption of oil, natural gas and coal also remained at historically high levels [2]. This creates an important policy dilemma: stricter energy-transition policies do not automatically strengthen energy security unless they are translated into reliable generation, diversified supply, grid resilience and reduced exposure to fossil-fuel price volatility. This creates a specific research gap: while previous studies have examined energy security, renewable deployment and environmental policy stringency separately, less is known about whether aggregate transition-policy stringency or individual policy instruments are more closely associated with national energy-security performance.
Recent international evidence confirms the growing role of renewable deployment in strengthening energy security while also showing that its effects depend on system readiness and policy design. In 2024, 91% of newly commissioned utility-scale renewable projects generated electricity at a lower cost than the cheapest fossil-fuel alternatives, helping to avoid an estimated USD 467 billion in fossil-fuel costs [3]. At the same time, global clean-energy investment is increasing rapidly [4]. However, the transition also creates new security risks related to critical minerals, clean technology manufacturing, and supply chain concentration [5]. Therefore, the key research question is not only whether countries adopt more ambitious energy transition policies but also which specific instruments help transform renewable expansion into more secure and resilient energy systems.
The uneven implementation of climate and energy transition measures across countries, sectors, and instruments strengthens the policy relevance of this issue. The OECD reports that current 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution targets remain insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement goals, with aggregate emissions in 50 OECD and partner countries still 8% above the required 2030 pathway [6]. Similarly, although global electricity access reached approximately 92% in 2023, further progress is needed to ensure affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all [7]. These developments justify a policy-instrument decomposition approach, which allows the analysis to move beyond aggregate policy stringency and examine whether fossil-fuel excise taxes, carbon taxation, feed-in tariffs, renewable auctions, certificates, emission standards and cross-sectoral policies have different implications for national energy security.
2. Theoretical Background and Conceptual Framework
2.1. Energy Security, Energy Transition and Geopolitical Vulnerability
Energy security is increasingly understood not only as resource availability, but also as the capacity of national energy systems to remain affordable, resilient, environmentally sustainable and protected from external shocks. This broader view is important because the same transition policy may improve one dimension, such as import independence, while creating risks for another, such as price stability or social affordability [8,9,10]. The recent literature, therefore, treats energy security as a dynamic outcome shaped by geopolitical exposure, policy capacity, technological readiness, market structure, and environmental constraints [11,12]. The energy transition further links security with decarbonisation, renewable deployment and energy-market transformation, as renewables can reduce fossil-fuel dependence and diversify the energy mix, although their effects depend on system flexibility, infrastructure, investment capacity and policy design [13,14,15]. Energy security is also connected with economic sustainability because transition policies influence production costs, consumer behaviour, enterprise resilience and national competitiveness [16,17,18].
The geopolitical dimension of energy security became especially visible after the 2022 energy crisis, when import dependence, infrastructure vulnerability and price shocks became central to European policy debates. The weaponisation of energy demonstrated that fossil-fuel dependence is both an economic problem and a strategic vulnerability that affects regional integration, national resilience, and European energy governance [19,20,21]. Country-specific and regional studies confirm that geopolitical risk influences energy security when fuel imports, price instability and institutional fragility interact [22,23,24]. The war in Ukraine further shifted attention from long-term decarbonisation to short- and medium-term system resilience, linking renewable deployment, electricity price shocks and macroeconomic stability [25,26]. The Ukrainian case also shows that energy security is connected with economic security, foreign trade, migration, public health and social vulnerability under wartime conditions [27,28,29].
Renewable energy deployment strengthens the link between energy transition and security by reducing import dependence, diversifying supply and decentralising energy production. However, this effect depends on national resource endowments, infrastructure, market maturity, storage capacity and the ability to manage variable renewable generation [15,30]. Evidence from Greece, lower-middle-income countries and EU economies shows that this relationship is context-specific and requires integration into broader sustainability, investment and industrial strategies [16,17,31]. Local energy systems, including decentralised generation, energy clusters and community-level solutions, can further increase resilience during disruptions, but they require coordination among national regulation, regional implementation and local acceptance [32,33,34].
2.2. Policy Instruments, Green Finance and Investment Mechanisms
Environmental policy stringency provides an important basis for analysing which energy-transition policies improve energy security. It can stimulate green innovation, cleaner energy substitution and environmental performance, but its effects depend on institutional credibility, implementation quality and interactions among instruments [35,36,37]. Therefore, aggregate stringency indices may hide the distinct effects of taxes, subsidies, feed-in tariffs, renewable portfolio standards, emission standards and regulatory restrictions. Regulatory instruments may reduce energy intensity, encourage cleaner production, create demand for renewable electricity and improve corporate accountability through environmental disclosure [38,39,40]. However, their effects may be non-linear, as policy changes can influence investors, innovation and energy security differently [41].
Fiscal, market-based, and financial instruments are also central because they affect prices, investment incentives, and the affordability of the transition. Energy taxes and green fiscal tools can discourage fossil-fuel use and support cleaner technologies, but they must avoid high social costs and resistance [42,43,44]. Sectoral and cross-country evidence therefore confirms the need to examine individual policy instruments separately rather than relying only on aggregate indices [45,46]. Energy-transition policies improve energy security when they mobilise investment in renewable capacity, infrastructure, innovation and energy-efficiency technologies. Green finance and renewable-energy incentives, including feed-in tariffs, power purchase agreements, public investment instruments and fiscal support, can reduce investor uncertainty and accelerate renewable deployment. However, their effects differ by timing, durability and national context [47,48,49].
Large-scale capital allocation is essential because green finance, sustainable infrastructure investment and specialised financial mechanisms help convert decarbonisation goals into bankable projects [50,51,52]. Their effectiveness depends on financial-market development, policy credibility, governance quality and the ability to manage technological, geopolitical and macro-financial risks [53,54,55]. Public finance also matters because energy security includes affordability and protection against energy poverty. Government support can reduce distributional risks for vulnerable households, while effective renewable-energy policy requires realistic instruments for entrepreneurs, investors and consumers within a stable legal and investment environment [56,57,58,59].
2.3. Governance, Institutional Quality and Technological Readiness
Governance quality strongly shapes the effectiveness of energy-transition policies by increasing policy credibility, reducing implementation gaps and strengthening the link between policy ambition and energy-security outcomes [46,60]. Since energy security requires coordination among public authorities, firms, consumers, financial institutions, and local communities, leadership and institutional adaptability are especially important during periods of crisis [33,61,62].
Technological and administrative readiness also determine whether formal policies produce measurable security gains. Government AI readiness, digital capacity and forecasting tools can support renewable electricity development, demand management, system efficiency and evidence-based policy design [63,64,65]. At the firm and sector levels, the transition depends on innovation, circular-economy principles, sustainable business models and effective project management [66,67,68,69,70,71]. These studies show that energy-transition policy should be assessed not only as formal regulation but also as a mechanism operating within governance, technological and organisational systems shaped by Industry 4.0 and digitalisation [72].
2.4. Environmental and Socio-Economic Co-Benefits of Transition Policies
Energy-transition policy cannot strengthen energy security without social acceptance and behavioural adaptation. Consumer satisfaction, energy-saving behaviour and perceptions of renewables influence the feasibility of transition measures, especially when households perceive costs as unfair or unclear [34,73,74]. Behavioural tools, green promotions, financial incentives, advertising and awareness-building can reduce resistance to cleaner technologies and support demand-side participation. At the same time, organisational culture and HR practices shape sustainability norms within firms and public institutions [75,76,77].
Energy security should also be assessed alongside environmental quality, public health, and socio-economic welfare. Renewable-energy transition and pollution reduction can improve health outcomes, whereas weak environmental performance creates long-term social and economic costs [78,79,80]. Climate policy and energy-efficiency measures also influence growth, productivity and development trajectories. At the same time, evidence from Visegrad and transformation economies links environmental convergence and climate mitigation with institutional capacity and structural adjustment [81,82,83,84,85]. These links justify evaluating transition policies not only through emissions indicators but also through their effects on energy security and economic resilience.
2.5. Cross-Country Evidence and the Need for Policy-Instrument Decomposition
The reviewed literature shows that energy security is shaped by policy, market, institutional and geopolitical factors. Still, existing studies usually focus on aggregate energy security indices, general policy stringency, renewable deployment, or crisis-related shocks. This leaves a gap in identifying which specific energy-transition instruments, such as energy taxes, renewable support schemes, emission standards, subsidy reforms, auctions, certificates or coal phase-out measures, are most strongly associated with national energy-security improvements.
This article addresses this gap by examining the direct, lagged, non-linear and conditional effects of the aggregate Energy Policy Stringency Index and its individual instruments on the Energy Security Score. The analysis controls for renewable electricity generation, economic development and governance quality, allowing the study to identify which policy tools are more closely linked to energy-security outcomes and whether their effects depend on the stage of renewable electricity deployment.
The study’s conceptual framework assumes that energy transition policies affect energy security through several interrelated channels: price incentives, renewable deployment, regulatory pressure, investment mobilisation, governance capacity, and system readiness. This logic explains why aggregate policy stringency may be insufficient to capture policy effectiveness and why decomposing energy-transition policy into individual instruments is necessary to identify which tools are more strongly associated with national energy-security outcomes.
A key element of this framework is the distinction between formal policy stringency and realised policy effectiveness. Energy-transition policies may be adopted at the legal or strategic level. Still, their impact on energy security depends on whether they are effectively implemented and converted into changes in the energy system. This creates a potential implementation gap between policy ambition and policy outcomes. Institutional filtering further explains this gap: formal policies pass through administrative capacity, regulatory credibility, investment conditions, infrastructure readiness, grid flexibility and social acceptance before they can influence energy security. Consequently, aggregate policy stringency may be statistically weak if policy instruments are not fully implemented, are poorly coordinated or operate in systems that are not yet ready to absorb them. By contrast, renewable electricity generation reflects realised deployment and therefore captures a more direct stage of the policy-to-security transmission mechanism.
3. Materials and Methods
This study uses a cross-country panel data design to examine whether energy transition policy stringency is associated with national energy security. The empirical dataset was constructed at the country-year level for the period 2000–2023. The dependent variable is the Energy Security Score, obtained from the World Energy Council’s World Energy Trilemma database. This indicator reflects the energy security dimension of national energy systems, including countries’ reliance on net energy imports, the diversity of electricity generation sources, and the capacity to meet demand through infrastructure, storage, and refining capabilities [86].
The main explanatory variables are taken from the OECD Climate Actions and Policies Measurement Framework, available through the OECD Data Explorer [87]. This framework provides harmonised cross-country indicators of climate and energy policy stringency and is based on a structured policy database designed to monitor countries’ mitigation actions [88]. The analysis uses both the aggregate Energy Policy Stringency Index and its individual policy instruments, including ETS for electricity, carbon tax for electricity, fossil fuel subsidies, fossil fuel excise taxes, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy auctions, renewable energy certificates, coal phase-out policy, planning for renewables expansion, air emission standards, cross-sectoral policies and international policies. All EPSI-related indicators are measured on a 1–10 scale, where higher values indicate stricter policy settings.
The empirical models also include several control variables. The share of renewable electricity generation, measured as the percentage of electricity generated from renewable sources, is included to capture the actual stage of renewable energy deployment. GDP per capita, measured in PPP terms at constant 2021 international dollars, is obtained from the World Bank and is used to control for the level of economic development [89]. Institutional quality is represented by three Worldwide Governance Indicators: Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law, taken from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators database [90]. These variables are included because the implementation of energy transition policies and the resilience of energy systems may depend on broader governance quality and regulatory capacity. Since Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law are closely related dimensions of institutional quality, their simultaneous inclusion may increase multicollinearity. These variables are retained because they capture relevant aspects of the institutional environment in which energy-transition policies operate. However, they are used mainly as control variables, and their individual coefficients are interpreted cautiously rather than as independent institutional effects.
Renewable electricity generation is included as a control variable in the baseline models because it captures the current stage of the energy system transformation and helps separate formal policy stringency from realised renewable deployment. In additional interaction models, it is used as a moderator to test whether the association between policy instruments and energy security depends on the level of renewable electricity generation. It is not treated as a mediation channel because the study does not estimate a causal pathway from policy stringency through renewable deployment to energy security.
The final sample comprises 49 countries, selected based on the joint availability of the Energy Security Score, OECD policy-stringency indicators, renewable electricity generation data, GDP per capita, and governance variables. The sample includes both advanced and emerging economies, allowing the analysis to capture substantial heterogeneity in energy systems, policy frameworks and institutional conditions. The countries included are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea (Rep.), Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. This cross-country composition allows comparisons of energy-security outcomes across countries with different levels of economic development, renewable electricity deployment, fossil-fuel dependence, and policy stringency.
The final estimation sample comprises 49 countries observed over 23 years from 2000 to 2023, yielding 1127 country-year observations in the baseline specifications. The year 2002 is excluded from the final merged dataset because complete information about governance variables was unavailable for that year. Accordingly, the sample should be interpreted as covering 23 observed years within the 2000–2023 period, rather than a continuous 24-year panel. Lagged policy specifications use fewer observations because the construction of one-, two- and three-year lags reduces the effective time dimension.
Before estimation, the dataset was harmonised by country and year. Country names and annual observations were matched across all data sources, and model-specific observations with missing values were removed. GDP per capita was transformed to its natural logarithm due to its right-skewed distribution and the theoretically expected diminishing marginal effect of income on energy security. The Energy Security Score, EPSI variables, renewable electricity generation share and governance indicators were retained in their original scales to preserve interpretability. Since several policy instruments contain many zero values, these zeros were treated as meaningful observations, indicating the absence or very low intensity of a policy instrument, rather than as missing data. Therefore, logarithmic transformations were not applied to these variables.
The baseline empirical specification is a two-way fixed effects model:
where denotes the Energy Security Score for the country in year , denotes the aggregate Energy Policy Stringency Index, is the renewable electricity generation share, is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, and , and denote governance controls. Country fixed effects control for time-invariant differences between countries, while year fixed effects capture common shocks affecting all countries in a given year. The parameter takes the values 0, 1, 2 and 3, allowing the analysis to test contemporaneous, one-year, two-year and three-year lagged policy effects.
To test whether the relationship between energy policy stringency and energy security is non-linear, an additional model includes the squared term of the aggregate EPSI. To explore whether different policy instruments are associated with energy security differently, the aggregate EPSI is decomposed into its components. These policy-instrument models are estimated jointly and separately. The one-by-one specifications are used as robustness checks because individual policy instruments may be highly correlated when they are adopted as part of broader policy packages. Additional conditional-effect models interact each policy instrument with the renewable electricity generation share to assess whether policy effects depend on the actual stage of renewable electricity deployment.
All panel models are estimated using two-way fixed effects with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors. This choice is motivated by the cross-country nature of the dataset, where unobserved shocks may be correlated across countries and where serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are likely. Diagnostic tests were therefore used to assess cross-sectional dependence, serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The use of Driscoll–Kraay standard errors makes the estimated standard errors robust to these forms of dependence in the panel error structure.
The diagnostic procedure included tests for cross-sectional dependence, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. Cross-sectional dependence was assessed using the Pesaran CD test, serial correlation using the Breusch–Godfrey/Wooldridge test, and heteroskedasticity using the studentised Breusch–Pagan test. Multicollinearity was evaluated using pairwise correlations and variance inflation factors. These diagnostics informed the choice of Driscoll–Kraay standard errors and the cautious interpretation of the full policy-instrument models.
Although the two-way fixed-effects design controls for time-invariant country characteristics and common annual shocks, it does not fully eliminate potential endogeneity. In particular, reverse causality may arise if countries with stronger energy security are better able to adopt stricter energy-transition policies rather than stricter policies directly improving energy security. The lagged specifications partly reduce this concern by examining whether policy variables precede changes in the Energy Security Score. Still, they should not be interpreted as a full causal identification strategy. Therefore, the estimated coefficients are interpreted as robust conditional associations rather than definitive causal effects.
Multicollinearity was assessed using pairwise correlation analysis and variance inflation factors (VIFs). This diagnostic step was particularly important because several policy instruments may be adopted as part of broader policy packages, while governance indicators such as Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law are conceptually related. Where multicollinearity was detected, the full policy-instrument model was interpreted cautiously, and one-by-one policy-instrument specifications were used as robustness checks. As an additional robustness diagnostic, panel unit-root tests were conducted using the Im–Pesaran–Shin and Maddala–Wu Fisher-ADF procedures to assess the stationarity properties of the main variables.
PCA and ridge regression could provide additional ways to mitigate multicollinearity. Still, they were not used as the main robustness strategy because they would reduce the direct interpretability of individual policy instruments, which is central to the policy-instrument decomposition approach. Instead, the study reports policy-instrument specifications one by one, thereby reducing multicollinearity while preserving the interpretation of each instrument.
All calculations were conducted in RStudio using R version 4.4.0 (2024-04-24 ucrt), “Puppy Cup”, (The R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria). The main estimation and diagnostic procedures were implemented using the fixest, plm, lmtest, performance and dplyr packages.
4. Results
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table A1 in Appendix A. The sample includes 1127 country-year observations spanning 2000–2023. The average Energy Security Score is 60.88, with a median of 61.70, indicating a distribution centred on a moderate-to-high level of energy security. However, the relatively wide range, from 20.51 to 80.04, confirms substantial cross-country and temporal heterogeneity. The negative skewness of the Energy Security Score indicates that most observations are concentrated at relatively higher values. In contrast, a smaller group of country-year observations demonstrates substantially weaker energy security performance. This confirms the relevance of applying a panel approach, as the dataset contains meaningful variation across countries and over time.
The policy variables also reveal important differences in the intensity and structure of energy-transition policies. The overall Energy Policy Stringency Index has a mean value of 3.03 on a 1–10 scale, suggesting a moderate average level of policy stringency. At the same time, individual policy instruments differ considerably. Instruments such as fossil fuel subsidies, regulation, and air emission standards show the highest average values. In contrast, carbon taxation, fossil-fuel excise taxes, and renewable energy auctions remain much less widespread across the sample. Several policy instruments have a median value of zero, indicating they were absent or only weakly developed in many country-year observations. This pattern is also reflected in high positive skewness and kurtosis for carbon taxation, fossil fuel excise taxes, and renewable energy auctions, suggesting that these instruments were applied intensively in only a limited number of countries or periods. The average share of renewable electricity generation is 33.57%, but its high standard deviation of 28.25 and range from 0.00% to 99.99% demonstrate very different stages of renewable energy development across countries. Institutional indicators are generally centred at relatively high values, with mean scores ranging from 64.48 for Control of Corruption to 74.17 for Political Stability. However, the dispersion remains sufficient to justify their inclusion as governance-related control variables. These descriptive patterns support the empirical strategy based on country and year fixed effects, since both policy stringency and energy-security outcomes vary considerably across the panel.
Given the bounded and policy-index nature of most variables, the baseline models retain the Energy Security Score, EPSI indicators, renewable electricity generation share and governance indicators in their original scales to preserve interpretability. GDP per capita is transformed into its natural logarithm due to its right-skewed distribution and the theoretically expected diminishing marginal effect of income. For highly zero-inflated policy instruments, robustness checks distinguish between policy adoption and policy intensity rather than applying logarithmic transformations, since zero values represent meaningful non-adoption rather than missing or abnormal observations.
Before estimating the TWFE specifications, diagnostic tests were conducted to assess the panel’s error structure. The Pesaran CD test rejects the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence (z = 9.769, p < 0.001), indicating that unobserved shocks affecting energy security may be correlated across countries. The Breusch–Godfrey/Wooldridge test also rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors (χ2 = 1004.3, p < 0.001). In addition, the studentised Breusch–Pagan test confirms the presence of heteroskedasticity (BP = 58.356, p < 0.001). These diagnostic results show that conventional standard errors would be inappropriate, as they may underestimate statistical uncertainty. Therefore, all panel regressions are estimated using Driscoll–Kraay standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence in panel data.
Table 1 summarises the main TWFE results. The aggregate EPSI has a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient in both the contemporaneous and one-year lagged specifications, suggesting that the overall formal stringency of energy-transition policy is not directly associated with a higher Energy Security Score after controlling for renewable electricity generation, income, governance, country-specific effects, and common-year shocks. By contrast, the renewable electricity generation share remains positive and statistically significant across all main specifications, confirming that actual renewable deployment is more consistently related to energy security than aggregate policy stringency. When EPSI is decomposed into individual policy instruments, the results reveal stronger heterogeneity. Fossil fuel excise taxes show the most robust positive association with energy security, while fossil fuel subsidies, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy certificates and cross-sectoral policies display negative coefficients. These findings indicate that the energy security effects of transition policy depend on the specific instrument used rather than on policy stringency as a single aggregate index.
Table 1.
Main TWFE results for Energy Security Score.
The results reported in Table A2 in Appendix B show that the direct effect of the aggregate Energy Policy Stringency Index is positive in the contemporaneous specification but is statistically insignificant. This pattern remains stable when EPSI is lagged by 1, 2, and 3 years. The coefficient gradually declines from 0.421 in the non-lagged model to 0.187 for the one-year lag and 0.128 for the two-year lag and becomes slightly negative in the three-year lag specification. However, none of these coefficients is statistically significant. Therefore, the results do not provide strong evidence that a higher aggregate level of energy policy stringency directly improves the Energy Security Score within the observed time horizon, after controlling for renewable electricity generation, income, governance indicators, country fixed effects and year fixed effects. The non-linear specification also fails to confirm a statistically significant quadratic relationship, as both EPSI and EPSI squared are insignificant. Thus, there is no robust evidence of a U- or inverted-U-shaped relationship between aggregate policy stringency and energy security in this model setting.
At the same time, the share of renewable electricity generation is consistently positive and statistically significant across all model specifications. Its coefficient ranges from 0.071 to 0.090, suggesting that a one-percentage-point increase in renewable electricity generation is associated with approximately 0.07–0.09 points higher in the Energy Security Score. This finding indicates that actual renewable energy deployment is more strongly associated with improvements in energy security than policy stringency alone. Among the governance controls, Regulatory Quality is negative and statistically significant in all specifications, while Rule of Law is positive and becomes statistically significant in the three-year lag model. These governance results should be interpreted cautiously, as institutional indicators are often highly correlated, and country fixed effects may partly absorb their long-term structural effects. The models suggest that the practical implementation of the renewable transition, rather than the formal intensity of policy stringency, is a more stable predictor of energy security performance.
The conditional-effect models reported in Table A3 in Appendix B test whether the relationship between energy policy stringency and the Energy Security Score depends on the actual level of renewable electricity generation. In the non-centred interaction model, the coefficient of EPSI is positive but statistically insignificant, while the interaction term EPSI × RES share is negative and also statistically insignificant. The same conclusion is obtained after mean-centring EPSI and the renewable electricity share. In the centred specification, EPSI remains positive but insignificant, whereas renewable electricity generation remains positive and statistically significant. This means there is no evidence that the effect of policy stringency on energy security becomes stronger or weaker with the share of renewable electricity generation. In other words, the results do not support a conditional or moderating effect of renewable electricity deployment on the EPSI–energy security relationship.
The lagged interaction model confirms the same pattern. The coefficient of the one-year lagged EPSI is positive but statistically insignificant, and the interaction between lagged EPSI and the centred renewable electricity share is also insignificant. Therefore, the conditional effect is not supported either contemporaneously or with a one-year delay. However, the renewable electricity generation share remains positive and statistically significant across all specifications, with coefficients around 0.073–0.076. This suggests that actual renewable electricity deployment is consistently associated with higher energy security. In contrast, the formal stringency of transition policy does not show an independent or conditional effect in these models. The governance controls remain broadly consistent with the previous specifications: Regulatory Quality is negatively significant, while Rule of Law is positive and weakly significant. Given the likely correlation among institutional indicators, these governance effects should be interpreted cautiously and checked in alternative specifications.
The results in Table A4 in Appendix B show that the aggregate policy effect becomes more informative when the Energy Policy Stringency Index is decomposed into its individual instruments. Across the contemporaneous, one-year, two-year and three-year lagged specifications, two instruments show the most stable associations with the Energy Security Score. First, fossil fuel excise taxes have a consistently positive, statistically significant coefficient, though the magnitude declines from 1.554 in the contemporaneous model to 1.082 in the three-year lag model. This suggests that stronger taxation of fossil fuel use is associated with higher energy security, possibly because such instruments encourage energy efficiency, reduce fossil fuel dependence and support diversification of the energy system. Second, fossil fuel subsidies are consistently negative and statistically significant, indicating that more stringent scoring related to fossil fuel subsidies is associated with lower energy security in this specification. This result requires cautious interpretation, as it may reflect the fact that subsidy-related reforms are often introduced in countries facing structural energy-system vulnerabilities or difficult transition conditions.
Several renewable and cross-sectoral instruments also show relevant patterns. Renewable energy certificates are negative and statistically significant across all specifications, while feed-in tariffs are mostly negative and become statistically significant in the contemporaneous and three-year lagged models. Air emission standards become positive and statistically significant in the two- and three-year lagged models, suggesting that environmental regulation may contribute to energy security with a delay rather than immediately. By contrast, ETS, carbon tax, coal phase-out policy, planning for renewables expansion and international policies are not statistically significant in these full-instrument specifications. Importantly, the renewable electricity generation share remains positive and statistically significant in all four models, confirming the earlier conclusion that actual renewable deployment is more consistently associated with stronger energy security than the formal intensity of policy instruments alone. The model fit is relatively strong, with adjusted R2 increasing from 0.872 to 0.877 and within R2 ranging from 0.203 to 0.220. However, the results should still be interpreted carefully because including all instruments simultaneously may increase multicollinearity.
Additional multicollinearity diagnostics were conducted for the full policy-instrument specifications. The VIF results indicate high multicollinearity among several EPSI instruments, renewable electricity generation, income, and governance indicators. This is expected, as energy-transition policy instruments are often adopted as part of broader policy packages, while governance indicators capture closely related institutional dimensions. Therefore, the full-instrument models are interpreted as exploratory decompositions of the aggregate policy framework rather than as definitive estimates of the isolated causal effect of each instrument. To address this concern, the analysis also reports policy-instrument specifications one by one and lagged robustness checks, which provide more stable evidence on instrument-specific associations with energy security.
The multicollinearity diagnostics indicate that the full policy-instrument specifications exhibit very high VIF values, particularly for renewable energy certificates, planning for renewable energy expansion, fossil fuel excise taxes, governance indicators, and renewable electricity generation. This confirms that these models should be interpreted mainly as exploratory decompositions of the aggregate policy framework rather than as fully isolated estimates of individual instruments. The correlation matrix further shows strong interrelations among governance indicators, with correlations ranging from 0.91 to 0.94, as well as among several policy variables, including EPSI and cross-sectoral policies (0.81), air emission standards (0.75) and fossil fuel subsidies (0.73). However, correlations between the Energy Security Score and most explanatory variables remain moderate, indicating that multicollinearity arises primarily among regressors rather than between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables.
Because the full policy-instrument specification is affected by very high VIF values, Model 3 should not be interpreted as providing fully isolated estimates of each individual policy instrument. Its purpose is exploratory: it shows how instruments behave when included jointly as part of a broader policy package. The more reliable basis for instrument-specific interpretation is provided by the one-by-one robustness specifications, which reduce multicollinearity and preserve the interpretation of each policy tool separately.
The panel unit-root diagnostics in Table A9 provide mixed evidence across the variables. The null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected for the Energy Security Score, the aggregate Energy Policy Stringency Index, and the renewable electricity generation share. At the same time, income and governance indicators show stronger evidence of stationarity, especially under the Fisher-ADF test. This result should be interpreted cautiously because the variables are bounded-index or percentage measures, and the panel is unbalanced; however, it confirms the importance of controlling for country and year fixed effects in the baseline models. Therefore, the two-way fixed-effects specification remains appropriate for estimating within-country associations, while the results should be interpreted as conditional relationships rather than long-run causal equilibrium effects.
The one-by-one robustness models reported in Table A5 in Appendix B confirm that the relationship between policy instruments and the Energy Security Score is strongly instrument-specific. The most robust positive association is observed for fossil fuel excise taxes. Its coefficient remains positive and statistically significant in the contemporaneous model and in the one-, two- and three-year lagged specifications, although the magnitude gradually decreases from 1.614 to 1.077. This suggests that fiscal pressure on fossil fuel use is consistently associated with higher energy security, possibly because it encourages energy efficiency, reduces fossil-fuel dependence and supports diversification of the energy system. A delayed positive effect is also visible for air emission standards, which become statistically significant in the two- and three-year lagged models. This indicates that regulatory standards may influence energy security with a time lag, after technological, infrastructural or operational adjustments have taken place. Across almost all specifications, the renewable electricity generation share remains positive and statistically significant, reinforcing the conclusion that actual renewable deployment is a more stable predictor of energy security than policy stringency alone.
Several instruments show negative and statistically significant associations with energy security. Carbon taxes, fossil-fuel subsidies, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy certificates, and cross-sectoral policies are negative in most or all time specifications. These results should be interpreted cautiously. They do not necessarily imply that these policies directly reduce energy security. Rather, they may reflect policy endogeneity: such instruments are often introduced or strengthened in countries facing more difficult transition conditions, higher energy-system adjustment costs, stronger import dependence or weaker initial security positions. By contrast, ETS, renewable energy auctions, coal phase-out policy, planning for renewable energy expansion, and international policies do not show statistically significant effects in the one-by-one specifications. The robustness checks support the view that energy-transition policies do not influence energy security uniformly; their association depends on the type of instrument, the time horizon and the country-specific transition context.
The interaction results in Table A6 show whether the association between individual policy instruments and the Energy Security Score changes depending on the share of renewable electricity generation. The findings suggest that renewable electricity generation does not uniformly strengthen the energy-security effect of all policy instruments. Several interaction terms are statistically insignificant, including those for ETS, fossil fuel subsidies, and the coal phase-out policy, suggesting that the relationship between these instruments and energy security is not significantly affected by the level of renewable electricity deployment. In contrast, some instruments show positive conditional effects. The interaction between fossil fuel excise taxes and renewable electricity generation is positive and statistically significant in the contemporaneous model and weakly significant in the one-year lag model. This suggests that fossil fuel taxation is more strongly associated with energy security in countries where renewable electricity already plays a larger role. A similar delayed pattern is evident for air emission standards, with positive, significant interaction terms from the current to the two-year lag specification. This implies that environmental standards may support energy security more effectively when they operate alongside a more developed renewable electricity sector.
At the same time, several interaction effects are negative and statistically significant. The most robust negative conditional effects are observed for planning for renewables expansion, cross-sectoral policies, and international policies, which remain negative across all time specifications. This means that, at higher levels of renewable electricity generation, these policy instruments are associated with a weaker contribution to the Energy Security Score. This result should be interpreted cautiously. It does not necessarily mean that planning, cross-sectoral coordination or international policy commitments reduce energy security. Rather, it may reflect transition complexity: in countries with a higher renewable share, additional planning and cross-sectoral policy measures may be introduced precisely because the system faces integration challenges, grid-balancing constraints, storage needs or security-of-supply risks. Renewable energy certificates also show a negative conditional effect, although the statistical strength is weaker and varies across lag structures. The interaction analysis suggests that policy effectiveness depends not only on the presence of renewable energy policy instruments but also on the stage and complexity of renewable electricity integration.
The empirical results indicate that the relationship between energy-transition policy and energy security is more complex than a simple positive policy effect. The aggregate Energy Policy Stringency Index does not show a statistically significant direct, lagged or non-linear association with the Energy Security Score. By contrast, the share of renewable electricity generation remains positive and statistically significant across almost all specifications, suggesting that the actual deployment of renewable electricity is more closely related to energy-security improvements than the formal intensity of policy stringency. The disaggregated policy-instrument analysis further shows that fiscal instruments, especially fossil-fuel excise taxes, and delayed regulatory instruments, such as air-emission standards, are more consistently associated with stronger energy security. At the same time, several renewable-support and cross-sectoral policy instruments display negative or conditional associations, which may reflect transition complexity, policy endogeneity or the fact that these instruments are often introduced in countries facing more difficult energy-system adjustment challenges. Therefore, the results suggest that energy-transition policy contributes to energy security only when it is translated into effective deployment, diversification and system-level adaptation rather than through formal stringency alone.
The interaction results (Table 2) suggest that renewable electricity deployment does not uniformly strengthen the effect of all policy instruments. The most consistent positive conditional effects are observed for fossil fuel excise taxes and air emission standards, indicating that these instruments may be more effective where renewable electricity deployment is already more advanced. In contrast, planning for renewable energy expansion, cross-sectoral policies, and international policies show robust negative interactions, which may reflect greater integration complexity in countries with more mature renewable energy systems. ETS, fossil fuel subsidies and coal phase-out policy show no stable conditional effects.
Table 2.
Summary of interaction effects between policy instruments and renewable electricity generation.
5. Discussion
The results show that the formal stringency of energy-transition policy does not automatically translate into stronger energy security. The aggregate Energy Policy Stringency Index has a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient in the contemporaneous model. It remains insignificant at one-, two-, and three-year lags, while the non-linear specification also fails to confirm a robust U- or inverted-U-shaped relationship. This finding refines the broader literature, which often argues that environmental policy stringency can stimulate green innovation, improve environmental performance and support transition outcomes, but also stresses that its effectiveness depends on credibility, implementation quality and institutional context [35,36,37]. In this sense, the present findings suggest that policy stringency, as a formal aggregate measure, is not sufficient on its own; energy security improves when policy ambition is translated into concrete changes in energy-system structure, infrastructure, supply diversification, and demand-side adaptation.
The most stable result is a positive, statistically significant association between renewable electricity generation and the Energy Security Score. This supports the argument that actual renewable deployment is more important for energy security than the declared intensity of transition policy. The coefficient on renewable electricity generation remains positive across almost all model specifications, indicating that countries with a higher share of renewable electricity tend to exhibit stronger energy security performance. This result is consistent with the literature, which shows that renewable energy can reduce dependence on fossil fuels, diversify the electricity mix, and improve resilience to geopolitical shocks. However, the benefits depend on system flexibility, storage, grid capacity, and institutional readiness [14,15,30]. It also aligns with recent studies on the European energy crisis, which interpret renewable deployment not only as a decarbonisation tool but also as a response to war-related energy dependency, price shocks, and macroeconomic instability [19,21,26]. This interpretation should also account for potential reverse causality. Countries with more secure, diversified, and institutionally developed energy systems may have greater capacity to introduce stricter transition policies. In contrast, countries facing weaker energy security may adopt specific instruments to address existing vulnerabilities. This may explain why aggregate policy stringency shows no clear direct effect, while some individual instruments display mixed or negative associations. Therefore, the findings should be read as evidence on instrument-specific relationships with energy security, not as proof of one-directional causality.
The negative coefficient of Regulatory Quality should also be interpreted cautiously. It does not imply that better regulation weakens energy security. A more plausible explanation is that improvements in regulatory quality often coincide with transition reforms, market liberalisation, subsidy restructuring, stricter environmental rules or renewable-integration pressures. These processes may create short- or medium-term adjustment costs before they translate into stronger energy-system resilience. In addition, Regulatory Quality is highly correlated with other governance indicators, while country fixed effects absorb many long-term institutional differences. Therefore, the negative coefficient is best understood as a conditional association reflecting transition complexity and initial country conditions rather than as evidence of a direct adverse effect of regulatory quality. For policymakers, this result suggests that regulatory reforms should be accompanied by infrastructure investment, grid flexibility, storage capacity and affordability safeguards, because stronger regulation alone may not immediately improve energy security if the energy system is still undergoing adjustment.
The concepts of the implementation gap and institutional filtering can explain the gap between insignificant aggregate EPSI coefficients and consistently positive renewable-electricity coefficients. Formal policy stringency measures the existence and intensity of policy settings. Still, it does not fully capture whether these policies are enforced, financed, coordinated or translated into infrastructure and behavioural change. Institutional filtering means that administrative capacity, regulatory credibility, investment conditions, grid readiness and social acceptance mediate the effect of policy stringency. Renewable electricity generation, by contrast, reflects realised deployment and therefore stands closer to the actual energy-system transformation that can improve security through diversification, lower fossil-fuel dependence and greater resilience.
The policy-instrument decomposition provides a more nuanced interpretation of the policy-security relationship. Fossil fuel excise taxes show the most robust positive association with energy security, both in full-instrument specifications and in one-by-one robustness checks. This finding is consistent with studies showing that energy taxes and environmental fiscal instruments can support a cleaner and more secure energy system by discouraging fossil-fuel consumption, encouraging energy efficiency and shifting incentives towards cleaner technologies [42,43,44]. Air-emission standards also show delayed positive effects after 2 and 3 years, suggesting that regulatory instruments may take time to influence energy security through technological upgrading, cleaner production, reporting improvements, and operational adaptation [39,40]. Thus, the results indicate that instruments that directly reduce fossil-fuel dependence or improve environmental-technological performance may be more favourable for energy security than broad policy stringency alone.
At the same time, the negative or conditional coefficients for some renewable-support and cross-sectoral instruments should not be interpreted as evidence that these policies are harmful in a direct causal sense. Feed-in tariffs, renewable energy certificates, cross-sectoral policies and some planning-related instruments may be introduced precisely in countries facing more difficult transition conditions, higher integration costs, weaker initial energy security or more complex renewable-system adjustment needs. This interpretation is consistent with the literature, which shows that renewable-support schemes, public finance, and green investment instruments can mobilise renewable capacity but depend strongly on policy design, financial-market conditions, infrastructure readiness, and social acceptance [49,52,91]. Therefore, the findings strengthen the core argument of this study: energy-transition policy improves energy security not through formal stringency alone, but through an effective policy mix that converts regulation and fiscal pressure into renewable deployment, reduced fossil-fuel dependence, grid flexibility, institutional capacity and system-level resilience.
6. Conclusions
This article examined whether energy-transition policies are associated with stronger national energy security and which policy instruments show the most consistent relationship with better energy-security outcomes. The study also assessed whether these associations are immediate, delayed, non-linear or conditional regarding the level of renewable electricity generation.
The empirical analysis was based on a cross-country panel of 49 countries covering 23 observed years between 2000 and 2023, excluding 2002, with 1127 country-year observations. The dependent variable was the Energy Security Score from the World Energy Council. In contrast, the main explanatory variables were the aggregate Energy Policy Stringency Index and its individual instruments from the OECD Climate Actions and Policies Measurement Framework. The models controlled for renewable electricity generation, GDP per capita, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law. The empirical strategy used two-way fixed-effects models with country and year effects, and Driscoll–Kraay standard errors were applied to account for cross-sectional dependence, serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
Three main findings emerge from the analysis. First, aggregate energy-policy stringency is not, by itself, a reliable predictor of energy security once renewable deployment, income, governance and fixed effects are controlled for. The aggregate EPSI has a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient in the contemporaneous model (0.421) and remains insignificant when lagged by 1, 2, and 3 years (0.187, 0.128, and –0.026, respectively). Second, renewable electricity generation is the most stable positive correlate of the Energy Security Score, with coefficients ranging from approximately 0.071 to 0.090. This suggests that realised energy-system transformation is more consistently associated with energy security than formal policy ambition alone. Third, policy-instrument decomposition reveals substantial heterogeneity. Fossil fuel excise taxes show the strongest positive association with energy security, with coefficients ranging from 1.554 to 1.082 in the full-instrument models and from 1.614 to 1.077 in the one-by-one robustness checks. Air emission standards show delayed positive associations after 2 and 3 years, while several instruments, including fossil fuel subsidies, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy certificates, and cross-sectoral policies, display negative coefficients that may reflect transition complexity, policy endogeneity, or more difficult energy-system adjustment conditions. This gap between insignificant aggregate EPSI coefficients and significant renewable-electricity coefficients suggests an implementation gap: formal policy stringency improves energy security only when it passes through institutional, financial and infrastructural filters and is translated into realised energy-system transformation.
These results suggest that policymakers should not treat aggregate energy-transition policy stringency as a sufficient condition for stronger energy security. Energy-security gains appear to depend more on whether policy frameworks translate into actual renewable electricity deployment, reduced fossil-fuel dependence and system-level adaptation. Fiscal instruments that discourage fossil-fuel use, especially fossil-fuel excise taxes, may be associated with stronger energy security when combined with credible investment signals, diversification strategies, and measures to protect vulnerable consumers from excessive cost burdens. Regulatory instruments such as air emission standards may also be relevant, although their effects appear to emerge only after technological and infrastructural adjustments have taken place. Therefore, energy-transition policy should be designed as an integrated policy mix combining renewable deployment, fossil-fuel demand reduction, grid flexibility, storage development and institutional capacity, rather than as a set of formal instruments whose stringency increases independently of system readiness.
The findings should be interpreted with appropriate caution. The VIF diagnostics indicate substantial multicollinearity in the full policy-instrument specifications, with the maximum VIF reaching 5657 for fossil fuel excise taxes in the two-year lagged model. Therefore, the full-instrument models are interpreted as exploratory decompositions rather than isolated estimates of each policy instrument. In addition, potential endogeneity and reverse causality cannot be fully excluded: countries with stronger energy security may be better able to adopt stricter policies. In contrast, countries with weaker energy security may introduce targeted instruments to address existing vulnerabilities. For this reason, the estimated coefficients should be understood as robust conditional associations rather than definitive causal effects.
Several limitations should be considered. First, the analysis uses country-level annual panel data, which allows broad cross-country comparison but does not capture regional differences, sector-specific risks or short-term market disruptions. Second, although the use of two-way fixed effects and Driscoll–Kraay standard errors improves inference robustness, it does not provide full causal identification. Third, the Energy Policy Stringency Index measures the formal intensity of policy settings but does not fully reflect enforcement quality, administrative capacity, credibility or implementation delays. Fourth, some policy instruments and governance indicators are highly correlated, complicating the interpretation of their separate effects despite one-by-one robustness checks. Fifth, panel unit-root tests provide mixed evidence for the main variables, so the results should be interpreted as conditional within-country associations rather than long-run equilibrium effects. A further limitation concerns the omission of time-varying factors. Although year fixed effects capture common global shocks, the models cannot fully account for country-specific exposure to energy-price volatility, heterogeneous effects of the 2022 Russia–Ukraine war, grid flexibility, storage capacity or other system-readiness factors that may influence both policy adoption and energy-security outcomes. Therefore, the results should be interpreted as conditional associations rather than causal estimates. Finally, the Energy Security Score is a composite indicator; therefore, the results refer to overall energy security performance rather than to separate dimensions such as affordability, reliability, import dependence, infrastructure resilience, or storage capacity. Future research could extend the analysis by using disaggregated energy-security indicators, higher-frequency data, country-group comparisons and causal identification strategies to examine how specific policy instruments affect different components of energy security.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization, B.K., N.S., G.N., M.J., A.S. and O.H.; methodology, O.H.; software, B.K., N.S., G.N., M.J., A.S. and O.H.; validation, O.H.; formal analysis, O.H.; investigation, O.H.;resources, B.K., G.N., M.J. and A.S.; data curation, O.H.; writing—original draft preparation, B.K., N.S., G.N., M.J., A.S. and O.H.; writing—review and editing, B.K., N.S., G.N., M.J., A.S. and O.H.; visualization, B.K., N.S., G.N., M.J., A.S. and O.H.; supervision, N.S.; project administration, G.N.; funding acquisition, B.K., G.N., M.J., and A.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding
This research received no external funding.
Data Availability Statement
The data presented in this study are openly available in [Zenodo] at [10.5281/zenodo.21225765].
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
| EPSI | Energy Policy Stringency Index |
| IEA | International Energy Agency |
| IRENA | International Renewable Energy Agency |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| NDC | Nationally Determined Contribution |
| UNSD | United Nations Statistics Division |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goal |
| ETS | Emissions Trading System |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| PPP | Purchasing Power Parity |
Appendix A
Table A1.
Descriptive statistics of the variables.
Appendix B
Table A2.
Robustness checks for the effect of EPSI on Energy Security Score.
Table A3.
Conditional effect of EPSI and renewable electricity generation on Energy Security Score.
Table A4.
Full policy-instrument specifications for Energy Security Score.
Table A5.
One-by-one policy-instrument robustness checks for Energy Security Score.
Table A6.
Conditional effects of policy instruments and renewable electricity generation.
Table A7.
Variance inflation factor diagnostics for the full policy-instrument models.
Table A8.
Pairwise correlation matrix of selected variables.
Table A9.
Panel unit-root tests for the main variables.
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