Mitigating Market Power and Promoting Competition in Electricity Markets through a Preventive Approach: The Role of Forward Contracts
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Market Power and Preventive Antitrust Law
2.2. Forward Contract to Mitigate Market Power
3. Research Methodology
- The first step is to create a model of the nodal market using market characteristics and constraints. We developed perfect and imperfect (Cournot) competition models of the IEEE 30 nodes system by incorporating generation and transmission constraints. The perfect competition model is grounded in research conducted in [13,14,15,26,27,28,29,30]. The research on Cournot competition modeling served as the basis for our implementation of this approach in the study. Specifically, we relied on the work of [4,11,13,31,32]. The constraints related to generation include capacity, energy mix, and reserve margin, whereas transmission constraints encompass DC load flow, transmission limits, and line connections.
- The model is then calibrated to match the actual conditions of the power system in the second step. This includes examining market power behavior during peak loads. This step is critical for ensuring that the model accurately reflects the power system’s real-world conditions.
- The third step is to use a power plant merger analysis to examine potential market structure configurations. We assume that companies that own multiple power plants behave as multi-plant monopolists [33]. This step takes into account things such as the initial generation structure and the presence of independent power plants. The goal is to determine the best ownership structure and succession company mix.
- The final step is to assess market power using the Residual Supply Index (RSI) and consider any additional capacity investments that may be required. This step ensures that the market structure is competitive, and that welfare is maximized while addressing any issues with generation capacity and reserve margin. Based on the empirical study in [7,8,9], we used a screening process to determine the optimal market structure for each configuration. The screening process was based on an RSI threshold of 110%.
3.1. Nodal Pricing and DC Power Transmission System
3.2. Supply and Demand
3.3. ISO Problem in Nodal Pricing
3.4. Cournot Equilibrium Determination
4. Case Study and Numerical Results
4.1. Case Study: Modified IEEE 30 Bus
4.2. Numerical Results
4.2.1. Base Case: Nodal Pricing with Transmission Constraint
4.2.2. Second Case: Cournot Model
4.2.3. Forward Contract in Cournot Model
5. Discussion
6. Conclusions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Type | PP | ||
---|---|---|---|
Base | Coal PP | 30 | 0.1 |
Intermediate | Gas | 35 | 0.15 |
Peaking | Diesel | 40 | 0.2 |
n | n | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 100 | 10 | 16 | 0 | 9 |
2 | 200 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 0 |
3 | 50 | 20 | 18 | 100 | 35 |
4 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 0 | 17 |
5 | 0 | 85 | 20 | 0 | 60 |
6 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 0 | 34 |
7 | 0 | 50 | 22 | 150 | 0 |
8 | 130 | 25 | 23 | 150 | 85 |
9 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 9 |
10 | 0 | 190 | 25 | 0 | 9 |
11 | 120 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 0 |
12 | 0 | 50 | 27 | 120 | 0 |
13 | 120 | 20 | 28 | 0 | 27 |
14 | 160 | 50 | 29 | 0 | 35 |
15 | 100 | 50 | 30 | 30 | 0 |
1 | 2 | 0.06 | 130 | 15 | 18 | 0.22 | 100 |
1 | 3 | 0.19 | 130 | 18 | 19 | 0.13 | 100 |
2 | 4 | 0.17 | 65 | 19 | 20 | 0.07 | 132 |
3 | 4 | 0.04 | 130 | 10 | 20 | 0.21 | 64 |
2 | 5 | 0.2 | 130 | 10 | 17 | 0.08 | 64 |
2 | 6 | 0.18 | 90 | 10 | 21 | 0.07 | 64 |
4 | 6 | 0.04 | 90 | 10 | 22 | 0.15 | 64 |
5 | 7 | 0.12 | 140 | 21 | 22 | 0.02 | 64 |
6 | 7 | 0.08 | 130 | 15 | 23 | 0.2 | 64 |
6 | 8 | 0.04 | 132 | 22 | 24 | 0.18 | 96 |
6 | 9 | 0.21 | 96 | 23 | 24 | 0.27 | 100 |
6 | 10 | 0.56 | 96 | 24 | 25 | 0.33 | 64 |
9 | 11 | 0.21 | 65 | 25 | 26 | 0.38 | 130 |
9 | 10 | 0.11 | 65 | 25 | 27 | 0.21 | 65 |
4 | 12 | 0.26 | 65 | 28 | 27 | 0.4 | 65 |
12 | 13 | 0.14 | 65 | 27 | 29 | 0.42 | 64 |
12 | 14 | 0.26 | 64 | 27 | 30 | 0.6 | 64 |
12 | 15 | 0.13 | 132 | 29 | 30 | 0.45 | 18 |
12 | 16 | 0.2 | 64 | 8 | 28 | 0.2 | 32 |
14 | 15 | 0.2 | 64 | 6 | 28 | 0.06 | 32 |
16 | 17 | 0.19 | 100 |
No | Case 1: Perfect Competition | ||
---|---|---|---|
1 | 4 | 6 | 90 |
2 | 9 | 10 | 65 |
3 | 12 | 13 | −65 |
4 | 14 | 15 | 64 |
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | |
1 | 0.662 | −0.177 | 0.152 | 0.045 | −0.092 | −0.007 | −0.041 | −0.007 | 0.002 | 0.006 | 0.002 | 0.024 | 0.024 | 0.021 | 0.019 | 0.016 | 0.009 | 0.015 | 0.012 | 0.011 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.015 | 0.008 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.00E+00 | −0.006 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
2 | 0.338 | 0.177 | −0.152 | −0.045 | 0.092 | 0.007 | 0.041 | 0.007 | −0.002 | −0.006 | −0.002 | −0.024 | −0.024 | −0.021 | −0.019 | −0.016 | −0.009 | −0.015 | −0.012 | −0.011 | −0.007 | −0.007 | −0.015 | −0.008 | −0.003 | −0.003 | 0.00E+00 | 0.006 | −2.22E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
3 | 0.224 | 0.303 | −0.024 | −0.076 | 0.157 | 0.012 | 0.070 | 0.012 | −0.003 | −0.011 | −0.003 | −0.041 | −0.041 | −0.036 | −0.033 | −0.028 | −0.016 | −0.025 | −0.021 | −0.018 | −0.012 | −0.012 | −0.025 | −0.014 | −0.006 | −0.006 | 0.00E+00 | 0.011 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
4 | 0.338 | 0.177 | 0.848 | −0.045 | 0.092 | 0.007 | 0.041 | 0.007 | −0.002 | −0.006 | −0.002 | −0.024 | −0.024 | −0.021 | −0.019 | −0.016 | −0.009 | −0.015 | −0.012 | −0.011 | −0.007 | −0.007 | −0.015 | −0.008 | −0.003 | −0.003 | 0.00E+00 | 0.006 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
5 | 0.136 | 0.161 | 0.055 | 0.038 | −0.422 | −0.006 | −0.172 | −0.006 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.020 | 0.020 | 0.018 | 0.016 | 0.014 | 0.008 | 0.012 | 0.010 | 0.009 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.012 | 0.007 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 4.44E−16 | −0.005 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
6 | 0.302 | 0.358 | 0.122 | 0.084 | 0.173 | −0.013 | 0.061 | −0.013 | 0.003 | 0.012 | 0.003 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.040 | 0.036 | 0.031 | 0.018 | 0.028 | 0.023 | 0.020 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.027 | 0.016 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 4.44E−16 | −0.012 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
7 | 0.404 | 0.326 | 0.650 | 0.701 | 0.109 | −0.108 | −0.021 | −0.106 | 0.029 | 0.101 | 0.029 | 0.372 | 0.372 | 0.333 | 0.303 | 0.257 | 0.147 | 0.232 | 0.190 | 0.168 | 0.106 | 0.108 | 0.229 | 0.130 | 0.051 | 0.051 | 1.78E−15 | −0.096 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
8 | 0.136 | 0.161 | 0.055 | 0.038 | 0.578 | −0.006 | −0.172 | −0.006 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.020 | 0.020 | 0.018 | 0.016 | 0.014 | 0.008 | 0.012 | 0.010 | 0.009 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.012 | 0.007 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.00E+00 | −0.005 | 2.22E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
9 | −0.136 | −0.161 | −0.055 | −0.038 | −0.578 | 0.006 | −0.828 | 0.006 | −0.002 | −0.005 | −0.002 | −0.020 | −0.020 | −0.018 | −0.016 | −0.014 | −0.008 | −0.012 | −0.010 | −0.009 | −0.006 | −0.006 | −0.012 | −0.007 | −0.003 | −0.003 | 0.00E+00 | 0.005 | 4.44E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
10 | 0.129 | 0.129 | 0.128 | 0.128 | 0.129 | 0.130 | 0.130 | −0.736 | 0.117 | 0.110 | 0.117 | 0.113 | 0.113 | 0.110 | 0.108 | 0.112 | 0.110 | 0.109 | 0.109 | 0.109 | 0.105 | 0.104 | 0.098 | 0.085 | 0.033 | 0.033 | 1.78E−15 | −0.063 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
11 | 0.126 | 0.128 | 0.118 | 0.116 | 0.135 | 0.142 | 0.140 | 0.140 | −0.474 | −0.273 | −0.474 | −0.082 | −0.082 | −0.103 | −0.119 | −0.164 | −0.241 | −0.173 | −0.205 | −0.222 | −0.255 | −0.249 | −0.141 | −0.172 | −0.067 | −0.067 | −1.78E−15 | 0.127 | −9.99E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
12 | 0.072 | 0.073 | 0.067 | 0.067 | 0.077 | 0.081 | 0.080 | 0.080 | −0.075 | −0.156 | −0.075 | −0.047 | −0.047 | −0.059 | −0.068 | −0.094 | −0.138 | −0.099 | −0.117 | −0.127 | −0.145 | −0.142 | −0.081 | −0.098 | −0.038 | −0.038 | −9.99E−16 | 0.073 | −5.55E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
13 | 0.0E+00 | 0.0E+00 | 4.4E−16 | 8.9E−16 | 0.0E+00 | 0.0E+00 | 4.4E−16 | 0.0E+00 | −4.4E−16 | 0.0E+00 | −1.0E+00 | 4.4E−16 | 4.4E−16 | 0.0E+00 | 4.4E−16 | 4.4E−16 | 0.0E+00 | 4.4E−16 | 0.0E+00 | 0.0E+00 | −4.4E−16 | 0.0E+00 | 0.0E+00 | 0.0E+00 | 0.0E+00 | 0.0E+00 | 2.2E−16 | 4.4E−16 | 1.1E−16 | 0.0E+00 |
14 | 0.126 | 0.128 | 0.118 | 0.116 | 0.135 | 0.142 | 0.140 | 0.140 | 0.526 | −0.273 | 0.526 | −0.082 | −0.082 | −0.103 | −0.119 | −0.164 | −0.241 | −0.173 | −0.205 | −0.222 | −0.255 | −0.249 | −0.141 | −0.172 | −0.067 | −0.067 | −1.33E−15 | 0.127 | −1.11E−15 | 0.00E+00 |
15 | 0.159 | 0.154 | 0.174 | 0.177 | 0.140 | 0.127 | 0.132 | 0.124 | −0.034 | −0.118 | −0.034 | −0.437 | −0.437 | −0.390 | −0.355 | −0.301 | −0.172 | −0.272 | −0.223 | −0.197 | −0.124 | −0.126 | −0.269 | −0.153 | −0.059 | −0.059 | 2.22E−16 | 0.113 | 1.11E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
16 | 8.88E−16 | 0.00E+00 | 1.78E−15 | 0.00E+00 | 1.78E−15 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 8.88E−16 | 1.78E−15 | 8.88E−16 | 8.88E−16 | −1.00E+00 | 1.78E−15 | 8.88E−16 | 1.78E−15 | 8.88E−16 | 0.00E+00 | −8.88E−16 | 1.78E−15 | 1.78E−15 | 0.00E+00 | 8.88E−16 | 8.88E−16 | 1.33E−15 | 4.44E−16 | 4.44E−16 | 8.88E−16 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
17 | 0.028 | 0.027 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.026 | 0.024 | 0.025 | 0.024 | 0.007 | −0.001 | 0.007 | 0.076 | 0.076 | −0.463 | −0.109 | 0.043 | 0.012 | −0.072 | −0.049 | −0.037 | −0.006 | −0.008 | −0.075 | −0.029 | −0.011 | −0.011 | 6.66E−16 | 0.021 | −1.11E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
18 | 0.099 | 0.097 | 0.105 | 0.106 | 0.091 | 0.085 | 0.087 | 0.084 | 0.026 | −0.004 | 0.026 | 0.270 | 0.270 | −0.101 | −0.387 | 0.153 | 0.042 | −0.253 | −0.174 | −0.132 | −0.023 | −0.028 | −0.266 | −0.102 | −0.040 | −0.040 | −4.44E−16 | 0.076 | −6.66E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
19 | 0.032 | 0.030 | 0.039 | 0.041 | 0.024 | 0.018 | 0.020 | 0.017 | −0.068 | −0.112 | −0.068 | 0.217 | 0.217 | 0.174 | 0.141 | −0.498 | −0.226 | 0.053 | 0.000 | −0.028 | −0.096 | −0.091 | 0.072 | −0.021 | −0.008 | −0.008 | −1.11E−15 | 0.016 | −6.66E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
20 | 0.028 | 0.027 | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.026 | 0.024 | 0.025 | 0.024 | 0.007 | −0.001 | 0.007 | 0.076 | 0.076 | 0.537 | −0.109 | 0.043 | 0.012 | −0.072 | −0.049 | −0.037 | −0.006 | −0.008 | −0.075 | −0.029 | −0.011 | −0.011 | −1.33E−15 | 0.021 | −2.22E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
21 | 0.032 | 0.030 | 0.039 | 0.041 | 0.024 | 0.018 | 0.020 | 0.017 | −0.068 | −0.112 | −0.068 | 0.217 | 0.217 | 0.174 | 0.141 | 0.502 | −0.226 | 0.053 | 0.000 | −0.028 | −0.096 | −0.091 | 0.072 | −0.021 | −0.008 | −0.008 | −1.55E−15 | 0.016 | −6.66E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
22 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.008 | −0.001 | −0.004 | −0.003 | −0.004 | −0.056 | −0.083 | −0.056 | 0.106 | 0.106 | 0.151 | 0.185 | 0.026 | −0.051 | −0.559 | −0.408 | −0.327 | −0.067 | −0.062 | 0.109 | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.002 | −1.11E−15 | −0.004 | −4.44E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
23 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.008 | −0.001 | −0.004 | −0.003 | −0.004 | −0.056 | −0.083 | −0.056 | 0.106 | 0.106 | 0.151 | 0.185 | 0.026 | −0.051 | 0.441 | −0.408 | −0.327 | −0.067 | −0.062 | 0.109 | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.002 | −4.44E−16 | −0.004 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
24 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.008 | −0.001 | −0.004 | −0.003 | −0.004 | −0.056 | −0.083 | −0.056 | 0.106 | 0.106 | 0.151 | 0.185 | 0.026 | −0.051 | 0.441 | 0.592 | −0.327 | −0.067 | −0.062 | 0.109 | 0.005 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.00E+00 | −0.004 | −4.44E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
25 | −0.004 | −0.003 | −0.008 | −0.008 | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.056 | 0.083 | 0.056 | −0.106 | −0.106 | −0.151 | −0.185 | −0.026 | 0.051 | −0.441 | −0.592 | −0.673 | 0.067 | 0.062 | −0.109 | −0.005 | −0.002 | −0.002 | 1.11E−15 | 0.004 | 6.66E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
26 | −0.032 | −0.030 | −0.039 | −0.041 | −0.024 | −0.018 | −0.020 | −0.017 | 0.068 | 0.112 | 0.068 | −0.217 | −0.217 | −0.174 | −0.141 | −0.502 | −0.774 | −0.053 | 0.000 | 0.028 | 0.096 | 0.091 | −0.072 | 0.021 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 8.88E−16 | −0.016 | 8.88E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
27 | 0.146 | 0.147 | 0.145 | 0.145 | 0.147 | 0.148 | 0.148 | 0.146 | 0.205 | 0.234 | 0.205 | 0.121 | 0.121 | 0.102 | 0.087 | 0.169 | 0.215 | 0.139 | 0.169 | 0.185 | −0.435 | −0.340 | −0.026 | −0.179 | −0.069 | −0.069 | −2.66E−15 | 0.132 | −1.33E−15 | 0.00E+00 |
28 | 0.088 | 0.088 | 0.087 | 0.087 | 0.088 | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.087 | 0.123 | 0.141 | 0.123 | 0.073 | 0.073 | 0.061 | 0.052 | 0.102 | 0.129 | 0.083 | 0.101 | 0.111 | −0.127 | −0.204 | −0.015 | −0.107 | −0.042 | −0.042 | −8.88E−16 | 0.079 | −4.44E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
29 | 0.146 | 0.147 | 0.145 | 0.145 | 0.147 | 0.148 | 0.148 | 0.146 | 0.205 | 0.234 | 0.205 | 0.121 | 0.121 | 0.102 | 0.087 | 0.169 | 0.215 | 0.139 | 0.169 | 0.185 | 0.565 | −0.340 | −0.026 | −0.179 | −0.069 | −0.069 | 0.00E+00 | 0.132 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
30 | 0.123 | 0.121 | 0.127 | 0.128 | 0.117 | 0.113 | 0.115 | 0.111 | 0.090 | 0.077 | 0.090 | 0.240 | 0.240 | 0.284 | 0.319 | 0.171 | 0.105 | 0.234 | 0.185 | 0.158 | 0.038 | 0.026 | −0.450 | −0.137 | −0.053 | −0.053 | −2.22E−16 | 0.101 | −2.22E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
31 | 0.234 | 0.234 | 0.232 | 0.232 | 0.236 | 0.237 | 0.237 | 0.233 | 0.328 | 0.375 | 0.328 | 0.194 | 0.194 | 0.163 | 0.140 | 0.271 | 0.344 | 0.222 | 0.271 | 0.297 | 0.438 | 0.456 | −0.041 | −0.286 | −0.111 | −0.111 | 2.22E−15 | 0.212 | 1.33E−15 | 0.00E+00 |
32 | 0.123 | 0.121 | 0.127 | 0.128 | 0.117 | 0.113 | 0.115 | 0.111 | 0.090 | 0.077 | 0.090 | 0.240 | 0.240 | 0.284 | 0.319 | 0.171 | 0.105 | 0.234 | 0.185 | 0.158 | 0.038 | 0.026 | 0.550 | −0.137 | −0.053 | −0.053 | −6.66E−16 | 0.101 | −2.22E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
33 | 0.357 | 0.356 | 0.360 | 0.360 | 0.353 | 0.351 | 0.352 | 0.344 | 0.417 | 0.452 | 0.417 | 0.434 | 0.434 | 0.448 | 0.458 | 0.442 | 0.449 | 0.456 | 0.455 | 0.454 | 0.476 | 0.482 | 0.509 | 0.577 | −0.164 | −0.164 | 1.11E−15 | 0.313 | 6.66E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
34 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | −4.44E−16 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | −2.22E−16 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 2.22E−16 | 2.22E−16 | −2.22E−16 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | −2.22E−16 | 0.00E+00 | −1.00E+00 | −1.11E−16 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
35 | 0.357 | 0.356 | 0.360 | 0.360 | 0.353 | 0.351 | 0.352 | 0.344 | 0.417 | 0.452 | 0.417 | 0.434 | 0.434 | 0.448 | 0.458 | 0.442 | 0.449 | 0.456 | 0.455 | 0.454 | 0.476 | 0.482 | 0.509 | 0.577 | 0.836 | 0.836 | 1.11E−15 | 0.313 | 5.55E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
36 | −0.643 | −0.644 | −0.640 | −0.640 | −0.647 | −0.649 | −0.648 | −0.656 | −0.583 | −0.548 | −0.583 | −0.566 | −0.566 | −0.552 | −0.542 | −0.558 | −0.551 | −0.544 | −0.545 | −0.546 | −0.524 | −0.518 | −0.491 | −0.423 | −0.164 | −0.164 | −7.77E−16 | −0.687 | −4.44E−16 | 0.00E+00 |
37 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 0.399 | 3.99E−01 | 0.399 | −3.22E−01 | 0.00E+00 |
38 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 0.601 | 6.01E−01 | 0.601 | 3.22E−01 | 0.00E+00 |
39 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 0.429 | 4.29E−01 | 0.429 | 7.30E−01 | 0.00E+00 |
40 | 0.129 | 0.129 | 0.128 | 0.128 | 0.129 | 0.130 | 0.130 | 0.264 | 0.117 | 0.110 | 0.117 | 0.113 | 0.113 | 0.110 | 0.108 | 0.112 | 0.110 | 0.109 | 0.109 | 0.109 | 0.105 | 0.104 | 0.098 | 0.085 | 0.033 | 0.033 | −2.22E−16 | −0.063 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
41 | 0.515 | 0.515 | 0.512 | 0.512 | 0.517 | 0.520 | 0.519 | 0.391 | 0.466 | 0.438 | 0.466 | 0.453 | 0.453 | 0.442 | 0.433 | 0.447 | 0.441 | 0.435 | 0.436 | 0.436 | 0.420 | 0.414 | 0.393 | 0.338 | 0.131 | 0.131 | 0.00E+00 | −0.250 | 0.00E+00 | 0.00E+00 |
n Firm | Combination | |
---|---|---|
12 | 1.526 | 15 Merge 30 |
11 | 1.521 | 3 Merge 11 |
10 | 1.497 | 1 Merge 18 |
9 | 1.418 | 13 Merge 27 |
8 | 1.387 | 8 Merge 15 + 30 |
7 | 1.324 | 14 Merge 22 |
6 | 1.294 | 3 + 11 Merge 23 |
5 | 1.185 | 1 + 18 Merge 2 |
4 | 1.043 | 8 + 15 + 30 Merge 13 + 27 |
n Firm | Combination | |
---|---|---|
12 | 1.573 | 15 Merge 30 |
11 | 1.562 | 3 Merge 8 |
10 | 1.541 | 1 Merge 18 |
9 | 1.477 | 13 Merge 27 |
8 | 1.432 | 11 Merge 15 + 30 |
7 | 1.383 | 22 Merge 23 |
6 | 1.311 | 3 + 8 Merge 14 |
5 | 1.224 | 1 + 18 Merge 2 |
4 | 1.051 | 13 + 27 Merge 22 + 23 |
Case 1: Perfect Competition | Case 2: Cournot | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 2 | 27.0 | 20.0 | 130 |
1 | 3 | 37.6 | 23.6 | 130 |
2 | 4 | 43.0 | 25.7 | 65 |
3 | 4 | 44.8 | 26.9 | 130 |
2 | 5 | 79.8 | 66.9 | 130 |
2 | 6 | 60.6 | 33.1 | 90 |
4 | 6 | 90.0 | 39.6 | 90 |
5 | 7 | −5.3 | −17.7 | 140 |
6 | 7 | 55.0 | 66.4 | 130 |
6 | 8 | 3.3 | 0.3 | 132 |
6 | 9 | 43.1 | −8.5 | 96 |
6 | 10 | 28.9 | 15.9 | 96 |
9 | 11 | −21.9 | −105.7 | 65 |
9 | 10 | 65.0 | 97.2 | 65 |
4 | 12 | −2.2 | 13.0 | 65 |
12 | 13 | −65.0 | −32.1 | 65 |
12 | 14 | −44.8 | −24.1 | 64 |
12 | 15 | 9.0 | 0.2 | 132 |
12 | 16 | 48.5 | 19.8 | 64 |
14 | 15 | 64.0 | 31.4 | 64 |
16 | 17 | 39.6 | 11.7 | 100 |
15 | 18 | 15.8 | 31.0 | 100 |
18 | 19 | 80.8 | 46.1 | 100 |
19 | 20 | 63.8 | 25.4 | 132 |
10 | 20 | −3.7 | 35.7 | 64 |
10 | 17 | −39.6 | −11.7 | 64 |
10 | 21 | −30.0 | −58.2 | 64 |
10 | 22 | −22.5 | −38.9 | 64 |
21 | 22 | −64.0 | −87.9 | 64 |
15 | 23 | 7.2 | −20.1 | 64 |
22 | 24 | −31.7 | −21.1 | 96 |
23 | 24 | 32.3 | 5.5 | 100 |
24 | 25 | −8.3 | −17.3 | 64 |
25 | 26 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 130 |
25 | 27 | −17.3 | −20.4 | 65 |
28 | 27 | 1.1 | 26.6 | 65 |
27 | 29 | 21.8 | 12.8 | 64 |
27 | 30 | 4.8 | −5.5 | 64 |
29 | 30 | −14.0 | −19.3 | 18 |
8 | 28 | 5.4 | −0.5 | 32 |
6 | 28 | 20.3 | −1.4 | 32 |
Scenario | Contract Coverage | |
---|---|---|
1 | 0% | 1.05 |
2 | 5% | 1.08 |
3 | 10% | 1.11 |
4 | 20% | 1.17 |
5 | 26% | 1.20 |
6 | 30% | 1.22 |
7 | 40% | 1.28 |
8 | 50% | 1.34 |
9 | 60% | 1.40 |
10 | 70% | 1.45 |
11 | 80% | 1.51 |
12 | 90% | 1.57 |
13 | 100% | 1.62 |
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Hakam, D.F. Mitigating Market Power and Promoting Competition in Electricity Markets through a Preventive Approach: The Role of Forward Contracts. Energies 2023, 16, 3543. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16083543
Hakam DF. Mitigating Market Power and Promoting Competition in Electricity Markets through a Preventive Approach: The Role of Forward Contracts. Energies. 2023; 16(8):3543. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16083543
Chicago/Turabian StyleHakam, Dzikri Firmansyah. 2023. "Mitigating Market Power and Promoting Competition in Electricity Markets through a Preventive Approach: The Role of Forward Contracts" Energies 16, no. 8: 3543. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16083543
APA StyleHakam, D. F. (2023). Mitigating Market Power and Promoting Competition in Electricity Markets through a Preventive Approach: The Role of Forward Contracts. Energies, 16(8), 3543. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16083543