Machine Learning-Based Blockchain Technology for Secure V2X Communication: Open Challenges and Solutions
Abstract
1. Introduction
- We provide a comprehensive categorization of security threats in V2X, distinguishing between long-standing persistent issues and emerging adversarial techniques, offering a structured foundation for designing robust defense mechanisms.
- This survey presents a holistic analysis of the synergistic integration of three key technologies: ML, blockchain, and multi-access edge computing (MEC). Unlike previous works that focused on these technologies in isolation, we scrutinize how their combined strengths can address critical gaps in V2X security such as real-time threat detection, decentralized trust management, and low-latency processing.
- We present a multi-layered service scenario architecture that cohesively combines ML, blockchain, and MEC. This conceptual framework serves as a practical blueprint for future research and development.
- Based on our integrated analysis, we identify and discuss specific open research challenges and future directions that arise directly from the convergence of these technologies.
2. Related Work
2.1. Key Considerations
- Security: Security in V2X communications is defined by the CIA triad—confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality protects sensitive information like vehicle location and user data from unauthorized access to prevent privacy breaches. Integrity ensures that the data exchanged between vehicles and infrastructure remains accurate and unaltered, maintaining trust and preventing dangerous misinformation. Availability guarantees that critical services, such as traffic control and real-time vehicle communication, are accessible when needed, preventing disruptions that could lead to accidents and traffic issues. Together, these principles uphold the security and functionality of V2X systems.
- Role of ML and blockchain: ML and blockchain serve complementary roles in meeting these security needs. Machine learning techniques bolster V2X security by enabling real-time threat detection and adaptive responses. For instance, ML can analyze vehicular data to identify anomalies indicative of cyberattacks or classify threats based on patterns, improving system resilience in dynamic environments. Blockchain provides decentralized solutions for secure data management and trust. Its tamper-proof nature ensures data integrity, while its distributed architecture supports secure identity verification and logging, reducing reliance on vulnerable centralized systems. We provide insights into utilizing blockchain technology in securing V2X communications including decentralized vehicle identity management, secure message broadcasting, and tamper-proof data logging.
- Scalability: As V2X networks grow, scalability emerges as a key challenge. We examine the role of machine (deep) learning in processing and analyzing vast amounts of vehicular data, improving threat detection, and real-time decision-making in traffic scenarios. Additionally, we discuss the challenges in integrating blockchain technology into existing V2X systems and potential solutions such as scalability and latency issues. As a solution, we discuss MEC, which enhances scalability by enabling localized data processing and reducing latency.
2.2. Methodology
- Relevance to V2X security (P1): Studies must specifically address security challenges in V2X communication systems such as data integrity, confidentiality, authentication, or availability. Papers focusing solely on general vehicular networks or non-security aspects were excluded.
- Technological focus on machine learning and blockchain (P2): Papers covering various ML techniques that addressed anomaly detection, threat identification, or network security, giving priority to studies that focused on real-time applications and adaptability in dynamic environments. Additionally, we selected papers on blockchain applications for secure data sharing, decentralized identity verification, and integrity assurance in V2X networks, especially those tackling latency and scalability in resource-constrained environments. We also placed a focus on papers exploring the integration of ML and blockchain, either in concept or in practice.
- Evaluation of capabilities and limitations (P3): We focused on studies that provided a critical assessment of each technology’s effectiveness and constraints. This included:
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- Performance evaluations of machine learning models (e.g., accuracy, false positive rates);
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- Analysis of blockchain’s impact on latency, computational overhead, and scalability;
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- Discussion of vulnerabilities such as adversarial attacks on ML models or centralization risks in blockchain networks.
- Cutting-edge research (P4): As V2X security is a rapidly evolving area, we prioritized recent publications (last 3–5 years) to ensure that the technologies discussed were current and applicable to modern V2X systems. Moreover, we looked for studies that identified unresolved issues, practical deployment challenges, or promising directions for future research. These insights were instrumental in forming the backbone of our discussion on future research paths.
2.3. Existing Surveys
3. Security Issues in V2X Communications
3.1. Attack Spectrum
- Spoofing attacks: Malevolent actors may feign legitimate vehicles or infrastructure components, transmitting false data to disrupt traffic flow or cause accidents [38]. GPS spoofing [39] is where attackers broadcast fake GPS signals to deceive a vehicle’s navigation system. When such an attack is successful, a vehicle’s perceived position can be offset by several kilometers, leading to misplacement on distant roads and creating severe safety risks. To enhance anti-interference and anti-spoofing capabilities, alternative or supplementary positioning systems, such as pseudolites, which are ground-based transmitters that can augment or provide a backup to traditional GNSS signals, have been explored [40]. Another type of spoofing attack by impersonating another vehicle or infrastructure unit, known as identity spoofing, can lead to unauthorized access to network resources and the dissemination of false information [41].
- Eavesdropping: Unauthorized interception of V2X communications can divulge sensitive information such as the drivers’ location and personal details [42]. A type of eavesdropping famously known as a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack is where attackers intercept and potentially alter the communication between two parties, which can lead to misinformation or unauthorized data access [43].
- Denial of service (DoS) attacks: These attacks target overwhelming the network with excessive traffic, leading to service disruptions and impaired communication [44]. One way of doing this is jamming, intentionally sending disruptive signals to overload the communication channels, hindering the transmission of critical safety messages [45]. Another way is flooding, which overwhelms the network with high volumes of data packets, rendering the network unable to process legitimate requests [46]. It is important to highlight the significance of widespread distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in this context, as they emerge as critical facilitators within a 6G IoT environment, potentially giving rise to challenges related to network security, privacy, and trust [47].
- Sybil attacks: In a Sybil attack, an attacker forges multiple fake identities to gain an unfair advantage or disrupt network operations. In the V2X context [48], this could lead to falsifying vehicle positions or flooding the network with fake data, disrupting traffic management systems or causing accidents. Sybil attacks are particularly dangerous in decentralized networks and must be mitigated by robust identity verification and reputation-based trust systems.
- Replay attacks: Replay attacks involve intercepting and retransmitting legitimate communication messages to create false impressions or manipulate vehicular behavior. For example, an attacker could capture a message indicating a vehicle’s location and replay it at a different time to mislead traffic management systems or create congestion [49]. Timestamping, cryptographic hashing, and nonce-based schemes can help mitigate these attacks by ensuring message freshness and authenticity.
3.2. Privacy Concerns
- User anonymity: Ensuring user anonymity in vehicle-related data is a complex challenge, as highlighted by several studies. Hara et al. [51] and Troncoso et al. [52] both emphasized the need for effective methods to reduce traceability and protect privacy in location-based services and V2X communication. Pseudonymization and frequent ID changing are two potential strategies, but they need to be carefully implemented to prevent attackers from linking pseudonyms back to real-world identities.
- Data aggregation risks: Aggregating vehicular data over time can inadvertently disclose patterns that might lead to user identification. This re-identification risk is influenced by the background knowledge of potential attackers, with a trade-off between privacy and data utility [53]. This necessitates the deployment of privacy-preserving algorithms like differential privacy or homomorphic encryption to balance data utility with privacy.
3.3. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
- Single points of failure: Although V2X aims to decentralize communications, many systems still rely on centralized control mechanisms. Centralized systems can become prime targets for cyberattacks, potentially impacting traffic engineering, network design, and system reliability [55]. Centralized architectures, such as those used in traffic management systems or cloud-based services, can create vulnerabilities where a single point of compromise can impact the entire network.
- Distributed elements as targets: The decentralized nature of V2X systems, while essential for supporting low-latency communications, also introduces multiple points of vulnerability. Roadside units (RSUs) and MEC nodes may be susceptible to physical tampering or remote cyberattacks, compromising the integrity and security of the entire network. Attackers could target these elements to introduce malware, intercept communications, or alter traffic management data [56].
- Scalability issues: As the number of connected vehicles grows, the existing infrastructure may face challenges in efficiently managing and allocating resources, such as bandwidth and computing power, leading to traffic overload and energy consumption [57].
3.4. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)
3.5. Evolving Cyberattack Techniques
- AI-driven assaults: Attackers increasingly use AI to craft more intelligent and dynamic threats. For instance, AI-based malware can learn from defense mechanisms and alter its behavior to evade detection. At the same time, adversarial machine learning can manipulate AI models used in V2X networks, leading to incorrect classifications or false alerts. This underscores the need for adversarial resilience in AI models, which can identify and defend against malicious inputs designed to compromise their integrity. The employment of AI by malevolent actors can result in increasingly sophisticated and responsive cyber threats [63]. The threats mentioned above can be further exacerbated by using AI, as discussed by Aliman et al. [64] in the context of AI and virtual reality.
- Zero-day vulnerabilities: Attackers may capitalize on undiscovered weaknesses in V2X technologies before they are detected and rectified [65]. Traditional defense mechanisms are often ineffective against these attacks, making it crucial to develop new detection and prevention mechanisms [66]. These vulnerabilities are particularly dangerous in V2X environments, where using novel communication protocols and emerging technologies introduces new attack surfaces. Moreover, if the security challenges posed by the malicious application of AI are not adequately mitigated, the increasing inclination toward integrating AI/ML in securing V2X communications might decline [22].
- The emergence of quantum computing presents a substantial risk to the cryptographic standards currently employed in V2X communications [67,68,69,70]. Quantum computers have the potential to break widely used encryption schemes such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, which are foundational to securing V2X systems. Quantum computing’s ability to process data at an exponential rate and its potential to crack digital encryption [67,70] necessitate the development and adoption of post-quantum cryptography [68]. While the threat is urgent, it is also manageable. The development of quantum-resistant cryptographic schemes is crucial to address this risk [69].
3.6. Threats and Attacks on Machine Learning and Blockchain
4. V2X Communication Security Mechanisms
4.1. Machine Learning for V2X Communication Security
4.2. Blockchain for Decentralized V2X Communication Security
4.2.1. Decentralization of Trust and Immutable Ledger
4.2.2. Scalability and Security Challenges in V2X Blockchains
4.3. Machine Learning-Based Blockchain for Advanced Security
4.3.1. Integrated Architectures for Proactive Defense
4.3.2. AI-Driven Optimization of Blockchain Networks
5. Discussion and Lessons Learned
5.1. Discussion on ML, Blockchain, and MEC Integration
5.2. Service Scenario Architecture
- Vehicle layer: This is the foundational layer, consisting of vehicles equipped with various sensors and communication modules (e.g., dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) or cellular V2X (C-V2X)) that facilitate V2X communication. The modules are responsible for collecting critical data such as vehicle location, speed, and proximity to obstacles, and for communicating this information with other vehicles and nearby infrastructure. Vehicles in this layer can also be configured to host lightweight blockchain nodes, allowing them to participate directly in the decentralized ledger and enhance data authenticity at the source.
- Edge layer (MEC): The edge layer comprises MEC nodes, strategically positioned near road infrastructure (e.g., traffic lights, road signs), which serve as the computational backbone of the architecture. These nodes are equipped with advanced software modules including a data processing module for real-time data ingestion, an ML inference engine running models for anomaly detection and traffic pattern analysis, a model update manager employing federated learning for continuous adaptation, and a communication interface using encrypted protocols (e.g., TLS). MEC nodes reduce latency and facilitate immediate responses to security threats, enhancing vehicular network safety and efficiency. Supporting this layer are RSUs, which act as communication hubs using DSRC or C-V2X to relay data from vehicles to MEC nodes and participate as lightweight blockchain nodes for local validation. The integration is achieved via a blockchain gateway module, which encrypts and forwards processed data to the cloud layer, ensuring seamless interoperability between the MEC and RSU functionalities.
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- ML-based security services: The architecture’s security management component leverages ML algorithms for swift threat identification and response coordination. These algorithms are distributed across the network, where MEC nodes run lightweight ML models (e.g., convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for image-based anomaly detection) to process data locally, enabling immediate responses like alerting drivers or adjusting signals.
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- Blockchain network executes heavier ML analytics (e.g., LSTM networks for predictive trends) on aggregated data, ensuring tamper-proof threat logging and policy enforcement via smart contracts. The integration is facilitated by a security orchestration module on MECs, which coordinates ML outputs with blockchain transactions, ensuring prompt action (e.g., triggering cybersecurity protocols) by interfacing with vehicle control units and infrastructure systems.
- Central cloud/control center: This layer handles complex processing, long-term data storage, and system management. It employs high-performance computing resources to update ML models with global threat intelligence using batch learning, maintain blockchain protocols by adding new nodes and refining consensus algorithms, and oversee the entire operational domain by providing essential oversight and management functions. The blockchain layer operates as a decentralized ledger integrated with the MEC layer to ensure data integrity, traceability, and non-repudiation across the V2X network. This integration is achieved at a high level through the following mechanism:
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- An interlayer communication where MEC nodes act as blockchain clients, submitting validated data to a distributed network of nodes (vehicles, roadside units (RSUs), and traffic management centers) via a consensus protocol that is optimized for low-latency V2X requirements.
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- The blockchain serving as a data storage of critical V2X data such as transaction logs with timestamps and digital signatures, anomaly reports, and security policies (smart contract definitions enforcing access control and response actions).
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- The self-executing smart contracts, written in languages like Solidity, automate security policies based on ML insights. For example, a smart contract might trigger a traffic signal adjustment if an MEC node detects a collision risk, ensuring rapid, trustless enforcement.
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- The decentralized ledger is maintained across a heterogeneous network of nodes. Vehicles contribute lightweight nodes for data validation, RSUs serve as intermediate nodes for regional consensus, and traffic management centers act as full nodes for global oversight, balancing scalability and security.
- Data flow and processing mechanism: The operational flow, as indicated by the numbered steps in Figure 3, begins with raw sensor data being collected by vehicles. (①) These data are transmitted via DSRC or C-V2X to nearby edge nodes for real-time processing using embedded ML models. In the next step (②), the ML models analyze the data for anomalies or threats. These processed data and any detected anomalies or threats are then securely sent to the blockchain layer at step (③) via the blockchain gateway module. Smart contracts on the blockchain can be used to implement security policies automatically, and ML models at the central data center assess data over time, refining predictions and identifying emerging threats. The models are continuously enhanced with new data and threat intelligence. At the same time, the blockchain network is meticulously maintained and updated to include new nodes, improve consensus mechanisms, and enhance security protocols. Finally, at step (④), processed and analyzed data are communicated back to the vehicles and infrastructure. Here, vehicles and traffic systems receive actionable insights for immediate response or adjustments. The central control center oversees the entire v2x system architecture. This comprehensive architecture encapsulates a dynamic, adaptive, and secure approach to V2X communication, ensuring the reliability and robustness of these increasingly critical systems.
- Empirical validation and performance benchmarking: The architecture outlined, at present, is conceptual. A critical direction for future research is its empirical validation through realistic simulations. Joint simulation platforms, such as integrating the network simulator NS-3 with the autonomous driving simulator CARLA, would be essential for evaluating the real-world performance of the integrated ML, blockchain, and MEC framework.
6. Open Research Challenges and Solution
6.1. Key Research Challenges
- Scalability and efficiency: Key among these challenges is the issue of scalability and efficiency, particularly in densely populated vehicular environments where system demands are significantly higher [34]. As V2X networks expand and the number of connected vehicles increases, the system must efficiently manage larger volumes of data while maintaining low latency. The integration of ML and blockchain introduces computational overhead, which can become a bottleneck in dense vehicular environments. For instance, blockchain consensus mechanisms, such as PoW or PoS, require substantial computational resources, while ML models used for real-time threat detection demand significant processing power [116]. Privacy-preserving ML models, such as those using federated learning, still face issues in terms of computational load and efficient training across heterogeneous nodes in V2X environments.
- Ensuring interoperability: Ensuring interoperability poses another significant hurdle, necessitating the development of universal standards and protocols that enable seamless communication between diverse technologies, manufacturers, and service providers [131]. The V2X environment involves diverse manufacturers, devices, and communication protocols. Ensuring interoperability between these systems is essential for seamless communication between vehicles, RSUs, and infrastructure elements. The lack of universal communication protocols leads to fragmentation across vehicle manufacturers, limited RSU and infrastructure integration, and difficulties in blockchain adoption. When different companies implement proprietary V2X communication standards, it creates compatibility issues. Many existing ITS do not support cross-vendor interoperability, reducing the effectiveness of large-scale deployments. Moreover, without standardized APIs and cross-chain interoperability, integrating blockchain into existing V2X architecture remains challenging.
- Data privacy: Another critical concern is data privacy [20]; balancing the need for extensive data sharing and processing with the privacy rights of individual drivers and compliance with regulatory standards is paramount. In V2X systems, sensitive data such as driver identity, location, and movement patterns must be protected, but at the same time, these data are crucial for system-wide functionality and safety. While strong encryption and privacy-preserving ML techniques (e.g., homomorphic encryption, secure multi-party computation) can protect data, these approaches introduce increased computational complexity, which can hinder real-time decision-making. They can also create challenges in regulatory compliance, as different regions such as GDPR in Europe and CCPA in the U.S. impose strict rules on personal data usage.
- Sophisticated cyber threats: The rising sophistication of cyber threats, including zero-day exploits and APTs, which traditional security models struggle to detect and respond to in real-time. Other persisting threats include attackers who can manipulate ML models by injecting misleading data, leading to incorrect threat assessments. Blockchain 51% attacks and smart contract exploits, where flawed contract codes are exploited for financial or data breaches, are persisting sophisticated cyber threats.
- Post-quantum threats: The seemingly inevitable arrival of quantum computing presents a future challenge to the blockchain’s current cryptographic standards, calling for proactive research and development in quantum-resistant cryptographic methods [132]. While lattice-based cryptography and multivariate polynomial cryptography offer potential solutions, they introduce larger key sizes and higher computational overhead. Moreover, updating cryptographic standards across a decentralized V2X network will require gradual, large-scale deployment efforts.
6.2. Future Research Directions
- Optimizing scalability and efficiency: The computational overhead of ML and blockchain in dense vehicular environments poses a significant bottleneck to scalability and efficiency. Future research should focus on developing lightweight ML models and efficient blockchain consensus mechanisms tailored for V2X networks. For ML, techniques such as model compression, pruning, or adaptations of federated learning could reduce the processing demands while maintaining real-time performance for threat detection and data analysis. For blockchain, exploring resource-efficient consensus protocols can minimize latency and energy consumption, enabling high throughput in large-scale V2X deployments.
- Ensuring interoperability across diverse systems: The diversity of manufacturers, devices, and protocols in the V2X communication environment demands seamless interoperability, which remains hindered by the lack of universal standards. Research efforts should prioritize the development of standardized protocols and open-source frameworks to enable cohesive communication across vehicles, RSUs, and infrastructure elements. Creating standardized APIs and communication interfaces will bridge the gap between proprietary systems, fostering a unified V2X environment that supports scalability and collaboration among stakeholders. Moreover, cross-industry collaboration is needed to establish universal V2X communication protocols that support ML-blockchain integration.
- Enhancing data privacy while enabling functionality: Balancing the need for data sharing with privacy protection is critical for user trust and regulatory compliance in V2X systems. Future research should explore advanced privacy-preserving techniques, such as differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, or secure multi-party computation, specifically designed for vehicular networks. These methods can safeguard sensitive data, such as driver identity and location, while preserving the functionality required for safety features like collision avoidance and traffic optimization. Tailoring these techniques to the decentralized nature of V2X environments will be a key focus.
- Fortifying against sophisticated cyber threats: Research should concentrate on developing AI-powered threat intelligence systems capable of real-time anomaly detection and rapid response to emerging threats. Additionally, automated patching mechanisms should be designed to swiftly address vulnerabilities across the network, leveraging MEC for decentralized, edge-based threat mitigation. These solutions must be scalable and efficient to operate in dynamic, high-stakes vehicular contexts.
- Preparing for post-quantum security challenges: Proactive research is needed to develop and implement PQC algorithms to ensure long-term security against quantum threats. The focus should not only be on developing new algorithms, but also on their practical integration into the V2X architecture. For instance, lattice-based cryptography has emerged as a promising candidate, offering signature schemes like the Bimodal Lattice Signature Scheme (BLISS) [133], which have been designed for efficiency on resource-constrained devices. However, integrating these schemes is not trivial. They often involve trade-offs, such as larger key sizes or a higher computational overhead compared with current elliptic curve cryptography. Future research must therefore analyze these performance impacts within the V2X context, ensuring that PQC solutions do not compromise the low-latency requirements of safety-critical applications. A gradual, large-scale deployment strategy will be essential for a smooth transition before quantum threats become prevalent.
- Explainable AI (XAI) for V2X security: Future systems must not only detect threats, but also provide transparent and human-understandable reasons for their decisions. Research into explainable AI (XAI) is needed to ensure that security alerts are trustworthy and auditable. This is crucial in V2X environments, where false positives can cause unnecessary traffic disruptions and false negatives can be catastrophic.
- Governance and liability in decentralized systems: The decentralized nature of the proposed architecture raises complex questions of governance and liability. Future research must address the challenges of establishing clear accountability frameworks. For instance, who is responsible if an autonomous security decision triggered by an ML model and executed via a smart contract leads to an accident? Developing robust governance models for these automated systems is critical.
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
APTs | Advanced persistent threats |
CAVs | Connected and autonomous vehicles |
CNN | Convolutional neural network |
CAN | Controller area network |
CIA | Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability |
C-V2X | Cellular vehicle-to-everything |
DSRC | Dedicated short-range communications |
FL | Federated learning |
IDS | Intrusion detection system |
IoV | Internet of vehicles |
IPFS | InterPlanetary File System |
ITS | Intelligent transportation systems |
MEC | Multi-access edge computing |
ML | Machine learning |
PBFT | Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance |
PQC | Post-quantum cryptography |
PoS | Proof of stake |
PoW | Proof of work |
RF | Random forest |
RL | Reinforcement learning |
RNN | Recurrent neural network |
RSU | Roadside unit |
SDN | Software-defined networking |
SDVNs | Software-defined vehicular networks |
SVM | Support vector machine |
V2X | Vehicle-to-everything |
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Paper | Year | V2X Security Issues | AI/ML Based Solutions | Blockchain-Based Solutions | ML and Blockchain Integrated | Conceptual Architecture |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[20] | 2023 | |||||
[21] | 2023 | |||||
[22] | 2023 | |||||
[23] | 2023 | |||||
[24] | 2022 | |||||
[25] | 2020 | |||||
[26] | 2023 | |||||
[27] | 2019 | |||||
[28] | 2024 | |||||
[29] | 2022 | |||||
[30] | 2024 | |||||
Our work | 2025 |
Subcategory | CIA Undermined | Severity Level and Potential Damage |
---|---|---|
Spoofing attacks | Confidentiality, Integrity | False vehicle information, accidents, traffic disruption, and unauthorized access to infrastructure. |
Eavesdropping (MitM) | Confidentiality | Disclosure of sensitive information, manipulation of messages, leading to security breaches. |
Denial of service (DoS) | Availability | Disruption of critical communication, potentially causing accidents or halting traffic flow. |
Sybil attacks | Integrity | Disrupts network integrity, leading to traffic mismanagement or collisions. |
Replay attacks | Integrity | Misdirects traffic flow or vehicle behavior, potentially causing accidents or traffic jams. |
Privacy concerns | Confidentiality | Tracking of vehicle movements, exposure of personal information, and user identification. |
Infrastructure vulnerabilities | Availability, Integrity | Disruption of traffic systems, altered communication signals, or shutdown of critical services. |
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) | Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability | Data breaches or loss of control in V2X networks through long-term, sophisticated attacks. |
AI-driven assaults | Integrity | Incorrect vehicle decisions, false alerts, or system malfunctions causing accidents or system breakdowns. |
Zero-day vulnerabilities | Integrity, Availability | Exploitation of unknown vulnerabilities for major system failures or data breaches. |
Quantum computing threats | Confidentiality, Integrity | Compromise of entire V2X security infrastructure, allowing unauthorized access to secure data. |
Ref. | Machine Learning Algorithm | Service in V2X Security | Dataset | Effectiveness (Metrics) |
---|---|---|---|---|
[77] | SVM | Sybil attack detection in vehicle networks | SUMO simulated urban scenario | High true positive rate of 97% with low false positive and negative rate, less than 8%. |
[79] | HDAD (MARL + MaxEntIRL) | Anomaly detection | Simulated 6G V2X using NS-3 and SUMO | 98% accuracy, 95% recall, and a 4% false prediction rate |
[80] | DDPG | Trajectory anomaly detection | OMNET++ and SUMO (trajectory dataset) | Achieved 97% accuracy in anomaly detection and classification |
[81] | DVT and variational attention mechanism | Interpretable, unsupervised anomaly detection | Simulated (Carla) and real-world vehicle dataset | F1-score of 0.9096 on real AV data and 0.8350 on simulated data |
[83] | RNN (LSTM) + RL (Q-learning) | Anomaly detection | Yahoo benchmark datasets | Near 100% accuracy and recall in detecting anomalies. |
[84] | RL | MDS | VeReMi dataset | Precision up to 100% and recall up to 99.79% |
[87] | RF + CTGAN | IDS for in-vehicle networks | Car-hacking dataset from HCRL lab | Achieved 0.93 accuracy for traditional traffic and 0.89 accuracy for AI-generated attack detection |
[88] | GAN with LSTM backbone | Unsupervised anomaly detection | VeReMi extension dataset | Achieved 81.8% overall recall with 100% recall on 5 of the 11 attack types |
[91] | xNN + K-means clustering | Anomaly detection | UNSW-NB15 and CICIDS2019 dataset | Above 99% accuracy on both datasets |
[92] | RF + SVM | Anomaly detection | NSL-KDD dataset | 99.6% accuracy and 0.004 false-alarm rate |
[93] | Decentralized federated learning (DFL) | Network anomaly detection while preserving privacy | AWID-3 dataset | Achieved a median accuracy of 71.01% across all clients, an average improvement of 19.17% over localized training |
[94] | FL with stacking + DP | IDS in 6G-V2X network slices | 5G-NIDD dataset | Up to 92% precision, 92% recall, and 91% f1-score |
[95] | FL + LSTM | MDS | VeReMi-extension dataset | Achieved 98.4% accuracy, 99.3% precision, and 96.9% detection rate |
[97] | Autoencoder and (transformer-LSTM) | Lightweight, unsupervised anomaly detection | VeReMi-extension dataset | 0.9811 F1-score reducing parameters by 82% and prediction time by 62% |
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Gebrezgiher, Y.T.; Jeremiah, S.R.; Deng, X.; Park, J.H. Machine Learning-Based Blockchain Technology for Secure V2X Communication: Open Challenges and Solutions. Sensors 2025, 25, 4793. https://doi.org/10.3390/s25154793
Gebrezgiher YT, Jeremiah SR, Deng X, Park JH. Machine Learning-Based Blockchain Technology for Secure V2X Communication: Open Challenges and Solutions. Sensors. 2025; 25(15):4793. https://doi.org/10.3390/s25154793
Chicago/Turabian StyleGebrezgiher, Yonas Teweldemedhin, Sekione Reward Jeremiah, Xianjun Deng, and Jong Hyuk Park. 2025. "Machine Learning-Based Blockchain Technology for Secure V2X Communication: Open Challenges and Solutions" Sensors 25, no. 15: 4793. https://doi.org/10.3390/s25154793
APA StyleGebrezgiher, Y. T., Jeremiah, S. R., Deng, X., & Park, J. H. (2025). Machine Learning-Based Blockchain Technology for Secure V2X Communication: Open Challenges and Solutions. Sensors, 25(15), 4793. https://doi.org/10.3390/s25154793