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Open AccessArticle

An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms

School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China
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Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16(15), 2775; https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16152775
Received: 29 May 2019 / Revised: 21 July 2019 / Accepted: 31 July 2019 / Published: 3 August 2019
In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control. View Full-Text
Keywords: evolutionary games; industrial pollution; static punishment mechanism; dynamic punishment mechanism evolutionary games; industrial pollution; static punishment mechanism; dynamic punishment mechanism
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Wang, C.; Shi, F. An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 2775.

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