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Sensors
  • Article
  • Open Access

27 April 2021

Two-Level Blockchain System for Digital Crime Evidence Management

,
and
1
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Dongguk University, Seoul 04620, Korea
2
Department of Computer Engineering, Pai Chai University, Daejeon 35345, Korea
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
This article belongs to the Special Issue Blockchain for Trustworthy Internet of Things

Abstract

Digital evidence, such as evidence from CCTV and event data recorders, is highly valuable in criminal investigations, and is used as definitive evidence in trials. However, there are risks when digital evidence obtained during the investigation of a case is managed through a physical hard disk drive until it is submitted to the court. Previous studies have focused on the integrated management of digital evidence in a centralized system, but if a centralized system server is attacked, major operations and investigation information may be leaked. Therefore, there is a need to reliably manage digital evidence and investigation information using blockchain technology in a distributed system environment. However, when large amounts of data—such as evidence videos—are stored in a blockchain, the data that must be processed only within one block before being created increase, causing performance degradation. Therefore, we propose a two-level blockchain system that separates digital evidence into hot and cold blockchains. In the criminal investigation process, information that frequently changes is stored in the hot blockchain, and unchanging data such as videos are stored in the cold blockchain. To evaluate the system, we measured the storage and inquiry processing performance of digital crime evidence videos according to the different capacities in the two-level blockchain system.

1. Introduction

Recently, digital evidence has been used as definitive evidence in criminal investigations and trials. For instance, in 1985, a murder occurred at a rest stop in Oklahoma, USA, but a strong suspect could not be found. However, DNA from cigarette butts smoked by the murderer at that time was stored until 35 years later, when the criminal could be charged [1]. Moreover, in South Korea, a criminal was arrested for a crime that was committed in 1988 after the evidence of sexual assault and murder cases that remained unsolved after 18 years was compared with DNA that had been permanently stored [2]. Thus, it is becoming important to store and manage digital evidence for a long time so that it is not tampered with or damaged [3].
Table 1 shows the amount of digital evidence stored in Korea as of 2020. As the use of devices such as smartphones, CCTV, and event data recorders (EDRs; also known as black boxes) has expanded recently, the amount of digital evidence used in criminal investigations continues to increase. This means that the amount of digital evidence that needs to be stored and managed has increased, and standard and systematic management is required. However, there is currently no standard model for digital evidence storage in Korea or abroad, so this management is not effective [3]. In particular, South Korea generally uses a hard disk, which is a physical storage device, to store digital evidence collected by investigators. This hard disk drive is used from the collection of the digital evidence in the early stages of a criminal investigation until it is submitted to the court. In this digital evidence management system, there is potential for the damage and manipulation of digital evidence during the criminal investigation process, because the chain of custody cannot be maintained. Therefore, such evidence has not been used in court, because its reliability cannot be guaranteed [4]. To solve this problem, [5] proposed a system for storing and managing digital evidence in a reliable and transparent blockchain, wherein the digital evidence is encrypted and stored in the blockchain in the form of a hash, and all blocks refer to the hash of the previous block. In addition, because all of the nodes participating in the blockchain are connected like a chain in order to share digital evidence, it has the advantage of ensuring the transparency of digital evidence.
Table 1. Amount of digital evidence stored in South Korea as of 2020 [3].
However, because CCTV and EDRs have been proven to provide important evidence in recent criminal investigations, the necessity of safely managing digital crime evidence videos is also increasingly clear [6]. When large amounts of data, such as crime evidence videos, are stored in the blockchain, the amount of data that must be processed within one block increases when the transaction is confirmed and the block is created. Therefore, performance degrades in the blockchain system [7]. In this paper, to address this problem, we propose a two-level blockchain system consisting of hot and cold blockchains to efficiently manage the large amount of crime data considering the characteristics of criminal evidence. The criminal evidence is characterized by its use as evidence to ensure immutability. Blockchain systems for managing large amounts of data have been widely studied, such as hierarchical, multi-level, and on/off-chain blockchains. However, the existing hierarchical blockchain or multi-level blockchain is suitable for effectively managing the data of multiple terminals or nodes, such as IoT devices [8,9]. Moreover, there are some studies that combine on-chain and off-chain scaling. The on-chain consists of blockchains, but the off-chain is composed of external data, not blockchains, and so there is an oracle problem that requires verification every time [10]—that is, there has been no research on an efficient blockchain system that considers data usage. Thus, in this paper we divide the blockchain into two levels for retrieval and utilization, while maintaining security based on the Hyperledger Fabric framework—one of the consortium blockchains. Crime evidence data can be categorized into two types as frequently modified data: investigative information; and data for recording, such as videos. This system separates and stores crime evidence into hot evidence—which has been highly modified in each criminal investigation (e.g., investigation or identity information)—and cold evidence, which has not been modified (e.g., criminal evidence videos).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the Korean criminal investigation process for digital evidence management, and describes prior research on digital crime evidence video management. In addition, we introduce the basic concept of a blockchain, the Hyperledger Fabric framework for constructing blockchain systems, and techniques for storing digital crime evidence videos in a blockchain. Section 3 proposes the design and implementation of the two-level blockchain system, consisting of hot and cold blockchains for crime evidence video management. Section 4 shows performance experiments on the proposed two-level blockchain system, and Section 5 concludes the study and presents future work.

3. Two-Level Blockchain System for Digital Crime Evidence Management

3.1. Design of the Two-Level Blockchain System

Our proposed two-level blockchain system for efficient crime evidence management consists of two layers, managed by hot and cold blockchains (Figure 3). In the hot blockchain, investigation and identity information with frequent transaction fluctuations throughout the criminal investigation process is stored, and the cold blockchain stores digital crime evidence videos that do not require modification after storage.
Figure 3. Two-level blockchain system.
Institutions corresponding to the national police agency, local police agency, cyber analysis team, prosecutor’s office, and courts—which are the peers in the channel—would form a consortium in order to participate in blockchain channels and share the identity and investigation information in the hot blockchain using the process shown in Table 2. When registering an identity, the authentication server issues a private key belonging to the national police agency peer to the on-site investigator. In Algorithm 1, the on-site investigator obtains the authority to access the hot blockchain through the issued private key, and can store the investigation and identity information. Users who do not have keys belonging to the national police agency peer cannot access or store data on a hot blockchain. The transactions delivered by the on-site investigator to the hot blockchain include ID, name, social security number, department, jurisdiction, date, investigation information, and evidence ID. In addition, only investigators with verified identities and those in the judicial system can transfer transactions to the chaincode. After the transaction has been delivered, a block containing the identity and investigation information is created through the chaincode, which is a predefined smart contract source code, and the transaction and block are distributed to all organizations participating in the blockchain.
Algorithm 1 Save and Search of Hot & Cold Blockchain
Input: Hot_Tx // Investigation and identity transaction
    Cold_Tx // Evidence video and identity transaction
    K // User Private key
output: Save Success or Failure
     Search Result of Hot_Tx and Cold_Tx
01 Hot_ledger [] ← NULL // Hot Blockchain Ledger
02 Cold_ledger [] ← NULL // Cold Blockchain Ledger
03 D [] ← List // User Digital Certificate
04 function Save(Hot_Tx, Cold_Tx, K)
05   I ← 0 // User index
06   V ← 0 // Valid flag
07   F ← 2 // Full flag
08   while D[I] do
09    if D[I] ∋ K && !is Empty(HoT_Tx)
10      V ← V + 1
11      Append(Hot_ledger [I], HoT_Tx)
12    end if
13    if D[I] ∋ K && !isEmpty(Cold_Tx)
14      V ← V + 1
15      Append(Cold_ledger[I], Cold_Tx)
16    end if
17    I ← I + 1
18    end while
19   while true do
20    if V = F return true
21    else return false
22    end if
23   end while
24 end function
25 function Search(HoT_Tx.ID and RNN, K)
26   I ← 0 // User index
27   R1 ← 0 // Hot_Tx
28   R2 ← 0 // Cold_Tx
29   while D[I] do
30    if D[I] ∋ K
31      if Hot_Tx[I].ID and RNN = Hot_Ledger[i].IDand RNN
32       R1 ← Hot_Ledger[I]
33      end if
34      if R1. EVI_ID = Cold_Ledger[I].EVI_ID
35       R2 ← Cold _Ledger[I]
36      end if
37     I ← I + 1
38   end while
39   return R1, R2
40 end function
Table 2. Process of the two-level blockchain system.
To manage digital crime evidence videos, we can access the cold blockchain using the key used to verify the identity of the police agency peer in the hot blockchain. After identity verification, the on-site investigator obtains the right to create and distribute blocks by storing the original digital crime evidence video in the cold blockchain. Then, frequent transactions during the investigation process can access the hot blockchain in order to request the identity and investigation information, as well as accessing the cold blockchain through the evidence ID in order to retrieve evidence. In addition, it is impossible to modify a digital crime evidence video that is not allowed to be modified. In this way, the data stored in the hot and cold blockchains are created in blocks and cannot be modified or deleted, and they are shared with all peers in the blockchain system, thus enhancing transparency and reliability.

3.2. Implementation

In the system proposed in this paper, we use Hyperledger Fabric, a blockchain construction framework, and Docker, a software virtualization framework, to implement the two-level blockchain. When managing a blockchain, a number of nodes are connected within the communication network in order to exchange data, so physical computers for each configured peer are required. To do this, a number of peers, authentication servers, orderers, and blockchain state databases are created as containers using Docker, and the blockchain infrastructure is maintained by mounting ledgers, blocks, transactions, and other components to the built container. In the two-level blockchain system, PKI-based encryption keys are issued and used as credentials, so that peers corresponding to the local police agency, cyber analysis team, prosecutor’s office, police agency, and courts can form a consortium and participate in the same channel. To enable the on-site investigator to store investigation and identity information and digital crime evidence videos in the hot and cold blockchains in the two-level blockchain system, the identity is registered in containerized peers and orderers. To this end, containerized peers participate in the channel to form a consortium, and an identity registration request is made to the authentication server using a PKI-based administrator digital certificate and private key. Figure 4 shows the result of requesting the authentication server to register an identity for each affiliated organization, and obtaining access to the two-level blockchain system in order to register the user identity to the peer of the hot and cold blockchain. We can confirm that the identities of the peers have been registered. Based on the registered identity shown in Figure 4, the authentication server issues the digital certificate and private key for each institution, and these are used for identity verification when accessing the hot and cold blockchains.
Figure 4. Identity registration by (a) institution, and (b) digital authentication issuance of the two-level blockchain system.
Subsequently, the verified on-site investigator can access the two-level blockchain and obtain the authority to store investigation and identity information, as well as crime evidence videos. The on-site investigator delivers the data to the peer of the national police agency to which he or she belongs, in order to store investigation and identity information and video clips of criminal evidence in the blockchain. At this time, the investigation and identity information are transferred to the hot blockchain, and the crime evidence video is transferred to the cold blockchain chaincode factor to execute the contract. Figure 5 shows the result of the on-site investigator delivering the investigation and identity information to the hot blockchain, executing the chaincode, and finally requesting and updating the transactions stored in the ledger and state database. In the transaction, investigation and identification information such as ID, name, social security number, department, jurisdiction, date, investigation information, and evidence ID are stored in the ledger. Storage in the chaincode of the investigation and identity information is identified by the registrant’s ID, digital certificate, and private key. When a field investigator requests a transaction, the chaincode is executed and registered in the ledger of the national police agency peer.
Figure 5. Save, update, and retrieve of the two-level blockchain system. (a) Saving the information of investigation and identity, (b) updating the information of investigation and identity, and (c) retrieving digital crime evidence videos.
The cold blockchain, which is a core part of the system proposed in this paper, is accessed using the same digital certificate and key used when requesting identity registration for the hot blockchain. Subsequently, the on-site investigator stores the crime evidence video by passing the digital crime evidence video and part of the identity information stored in the hot blockchain as chaincode factors of the cold blockchain. In the chaincode of the cold blockchain, the crime evidence video delivered by the on-site investigator is sequentially delivered, and the chaincode is executed. When investigation and identity information, along with crime evidence video transactions, are shared with all of the peers in the two-level blockchain, all of the nodes of each blockchain reach consensus to create a block. At this time, all peers participating in the channel share the same transaction and block. In contrast, if the two-level blockchain is accessed using an unregistered identity, the two-level blockchain system cannot verify the identifier, and the chaincode cannot be modified, as shown in Figure 6. Therefore, the records stored in each ledger cannot be changed, and blocks cannot be created.
Figure 6. Failure to access the two-level blockchain system using an unregistered identity.

4. Experimental Results and Analysis

4.1. Experimental Environment

The environment and system configuration for testing the performance of the two-level blockchain system are shown in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively, and Hyperledger Caliper was used to test the performance of digital crime evidence video, investigation and identity information, registration, and inquiry. Hyperledger Caliper is one of the Linux Foundation’s Hyperledger benchmarking projects. It is a framework that enables the performance of the blockchain to be tested. Results for a predefined use case can be derived to determine the performance of the blockchain [36].
Table 3. Experimental environment.
Table 4. System configuration of the two-level blockchain system for the experiments.
Hyperledger Caliper’s performance evaluation index supports tests on transaction read throughput, latency, CPU and memory use, and network I/O resource use. Components include the benchmark layer, interface and core layer, and adapter layer. The benchmark layer defines the backend blockchain network and tests arguments to measure performance, while the interface and core layers query the ledger status of the backend blockchain, invoke smart contracts, and generate performance measurement results in HTML format. The adapter layer measures the experiment by interacting with the blockchain and Caliper [37]. To measure the performance of the two-level system, the digital certificates and private keys of each peer and orderer are registered and issued by the authentication server, and the configuration information of the hot and cold blockchains is delivered to the adapter layer.
Next, to deliver multiple transactions to the blockchain and receive responses, a rate controller module is defined in order to deliver transactions at fixed intervals, designated as transactions per second (TPS). In addition, the calling code is implemented so that the experimental module, acting as a real client, can create and deliver transactions. The calling code consists of the Init, Run, and End functions. The Init function consists of a blockchain object and context, as well as user-defined arguments, and is called at the beginning of each experiment round. The Run function transfers crime evidence videos, investigations, and transactions of identity information to the system, while the End function is called at the end of each experiment round to initialize the corresponding function. At this time, all functions in each calling code are processed in an asynchronous manner in order to control response requests and delays occurring between nodes.

4.2. Experimental Results

To evaluate the performance of the two-level blockchain system, we evaluated the performance of the storage function and inquiry function of the hot and cold blockchains. To this end, crime evidence videos with capacities of 100 MB to 1 GB and 1 GB to 5 GB, which were selected only in the areas necessary for the facts of presumption, were stored and searched for on the cold blockchain. In the case of crime evidence videos to be stored in the cold blockchain, the capacity was increased in units of 100 MB from 100 MB to 1 GB, and in units of 1 GB from 1 GB to 5 GB, and the blocks were created by repeatedly submitting 100 transactions for each capacity.
In addition, for the identity and investigation information, for which transactions in the hot blockchain are frequently stored, the amount of data registered when investigating a criminal case in Korea was assumed to be 1 KB. The transmission rate was increased, and 100 transactions were repeatedly submitted in order to create a block. At that point, the TPS was measured by calculating the total number of transactions submitted, the time required, and the transaction processing delay time of the crime evidence videos, as well as identity and investigation information stored in each of the hot and cold blockchains.
The TPS is the number of transactions that can be processed in one second, and is a representative blockchain performance evaluation index that indicates how many contracts the corresponding blockchain system can process. The transaction processing delay time refers to the delay until a transaction is received and the chaincode is executed. This is used to measure the number of transactions processed per second. Transaction throughput per second calculates the number of transactions processed per second using the first transaction submission time and the last transaction submission time, which is the transaction time, the number of successful and unsuccessful submissions, and the transaction processing delay time.
Caliper’s rate control module can control the transaction submission rate, number of submissions, and performance calculations. Subsequently, if the experimental module acting as a client repeatedly submits each transaction, including crime evidence videos and identity and investigation information, to the hot and cold blockchains 100 times for 5 rounds, the two-level blockchain system will, upon request, execute the chaincode and create 500 blocks in the configured node. At this time, information such as the number of successful and unsuccessful transaction submissions, submission time, and response time is communicated with the adapter layer in real time during the series of processes from transaction request to block creation.
The experimental results shown in Figure 7 reveal that the storage function of the cold blockchain decreases by an average of 0.11 TPS when the capacity increases in steps of 100 MB, from 100 MB to 1 GB, while when the capacity increases in steps of 1 GB, the average decrease in TPS is 0.7. In addition, as shown in Figure 8, the query function performance of the cold blockchain decreased by an average of 1.4 TPS when the capacity increased from 100 MB to 1 GB in steps of 100 MB, and by an average of 6.8 TPS when increased in steps of 1 GB. This reflects the difference in the increase in capacity of 100 MB and 1 GB, and confirms that the difference in TPS as the actual uniform capacity increases can be predicted for the target capacity.
Figure 7. Results of crime evidence video storing performance (a) per MB, and (b) per GB in the cold blockchain system.
Figure 8. Results of crime evidence video retrieval performance (a) per MB, and (b) per GB in the cold blockchain system.
According to the experimental results for the hot blockchain, the storage function increases in steps of 100 TPS, from 100 TPS to 500 TPS, as shown in Figure 9, and as the transmission rate increases, the TPS decreases by 3.82 TPS. The inquiry function was also tested in steps of 100 TPS units, from 100 TPS to 500 TPS. As the transfer rate increased, the TPS increased by 79.8 TPS. The query function of the hot and cold blockchains accesses the ledger and state database of the blockchain and only performs a read, so it does not execute a chaincode or create a block. Accordingly, it can be seen that the inquiry function has a higher processing speed than the storage function. In contrast, the storage function of the hot and cold blockchains, which directly generates storage for crime evidence videos and identity and investigation information as blocks in the ledger, is different from the inquiry function, which searches for data stored in the ledger and state database. The storage function of the hot and cold blockchains starts a transaction when a crime evidence video and identity and investigation information are submitted to each blockchain, and if there is no abnormality after verifying the result value of the peer and the digital certificate and private key, the transaction is collected, and blocks are generated. It can be confirmed that the TPS is lower than that of the inquiry function by performing the generation process.
Figure 9. Results of (a) saving and (b) selecting the performance of identity and investigation information in the hot blockchain by send rate.
Currently, the typical blockchain systems, Bitcoin and Ethereum, operate at 7 TPS and 20 TPS, respectively, for cryptocurrency transactions for an unspecified number of people. This is numerically superior to the performance of the proposed two-level blockchain system. However, because of the nature of a crime evidence management system, this system can provide similar performance to Bitcoin while storing frequent transactions and large amounts of data separately if the blockchain is accessed by a limited number of users. In addition, because of the technical characteristics of a blockchain, the original crime evidence video can be safely stored and managed inside the blockchain.

5. Conclusions and Future Work

The digital crime evidence data obtained during the investigation of a criminal case is transmitted and managed on a physical hard disk until it is analyzed and submitted to the court, and there is a risk that it can be damaged or manipulated by an attack. Therefore, digital crime evidence videos that were difficult to obtain and analyze are not adopted as court evidence, because the continuity of storage cannot be guaranteed. Criminal evidence data are not modified once stored, but investigation information is frequently modified. In this paper, we proposed a two-level blockchain system to increase the integrity of digital crime evidence, so as to efficiently manage criminal evidence. In the proposed system, only authorized participants can access the hot and cold blockchains, in a decentralized environment to separate, store, and share the original information of the investigation, identity information, and digital crime evidence videos. The two-level blockchain system stores the investigation and identity information, as well as digital crime evidence videos, by on-site investigators with verified identities. In addition, by separating data into two blockchains, the same transaction can be stored in the ledgers of all institutions participating in the channel, and the same block can be generated by executing a smart contract. Investigation and identity information, as well as digital crime evidence videos, once created in blocks, cannot be deleted by any user. In addition, because the block is shared with all institutions in the two-level blockchain system, transparency and reliability are enhanced.
We also evaluated the performance of the proposed system. According to the experimental results, when the storage performance of the cold blockchain increased from 100 MB to 1 GB in units of 100 MB, the average performance decreased by 0.11 TPS. In addition, it was confirmed that when the capacity increased by 1 GB from 1 GB to 5 GB, the decrease was 0.7 TPS on average. The query performance of the cold blockchain had an average decrease of 1.4 TPS when increasing in steps of 100 MB, from 100 MB to 1 GB, and an average decrease of 6.8 TPS when increasing in steps of 1 GB.
In addition, the experimental results of the hot blockchain revealed that the storage function decreased the TPS by 3.82 when the transmission rate increased from 100 TPS to 500 TPS in units of 100 TPS, and the inquiry performance increased by 79.8 TPS. This is the difference according to the capacity width of the digital crime evidence video used in the experiment, and the transmission rate of the identity and investigation information, and it was confirmed that the actual uniform capacity and the TPS according to the increase in transmission rate were predictable.
The proposed system is suitable for a system that can search while storing data with large files for recording, and ensure the integrity of the data. It can be applied to other applications considering data with similar characteristics, but there is a limitation in applying it to various applications in general. Additionally, for the two-level blockchain system to be used as an actual digital evidence management system, further performance improvements will be required. To this end, as future work, we must first perform an experiment to show the effect of the number of peers in the network. We also intend to research a two-level blockchain system that can respond to high transaction transmission speeds. We also plan to lower the code complexity within the cold blockchain. In the future, it is expected that the proposed two-level blockchain system will contribute to lowering the threat that exists in the transmission and management of digital evidence in Korea, and increasing reliability as a result.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, Y.S., D.K.; methodology, Y.S., D.K.; software, D.K.; writing—original draft preparation, D.K., S.-Y.I.; writing—review and editing, Y.S., S.-Y.I.; supervision, Y.S.; project administration, Y.S.; funding acquisition, Y.S.; D.K., S.-Y.I. contributed equally to this work. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

The research was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant by the Korean government (MSIT) (No.2018R1A5A7023490). This research was supported by the MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT), Korea, under the ITRC (Information Technology Research Center) support program (IITP-2021-2020-0-01789) supervised by the IITP (Institute for Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation).

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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