Integrating Human Barriers in Human Reliability Analysis: A New Model for the Energy Sector
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Traditional HRA: SPAR-H and HEART Methodologies
2.2. Human Factors as Safety Barriers
3. Development of the Methodology
3.1. Human Barriers Dimensions
- (1)
- Dimension’s relevance as a barrier: To assess whether the dimension could be considered as a human safety barrier, the judges were asked the following question: “To what extent do you believe that the psychosocial dimension can positively influence workers’ safety behavior?”
- (2)
- Barrier category: To assess whether the dimension could be considered as a direct or safeguard barrier, the judges were asked the following question: “To what extent do you believe that the psychosocial dimension directly prevents workers from making errors during task execution?”
3.2. Estimating HEP including Barriers in the Analysis
4. Test Application of the Model
4.1. Method
4.2. Context and Task Description
4.3. Results of the Test
5. Discussion
Limitations and Further Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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GTT | Definition | NEP |
---|---|---|
A | A totally unfamiliar task, performed at speed | 0.55 |
B | Shift or restore the system to a new or original state on a single attempt without supervision | 0.26 |
C | A complex task requiring a high level of comprehension and skill | 0.16 |
D | Routine, highly practiced, a rapid task involving a relatively low level of skill | 0.02 |
E | Restore or shift a system to original or new state following procedures, with some checking | 0.003 |
F | Respond correctly to system command even when there is an augmented or automated supervisory system | 2 × 10−5 |
PSF | Definition |
---|---|
Available time | The amount of time an operator or a crew has to diagnose and act to perform a task. |
Threat Stress | The dangerousness of the task in terms of psychological and physical harm and operators’ adequacy of risk perception. |
Complexity | How difficult the task is to perform in the given context. |
Experience/Training | The experience and training of the operator(s) involved in the task. Included in this consideration are the years of experience of the individual or crew, and whether or not the operator/crew has been trained on the type of accident, the amount of time passed since training and the systems involved in the task and scenario. |
Procedures | The existence, the quality and actual use of formal operating procedures for the tasks under consideration. |
Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) | The equipment, displays and controls, layout, quality, and quantity of information available from instrumentation, and the interaction of the operator/crew with the equipment needed to carry out tasks. |
Environmental Context | Physical conditions of the working environment (e.g., noise, temperature, brightness) in which the task is performed. |
Fatigue | Whether or not the individual performing the task is physically and mentally fit to perform the task at the time. Things that may affect fitness include fatigue or sickness. |
PSF | Level | Multiplier |
---|---|---|
Available Time | Inadequate time | 100 |
Barely adequate time | 50 | |
Limited time | 10 | |
Nominal | 1 | |
Extra Time | 0.1 | |
Threat Stress | Very threatening | 5 |
Moderately threatening | 2 | |
Nominal | 1 | |
Complexity | Overly complex | 50 |
Moderately complex | 10 | |
Nominal | 1 | |
Simplified task | 0.1 | |
Experience/Training | The mismatch between knowledge or skills and correct behavior | 100 |
No experience/training | 50 | |
Low experience/training | 15 | |
Nominal | 1 | |
Extensive experience/training | 0.1 | |
Procedures | No procedures available or not used | 50 |
Very poor procedures | 20 | |
Poor procedures | 5 | |
Adequate and followed procedures | 1 | |
Exceptionally good and followed procedures | 0.5 | |
HMI | Completely inadequate | 100 |
Inadequate | 50 | |
Barely adequate | 10 | |
Adequate | 1 | |
Specifically designed to ease the task | 0.5 | |
Environmental Context | Environmental conditions do not allow to perform the task | 100 |
Adverse conditions | 10 | |
Nominal | 1 | |
Fatigue | High | 100 |
Moderate | 10 | |
Nominal | 1 |
Barrier Type | Dimension | Definition |
---|---|---|
Direct Barriers | Safety task performance | The quality of the operator’s performance in terms of safety in relation to a given task. |
Compliance with safety norms and procedures | The set of activities that an operator needs to carry out to maintain high levels of safety while performing a task. It involves complying with safety norms, procedures and standards, using PPE. | |
Safety contextual performance | The set of behaviors that grant the development of a safe environment at work. An example of performance is the operator’s active participation in safety briefings or safety cooperation behaviors among workers. | |
Safety participation | Workers’ proactivity and efforts toward the improvement of safety at work and safety performances. | |
Safety teamwork | Operators’ ability to work in teams pursuing goals while safely performing tasks. | |
Safety communication | Quality and quantity of relevant safety information exchanges about safety in working teams. | |
Safeguard Barriers | Non-Technical Safety skills | The set of cognitive, social and personal resource skills complementing technical skills and contributing to safe and efficient task performance (e.g., fatigue and stress management, safety awareness). |
Technical Safety Skills | The set of technical skills that operators need to own to work safely. These skills vary as a function of the task to be performed and the operators’ role. | |
Safety Motivation | Refers to workers’ willingness to spend energies and efforts to work safely. The worker may be intrinsically motivated to engage in safe behaviors or extrinsically motivated by external pressures from the organization. | |
Safety organizational citizenship | Enlargement of workers’ role about safety without a formal acknowledgement of the acquired functions from the organization (e.g., through rewards). | |
Assessment and development of safety skills | Evaluates the quality of organizational management of workers’ skills. It mainly focuses on how and how often organizations assess workers’ safety skills and their commitment to improving these. | |
Safety Leadership | Evaluates the quality of members-leader interactions about safety. It involves the ability of leaders to promote safety behaviors among workers and improve the overall levels of safety in the working environment. | |
Safety Climate and Culture | Refers to the set of workers’ perceptions about safety rules, norms and procedures, and the importance of safety in the working environment. |
Level | Score |
---|---|
Yes | 1.00 |
Rather Yes than No | 0.66 |
Rather No than Yes | 0.33 |
No | 0 |
DBS | Conversion Coefficient |
---|---|
DBS ≥ 0.75 | 0.2 |
0.55 ≤ DBS 0.75 | 0.6 |
0.35 ≤ DBS 0.55 | 1.0 |
0.15 ≤ DBS 0.35 | 1.4 |
DBS 0.15 | 1.8 |
SBS | Conversion Coefficient |
---|---|
SBS ≥ 0.75 | 0.2 |
0.55 ≤ SBS 0.75 | 0.6 |
0.35 ≤ SBS 0.55 | 1.0 |
0.15 ≤ SBS 0.35 | 1.4 |
SBS 0.15 | 1.8 |
PSF | Selected Level | Multiplier |
---|---|---|
Available time | Extra Time | 0.1 |
Threat Stress | Nominal | 1 |
Complexity | Nominal | 1 |
Experience/Training | Extensive experience/training | 0.1 |
Procedures | Poor procedures | 5 |
Human Machine Interfaces (HMI) | Specifically designed to ease the task | 0.5 |
Environmental Context | Adverse condition | 10 |
Fatigue | Nominal | 1 |
Indicator | Evaluation | Score |
---|---|---|
Do workers pay attention and comply with safety norms and procedures even if they are not easy to apply? | Rather No than Yes | 0.33 |
Do workers use the correct procedures to work safely? | Rather No than Yes | 0.33 |
Do workers correctly use PPE in line with safety norms and procedures? | Yes | 1.00 |
Do workers ensure the maximum respect of safety norms and procedures while working? | Rather No than Yes | 0.33 |
Barrier total score | 0.50 |
Variable | Score |
---|---|
Nominal Error Probability (NEP) | 0.02 |
PSF Composite (PSFC) | 0.05 |
Conversion Coefficient Direct Barriers (CCDB) | 0.2 |
Conversion Coefficient Safeguard Barriers (CCSB) | 0.2 |
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Guglielmi, D.; Paolucci, A.; Cozzani, V.; Mariani, M.G.; Pietrantoni, L.; Fraboni, F. Integrating Human Barriers in Human Reliability Analysis: A New Model for the Energy Sector. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2022, 19, 2797. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19052797
Guglielmi D, Paolucci A, Cozzani V, Mariani MG, Pietrantoni L, Fraboni F. Integrating Human Barriers in Human Reliability Analysis: A New Model for the Energy Sector. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2022; 19(5):2797. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19052797
Chicago/Turabian StyleGuglielmi, Dina, Alessio Paolucci, Valerio Cozzani, Marco Giovanni Mariani, Luca Pietrantoni, and Federico Fraboni. 2022. "Integrating Human Barriers in Human Reliability Analysis: A New Model for the Energy Sector" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 5: 2797. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19052797