4.1. The Potential of Shale Gas for the UK and Gov’t Expectation
Recoverable volumes of shale gas in the UK are uncertain and depend on the results of exploratory well drilling. The British Geological Survey’s (BGS) current estimates of the geological potential of shale oil and shale gas within the UK stand at 1,419.6 Tcf and 11.5 billion bbl respectively and cover parts of England, Scotland and a small area of Wales in the Upper Bowland Hodder.
Table 2 presents the BGS’s estimates of in-place shale gas and oil in the UK.
The former Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron in underscoring the Government’s expectations from shale gas is reported to have indicated that recovering just 10% of the Bowland Shale alone, could supply about 51 years of the UK’s natural gas demand [
5]. Meanwhile Cuadrilla Resources Ltd., the operator of the Bowland shale estimates a central annual production rate from the Bowland shale alone to be 3.5 billion cubic metres (Bcm) [
64]. If these estimates are anything good to go by, it would be a significant facelift to UK energy supply and security. The US EIA [
65] believes that 26 Tcf of the UK’s shale gas is technically recoverable. The IoD shares the optimism for shale gas extraction and projects that producing the UK’s shale gas could result in as much as 39 per cent reduction (from 76% to 37%) in natural gas import by 2030, and reduce the Government’s natural gas imports bill from £15.6 billion to £7.5 billion, saving some £7.5 billion, in 2012 prices [
66]. The economic savings by households and industrial electricity and gas users from such a significant shale gas production would be enormous. As an example, between 1980 and 2000, a rapid increase in domestic natural gas and crude oil production kept domestic and industrial electricity and gas bills at record low levels [
5]. The DBEIS again reports that gas and electricity prices more than doubled over the period from 2002 to 2016, except for 2016 when prices decreased due to increased domestic gas production [
5,
67,
68,
69]. The period 2002 to 2016, coincides with the peaking and subsequent falling of North Sea production and consequently increased imports from -11 % in the year 2000 to an average to 47% gas imports in 2016 (see
Table 3). Both domestic and industrial gas and electric bills have been on an upward trajectory since 2004 [
70] .In 2016 however, industrial gas and electricity prices decreased 17% and 4% respectively whilst domestic prices fell 7.5% for gas and 1.9% for electricity over 2015 (
Table 4 and
Table 5). These price reductions were linked to the start-up of the Laggan and Cygnus gas fields in mid-2016 and December 2016 respectively to contribute 6.5% to domestic gas production [
67]). The Laggan gas field is projected to contribute between 5% and 10% to “all UK production in the next few years” [
67]). By extension, significant domestic production, whether from conventional or unconventional sources, will have varying degrees of moderating effects on both domestic and industrial energy prices, and thus contradict hypotheses that shale gas will not lead to reduced UK gas price [
71] (Roger 2013). It would therefore be safe to indicate that a significant shale gas production should reduce domestic gas and electricity prices. Such reasoning is consistent with predictions of reduced UK gas prices upon commercial production of shale gas [
8,
66]).
The UK Onshore Operators’ Group, UKOOG, notes that shale gas will help reduce the UK’s carbon footprint as it will displace coal production in the energy mix [
8]
4.2. Brexit, Energy Price and the Role of Shale Gas
In the US, the share of shale gas in the energy mix, rose from 1% to 20% in 10 years, from 2000 to 2010 according to Stevens [
12]. In 2016, the EIA believes that 15.8 Tcf of dry natural gas was produced from shale and tight oil resources, accounting for about 60% of US dry natural gas production; 81.1 Bcfd in 2018 [
72,
73]. The benefits from shale gas in the US have been reaped in the form of reduced electricity and gas prices, even in the face of increasing gas consumption, job creation, etc. [
74]. For example, the average Henry Hub gas price from 2015 to Nov 2017 was less than
$3 per million Btu [
75]. Consequently, the US government anticipates supporting the unconventional gas industry in order to sustain lower gas prices from the impact of shale and tight gas production.
Uncertainty surrounds the UK’s shale gas estimates at this early stage, and this has resulted in mixed anticipation of its potential contribution to the UK economy, businesses and households. Nonetheless, from a purely economic standpoint, it is possible to characterise the conditions under which the potential benefits of shale gas production may or may not be derived. Following basic laws of demand and supply, a hard Brexit is expected to lock in outflows of UK produced shale gas into the EU’s Internal Energy Market (IEM), where it could otherwise sell at a higher price and ultimately remove the benefits of cheaper gas prices from UK residents. In essence, similar to the implications of US shale gas, of excess natural gas supply, LNG capacity utilisation growth and lower gas prices; UK shale gas could cause an additional supply of natural gas at least within the UK, and force gas prices downwards and consequently reduce energy prices. It is to be noted however, that Stevens [
11] warns such theory only holds true under a UK-only gas market; and by implication under a Hard Brexit only that presents a closed energy market, one similar to the US’s energy market structure which essentially locks immediate additional gas supply to a UK–only market. Stevens [
12] explains that as the UK gas price falls, the country’s physical connection to the European Gas Market via the Batcon interconnector could encourage arbitrage as market participants look to trade cheaper UK gas in the higher- price European gas markets, which eventually would push UK gas prices up. This is why the author believes that the theory that shale gas would decrease UK gas prices is a myth. Thus, a soft Brexit would render the benefits of reduced gas and electricity prices an illusion. Nonetheless, the analytical review in the section on IEM and Energy prices extends this discussion and characterises the conditions under which shale gas may or may not reduce energy prices.
4.3. The IEM, Natural Gas Trade and UK Energy Supply and Prices Post Brexit
The EU’s Internal Energy Market (IEM), introduced in 1988, aimed at facilitating free trade, particularly the energy trade within the EU [
76]. Currently, the IEM rules permit the use of cross-border infrastructure to facilitate the import and export of energy produced in member states without the burden of transport tariffs being applied [
77]. Thus, consumers of energy in EU member states may pay lower, all things equal, for energy under IEM arrangements. The UK imports about 60% of its energy. Except for gas, imports of all energy types declined in 2016. In 2016, 65% of the UK gas import was from Norway’s Continental Shelf [
67,
78]. Of the UK’s gas import of 532 TWh in 2016, an insignificant amount was imported from the interconnector via Belgium in the last ten years to 2017 and the combined UK import of natural gas from interconnectors, including the Netherlands were found to be much lower than the total exports of natural gas from the UK into Europe as seen in
Figure 5. The evidence suggests that the UK exported on average 5,191 GWh of natural gas to Europe via interconnectors. This significant net export to the EU as in
Figure 5, would stay within the local UK gas market to boost domestic supply and fill local demand gaps should the UK opt out of the IEM post-Brexit. As seen in
Figure 5, there has been an upward trajectory of net natural gas exports from the UK into Europe since 2012—an important revelation of the relative positions of the EU and UK on energy trade. We argue on the back of this evidence that an increase in domestic gas supply from shale gas production, which would result in additional supply will put downward pressure on natural gas prices, a major source of electricity production in the UK and thereby reduce industrial and household energy prices/bills.
It is believed that shale gas will lead to reduced energy prices for the UK [
80] but there are others who suggest this is not the case [
11,
12,
71]). Commercial extraction of shale gas in the UK has not started yet, but it is possible to characterise the conditions under which shale gas production could influence energy prices. Also, although it has not left the IEM yet, it is possible to draw lessons from the US experience and also characterise what is likely obtainable in the UK based on the evidence available on UK natural gas. Indeed, the UK shale gas industry and government institutions have relied on such analysis to construct an envelope of likely obtainable benefits from shale gas in the UK [
63,
81]. For, example IoD 66], suggests among other advantages and benefits, that shale gas has the potential to reduce the UK’s import dependency to just 36%, a drastic reduction from 76% without shale gas production. This conclusion again contradicts popular studies such as Stevens [
11,
12] and Rogers [
71] who believe import levels and prices are unlikely to change due to shale gas production.
US shale gas revolution has changed world energy flows. As reported by the US EIA [
73] the US is a net exporter of natural gas. Consequently, there is now more liquified natural gas LNG available for European and Asian markets. This surplus is in addition to US net exports of NG which averaged 0.3 Bcfd in 2017 and is forecast to increase to 2 Bcfd in 2018 and 5.4 Bcfd in 2019 [
73]. In addition, the US now exports more coal to Europe and Asia because this portion has been replaced by natural gas from shale, for electricity generation [
82]. The increased availability of LNG in Asian and European markets without a doubt does have an effect on prices in those markets.
The UK imports gas via four main subsea pipelines as in
Table 6. The IUK is the only bidirectional pipeline with the capability to flow gas from Belgium to the UK and vice versa, depending on the demand-supply and price dynamics between the two countries [
83]. Although, with nearly as much capacity as the Norwegian Langeled Pipeline, the IUK is less utilised for imports into the UK compared to the combined imports from Norway. In 2017, the UK imported 75% of its natural gas from Norway and this has been the trend for many years [
5,
11]. Nonetheless, the crucial role played by the interconnector in providing ‘balancing gas’ to augment the UK’s more reliable supplies from Norway, as well as offering UK gas companies arbitrage opportunities, may be lost should the UK opt out of the IEM. Yet, the UK still has the choice to negotiate bilateral trade with the EU under one of three options suggested by Ifelebuegu et al. [
18]—the European Economic Area trade rules, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) or the EU-Swiss Model. Furthermore, the UK has the infrastructural readiness to increase LNG imports as a short-term energy source to replace most of the gas from EU interconnectors. That said, immediate benefits that derive from the IEM may be lost to the UK but there may well be imminent opportunities too, especially with the potential commercialisation of shale gas in the UK. Stevens [
11] believes reduced UK energy prices due to shale gas is a myth. The author argues that as UK gas prices fall, the country’s physical connection to the European Gas Market via the Batcon interconnector could encourage arbitrage as market participants look to trade cheaper UK gas in the higher- price European gas markets, which eventually would push UK gas prices up.
Following basic laws of demand and supply, the rationalisation may hold true that a Hard Brexit is expected to lock in outflows of UK produced shale gas to the EU’s Internal Energy Market (IEM), where it could receive a higher price and ultimately remove the benefits of cheaper gas prices from UK residents, whereas a Soft Brexit may erode any benefits of lower UK gas prices from shale gas production due to arbitrage activity as suggested by [
11]. It is to be noted however, that available evidence from 2016 fails to support such theory. In addition, it appears that a very large scale of shale gas investment that results in significant recovery of shale gas may weaken this idea.
In this research, it is argued against popular theories of no reduction in energy prices from shale gas [
11,
12,
76], that whether the UK remains within the IEM or not, significant shale gas production could reduce gas price and the scale of reduction will be positively correlated to the scale of shale gas recovery from tight rock formations. As an example, in 2016, a 6.5% domestic increase in UK gas production over 2015 resulted to 17% and 4% reduction in industrial and domestic gas price respectively, whilst electricity prices reduced 7.5% and 1.9% respectively. It is important to note that, during this period the UK remained a member of the IEM and companies engaged in arbitrage trading. In fact, the UK exported 116.9 TWh (25%) of its natural gas production in 2016 compared to 159.5 TWh (35%) in 2015 [
67]) and yet had reduced gas prices. Overall, the UK natural gas production edged up by 2.3% in 2016 than 2015, but that was all it required to trigger the significant energy price savings above. Although overall imports were higher by 6.6% in 2016 than 2015, a whopping 20% less LNG import was required in 2016 compared to 2015. The UK uses LNG imports to balance its gas supply deficits from pipelines and this has been the case since 2005. Post-Brexit and given a ‘No-Deal’ or ‘Hard Brexit’ with no membership of the IEM, the UK may suffer a combined impact of its lost natural gas and electricity importation via the EU interconnectors. Currently, the UK imports the larger share of electricity via the interconnector from France. In 2016, although electricity import fell 13%, it was 11 TWh. A likely result of a Hard Brexit would include higher energy prices, albeit only in the short to medium term. Indeed Pollitt [
84] decries arguments that Brexit will result in increased energy bills. He notes that (1) measured benefits to the UK on its membership of the single energy markets has been small and difficult to quantify, and (2) the gains from market integration have remained under 5% of costs due to limited interconnection capacity. He also observes there were stable and sometimes decreasing energy demand for most EU countries since early 2000, and that appear to have limited trade gains by large economics, including the UK’s for the IEM. Pollitt however argues that a hard Brexit may rather benefit the UK by reducing energy prices. He notes that a hard Brexit may lead to a small limitation on net imports of electricity from France and Netherlands, but adds that this is about 6% only, and argues that gains will be made towards reducing UK energy prices from a more significant limitation on substantial export of energy from the UK into the EU. Shale gas production which will increase the domestic supply of natural gas will thus reduce energy prices even further.
The UK could still remain in the single energy market. Post-Brexit, the EU electricity market provides two models of trade that the UK could exploit. The UK could join the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and through its membership access the single energy markets should it wish to, in the way Norway has stayed a member of the single market, but not the EU. Norway, through its membership of the NordPool and EFTA has full access to the EU electricity markets with all associated benefits [
18,
84].
Alternatively, Switzerland is fully integrated into the single electricity market but with limited participation in the market owing to the former’s rejection of the EU’s freedom of movement in 2014 [
74], similar to a hard Brexit scenario. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that the Swiss Model accrues mutual benefits to Switzerland and the EU and the UK could exploit such a relationship with the EU should it opt for a hard Brexit).
Without the EU, the UK has the choice to increase its natural gas imports from Norway through bilateral arrangements via pipeline or import more LNG from elsewhere. Currently, Qatar supplies about 80-90% of the UK’s LNG requirements, (this was 15% of the total UK gas demand in 2017) [
5,
12] and the UK has three LNG receiving facilities with a combined capacity to meet 50% of the UK’s annual demand [
83]. It has the option to increase imports from Qatar, Nigeria, Algeria, Trinidad and Tobago or from North America. The US exported its first shale gas in LNG to the UK in July 2018 and the editor of Global LNG Markets at ICIS, Ed Cox believes the US is another potential supplier of UK LNG besides Nigeria, Algeria and Qatar [
85]. Indeed, the FT reports that US LNG could serve as an alternative for European countries that seek to reduce reliance on Russian pipeline gas [
75]. With its shorter distance to the US, Europe is argued by LNG market analysts to favourably compete against Asian LNG importers for US LNG [
86].
Fundamentally, the benefits of a closed energy market—one similar to the US’s will cause domestic energy prices to reduce significantly due to the replacement of the share of imported gas which was used to generate electricity or consumed by industry, households, services, etc. in the UK by shale gas upon start-up, should the UK exit the IEM. Similarly, if the UK were to remain in the IEM post-Brexit, benefits from shale gas would still lead to a reduction in domestic energy price as witnessed in 2016 with the start-up of the Laggan and Cygnus gas fields. Furthermore, increased energy prices have been linked to periods of lower domestic production and higher imports and exports of gas, whilst lower energy prices have been linked to periods of higher domestic production as seen in 2016, and the period before 2000 until 2004 as in
Figure 6. These factors do suggest UK energy prices could significantly reduce with strong recovery rates of shale gas, and such an impact stands to be felt by UK households and businesses whether the UK remains or not within the IEM. This analysis is consistent with the analysis contained in the European Parliamentary Research Service’s research on the potential impact of shale gas on EU energy security. The research document offers evidence on and argues that shale gas may not lead to energy self-sufficiency within the EU but could lead to reduced energy prices [
46].
Figure 6 suggests the UK imported relatively less volumes of natural gas between 1990 and 2004 compared with her current levels of natural gas imports in excess of 500 TWh in 2016. The period of lower imports coincides with lower energy prices and higher domestic production of fuels until peaking in 2000 and 2004 for oil and gas production respectively, and thus offer support to the notion that increased domestic shale gas would likely lead to a reduction in energy prices.