Duopoly Price Competition in Wireless Sensor Network-Based Service Provision
1
School of Information Engineering, Suzhou University, Suzhou 234000, China
2
Global Information and Telecommunication Institute, Waseda University, Tokyo 169-0051, Japan
3
School of Computer Science, Shenyang Aerospace University, Shenyang 110136, China
4
School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
5
School of Intelligent Systems Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
6
Fujian Provincial Key Laboratory of Information Processing and Intelligent Control, Minjiang University, Fuzhou 350108, China
7
School of Environment and Geomatics Engineering, Suzhou University, Suzhou 234000, China
*
Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
†
These authors contributed equally to this work.
Sensors 2018, 18(12), 4422; https://doi.org/10.3390/s18124422
Received: 26 October 2018
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Revised: 22 November 2018
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Accepted: 27 November 2018
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Published: 14 December 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Software-Defined Networking Based Mobile Networks)
The Internet of Things (IoT) is emerging as a new communication paradigm and has attracted a significant amount of attention from both academic and engineering communities. In this paper, we consider an IoT market where three roles exist: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), two service providers (SPs) and end users. The WSNs are responsible for sensing and providing data to the two SPs. Based on the sensed data from WSNs, the two SPs compete to provide services to the end users. We model the relationship between the two SPs and end users as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the two SPs set the prices for their services firstly, and then the end users decide which SP to choose. Specifically, we consider two price-competition scenarios of the two SPs, which are engaged in two games, one is a noncooperative strategic game (NSG) where the two SPs set the prices for services simultaneously, the other is a Stackelberg game (SG) where SP1 who sets the price first is the leader and SP2 who sets the price after is the follower. Each user decides whether and which SP to purchase services from based on prices and service rates. An equilibrium is achieved in each of the two scenarios. Numerical results are conducted to verify our theoretical analysis.
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MDPI and ACS Style
Li, X.; Zhao, L.; Zhou, Z.; Gu, B.; Chen, G.; Cheng, F.; Zhang, H. Duopoly Price Competition in Wireless Sensor Network-Based Service Provision. Sensors 2018, 18, 4422. https://doi.org/10.3390/s18124422
AMA Style
Li X, Zhao L, Zhou Z, Gu B, Chen G, Cheng F, Zhang H. Duopoly Price Competition in Wireless Sensor Network-Based Service Provision. Sensors. 2018; 18(12):4422. https://doi.org/10.3390/s18124422
Chicago/Turabian StyleLi, Xianwei, Liang Zhao, Zhenyu Zhou, Bo Gu, Guolong Chen, Fanyong Cheng, and Haiyang Zhang. 2018. "Duopoly Price Competition in Wireless Sensor Network-Based Service Provision" Sensors 18, no. 12: 4422. https://doi.org/10.3390/s18124422
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