Do Energy Security Crises Accelerate Decarbonisation? The Case of REPowerEU

Abstract

Energy security crises have historically been turning points for energy systems, exposing vulnerabilities, reshaping policy priorities, and boosting technological change. However, whether—and to what extent—such crises accelerate low-carbon transitions remains contested. This paper examines the effects of the 2022 energy crisis on the European Union (EU)’s energy transition, using policy analysis combined with a quantitative assessment of renewable energy trends, forecasts, and targets. We analyse the ambition, implementation, and outcomes of the REPowerEU plan, the main response to the crisis. In an unprecedented move, REPowerEU securitised renewable energy as a means to reduce dependence on Russian energy imports. However, the plan only moderately increased earlier renewable energy targets and did not reverse declining subsidies despite more forceful implementation measures. Its effects have been uneven across technologies. Already accelerating solar may overshoot its targets, onshore wind might only slightly accelerate beyond its current steady growth, and offshore wind remains constrained by economic and institutional uncertainties. Despite increased subsidies for fossil fuels, coal continued declining, oil remained stable, and natural gas dropped. Overall, REPowerEU sustained rather than transformed the EU’s low-carbon transition, illustrating both the potential and limits of accelerating decarbonisation under security crises.

1. Introduction

Energy crises have historically acted as turning points for energy systems, revealing vulnerabilities, reshaping policy priorities, and triggering the deployment of new technologies. Do such crises accelerate low-carbon transitions or reinforce incumbent fossil fuel systems? One school of thought argues that crises can stimulate diversification away from fossil fuels and promote the uptake of low-carbon technologies [1,2]. Historical examples support this view: for example, the oil shocks of the 1970s spurred the deployment of nuclear power in industrialised countries [3,4]. However, scholars have also argued that when energy security becomes the priority, policymakers tend to favour immediate, cheaper, more reliable, and institutionally familiar solutions, which in most cases will be domestic fossil production or diversification of fossil imports rather than expanding low-carbon technologies [5].

Which of these arguments more accurately tracks the reality of actual energy transitions under security crises and why? This paper addresses this question by examining deployment of renewables in the European Union (EU) before and after the energy security crisis of 2022 triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The EU has been a leader in renewable energy and climate policies [6] and at the same time has remained deeply reliant on fossil fuel imports, particularly from Russia. The war exposed this dependency and triggered one of the most severe energy security crises in the EU’s history. In March 2022, immediately after the outbreak of the war, the European Commission introduced the REPowerEU plan, a policy package designed to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels while accelerating renewable deployment. The plan was often celebrated as an unprecedented decarbonisation effort, with studies suggesting that replicating it globally could put the world on track to meeting the Paris Agreement targets [7]. Yet some of the proposed measures—including delaying coal phase-outs and setting potentially unachievable targets—raised concerns that REPowerEU could undermine rather than reinforce the EU’s energy transition objectives [7,8,9]. These mixed judgements make REPowerEU and related policies a valuable case for assessing whether energy crises can serve as catalysts or obstacles for low-carbon transitions.

This paper therefore examines whether, and if so to what extent, the 2022 energy crisis accelerated the EU’s transition to low-carbon energy. To do so, we structure the analysis around two guiding questions. First, did the crisis lead to higher renewable energy targets and stronger implementation measures? Second, have these targets and measures translated into accelerated renewable deployment and reduced fossil fuel use? To answer these questions, we analyse the formulation, ambition, and interim progress of REPowerEU’s implementation.

In its framing and methodological approach, this paper complements the existing studies of REPowerEU that focus on specific implementation measures, such as permitting reforms and legal design [10] budgetary innovation and institutional change [11], as well as on the wider implications of the plan, such as the trade-off between energy security and equity [12,13] and the geopolitical and material dependencies of the EU [14,15]. Here we investigate how the energy security crisis changed the ambition and policy effort compared to the pre-crisis situation, and we evaluate the impact on specific technologies at different stages of maturity, thus introducing additional variables into understanding the dynamics between energy crises and growth of policy-driven energy technologies.

We show that contrary to both the overly positive and overly sceptical assessments, the impact of REPowerEU on EU decarbonisation efforts is positive but modest. Following the crisis, oil use stayed constant, coal kept declining, and natural gas consumption peaked and dropped. Although the plan called for renewable deployment at rates far exceeding historical values, this ambition did not originate from the crisis. Rather, REPowerEU reinforced and sustained a shift that had already begun before the war, driven by declining technology costs and rising climate concerns. We also observe that the policy action has not fully matched this increase in ambition; for example, subsidies for renewables declined even as targets increased. Furthermore, the implementation of the plan has been uneven. Solar deployment surged due to favourable economics, whereas onshore wind continued to face land-use and social acceptance barriers, and offshore wind deployment remained limited by multiple economic and technical uncertainties.

On a more general level, our findings highlight several mechanisms through which energy security crises may affect energy transitions. We argue that high energy prices that usually follow crises have a double-edged effect. While accelerating the deployment of low-carbon technologies that are already cost-competitive and scalable, they simultaneously require governments to shield consumers from price shocks, diverting financial support away from renewables. This reduces the scope for expanding technologies that still depend on state intervention, such as offshore wind. Finally, for mature but socially contested technologies such as onshore wind, securitisation narratives do little to address fundamental constraints of their deployment, including land availability and local acceptance, and therefore do not necessarily translate into faster deployment. All in all, technologies respond to policy interventions depending on the phase of technology growth.

We thus demonstrate the limits of accelerating renewable energy through securitisation. Although framing renewable deployment as a matter of national security can reinforce political commitment, it cannot substitute for technological maturity, institutional capacity, or social legitimacy and may even amplify resistance to green transitions. Taken together, these insights advance understanding of the stability of climate and energy policies under geopolitical stress and outline a research agenda for quantitatively assessing the feasibility of crisis-driven low-carbon transitions.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Research Design

Conceptually, this study draws on three complementary strands of theory. First, it builds on the literature on co-evolution of policies, technologies, and markets [16,17,18,19]. Second, it draws on the distinction between different phases of technology growth, particularly formative, acceleration, and steady growth [20,21]. Third, it applies the concept of policy cycles [22,23,24,25], which views policymaking as an iterative process in which policy commitment and implementation measures evolve through feedback loops from policy outcomes. Taken together, these concepts inform our analytical approach. To account for co-evolution, we conduct an integrated analysis of technological developments, markets and policies using the mixed-method approach [26]. To account for the concept of policy cycle, we analytically distinguish the effects of the crisis on policy commitment, policy effort, and policy outcome. Finally, to explain divergent outcomes of policies, we diagnose the phase of development for different renewable technologies.

2.2. Scope

This paper covers the period between 2018 and 2025. This allows us to isolate the effects of the 2022 security crisis while encompassing preceding policy developments such as the European Green Deal (EC 2019) and the ‘Fit for 55’ package [27] as well as subsequent policies such as the REPowerEU [28] and Renewable Energy Directive III (RED III) [29]. The starting point corresponds to the end of the previous policy cycle, which culminated with the adoption of the Renewable Energy Directive II (RED II) in 2018 [24].

We analyse all major EU policy communications and legislative texts related to REPowerEU and the ‘Fit for 55’ package. Selected national energy strategies that operationalise EU-level targets are also reviewed for contextual insights, though they are not analysed systematically. We focus on three fossil fuels—oil, coal, and natural gas—and three modern renewable technologies: solar, onshore, and offshore wind. The three renewable technologies account for the bulk of recent and projected capacity increase in the EU and, as we show, are at different growth phases [20], enabling comparison across technologies at different levels of maturity.

2.3. Analytical Elements

The analysis includes five components, which allow us to trace the effects of the energy security crisis on policies and their outcomes. To address the first research question, we first qualitatively analyse policies to document the rationale behind REPowerEU and the preceding documents by counting the encounter of terms ‘climate change’ and ‘energy security’. Second, we quantitatively compare policy targets set both pre- and post-2022 to identify the effect of the crisis on policy ambition. Third, we assess the evolution of implementation measures such as subsidies and permitting reforms. We trace the evolution of subsidies using the Directorate-General for Energy data [30,31]. For policy density, we calculate the number of policy documents in the EUR-Lex database [32] that have ‘renewable energy’ in the text or the title. To address the second research question, we determine whether policy ambition has translated into accelerated deployment by examining renewable deployment trends in 2022–2024 and forecasts up to 2030 against the pre-2022 trajectories. We also compare the pre- and post-crisis trends in fossil fuel use and infrastructure.

2.4. Data Sources and Calculations

This study uses the following data sources and calculations:

• Official policy documents, including EU-level legislation and communications as well as National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) and non-binding agreements (NBAs) of EU Member States. NECPs and NBAs were retrieved from the European Commission’s website [33,34,35], while EU-level documents were collected via EUR-Lex [32].
• Historical data and projections on renewable energy deployment and fossil fuel consumption—sourced from Eurostat, the European Environment Agency (EEA), the International Energy Agency (IEA), the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), and the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA).
• Growth rates calculations. We report growth rates as annual changes in shares of renewables in final energy consumption or as annual renewable energy capacity additions. To calculate the annual growth rate, we divide the change in targeted, forecasted, or actual shares/capacity by the number of years between the start and the end year (where the latter may be the target/forecast year and the former the year where the target/forecast was set).
• Subsidies data extracted from the European Commission’s official energy subsidy reports prepared by the Directorate-General for Energy, Trinomics, and Enerdata [30,31].
• Media and industry reports, including analyses from Politico, Reuters, Carbon Brief, WindEurope, and SolarPower Europe, published between 2022 and 2025.

2.5. Limitations

Our analysis extends only to 2025, providing a partial view of REPowerEU’s outcomes relative to its 2030 targets. Given the rapidly evolving EU policy landscape, not all recent measures could be fully captured. Causal attribution of the observed changes to policies vs. market changes was not directly possible using our method. Moreover, this study focuses primarily on renewable deployment, whereas other crisis responses—such as reducing overall energy consumption, improving efficiency, or expanding nuclear power—merit further investigation. Finally, while the EU offers a rich and data-transparent case, the findings may have limited generalisability to other regions with different institutional and technological contexts.

3. Results

3.1. Securitisation of Renewables by REPowerEU Is Unprecedented for EU Policy

The REPowerEU plan [36] was released by the European Commission in March 2022 just weeks after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Initially conceived as a response to soaring energy prices, the plan was rapidly reframed as an emergency strategy to end the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels by 2030 [37]. Its other stated goals were to stabilise energy prices through domestic generation and to maintain progress towards the climate goals. Its true significance becomes clear in the context of the EU’s energy policy history, where renewables and energy security had evolved largely as separate strands.

On one track, the EU had been promoting renewable energy since the 1990s. The 1997 White Paper [38] marked the first formal commitment, followed by RED I in 2009 [39] and RED II in 2018 [40]. This trajectory culminated in the European Green Deal (EGD) [41], which committed the EU to climate neutrality by 2050, and the ‘Fit for 55’ package [27], which operationalised a 55 percent emissions reduction target for 2030, primarily through scaling wind and solar. By this point, the EU had clearly become a global leader in renewable technologies [20]. Yet, energy security was not the main motivation for renewables expansion. Policy targets were justified in terms of emission reductions and costs rather than energy independence of diversification; for example, the ‘Fit for 55’ package did not mention energy security at all.

Energy security policy meanwhile developed along a different logic. The EU followed a ‘resilience’ rather than ‘sovereignty’ strategy [42]: minimising the impact of potential disruptions rather than maximising control over energy sources. This meant investments in gas storage, alternative pipelines, shared storage facilities, and ‘solidarity’ mechanisms of emergency response, where renewables played a minor role. At the same time, the EU continued to depend on Russia for its energy; for example, between 2010 and 2019, Russia’s gas exports to Europe increased by 43% and their share rose from 26% to 47% [43].

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine exposed the limits of this approach. The abrupt loss of Russian gas and the ensuing price surge highlighted the strategic vulnerability created by the EU’s dependence on a single, politically unstable supplier. The crisis triggered a strategic shift: the goal became not only to withstand disruptions but to secure energy through domestic and allied sources. REPowerEU articulated this shift by explicitly reframing renewables as instruments of sovereignty and independence. In a classic example of securitisation [44,45,46] and in stark contrast to ‘Fit for 55’, REPowerEU used the term ‘energy security’ about twenty times, linking the momentum of wind and solar deployment to the imperative of Europe’s energy sovereignty.

3.2. REPowerEU Aimed to Accelerate Historical Growth but Only Modestly Increased the Pre-War Targets

A radically new framing of renewables in the REPowerEU plan prompts a crucial question: were the newly securitised renewable targets radically more ambitious than the pre-war targets? The ‘Fit for 55’ package, adopted in 2021, had already marked a major shift compared with RED II of 2018 by raising the main target from 32% to 40% of renewables in gross final energy consumption by 2030, which almost doubled the previously targeted growth speed (from 1.15 percentage points (pp) to 2 pp ${\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$). Against this backdrop, REPowerEU built upon, rather than transformed, the existing ambitions. It further raised the 2030 target from 40% to 45%, though the final figure agreed upon by the Member States and set in RED III in 2023 was 42.5%. The targeted acceleration compared to the historical trend was impressive: RED III required renewables to grow about five times faster in 2023–2030 (2.5 pp ${\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$) than in 2013–2018 (0.48 pp ${\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$) (Figure 1).

REPowerEU increased targets unevenly across renewable energy technologies. For solar, ‘Fit for 55’ already aimed for 2.4 times faster growth than RED II. REPowerEU raised the target by an additional 20% (Figure 2) through the EU Solar Strategy [47], which set goals of 320 GW by 2025 and 600 GW by 2030. ‘Fit for 55’ aimed for a similar acceleration of onshore wind (2.2 times faster than in RED II), a target which REPowerEU increased by a modest 11%. However, for offshore win,d the situation was different. ‘Fit for 55’ was based on the EU strategy on offshore renewable energy (ORES) [48], which already aimed to increase the RED II target by about 70%. The non-binding agreements (NBAs) of 2023 [34], which aimed to implement REPowerEU, almost doubled this target from 60 GW to 110 GW (Figure 2). Furthermore, the Commission reaffirmed its long-term target of 300 GW by 2050 [49]. Thus, offshore wind received the largest boost by REPowerEU, being presented as not only a decarbonisation tool but also a cornerstone of European industrial policy, innovation, and regional cooperation in the North and Baltic Seas. However, already in 2024, the 2030 target was scaled back to around 90 GW [35] (Figure 2).

In summary, the difference between ‘Fit for 55’ and REPowerEU appears modest compared to the transformation from RED II to ‘Fit for 55’. While ‘Fit for 55’ was a true turning point in the EU’s renewable energy policy, REPowerEU reinforced and operationalised this trajectory under the pressure of geopolitical crisis. Its ambition may have been incremental, but its symbolism was profound: faced with acute insecurity, Europe’s response was not to slow down but to accelerate the low-carbon transition.

3.3. Post-Crisis, the Number of Renewable Policies Increased but Subsidies Declined

While REPowerEU did not introduce an entirely new framework of support instruments, it coincided with a transformation in how renewables were financed and regulated across the European Union. By 2022, renewable energy policy had been moving away from subsidy-driven growth towards a more market-oriented model. The energy crisis that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine further reinforced this transition, consolidating a shift from financial support to regulatory facilitation.

3.3.1. Declining Subsidies and the Shift in Policy Focus

Since the 1990s and until ca. 2020, most of the new renewable installations in the EU were subsidised by the governments. The subsidy mechanisms shifted from direct grants to feed-in tariffs (FITs) that would guarantee a fixed price for renewable electricity towards market-based Contracts for Difference (CfDs) or two-sided premiums. CfDs guarantee developers a stable ‘strike price’ for electricity, covering the difference between this reference price and actual market revenues. Since the late 2010s, CfDs were awarded through auctions, which made them reflect the actual costs of producing renewable electricity. Throughout the 2010s, the costs of renewables fell to a level closer to wholesale electricity prices, and the CfDs concurrently declined. In 2021–2023, partially in response to the war in Ukraine and gas supply disruptions, wholesale electricity prices dramatically increased, effectively closing or reversing the gap between market and strike prices. In some cases, project developers even paid back revenues to governments under CfD contracts, as market prices exceeded guaranteed levels. Offshore wind remained an exception: due to its higher capital intensity and longer construction timelines, it continued to depend on revenue stabilisation mechanisms such as CfDs, though at lower levels of support than a decade earlier.

Thus, the combination of declining technology costs and rising electricity prices dramatically reduced the level of subsidies (Figure 1), particularly of FITs and CfDs, which almost halved between 2020 and 2023 [31]. Paradoxically, the energy security crisis did not motivate the governments to maintain the subsidies at their previous levels (e.g., to stimulate offshore wind or other emerging technologies or to compensate negatively affected communities and thus reduce social resistance). One explanation could be that freed financial resources were required to protect consumers from increased energy prices. Indeed, as we show later, the overall level of energy subsidies did not decrease and the level of subsidies for fossils paradoxically increased.

3.3.2. Rising Volume and Changing Nature of Policies

Even as subsidies started to decline around 2020, the number of renewable energy policies in the EU increased sharply between 2020 and 2024 (Figure 1). The focus of these policies shifted from incentivising investment to removing non-cost barriers—permitting delays, grid bottlenecks, and local opposition—that constrained the scaling up of renewables.

An emblematic measure was the Emergency Regulation on Renewables [50,51], which declared renewable projects as being of ‘overriding public interest’. This allowed Member States to temporarily bypass certain environmental or spatial planning restrictions, shortening approval procedures for solar and wind installations. Several countries introduced or expanded ‘go-to areas’—pre-designated zones for renewable deployment with simplified environmental assessments and prioritised grid access. The amended RED III retained the notion of ‘overriding public interest’ and mandated Member States to adopt plans designating renewable acceleration areas (RAAs) by February 2026.

Complementing these regulatory measures were several sectoral policy instruments introduced under the EGD broader framework. While the EGD outlined overarching goals and regulatory principles, REPowerEU translated these into concrete, sector-focused roadmaps, which did not exist previously. Among these, the EU Solar Strategy and its European Solar Rooftops Initiative [47] mandated solar installations on new and renovated public, commercial, and residential buildings. The strategy also established the European Solar PV Industry Alliance [52] to strengthen domestic manufacturing capacity and reduce import dependence. Similarly, the Wind Power Action Plan [53] and the European Wind Charter [54] were the first EU-level frameworks explicitly devoted to supporting the wind industry’s supply chains, addressing permitting bottlenecks, and ensuring stable auction design amid inflation and equipment shortages. In parallel, non-binding regional agreements on offshore wind [34,35] coordinated grid planning and joint tenders among participating states. The European Commission also encouraged Member States to integrate these instruments into their National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) [33], thereby aligning national actions with the accelerated EU-level targets.

In summary, while the scale of subsidies declined, the volume, diversity, and integration of renewable energy policies increased markedly after 2022. This reflected the EU’s growing confidence in the competitiveness of mature technologies and a recognition that the main obstacles to rapid deployment were institutional rather than economic. REPowerEU thus symbolised a new phase in European renewable energy governance: a transition from subsidising technologies to managing systems—through industrial coordination, regulatory innovation, and cross-border cooperation.

The ultimate test of these policy shifts lies in their impact on deployment. The following section assesses implementation progress under REPowerEU, focusing on actual and expected capacity additions for solar and wind between 2022 and 2024. It evaluates whether the redesigned policy mix—less reliant on subsidies but more focused on administrative acceleration and industrial coordination—has effectively translated into faster renewable energy expansion.

3.4. The Prospects for Achieving the Targets Are Uneven Across Renewable Technologies

The overall goal of the EU’s renewable energy policies has been traditionally formulated in terms of the share of renewables in final energy consumption. RED III aimed for this share to grow at about 2.5 pp ${\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$ and achieve 42.5% by 2030. However, the actual growth in 2022–2024 was only 1.15 pp ${\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$, which, if extrapolated, will result in just over 30% by 2030, in line with the old target formulated in 2018 by RED II (Figure 1). The 2025 EU-wide assessment of the NECPs found that around 40% of Member States’ targets are not aligned with the EU-wide goal [55]. Resistance has emerged not only among traditional opponents such as Poland and Hungary but also in countries once viewed as climate frontrunners. For example, Sweden—a long-standing leader in renewable deployment—was referred to the Court of Justice in 2025 for failing to transpose EU permitting reforms [56]. These developments suggest that the political consensus underpinning the EGD is under strain. Several governments have voiced concerns about the perceived overreach of EU renewable legislation, growing competition for land use, and rising social opposition to large-scale projects [57].

Against this backdrop, the progress and prospects of individual RE technologies has been uneven. For solar PV, REPowerEU set the target of 592 GW by 2030, requiring annual capacity additions of roughly 50 $\mathrm{GW}{\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$ in 2022–2030. In 2022–2024, the EU added 62 $\mathrm{GW}{\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$, significantly outpacing both the target and the historical pace (6.6 $\mathrm{GW}{\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$ in 2018–2021) (Figure 2). By the end of 2024, the cumulative solar capacity exceeded 330 GW, slightly higher than the interim target of 320 GW set by the EU Solar Strategy for 2025. This growth is driven by favourable economics of low costs and high electricity prices. The technology’s modularity and short lead times allow rapid scaling, and unlike wind projects, solar installations face fewer permitting constraints and social opposition. The IEA forecasts a near-linear growth of solar PV in 2025–2030, exceeding the 2030 target by some 20% even in the main scenario (Figure 2). About one half of the new additions are expected to come from utility-scale, and the other half from distributed PV systems [58]. However, when aggregated across the NECPs, Member States collectively plan for only about 550 GW [59], some 8% below the target but still within reach.

The REPowerEU target for onshore wind (420 GW by 2030) required adding on average 30 $\mathrm{GW}{\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$ in 2022–2030 (the 510 GW total wind target includes 90 GW offshore (according to the 2024 non-binding agreements [35]) and 420 GW onshore wind). However, the growth in 2022–2024 was only 11 $\mathrm{GW}{\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$, just marginally above the 2013–2018 pace of 9.9 $\mathrm{GW}{\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$ and in line with the 11.7 $\mathrm{GW}{\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$ targeted by RED-II in 2018 (Figure 2). The lack of acceleration reflects how lengthy permitting procedures, land-use conflicts, and local resistance have become major barriers. In Sweden, for instance, the majority of new onshore projects have been rejected by municipalities [60]. Other challenges for both wind and solar power include grid integration, transmission, and storage infrastructure [61,62]. WindEurope [63] and the IEA [58] project that the EU will reach only 300–350 GW of onshore wind by 2030, with the projected rate of additions around 18 $\mathrm{GW}{\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$—somewhat faster than historical but about half as slow as required by REPowerEU (Figure 2). This shortfall is consistent with Member States’ plans: the 18 largest EU countries (those with a total electricity generation greater than 30 TWh in 2024, namely, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden) collectively aim for roughly 360 GW of capacity by 2030 [33]. NECPs suggest that of all Member States, only Germany, Austria, and Belgium plan to accelerate beyond the historical pace [64]. This may require strong policy effort: for example, Germany has designated renewables as projects of ‘overriding public interest’ and obliges each federal state to allocate 2 per cent of its land to renewables.

The initial ambition for offshore wind was downscaled from 110 GW [34] to 90 GW [35] by 2030 in non-binding agreements, likely acknowledging slower-than-expected progress. Yet even this reduced target now appears increasingly difficult to achieve. With the 2024 capacity of only 21 GW, it will require adding 11 $\mathrm{GW}{\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$, which is far above the historical rate of 2.3 $\mathrm{GW}{\mathrm{yr}}^{-1}$, which did not increase between 2018 and 2024 (Figure 2). This reflects constraints in supply chains, inflation, capital costs, and permitting. Rising interest rates and shortages of critical components, such as turbines, cables, and substations, have eroded project profitability. In 2023, several high-profile tenders in Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark were either cancelled or failed to attract bids [65]. In November 2024, Sweden denied permits to 13 offshore wind farms in the Baltic Sea, with a total planned capacity up to roughly 30 GW, citing defence concerns [66]. Most Member States are still in the early formative phase [20,67] of offshore wind, lacking the institutional structures and technical capacity required for rapid scaling. Forecasts point to a widening gap between the ambition and achievable deployment. WindEurope projects about 50 GW by 2030, the IEA foresees between 50 GW (main) – 68 GW (accelerated scenario), and recent modelling [68] suggests only 40–43 GW will be built.

3.5. Energy Security Crisis Did Not Affect Trends in Fossil Fuels Except for Gas Despite Increase in Fossil Fuel Expenditures and Subsidies

Prior to the war, Russia had been the EU’s dominant energy supplier, providing nearly 30% of oil, over 40% of gas, and more than 50% of coal and other solid fuels [69]. Here we trace how the use of these fossil fuels changed after the crisis.

By 2021, coal was steadily declining across the EU, falling by almost two-thirds between 1990 and 2021 [70]. Many Member States joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), launched at COP23 in 2017, pledging to close coal plants by 2030 and halt new investments [71]. However, in order to reduce dependence on Russian gas, REPowerEU envisioned a temporary increase in coal-fired generation. In 2022, coal consumption rose to 430 million tonnes [70]. Germany, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Greece, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Austria extended the lifetime of coal-fired plants, restarted closed units, or suspended generation caps [72]. Four EU countries have official postponed their coal exit dates: France from 2022 to 2027, Greece from 2025 to 2026, and Hungary and Italy from 2025 to 2027 [73]. Nevertheless, coal use in the EU fell in 2023 and then again in 2024, resuming its pre-crisis decline [70].

After the start of the war, the EU turned to rapid diversification of natural gas and oil imports. Gas was the most urgent—and the hardest—due to entrenched pipeline dependencies that left several Member States almost entirely reliant on Russian supplies. In March 2022, the EU signed a joint declaration with the United States to expand liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports [55], followed in July by an agreement to double gas imports from Azerbaijan via the Southern Gas Corridor [74]. Two strategic projects—the Baltic Pipe linking Norway to Poland via Denmark [75] and the Greece–Bulgaria interconnector [76]—became operational in autumn 2022. These measures could not fully offset the loss of Russian gas after Moscow halted deliveries to Poland, Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands [77], followed by the Nord Stream pipeline explosions in September 2022, which further accelerated the EU’s turn to LNG. Between 2022 and 2025, the EU installed or expanded nineteen LNG terminals [78], increasing its regasification capacity by 32%. By 2024, LNG accounted for nearly 40% of EU gas imports, with the United States supplying 45% and Russia 16% [79]. Pipeline imports from Russia fell below 20%, replaced primarily by deliveries from Norway (50%), Algeria (17%), and Azerbaijan (7%) [80]. After Russian gas transit through Ukraine ended in early 2025, Russia’s share declined further to around 10% [80]. In parallel, several EU countries advanced domestic gas extraction projects, including the joint Netherlands–Germany field in the North Sea [81,82] and Romania’s Neptun Deep development in the Black Sea [83]. The gas security measures have proven to be costly and environmentally unfriendly. Between 2022 and 2025, Member States spent approximately EUR 258 billion on LNG imports [79]. Scholars warned that the LNG boom risked delaying the fossil phase-out and increasing emissions [8] given that LNG’s carbon footprint is roughly 70% higher than that of pipeline gas [84]. Similarly, new extraction projects in the North and Black Seas drew criticism for overlooking ecological risks [85,86].

While EU gas consumption fell by roughly 20% between 2021 and 2024 [80], oil use has remained broadly stable since the 2010s, but its supply structure has also shifted dramatically since the war began. Russia’s share of EU crude oil imports fell to just 3% in 2024, while the United States became the largest external supplier (14%), followed by Norway (11%) and Kazakhstan (10%) [87].

The energy crisis has also reversed the progress in phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, which the EU pledged before the crisis [88]. Overall energy subsidies in the EU more than doubled, rising from an average of EUR 190 billion in 2015–2020 to EUR 397 billion in 2022 before declining to EUR 354 billion in 2023 [30,31]. Within this total, fossil fuel subsidies more than doubled, too, increasing from an average of EUR 59 billion (2015–2020) to EUR 136 billion in 2022 and remaining high at EUR 111 billion in 2023. In contrast, renewable energy subsidies declined notably during the same period—from an average of EUR 82 billion (2015–2020) to EUR 68 billion in 2022 and EUR 61 billion in 2023, with their share falling from over 40% to just 17%.

The sharp rise in fossil subsidies stemmed mainly from emergency measures addressing the gas price shock. Even though total EU gas imports dropped from 343 bcm in 2021 to 300 bcm in 2023, gas subsidies remained four times higher than pre-crisis levels [31]. Household gas prices nearly doubled—from EUR 0.064 per kWh in early 2021 to EUR 0.116 per kWh in early 2023 and further to EUR 0.124 per kWh in late 2024—marking the highest level on record [89].

Crisis management instruments, including tax reductions, regulated tariffs, and direct transfers to households and firms, accounted for roughly one-third of all EU energy subsidies between 2021 and 2023. Although many of these measures were intended as temporary relief, they reversed years of subsidy reform, leaving the EU off-track to eliminate fossil fuel support by 2030, as nearly half (around EUR 53 billion) of the identified subsidies have no defined phase-out date [31].

4. Discussion and Conclusions

4.1. Key Finding: The Energy Security Crisis Has Had Positive, Though Modest and Uneven, Effects on Low-Carbon Transitions in the EU

This paper asked whether, and if so to what extent, the 2022 energy security crisis accelerated the European Union’s transition to low-carbon energy. Contrary to expectations that crises either decisively catalyse or derail transitions, our findings point to a more muted, nuanced, and conditional outcome.

REPowerEU undoubtedly strengthened political commitment to expand renewables, yet most of the increase in ambition had already occurred before the crisis, in the ‘Fit for 55’ package. For solar and onshore wind, REPowerEU did not significantly reshape pre-existing targets, which were already unprecedented relative to both historical trends and previous policy goals. Neither did it boost subsidies, which dropped almost in half since 2020. REPowerEU did contribute to a more forceful permitting reform backed by securitised narratives which framed renewables as instruments of European energy sovereignty. Yet even with stronger commitments and securitised rhetoric, the growth of renewables did not uniformly accelerate, with outcomes diverging sharply across technologies. This confirms the emerging insight that technologies at different growth phases respond differently to policy interventions [64,90].

Solar experienced rapid acceleration because it entered the crisis in the accelerating growth phase driven by steep cost declines and still unconstrained by permitting and social acceptance barriers. Elevated electricity prices further boosted its profitability, and solar now appears on track to exceed its 2030 target. By contrast, by the early 2020s, onshore wind was at the steady growth phase, its good techno-economic performance counter-balanced by land-use conflicts, permitting delays, and social opposition. For such mature technologies, political push and procedural reforms have proven insufficient to shift deployment trajectories. Offshore wind followed yet another pattern. In most EU countries, it is still in a formative phase [67], marked by high capital costs, supply chain bottlenecks, and fledging institutions. Politically, the crisis triggered an ambitious ramping of targets, but these were formed under strong uncertainties and followed optimistic assumptions about costs, supply chain readiness, and future electricity demand. As these assumptions did not materialise, the offshore target was downscaled, but it is still unlikely to be met [58,63,68].

With respect to fossil energy, concerns that REPowerEU would undermine climate policy through delayed coal phase-outs and expanded LNG infrastructure proved largely unfounded despite short-term effects. The use of gas reversed its pre-crisis upward trend, coal continued its long-term decline after the temporary rebound in 2022, and oil consumption remained stable. Subsidies for fossil fuels surged, but so did prices; the net effect was neither a renewed fossil expansion nor a structural reversal of decarbonisation. Yet, concerns over potential lock-in of newly build natural gas infrastructure remain highly relevant.

Overall, the 2022 shock neither derailed nor significantly accelerated the transition but rather consolidated and reinforced the pre-war commitments. The significance of REPowerEU lies precisely in its continuity: confronted with one of the most severe energy shocks in its history, the EU did not revert to fossil fuels or scale back its climate goals. Instead, it doubled down on renewables and embedded decarbonisation within a broader quest for energy sovereignty.

4.2. Broader Implications for Energy Transitions

These findings advance understanding of how security crises shape low-carbon transitions. First, crises are policy input that generate the overall demand for energy security but influence different elements of policy effort—commitment, action, and outcome [91]—asymmetrically (Figure 3). Second, the effect of crises on deployment depends on the phase of technological growth. Technologies in the formative phase may invite unrealistic targets that risk being missed due to uncertainties. Technologies in the accelerating growth phase are easier to boost as policy signals are amplified by increasing returns. In contrast, accelerating the growth of technologies in the steady growth phase requires a particularly strenuous effort to overcome substantial systemic barriers (Figure 3). Third, the dual price effects of crises—the windfall to renewable deployment and the simultaneous need to protect consumers from high bills—generate tensions that shape policy choices. These tensions may lead to shrinking fiscal space for renewable support and a widening gap between political ambition and implementation (Figure 3). Finally, policy feedback shapes policy choices in both stable and crisis conditions. Falling costs and strong track records can encourage governments to raise ambition even without security pressures (as under ‘Fit for 55’), while security shocks can trigger unrealistic targets given uncertainty and lack of less mature technologies. Because of these coupled dynamics, the impacts of energy security shocks on transitions are likely to be modest, uneven, and contingent on technology maturity and choice of policy measures. All in all, our findings align with ref. [92]’s conclusions that crises can support decarbonisation but that their effects depend on pre-existing policy and technology trends.

4.3. Future Research and Policy Agenda

Our findings have implications for the governance of energy transitions under security crisis. To begin with, target setting should be evidence-based and informed not only by techno-economic indicators but also by socio-technical analysis. For mature technologies like onshore wind, barriers such as land availability and public acceptance should be treated as core feasibility criteria. For formative technologies, targets should consider uncertainty and realistic timelines for supply-chain development, market growth, and institutional adjustment. Securitisation narratives cannot substitute for industrial capacity and technology readiness, nor can they overcome low social acceptance or strong political backlash [93,94,95]. This is because backlash emerges from distributional conflicts and ideational–political dynamics of energy policies that impose visible costs and challenge fairness, which populist and conservative actors mobilise through narratives of elite overreach, lost autonomy, and cost-of-living pressures—allowing various actors to contest the policy legitimacy [96,97,98].

Secondly, the lower need for direct subsidies once technologies become cost-competitive should not be equated with no need for financing transition. For example, redirecting part of this support toward improving grid reliability or compensating affected communities could resolve technical barriers, foster social acceptance, and accelerate growth.

Future research should deepen our understanding of the coupled technology–policy dynamics that unfold under external shocks. While this paper traced one policy cycle, answering broader questions about whether and when crises accelerate low-carbon transitions requires comparative analyses across multiple cycles, technologies, and jurisdictions. In particular, systematic evidence is needed on how policymakers update targets under uncertainty, allocate resources during crises, and weigh acceleration against feasibility.