1.1. Lack of a Pool of Scientists and Researchers in Specific Areas
1.2. Brain Drain
1.3. Institutional Environment
1.4. Inability to Make Public Investments in Relevant Research and Infrastructure
- Identify the factors of formation and change of the contractual system using the example of PSCs in Indonesia for the period from 1960 to 2020.
- Analyze PSC application problems, advantages, and disadvantages.
- Identify potential directions in the development of PSC systems, taking into account modern challenges.
- Justify the specifics of PSC contracts and the implementation of the win-win principle for the oil and gas sector of Lebanon.
2. Materials and Methods
- Through a PESTEL analysis, we studied the conditions for the creation of the oil and gas sector in Lebanon.
- Through a literature review and an analysis of Indonesia’s experience in using PSCs since 1966, we identified PSC characteristics that differentiate them from other contractual systems.
- We identified the factors of changes in Indonesia’s contract system that evolved through five generations of contracts from 1966 up to now.
- We studied the factors that determine the essence of PSCs as well as their advantages and disadvantages.
- We analyzed the main issues and directions in PSC development in Indonesia that can be used as a foundation for contractual systems in other developing countries with the aim of developing their oil and gas sectors.
- Based on the analysis of the contract theory statements, the requirements for PSA contracts for the development of offshore oil fields in Lebanon were clarified.
- The implementation of the principle of win-win game theory is proposed when the interests of the international oil company and the state are coordinated for the subsequent development of PSA parameters for the development of offshore oil fields in Lebanon.
3. Literature Review
- The contract is a process of interaction between two parties with different sets of rights and opportunities. The principal hires the agent who creates some benefit but whose actions cannot be constantly monitored. The agent can act in such a way as to gain benefits for himself and not for the principal.
- The contract is a process that goes through three stages. The first is the choice of an agent by the principal, the second is the conclusion of a contract, and the third is the fulfillment of the contract, during which revisions of its terms are allowed.
4. Key Research Findings and Discussions
4.1. Parties and Instruments
- IOC is selected by the host country and a contract is signed for a certain time and region;
- IOC’s operations can be done under the HC’s supervision;
- IOC shall give all the materials, equipment, and personnel required to conduct development and production processes;
- IOC has the right to recover the investments in the production;
- after the costs have been defrayed, the remaining from the extracted resources are shared between both parties in proportions given by PSC;
- IOC’s revenues are subject to tax .
4.2. Production Ownership
4.3. Facility Ownership
4.4. Responsibilities of IOCs and the Government
- Management is entrusted in the national oil company. Contractors, especially foreign oil companies, are the operators who are responsible to NOC for operations by the agreed work programs and the budget.
- All financial and technical supports for petroleum operations are provided by the contactor who also affords the risks associated with operating costs.
- Each year the contractor must prepare a work program and an operating budget to be approved with NOC.
- All equipment purchased by the contractor becomes the property of NOC upon arrival in Indonesia.
- NOC has the right to all data gained from the operations.
- The contractor pays Indonesian taxes on income. NOC refunds the contractor for other taxes paid for the work.
- The contractor must supply Indonesia’s domestic demand for crude oil.
- Rather than having a fixed after-tax share, PSCs became more flexible with respect to the proposed production sharing percentage;
- PSCs now prescribe a DMO for natural gas;
- the government and the contractor are both entitled to 20% FTP of oil production;
- the profits tax rate for the contractor is 20%;
- some costs (e.g., those associated with seismic surveys) may be defrayed;
- the government must approve any changes to the direct or indirect control of the PSC system .
- time frames (terms of construction and oil field development; oil well lifespans; the total term of project implementation);
- technological features (well productivity; production performance; production peaks);
- economic parameters (oil transportation costs; the number of workers employed in well servicing; administrative staff) .
- practices are more workable than purely fiscal ones, which allow conditions to be changed or negotiated (for new contracts) in accordance with the business potential of a particular work site, market circumstances, etc.;
- after signing, they have the strength of the agreement and, unlike tax legislation, cannot be modified unilaterally by the government ;
- they enable the state to supervise the contractor’s obligations;
- low risks for the host country, as the IOC bears all operational and financial costs and risks;
- transfer of knowledge from the IOC to the host country, increasing the employment rate and improving the quality of training in the country;
- the government exercises sovereign control over the nation’s natural resources;
- the government obtains a share in the production and the financial benefits associated with these wealth-producing assets without having to make an investment unless it agreed to do so .
- The PSC system is considered to be difficult for the government to inspect and control because it is generally difficult to calculate cost oil and profit oil. Thus, the profit calculation process is hard to do .
- This type of oil and gas agreement is very complex in structure and requires negotiations at a high level. The owner must have access to financial, commercial, legal, environmental, and technical expertise as well as information.
- Under the terms of the PSC, the host-country government is generally a decision-maker in oil field development. At the same time, it also gives oil companies a say in the enforcement of environmental and other standards when such standards are incorporated as contractual provisions .
- elimination of economic obstacles to the development of marginal deposits, which will subsequently lead to an improvement in their economic situation and facilitate the attraction of PSC contractors to invest in hydrocarbon fields located in border territories, deep waters, or other areas associated with high costs and risks [65,66,67,68,69].
- combining numerous existing types of contracts into one.
- The choice of one or more blocks as a PSC object depends on the economic desires and investment opportunities of the IOC. At the same time, the joint development of two or more blocks by one contractor can bring additional (synergistic) effects both to the contractor himself and to the state, since CAPEX per unit of production, oil transportation costs, and others can be reduced.
- When determining the schedule and method for the block development, the interests of the state lie in the rational use of subsoil, compliance with the environmental and social interests of society and the maximum economic effect, and if the interests of the IOC are in the maximum commercial effect.
- The term of the contract and its terms, as noted, must be long in order to provide guarantees for both parties. On the other hand, a rapid change in the external environment, primarily the volatility of the oil price, should be taken into account in the contract, either on the basis of a change in the contractor/government shares, on the basis of a change in the DMO, or on the basis of a change in the tax rate.
- For the situation with Lebanon, the rights of the government may be expanded and additional conditions and requirements may be introduced, according to which the contractor must pay the costs of training workers, building infrastructure, or transferring technology to the state.
- The contract theory and the win-win principle underlie the definition of PSC parameters.
- Field development efficiency indicators are determined by many factors (goals of the state and companies, taxation and institutional schemes, geological and technical conditions, legal and political conditions, technological development, oil prices, the pandemic (COVID-19), environmental issues, and the country’s infrastructure).
- The main factors of changes in Indonesia’s contractual system were identified, among which are fluctuations in oil prices, changes in the accounting practices, identification of fields associated with high costs and containing small reserves, weakly developed institutional environment, and various risk factors.
- The key issues of the PSC system in Indonesia are the disadvantages associated with the terms of FTP, which reduces the contractor’s profit from crude oil, the low price paid to contractors for fulfilling domestic supply obligations, different investment loan rates, and the increase in the government’s share of oil/gas profits, which is associated with a complex set of field profitability indicators.
- In modern conditions, ESG factors are becoming vital in the development of mineral, oil, and gas resources and should be included in the definition of the parameters of agreements.
- The following PSC practices can be used in other developing countries: reducing the portion of FTP oil received by the government; contractors should be paid the international price for any local market supply; contractors should be provided with a larger share of production to offset additional investment risks and costs; PSC conditions should be changed so that a direct connection is created between the share of the government’s profit and the achieved profitability of the hydrocarbon field.
- We clarified the specifics of PSC contracts for the conditions of oil and gas fields in Lebanon, including objects of rights, such as blocks; rational development of the block when coordinating the schedule and method of field development; determination of the contract term based on the coordination of the investor’s interests and the state, taking into account the profitability, the timing of the block development, the flexibility of the contract terms; inclusion in the contract of additional conditions for technology transfer, staff training, and others.
- In order to implement the win-win principle in PSC and harmonize the interests of the IOC and the state in Lebanon, one should take into account possible synergistic effects during the simultaneous development of several blocks; determination of the economic effect for the state and the commercial effect for the IOC, the values of which will suit both parties; flexible accounting in determining the terms and conditions of the contract of oil price volatility based on changes in the shares of the contractor/government, DMO, and tax rate; empowering the government in a contract with an innovation focus, whereby the contractor must pay the costs of training workers, building infrastructure, or transferring technology to the government.
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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|Generations||Features||Generation Transition Factors|
|According to FTP conditions, 20% of production is given to the government before operating costs are reimbursed. This type and level of effective royalties impose high fees (taxes) on large oil basins and can inhibit investment, especially at oil prices .|
|Low price paid to contractors for fulfilling obligations to supply oil to the domestic market .|
|The investment credit is applied at completely different rates to oil and gas production in accordance with the contract standard for tertiary and pre-tertiary reservoirs. However, it is not applied for the Frontier PSC .|
|The increase in the government’s share of oil/gas profits is associated with a complex set of field profitability indicators .|
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