Reflection and Amendment of China’s Nuclear Energy Policies and Laws with the Background of Global “Nuclear Relaunch”

Abstract

The design of a country’s nuclear energy development policy and legal system is crucial to the development of its nuclear energy industry, and thus also affects international issues such as climate change and energy green and low-carbon transformation. Under such a “Nuclear Relaunch” era that the world is experiencing, China’s nuclear power installed capacity has reached second in the world, and China’s nuclear energy policies and laws will have a significant impact on the development of civil nuclear energy worldwide. Therefore, it is crucial to reflect on the problems existing in China’s nuclear legal system and theoretical research and propose corresponding amendments based on the review of China’s existing nuclear energy policy and law and the comparison with the relevant system design of other countries. This paper first extracts the common clues of nuclear power development in the world through historical and comparative studies on the development of nuclear energy policies and laws in China and other countries in the world. Secondly, combined with relevant data such as the scale of China’s nuclear power industry, the number and focus of policies and laws, this paper comprehensively analyzes and points out the current practical difficulties faced by China’s nuclear energy policies and laws from an empirical perspective. Finally, in response to these practical difficulties, this paper will propose amendments such as promoting atomic energy legislation, improving the nuclear safety legal standard system and independent supervision system, and strengthening information disclosure in the field of nuclear energy.

1. Introduction

Energy consumption has long been considered the biggest contributor to global environmental pollution and climate change. Studies have shown that energy-related greenhouse gas emissions account for the majority of all anthropogenic emissions [1], and “among the leading contributors to CO₂ emissions is the combustion of nonrenewable energy (NRE) sources” [2]. For example, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in 2022, the total greenhouse gas emissions from the three economic sectors of transportation, industry, and electricity accounted for 76% of the total U.S. emissions, and fossil fuel consumption is the main source of greenhouse gases in these three economic sectors [3]. At the same time, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion increased by 1.3% in 2022 [4], which further highlights the necessity of decarbonization in the energy sector in addressing global climate change and greenhouse gas emissions. Today, as these issues are increasingly valued by all humanity, nuclear power, as mentioned later, has once again received widespread attention from the international community as the energy source with the lowest greenhouse gas emissions. The international community is experiencing an era of “nuclear relaunch”. At the international level, at COP28 in December 2023, 25 countries including the United States and France announced their participation in the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy, which “recognizing the key role of nuclear energy in achieving global net-zero greenhouse gas emissions/carbon neutrality by or around mid-century and in keeping a 1.5 °C limit on temperature rise within reach and achieving Sustainable Development Goal 7”, “recognizing that nuclear energy is already the second-largest source of clean dispatchable baseload power, with benefits for energy security”, and the participants of the declaration pledged to “work together to advance the global aspirational goal of tripling nuclear energy capacity from 2020 by 2050, recognizing the different domestic circumstances of each participant”, and “ensure nuclear power plants are operated responsibly and in line with the highest standards of safety, sustainability, security and non-proliferation, and that fuel waste is responsibly managed for the long term” [5]. At COP29, held in November 2024, six countries, including El Salvador, formally signed the declaration, bringing the total number of signatories of the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy to 31 [6].

In addition to the global expansion trend of the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy, countries around the world have also taken some actions in the field of domestic law to promote the development of nuclear power. For example, the United States, as one of the leaders of the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy, announced its domestic action framework for tripling nuclear energy in the next 25 years at COP29 [7], proposing seven guiding principles such as “Ensuring Public Health and Safety” and “Protecting the Environment”, and action plans in nine areas such as building new large reactors, small modular reactors, microreactors and extending, expanding and restarting existing reactors [8]. Although President Trump announced the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, he issued two executive orders on the day of his inauguration. One of them was “Declaring a National Energy Emergency”, proposing that executive agencies should identify and use any lawful emergency powers available to them to promote the transportation, refining, and production of domestic energy, including uranium, etc. [9]. The second was “Unleashing American Energy”, requiring executive agencies to immediately review agency actions that impose an undue burden on the identification, development, or use of domestic energy resources, which clearly listed nuclear energy resources [10]. Energy Secretary Chris Wright also recently promised to start the long-awaited American nuclear renaissance [11]. It can be seen that although the Biden administration and the Trump administration hold diametrically opposed positions on climate change, they share the same emphasis on nuclear energy resources. In addition, when Germany decided to end nuclear energy in 2011, its 17 nuclear reactors provided more than a quarter of its electricity. Later, the last three nuclear reactors in Germany were permanently shut down in April 2023 [12]. However, this situation seems to have changed recently: Rafael Grossi, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in an interview during COP29 that it was logical and rational for Germany to restart nuclear power generation [13]. The German nuclear engineering lobbying group also recently stated that “up to half a dozen nuclear power stations could in theory be reopened” [14]. Friedrich Merz, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and chancellor-designate, also said that the closure of the last reactor was a black day for Germany [15]. From this, it can be seen that Germany is very likely to restart nuclear power after Merz takes office.

In the context of the international community and countries around the world restarting nuclear energy, China’s total installed capacity of units in operation and under construction reached 87.33 million kilowatts in 2023, which ranks second in the world [16]. It determines that China is bound to play an important role in the era of nuclear restart in the future. By observing the current status of China and the global nuclear energy industry, it can be found that, as of the end of December 2023, in terms of the number of commercial nuclear power units and installed capacity, there were 32 countries in the world with a total of 413 nuclear power units in operation, with a total installed capacity of 371.51 million kilowatts. China has 55 nuclear power units in operation with an installed capacity of 57.03 million kilowatts, ranking third in the world (second only to the United States and France). In terms of the number of nuclear power units under construction and installed capacity, there were 17 countries in the world with a total of 58 nuclear power units under construction, with a total installed capacity of 59.867 million kilowatts. China has 26 nuclear power units under construction, with a total installed capacity of 30.3 million kilowatts, both of which remain first in the world [16].

In terms of national policies, laws, and institutional design, however, since the promulgation of the Nuclear Safety Law in 2017, China has not introduced any new special laws in the field of nuclear energy. Although the Atomic Energy Law was included in the first category of projects in the legislative work plan of the State Council [17] and the legislative plan of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee in 2018 (drafts of laws that are relatively mature and are planned to be submitted for deliberation during the term of office) [18], the draft was not submitted to the 14th NPC Standing Committee for deliberation until 23 April 2024 [19]. The Energy Law, which was submitted for deliberation on the same day as the draft Atomic Energy Law, has been promulgated and has come into effect. In contrast, this is enough to reflect the difficulty and slowness of China’s atomic energy legislation process. However, although the Energy Law is regarded as the basic law of China’s energy field, it only makes relatively abstract and inoperable declarative provisions for the nuclear energy field, such as “actively and orderly developing nuclear power” and “encouraging and supporting the safe use of nuclear energy” [20]. It is difficult to provide support for the improvement of China’s nuclear legal system at the level of the basic energy law. In addition, China has not announced its participation in the aforementioned “Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy”, but has invested a lot of resources in nuclear power facility construction, technical assistance, and talent training in developing countries such as Pakistan [21] and Saudi Arabia [22]. In the meantime, the construction of energy infrastructure, represented by nuclear energy, is one of the main goals of China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, which plays an important role in China’s international political diplomacy [2]. This consideration, based on a political game, will also have a certain impact on the internationalization of China’s nuclear energy industry. At the same time, at the national policy level, although China has issued a number of policy documents closely related to the nuclear energy field in recent years, such as the “Energy Development Strategic Action Plan (2014–2020)” issued by the General Office of the State Council in 2014, the “13th Five-Year Plan for Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control and Long-Term Goals for 2025” issued by the State Council in 2017, the “14th Five-Year Plan for Modern Energy System” issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) in 2022, and the “Three-Year Action Plan for High-Quality Development of Nuclear Technology Application Industry (2024–2026)” issued by the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), the NDRC and other 12 departments in 2024. These major policy documents have clarified the important position of nuclear power in China’s future energy development, but most of them lack operational normative guidance. The current lagging, abstract, and incomplete state of China’s nuclear policies and laws is in sharp contrast to the acceleration of China’s nuclear power engineering facility construction in recent years: during 2022 and 2023 alone, the number of units approved for construction has reached 10 [23]. Since 1 January 2025, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) and its National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) have issued 17 notices on environmental impact assessments, construction permits, and technical specifications for nuclear power facilities in various regions. Seven provinces and municipalities, including Shandong, Fujian, and Zhejiang, mentioned nuclear power in their 2025 government work reports and issued a total of 17 nuclear power project construction plans in 2025 [24]. If this reality of the incompatibility between the scale of industrial development and policy and legal support is not amended in a timely manner, China’s future development of the nuclear energy industry and legal system will inevitably face more severe practical difficulties.

On the one hand, China plays an important role in the nuclear energy field of the international community. On the other hand, its domestic nuclear energy system design faces various practical difficulties. Under such international and domestic dual pressures, China needs to reflect on the defects of its policies and laws in the field of nuclear energy and make timely corrections. The year 2025 is the final year of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan and the start year of the 15th Five-Year Plan. The preparation of the corresponding nuclear safety plan has also been gradually launched [25]. This year is crucial for the future development direction and quality of China’s nuclear industry. However, based on the above-mentioned current status of research on China’s nuclear energy policy, legal system and theory, it can be found that, on the one hand, China’s nuclear energy field has placed excessive emphasis on nuclear safety in terms of policy and legal system, and has not given enough attention to industrial development. On the other hand, theoretical research has also focused on the design of the nuclear safety legal system, and there has been little basic theoretical research and legislative initiatives on atomic energy law. This serious deviation between practice and theory has resulted in a large amount of blank space in China’s nuclear law system and theory, with the nuclear energy industry promotion legal system represented by the Atomic Energy Law, which has in turn caused the aforementioned serious dilemma of uncoordinated development. Thus, under this international and domestic situation, this article, based on sorting out China’s current nuclear energy policy and legal system, aims to reflect on the current defects and the practical difficulties China faces, and put forward suggestions for amendments. Specifically, first, in terms of key research issues, this article will focus on the field of China’s nuclear energy policies and laws. On the one hand, it will reflect on the gaps in existing theoretical research, and on the other hand, it will criticize the defects in the current legal system, and on this basis, it will put forward improvement suggestions and fill the gaps in theoretical research. Secondly, in terms of research methods, this article will use historical research, comparative research, empirical research and other research methods to sort out the common development clues of the nuclear energy industry and legal system in China and other countries in the world, and combine existing research results and various relevant data on the nuclear energy industry to provide empirical support for the defects in China’s nuclear energy policy and law, and then put forward the improvement suggestions advocated in this article, thereby constructing a complete research framework based on the analysis of the current situation to discover and solve problems. Third, in terms of writing structure, the second part of this article will first sort out the development history of the nuclear energy industry in China and other countries in the world from a comparative law perspective, and extract several common development clues and China’s position in them. The third part will systematically sort out the main policies and laws in China’s nuclear energy field, and on this basis, further analyze the current defects and practical dilemmas of China’s nuclear legal system, and explore the root causes of these problems. The fifth part will put forward several targeted amendments to China’s nuclear legal system. Finally, the main contribution and research significance of this article lies in providing a critical reflection perspective for the research in the field of nuclear law in China, pointing out that China’s current nuclear law system is difficult to adapt to the objective facts and difficulties of rapid industrial development, and providing practical and effective measures for the improvement of China’s nuclear law system, such as promoting the process of atomic energy legislation and improving the nuclear safety system. At the same time, it also fills the gap in China’s nuclear law theoretical research in the field of promoting the nuclear energy industry.

2. Development Clues of the Nuclear Energy Industry and China’s Position

In order to better reflect on and revise the policies, laws, and system design in the field of nuclear energy in China, it is necessary to sort out the development of the nuclear energy industry and policies and laws in China and other countries in the world. It can be found that there are some commonalities between them, which are mainly reflected in the following two clues: one is the coordination between safety assurance and industrial development, and the other is the balance between green and low-carbon energy transformation and radioactive pollution prevention and control. This section will discuss these two main clues, and on this basis, combined with the development process of China’s nuclear energy industry and nuclear legal system, determine China’s basic position in the above two clues, and lay the foundation for the analysis, reflection and amendment of China’s nuclear energy policies and laws in the following text.

2.1. Nuclear Safety and Development

In the process of the development of the nuclear energy industry and the improvement of human welfare, safety, and development have always been the two most important core values [26]. On the one hand, in terms of safety value, the technical characteristics of nuclear determine the importance of nuclear safety assurance. Since the peaceful use of nuclear energy by mankind, the international community has established a basic nuclear safety legal system through international treaties such as the “Convention on Nuclear Safety”, forming the “Nuclear Law Manual” and a series of international “soft laws” such as nuclear safety standards. Countries around the world have also established their own nuclear safety management systems by formulating and revising comprehensive nuclear energy laws, formulating special nuclear safety laws, or specifically stipulating nuclear safety systems in other laws [27]. On the other hand, in terms of development value, the development of the nuclear energy industry is actually a process of continuous renewal and iteration of energy and technology, and continuous improvement of economic efficiency. In the early stage of nuclear power development, some nuclear power plants have achieved power generation costs lower than traditional thermal power plants [28]. The impact of two oil crises in the 1970s forced countries to generally choose nuclear power instead of oil [29]. From 1970 to 1982, the proportion of nuclear power in total electricity production in the United States increased from 1.3% to 16%, Japan increased from 1.3% to 20%, and France increased from 3.7% to more than 40% [30]. Germany had about 110 nuclear devices put into operation between 1957 and 2004 [31]. The proportion of nuclear power generation reached 31.6% in 1997 and remained above 25% for a long time [32]. So far, the global nuclear energy industry has formed a certain scale. In addition to the data on the number of nuclear power units in operation and construction and the scale of installed capacity mentioned in the previous article, the global nuclear power generation has reached 248.68 billion kWh in 2022 [16], and 260.2 billion kWh in 2023 [33].

However, despite the advantages of lower fuel costs, longer investment payback period, more economical, cleaner, and low-carbon, the existing nuclear power technology is also accompanied by serious hidden dangers such as nuclear leakage that threaten the safety of life and property of all mankind. This constitutes the first common clue in the development of nuclear energy industries in various countries: the conflict and coordination between safety assurance and industrial development in the field of nuclear energy. This conflict is fully reflected in the historical law that the development of the nuclear energy industry has fallen into a low ebb after every nuclear accident. The Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the United States in 1979 and the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the former Soviet Union in 1986 triggered doubts about nuclear safety in the international community at the time, the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in 2011 reduced the proportion of nuclear power in the global electricity supply from the original 15% to 11–12%, and the number of nuclear reactors under construction in the world that year was only 4 [29]. These facts are enough to illustrate the huge impact and negative impact of nuclear accidents on the development of the nuclear energy industry, which is unmatched by any other energy field.

Nuclear accidents have greatly hindered the development of nuclear energy industries in all countries. First, in Germany, a survey after the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 showed that 69% of respondents opposed further expansion of nuclear energy. At the same time, the Green Party’s strength continued to grow, and it proposed the immediate closure of the country’s 20 commercial atomic power plants. This anti-nuclear sentiment also led to violent clashes at a nuclear waste reprocessing plant near Bavaria in 1986, injuring more than 400 people [34]. Germany’s 2002 “Orderly Phase-out of Nuclear Energy Commercial Law” “is regarded as the basis for the gradual phase-out of nuclear power plant operations” [31]. After the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, Germany directly announced that it would close 7 of its 17 nuclear power plants [35]. On June 30 of the same year, Germany passed Act No. 13 to amend the Atomic Energy Law, and “the fixed period for the closure of German nuclear power plants was written into law” [31]. Germany permanently closed the last three nuclear power plants in April 2023 [12], and the proportion of nuclear power generation in Germany’s total power generation at that time has dropped to only 1.4% [32]. Second, in France, affected by the Fukushima nuclear accident, the French nuclear industry giant Areva Group suffered a loss of 2.4 billion Euros that year. In 2012, Hollande announced plans to shut down France’s longest-operating nuclear power plant, and in 2015, France’s “Green Growth Energy Transition Act” proposed reducing the proportion of nuclear power in the energy structure. It was not until the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 that France announced a “revitalization of the nuclear power plan”, passed the “Act to Accelerate Nuclear Energy Development” and canceled the “upper limit of no more than 50% of nuclear power by 2035”, and the gradual withdrawal of nuclear power was alleviated [36]. Third, the development of the U.S. nuclear energy industry and policies and laws also has a similar process. In the 1950s, the U.S. government accelerated the development of the nuclear energy industry through various policies and legislation. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 clarified the three functions of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC): to continue nuclear weapons projects, promote the commercial application of nuclear power, and protect against hazards in peaceful applications. The Act broke the government’s monopoly on atomic energy technology and allowed private enterprises to participate in the development of the civilian nuclear industry through cooperation with the government [37]. During this period, the nuclear power regulatory policy of the U.S. nuclear energy industry was inclined towards development, implemented licenses for the purpose of development, and provided legal support for development [26]. This leapfrog development eventually led to the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the United States. Thus, the U.S. nuclear energy industry entered a 20-year dormant period, the nuclear safety system turned to “safety first”, and the licensing and approval of nuclear power plant construction plans went dormant. Although the U.S. nuclear power industry began to show signs of recovery after entering the 21st century, and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 restarted nuclear power [38], this recovery was suppressed again after the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011.

It can be seen that the development of the global nuclear energy industry has always been accompanied by conflicts, swings, and efforts to reconcile safety assurance and industrial development. From the initial emphasis on the clean and low-cost advantages of nuclear power and vigorous development to the rapid pace of industrial development leading to nuclear accidents, the anti-nuclear wave that was triggered eventually backfired on the nuclear energy industry of various countries. It can be said that the conflict and coordination between safety and development is a common thread that runs through the past, present, and future of the nuclear energy industry in various countries around the world.

2.2. Clean Energy and Radioactivity

The clues of conflict and coordination between nuclear safety assurance and industrial development mentioned above also provide another clue for the development of the global nuclear energy industry, namely the balance between green and low-carbon energy transformation and radioactive pollution prevention and control. These two clues are actually interdependent. On the one hand, the biggest safety concern of the global anti-nuclear wave for the nuclear energy industry is the radioactive pollution problem that may be caused by a nuclear accident: after the Chernobyl nuclear accident, 134 of the 237 people involved in the cleanup site were diagnosed with Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS) and 28 of them died of ARS a few weeks after the accident [39]. However, the impact of the accident is far more than that. According to a report released by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2006, the Chernobyl nuclear accident may cause up to 9000 deaths from cancer, and more than 5 million people live in areas still contaminated by radioactivity, and many of them show higher levels of anxiety, a variety of unexplained physical symptoms and subjective poor health [40].

However, on the other hand, the reason the global nuclear energy industry can still achieve extremely rapid scale expansion despite the aforementioned huge concerns about safety hazards is precisely because of the green and low-carbon attributes of nuclear power, which are still popular today: in addition to abundant nuclear fuel resources and low mining costs, nuclear power is also the power generation method with the lowest greenhouse gas emissions among various energy sources, and most of the greenhouse gas emissions from nuclear power generation come from the fossil fuels consumed in the extraction, processing and enrichment of nuclear fuel uranium and the production of building materials steel and cement which is used in the construction of nuclear power plants [41]. Other studies have shown that since Germany formulated its energy transition policy, Die Energiewende, to replace nuclear energy and fossil energy with renewable energy such as wind, solar and bioenergy, climate gas emissions have decreased by 25% between 2002 and 2022, with total nominal expenditures reaching 696 billion Euros. However, if Germany retains its 2002 stock of nuclear energy or continues to invest in new nuclear energy facilities, it may be able to save half of its expenditure while reducing greenhouse gas emissions by another 73% based on existing emission reductions in 2022 [42].

It can be seen that the nuclear energy industry is naturally “charmingly dangerous”. Countries must weigh and choose between the temptation of quickly and economically achieving green and low-carbon energy transformation and the huge safety risks. This also constitutes the second clue to the development of the global nuclear energy industry. In fact, if we look at the problem of how to balance the two from the perspective of cost-benefit analysis, we will find that they are interdependent. As some scholars have pointed out, the two methods of dumping or managing nuclear waste are essentially no different, because “a key deficit of waste management practices is not that they are inherently bad or incorrect, but that the underlying assumption that waste can be managed at all is misplaced”. Locking nuclear waste in complex containers to achieve permanent management is just a “managerial fantasy of total rational control” [43]. Therefore, whether to choose to bear or eliminate nuclear safety risks, and to choose to embrace or reject the temptation of clean and low-carbon energy transformation, there will be no universal standard answer in the past, present and future development of the global nuclear energy industry, it just depends only on the policy choices of the international community and various sovereign states.

2.3. China’s Position on Nuclear Energy

Combing the development history of China’s nuclear energy industry and policies and laws around the two clues summarized above, it is not difficult to find that since the beginning of the development of civilian nuclear energy and nuclear technology, China has adhered to the concept of nuclear energy industry development with safety assurance and radioactive pollution prevention as the priority. Most of the policies and laws promulgated are mainly focused on radiation protection and nuclear safety supervision, and the content of promoting and supporting the nuclear industry is only reflected in the planning or individual plans. This almost “one-sided” tendency in policies and laws has created extremely favorable conditions for the construction of China’s nuclear safety legal system and the smooth promulgation of the “Nuclear Safety Law”. However, it has also caused a great tilt of national administrative management and legislative resources, thereby limiting the development of policies and laws to promote the nuclear energy industry, such as the “Atomic Energy Law”, presenting an embarrassing situation where the actual scale of the industry is not compatible with the development of policies and laws to support and promote it.

At the beginning of the development of its nuclear industry, China attached great importance to the supervision and management of nuclear energy and put forward the nuclear safety work policy of “safety first, quality first” [27]. At that time, the use of civilian nuclear energy and nuclear technology mainly included the use of radioactive isotopes and radiation devices, so the legislative focus was also on the formulation of standards and administrative management of radiation protection. For example, in 1960, the State Council issued the “Interim Regulations on Health Protection in Radioactive Work”, the Science and Technology Committee and the Ministry of Health issued three standards including the “Maximum Permissible Standard of Ionizing Radiation”, in 1974, the State Planning Commission and other departments jointly issued the “Radiation Protection Regulations” (GBJ8-74) [44], and in 1979, the Ministry of Health and other departments jointly issued the “Radioactive Isotope Work Health Protection Management Measures” and other normative documents [45]. In the period when there were no civilian nuclear power plants in mainland China, the names of the above-mentioned normative documents clearly reflected China’s safety supervision of the use of nuclear energy and nuclear technology and its strict protection requirements for radioactive workers.

Although China’s nuclear energy industry briefly showed a policy tendency to support the development of the nuclear energy industry during the 1970s and 1980s, this tendency did not last long, and it turned to safety again amid concerns about nuclear accidents. Specifically, although China’s power industry during this period was mainly focused on thermal power and hydropower, it also proposed a plan to supplement and appropriately develop nuclear power, and envisioned “building three to four large and medium-sized nuclear power plants around 1990, and it is possible to reach 10 MKW by the end of the 20th century”, civilian nuclear power began to enter the development stage. However, China’s policy tendency to favor the development of the nuclear energy industry did not last long. As early as 1970, the “728 Project” that decided to start the construction of nuclear power plants was later suspended due to the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the United States in 1979, and was not restarted until August 1982 [45]. China’s policy trends during this period also show its hesitation and swing between safety assurance and industrial development.

On 1 January 1984, China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On October 30 of this year, the NNSA was established to supervise and manage civilian nuclear facilities [27]. This indicates that China has placed nuclear safety system construction in a more important position. Since then, policies and laws have also shown a more obvious preference for safety assurance. This tendency is first reflected in the changes in the administrative affiliation and institutional setup of NNSA. When it was first established, it was affiliated with the former State Science and Technology Commission, and was later incorporated into the upgraded State Environmental Protection Administration in 1998. This means the separation of China’s nuclear energy industry revitalization and safety supervision functions, and the transformation of the nuclear safety supervision mechanism from the original internal supervision to a more neutral and scientific external supervision [46]. Later, in 2012, NNSA expanded its internal institutional setup from one department to three departments, aiming to focus on improving nuclear safety supervision capabilities [46]. In addition, since the establishment of NNSA in 1984, China has formulated, promulgated, and joined a number of policies, laws, and international treaties on issues such as nuclear safety and radioactive pollution prevention and control. At the policy and normative document level, such as the 1986 “Regulations on the Safety Supervision and Management of Civilian Nuclear Facilities”, the 1993 “Regulations on Emergency Management of Nuclear Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants”, and the 2007 “Regulations on the Supervision and Management of Civilian Nuclear Safety Equipment” [27]. At the legal level, such as the 2003 “Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control Law” and the 2017 “Nuclear Safety Law”. At the international treaty level, such as joining the “Convention on Nuclear Safety” in 1996 and joining the “Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioan Waste Management” in 2006.

In fact, China is not completely without national-level promotion and support for the development of the nuclear energy industry. For example, the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China, adopted in 1986, proposed to build nuclear power plants in a focused and step-by-step manner and arranged an investment of RMB 12.5 billion for the four special economic zones of Guangdong and Fujian and the Guangdong Nuclear Power Plant [47]. In the same year, China’s Gross National Product (GNP) reached RMB 938 billion [48]. In 1991, the Ten-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China and the Outline of the Eighth Five-Year Plan proposed plans such as planned construction, expansion and reconstruction of a number of large and medium-sized power plants (including hydropower, thermal power and nuclear power), implementing the policy of adapting measures to local conditions, developing both hydropower and thermal power and appropriately developing nuclear power, and proposed future goals such as focusing on the construction of the Qinshan Nuclear Power Phase II project and the development of 600,000-kilowatt nuclear power unit equipment [49]. Based on these plans, China promoted the construction of Qinshan Nuclear Power Station and Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station through independent research and development and Sino-foreign joint ventures. Qinshan Nuclear Power Station was connected to the grid on December 15, 1991, ending the history of no nuclear power in mainland China [50]. In fact, China has explicitly mentioned nuclear power construction in every five-year plan since the “Sixth Five-Year Plan”.

Table 1. Main Contents Related to Nuclear Power in China’s Five-Year Plans.

Name of the File (“People’s Republic of China” Is Omitted Hereinafter)	Date of Publication	Main Contents Related to Nuclear Power
The Sixth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (1981–1985)	10 December 1982	In terms of nuclear power construction, a 300,000-kilowatt nuclear power plant will be built
The Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (Abstract) (1986–1990)	12 April 1986	Build nuclear power plants in a focused and step-by-step manner
Ten-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Outline of the Eighth Five-Year Plan	9 April 1991	Implement the policy of adapting measures to local conditions, developing both hydropower and thermal power, and appropriately developing nuclear power
The Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Outline of the Long-Term Objectives for 2010	17 March 1996	Implement the policy of adapting measures to local conditions, developing both water and fire, and appropriately developing nuclear power
Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development	15 March 2001	Moderate development of nuclear power
Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development	14 March 2006	Actively promote nuclear power construction
Outline of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development	14 March 2011	Developing nuclear power efficiently on the basis of ensuring safety
Outline of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development	16 March 2016	Safely build independent nuclear power demonstration projects and programs
Outline of the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Term Objectives for 2035	11 March 2021	Safely and steadily promote coastal nuclear power construction

summarizes the main contents of China’s nuclear power construction or industrial development guidelines from the “Sixth Five-Year Plan” to the present (“Fourteenth Five-Year Plan”). It is not difficult to see that China’s plans for the development of the nuclear power industry either propose the “appropriate development” of nuclear power or emphasize the safety foundation of nuclear power development.

However, China’s support for the nuclear energy industry has only remained at the level of planning, and has not formed a relatively stable legal basis and specific institutional design. The legislative work of the “Atomic Energy Law”, which should have provided institutional support for the development of China’s nuclear energy industry from a legal perspective, was first launched as early as 1984, but it has been shelved many times due to foreign nuclear accidents and adjustments to the powers of domestic government departments. It was not until the fifth launch that the “Atomic Energy Law (Draft for Comments)” was formed in 2018 [45]. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the draft Atomic Energy Law was not submitted to the NPC Standing Committee for deliberation until six years later, and it has not been passed to date. This has led to uncertainty in the development of China’s nuclear energy industry to a great extent, and has created an awkward situation in which the actual scale of the industry is not in line with the development of supporting and promoting policies and laws. On the one hand, the scale of China’s nuclear energy industry is expanding rapidly. In 2023, the total installed capacity of China’s nuclear power units in operation and under construction ranks second in the world and is still accelerating [16]. It is estimated that the market size of nuclear power units will reach an average of 150 billion RMB per year during the 15th Five-Year Plan period, and will reach 200 billion RMB during the 16th Five-Year Plan period [23]. On the other hand, the only effective laws in China’s nuclear energy field are the Energy Law, the Law on the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution, and the Nuclear Safety Law. Other normative documents have a lower level of effectiveness, and policy documents are relatively macroscopic and abstract, which makes it difficult to provide effective support for the current scale and future development of China’s nuclear energy industry.

3. Institutional Defects of China’s Nuclear Policies and Laws

Based on the above discussion, it can be found that the history of the nuclear energy industry in various countries around the world is essentially a history of constant conflict and coordination between the two values of safety and development in the field of nuclear energy. The conflict between these two values has also derived a kind of “charming danger”, which is to accept the hidden dangers of radioactive pollution and embrace nuclear energy as a clean and low-carbon energy, or to reject green energy transformation and radioactive pollution with a preventive attitude. There may never be a universal correct answer to this question. Each country will make its own choices that may be completely different based on the current political and economic environment. China, which first achieved nuclear power grid connection in 1991 and now has become the world’s second-largest nuclear power country in terms of total installed capacity of nuclear power units under construction and in operation, has always adhered to the concept of appropriate development of nuclear power and safety assurance priority since 1981. Furthermore, it is precisely the reason that China’s policies and laws have always focused on nuclear safety supervision and radioactive pollution prevention and control, and there are few policies or laws to promote the nuclear energy industry, which has led to an embarrassing situation in which the actual scale of China’s nuclear energy industry is not compatible with the development of supporting and promoting policies and laws. Based on the discussion in the previous article, this section will focus on, sort out and analyze several major policies and laws related to nuclear energy in China, refine the development context of China’s nuclear legal system, and then critically point out several defects in China’s policies and laws in the field of nuclear energy, laying the foundation for the proposal of amendments in the following article.

3.1. An Overview

On 22 September 2020, China proposed the “dual carbon” goal of achieving carbon peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060 at the general debate of the 75th United Nations General Assembly [51]. Since then, nuclear power, as the power generation method with the lowest greenhouse gas emissions, has begun to receive more attention. At the expiration of the planning period determined by NDRC’s “Medium- and Long-Term Nuclear Power Development Plan (2005–2020)” approved by the State Council in October 2007 [52] and the “Energy Development Strategic Action Plan (2014–2020)” issued by the State Council on 7 June 2014 [53], the NPC issued the aforementioned “14th Five-Year Plan” on 11 March 2021, NDRC and NEA issued the “14th Five-Year Plan for Modern Energy System” on 29 January 2022, and CAEA and other 12 departments jointly issued the “Three-Year Action Plan for High-Quality Development of Nuclear Technology Application Industry (2024–2026)” and other policy documents on 24 December 2024. At the same time, NNSA and other departments issued the “13th Five-Year Plan for Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control and the 2025 Five-Year Plan”. The planning for the 2025 long-term goals in the “2025 Vision Goals” is still valid. In addition, China’s nuclear energy management regulations also include laws such as the Energy Law, Emergency Response Law, Nuclear Safety Law, Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control Law and Civil Nuclear Safety Equipment Supervision and Management Regulations, Research Reactor Operator Nuclear Safety Reporting Regulations and other nuclear safety laws, regulations and other normative documents. The above policies and laws together constitute China’s current nuclear energy policy and legal system.

3.2. Lack of Legal Support for Nuclear Industry

Among the above current Chinese nuclear energy policies and laws, most of the content involves the design of a nuclear safety supervision system, and there are relatively few provisions related to the revitalization and development of the nuclear energy industry, and the provisions are relatively macroscopic and abstract. This has caused the first defect of China’s current nuclear energy policies and laws, i.e., the insufficient supply of laws and systems for the future development of the nuclear energy industry. Specifically, China currently lacks the “Atomic Energy Law” to provide stable institutional support for industrial development. At this stage, atomic energy legislation is relatively scattered and incomplete, and it is difficult to form a relatively complete regulatory system [54]. Among the currently effective laws, the content of the “Energy Law” involving the revitalization and development of the nuclear energy industry is stipulated in Articles 27 and 57, but they also clearly emphasize the safety value of nuclear energy, and are only declarative provisions, without establishing specific industrial support and incentive systems [55]. At the policy level, the “14th Five-Year Energy Plan” only mentions actively promoting the development of the nuclear energy industry and nuclear power technology research and development from a macroscopic perspective, and clarifies the development goal of “nuclear power operating installed capacity reaching about 70 million kilowatts” to be achieved by 2025 [56]. So far, no normative documents have been publicly issued to clarify the specific supporting measures for nuclear energy industry incentives, and no corresponding laws and regulations have been formulated in a timely manner to provide a relatively stable institutional support. Obviously, there is a serious lack of policies and laws to revitalize and develop China’s nuclear energy industry.

The direct consequence of the serious absence of policies and laws to revitalize the nuclear energy industry is a great restriction on the development speed of China’s nuclear energy industry. This restriction was actually reflected as early as 2020: China proposed in the “Medium- and Long-Term Development Plan for Nuclear Power (2005–2020)” that by 2020, the installed capacity of nuclear power in operation will strive to reach 40 MKW and the nuclear power capacity under construction will remain at around 18 MKW [52]. Later, in the “Energy Development Strategic Action Plan (2014–2020)”, the 2020 development goal was upgraded to 58 MKW of nuclear power installed capacity and more than 30 MKW of capacity under construction [53]. However, according to the “China Nuclear Energy Development Report (2021)” released by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Association in 2021, the total installed capacity of China’s commercial nuclear power units in 2020 was 49.88 MKW, and the total installed capacity of nuclear power units under construction was 18.53 MKW [57]. It is far behind the set target, and the goal was barely achieved till the end of 2023. If the current development speed is maintained, it will also be extremely hard for China to achieve the target of 70 MKW of commercial installed capacity proposed in the “14th Five-Year Energy Plan” by 2025.

It can be seen from this that the absence of laws and relevant specific policies to promote the revitalization of the nuclear energy industry, represented by the “Atomic Energy Law”, has led to a serious shortage of institutional supply for the development of China’s nuclear energy industry, and is facing the dilemma of a serious mismatch between the actual scale of the industry and the construction of a supporting institutional system. If this situation cannot be corrected in a timely manner, China’s future nuclear energy industry and nuclear legal system development will inevitably face more severe practical difficulties, and may even affect China’s realization of the “dual carbon” goals of reaching carbon peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060.

3.3. Vague Authority for Nuclear Safety Supervision

The second defect faced by China’s nuclear energy policies and laws exists in China’s current nuclear safety regulatory system. Although China’s administrative management and legislative resources in the field of nuclear energy have greatly tilted towards nuclear safety assurance, and many relevant policies and laws have been formulated and promulgated, the current nuclear safety regulatory system still faces the defect that its powers and responsibilities are unclear. This defect is first reflected in the imperfect system of various nuclear safety legal standards that serve as the basis for the regulatory authorities to exercise their powers. Some scholars pointed out based on China’s actual situation that “nuclear safety standards in a series of key areas such as nuclear power plants, research reactors, non-reactor nuclear fuel cycle facilities, nuclear material control, civilian nuclear safety equipment, and radioactive material transportation are missing, and the system of nuclear emergency and other fields is not strong”. At the same time, China’s existing 39 mandatory national standards (GB) and 47 recommended standards (GB/T, HJ) are far from meeting the mandatory requirements set forth in the Nuclear Safety Law [58]. In view of the inherent characteristics of the nuclear energy field with extremely strong scientific and technological attributes, the nuclear authorities need to refer to various pre-established technical standards in their daily nuclear safety regulatory work to carry out administrative management activities. The lack of technical standards in the nuclear energy field will cause the nuclear authorities to be at a loss in performing their safety assurance and regulatory duties, and will actually weaken their authority over nuclear safety assurance.

Secondly, the Nuclear Safety Law, on the one hand, formally established the principle of independent nuclear safety supervision [59] and clarified the supervisory responsibilities of the national nuclear safety supervision and management department [60], but on the other hand, it stipulated the relevant powers of the energy authorities in nuclear safety management [61]. As mentioned above, China’s reform of merging the NNSA into the State Environmental Protection Administration in 1998 was aimed at shifting the nuclear safety supervision mechanism from internal supervision to external supervision, ensuring that the supervision work is more neutral and scientific [46]. Today, NNSA, as the national nuclear safety supervision and management department stipulated in the Nuclear Safety Law, is still under the jurisdiction of the reorganized MEE, and this external supervision mechanism has continued to this day. However, the NEA under the NDRC, as the energy authority, focuses on promoting energy development and energy system reform. Specifically in the field of nuclear power, it is manifested as “formulating nuclear power development plans, access conditions, technical standards and organizing their implementation, proposing nuclear power layout and major project review opinions, organizing coordination and guiding nuclear power scientific research work”, etc. [62]. It is a typical industry support department that provides support and promotion for the development of energy industries, such as nuclear energy. The problem is that, in the case of a long-term conflict between the value of safety assurance and the value of industrial development in the field of nuclear energy, the nuclear safety regulatory authority oriented towards safety assurance should not be granted to the energy authorities that play the role of industry support, and they should be allowed to choose between industrial development and safety assurance. Otherwise, the independent nuclear safety regulatory system will lose its most critical “independence” feature. Moreover, handing over the nuclear safety regulatory responsibilities to both the nuclear safety supervision and management departments and the energy authorities may also lead to multiple policies in the field of nuclear safety supervision, thereby weakening the effectiveness and authority of the independent nuclear safety regulatory system.

4. The Resolutions of the Nuclear Legal System of China

Based on the previous discussion, it can be found that although China’s nuclear energy industry has experienced more than 30 years of development and has formed some policies and laws for nuclear safety supervision, its nuclear energy policies, laws, and institutional design are not perfect. On the one hand, there is a serious lack of policy and legal support to promote the revitalization of the nuclear energy industry. The legislative work of the “Atomic Energy Law” has been initiated five times before the draft was submitted for review and has not been passed so far. The nuclear power industry lacks institutional support, resulting in actual development far behind the initial planning goals. On the other hand, the nuclear safety supervision system is not perfect and lacks sufficient independence. The nuclear safety legal standard system is not perfect, resulting in a lack of sufficient basis for the nuclear safety supervision department to perform its duties. The simultaneous performance of supervision duties by the safety assurance department and the industry support department has led to the ambiguity of powers and responsibilities in the field of nuclear safety supervision. This section will propose targeted amendments to these two defects in China’s nuclear legal system.

4.1. Promoting the Legislation of the Atomic Energy Law of China

In view of the problem of insufficient policy and legal supply for the development of China’s nuclear energy industry, legislation of China’s “Atomic Energy Law” should be actively promoted in the future. In the context of modern rule of law, economic development cannot be separated from the support of a stable and predictable legal system, and this is also true in the field of nuclear energy. The consequences of the long-term absence of policies and laws to support and promote China’s nuclear energy industry have been extremely obvious in the disconnection between planning goals and actual conditions. As the deadline for carbon peak is approaching, it is even more necessary for China to reflect deeply on the development of the nuclear energy industry, and to formulate an “Atomic Energy Law” to support the development of the nuclear energy industry as soon as possible and to introduce relevant norms or regulations to support it, while adhering to nuclear safety assurances. Invest as much as possible in the necessary legislative and administrative management resources for the future development of the nuclear energy industry. This is the only way for China to achieve green and low-carbon energy transformation and fulfill its international commitment to the “dual carbon” goal as soon as possible.

In this regard, the NPC Standing Committee should speed up the review of the “Atomic Energy Law (Draft)” that has been submitted [63]. At the same time, the specific provisions contained in this draft should also be fully examined to ensure the status of the “Atomic Energy Law” as an industry promotion law in China’s nuclear energy field. First, Article 11, paragraph 1 of the “Atomic Energy Law (Draft)” only makes declarative provisions on the protection of intellectual property rights for atomic energy scientific research and technology development [64], which is not enough to fully protect the intellectual property rights of atomic energy technology. Therefore, special provisions should be set up to stipulate patent licenses for cutting-edge technologies in the field of atomic energy, to connect with the systematic patent licensing system stipulated in the “Patent Law”. Secondly, Article 14, paragraph 2 of the “Draft” only stipulates the support of national fiscal funds for the research and development of atomic energy technology [65]. However, considering the current industrial scale of China, relying solely on national finances cannot support the further rapid development of nuclear power. Therefore, a paragraph should be added to this article to encourage and support social capital to participate in the development of the nuclear power industry in various forms, such as credit and investment, thereby expanding the scale of construction and development funds in the field of nuclear energy. Finally, Chapter 7 of the Draft regarding the establishment of legal liabilities only sets corresponding liabilities for illegal activities in the development and utilization of atomic energy, and still lacks legal regulations for illegal activities that hinder the development of the nuclear energy industry. Special provisions should be used to establish corresponding civil liabilities or administrative penalties and sanctions for illegal activities, such as administrative agencies, enterprises, or individuals that hinder the construction and operation of nuclear power facilities.

4.2. Clarifying the Division of Power and Responsibility in China’s Nuclear Safety Regulatory System

In view of the unclear powers and responsibilities in China’s nuclear safety regulatory system, improvements should be made in the following aspects. First, improve China’s nuclear safety legal standards system. Considering that nuclear energy is an important clean and low-carbon energy source in the future, and its characteristics are accompanied by certain safety hazards, the formulation and implementation of nuclear safety legal standards is an important part of the nuclear safety regulatory system, which is also fully reflected in Article 8 of the Nuclear Safety Law [66]. Therefore, China should actively improve the nuclear safety legal standards system in the future, strengthen the formulation of technical standards, and improve the efficiency of standard formulation. At the same time, a special agency should be established within the nuclear safety regulatory department to specialize in the formulation and implementation of relevant laws and regulations on nuclear safety supervision. Additionally, regular compliance inspections should be carried out on nuclear energy enterprises in the field of nuclear safety to ensure that nuclear energy enterprises strictly follow relevant nuclear safety legal standards in the production and operation process. Second, China should formulate and promulgate relevant implementing regulations of the Nuclear Safety Law in the form of administrative regulations in the future to implement the principle of independent nuclear safety supervision stipulated in Article 4 of the Nuclear Safety Law, clarify and distinguish the respective powers of nuclear safety supervision and management departments and energy authorities. On the one hand, it clarifies the management and promotion responsibilities of the energy authorities (NEA) and the nuclear industry authorities (CAEA) as the supporting and promoting authorities of the nuclear energy industry for nuclear energy technology research and development, utilization, and the construction and operation of facilities such as nuclear power plants. On the other hand, it clarifies the supervision responsibilities of the nuclear safety supervision and management department (NNSA) as the safety supervision authority of the nuclear energy industry for the formulation and implementation of safety standards in the aforementioned nuclear energy industry activities, the monitoring and prevention of potential nuclear safety hazards, and the emergency response to sudden nuclear accidents. This is the only way to ensure the independent status of the former in nuclear safety supervision, solve the current problems of multiple nuclear safety supervision policies, conflicts among different regulations, and difficulty in forming a system, truly realize the separation of industrial promotion and safety supervision functions in the nuclear energy field, and ensure the effective operation of the external nuclear safety supervision model.

In addition, Chapter 5 of the Nuclear Safety Law provides for detailed provisions on the disclosure of nuclear safety information and public participation, but in practice, limited by the sensitivity of nuclear technology research and development, nuclear power plant site selection, and other work, the system cannot be fully implemented. On the one hand, the nuclear safety regulatory authorities only solicit public opinions and rarely respond, and it is unknown whether public opinions have an impact on nuclear safety decisions. On the other hand, it has also led to a general unfamiliarity and fear of nuclear power among the public [67]. In this regard, it is also necessary for China to refine relevant matters in the future by revising the current Regulations on the Disclosure of Government Information or formulating regulations specifically on information disclosure in the field of nuclear safety to ensure the realization of the public’s right to know and right to participate.

5. Conclusions

In the international context of the global “nuclear relaunch” era, China, as a major nuclear power country in the world, shoulders the mission of promoting the safe, healthy, and sustainable development of the global nuclear energy industry and eliminating potential nuclear accident hazards. At the same time, it also bears the commitment and pressure of green and low-carbon energy transformation, achieving carbon peak and carbon neutrality to cope with global climate change. Based on this, China has more reason to actively improve the domestic nuclear energy policy legal system and institutional design, overcome the current shortcomings such as insufficient industrial support supply and unclear nuclear safety supervision rights and responsibilities, so as to create a good legal environment for the development of its nuclear energy industry and complete the nuclear power scale goals proposed in its “14th Five-Year Energy Plan” as soon as possible. Through the analysis and comparison of the development of the nuclear energy industry and legal system in China and other countries in the world, it can be found that China’s nuclear legal system is not perfect. On the one hand, this is reflected in the absence of laws to promote the industry, and on the other hand, it is reflected in the abstractness and ambiguity of important nuclear safety legal systems. Therefore, China should actively promote the legislation of the Atomic Energy Law and supporting regulations in the formulation of future nuclear energy policies and laws. While accelerating the legislative review, it should also review the specific provisions of the Atomic Energy Law (Draft) currently submitted. For example, it should link the intellectual property protection provisions on atomic energy scientific research and technology development with the patent licensing system of the current Patent Law, encourage social capital to participate in the construction of the nuclear power industry while providing national financial support, and set corresponding legal responsibilities for illegal acts such as obstructing the construction and operation of nuclear power facilities. At the same time, China also needs to improve the existing nuclear safety regulatory system. It should also clarify the powers of independent regulatory departments, and clearly distinguish the responsibilities and authorities of nuclear energy industry support and promotion functions and safety regulatory functions through administrative regulations and other normative documents, to achieve the separation of functions and balances between the NEA, the CAEA, and the NNSA. In addition, China should fill the gaps in the current nuclear safety standards and legal system, strengthen the construction of information disclosure and public participation systems in the field of nuclear safety supervision, seek reconciliation and balance between the two long-standing contradictions of safety assurance and industrial development, and green and low-carbon energy transformation and radioactive pollution prevention and control, and provide a “Chinese solution” for the global nuclear energy industry.