# Beyond Causal Explanation: Einstein’s Principle Not Reichenbach’s

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## Abstract

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## 1. Introduction

Thus, if relational QM is true, there are no such things as beables so defined. We will return to such questions in the Discussion and Postscript wherein we will take up the topic of contextuality and realism more explicitly. Therein, we will explain why our principle account of QM is a realist, psi-epistemic account, as well as our take on beables, etc.For RQM (relational quantum mechanics), the lesson of quantum theory is that the description of the way distinct physical systems affect each other when they interact (and not the way physical systems ‘are’) exhausts all that can be said about the physical world. The physical world must be described as a net of interacting components, where there is no meaning to ‘the state of an isolated system’, or the value of the variables of an isolated system. The state of a physical system is the net of the relations it entertains with the surrounding systems. The physical structure of the world is identified as this net of relationships.

Retrocausality renders Kochen-Specker-type contextuality potentially explainable as a form of “causal contextuality”. If there is a backward-directed influence of the chosen measurement setting (and context) on the pre-measurement ontic state, it is no longer to be expected that the measurement process is simply uncovering an independently existing definite value for some property of the system, rather the measurement process can play a causal role in bringing about such values (the measurement process is retrocausal rather than retrodictive). Indeed, one might argue contextuality of measured values is just what one might expect when admitting retrocausal influences. As Wharton (2014: 203) puts it, “Kochen-Specker contextuality is the failure of the Independence Assumption”, i.e., the failure of measurement independence.

Two of the more significant assumptions are (i) the causal Markov condition, which ensures that every statistical dependence in the data results in a causal dependence in the model—essentially a formalization of Reichenbach’s common cause principle—and (ii) faithfulness, which ensures that every statistical independence implies a causal independence, or no causal independence is the result of a fine-tuning of the model.

We would say that even if interventionist and causal modelling accounts of causation could be applied to EPR correlations with nothing like the preceding concerns, there is still little reason to find such explanations deeply satisfying. Is there really no more fundamental and objective, God’s-eye explanation for EPR correlations that transcends and subsumes perspectival causation? Such interventionist explanations strike us as too cheap and easy, and not very deep from the perspective of fundamental physics.It has long been recognized (Butterfield 1992; Hausman 1999; Hausman and Woodward 1999) that quantum correlations force one to give up at least one of the assumptions usually made in the causal modeling framework. Wood and Spekkens (2015) argue that any causal model purporting to causally explain the observed quantum correlations must be fine-tuned (i.e., must violate the faithfulness assumption). More precisely, according to them, since the observed statistical independences in an entangled bipartite quantum system imply no signalling between the parties, when it is then assumed that every statistical independence implies a causal independence (which is what faithfulness dictates), it must be inferred that there can be no (direct or mediated) causal link between the parties. Since there is an observed statistical dependence between the outcomes of measurements on the bipartite system, we can no longer account for this dependence with a causal link unless this link is fine tuned to ensure that the no-signalling independences still hold. There is thus a fundamental tension between the observed quantum correlations and the no-signalling requirement, the faithfulness assumption and the possibility of a causal explanation.

- Assumption 1 (Absoluteness of Observed Events-AOE): An observed event is a real single event, and not relative to anything or anyone (realism and non-contextuality).
- Assumption 2 (No-Superdeterminism-NSD): Any set of events on a space-like hypersurface is uncorrelated with any set of freely chosen actions subsequent to that space-like hypersurface.
- Assumption 3 (Locality-L): The probability of an observable event e is unchanged by conditioning on a space- like-separated free choice z, even if it is already conditioned on other events not in the future light-cone of z.
- Assumption 4 (The completeness of QM-COMP): QM unmodified applies to any and all macroscopic measuring devices including human observers.

We share their sentiment, but even leading retrocausalists Price and Wharton are committed to causal explanations of EPR correlations of either the causal processes account or the interventionist/perspectivalist account [1].In putting future and past on an equal footing, this kind of approach is different in spirit from (and quite possibly formally incompatible with) a more familiar style of physics: one in which the past continually generates the future, like a computer running through the steps in an algorithm. However, our usual preference for the computer-like model may simply reflect an anthropocentric bias. It is a good model for creatures like us, who acquire knowledge sequentially, past to future, and hence find it useful to update their predictions in the same way. But there is no guarantee that the principles on which the universe is constructed are of the sort that happens to be useful to creatures in our particular situation. Physics has certainly overcome such biases before—the Earth isn’t the center of the universe, our sun is just one of many, there is no preferred frame of reference. Now, perhaps there’s one further anthropocentric attitude that needs to go: the idea that the universe is as “in the dark” about the future as we are ourselves.

The account is a retrocausal picture based on Hamilton’s principle and the symmetric constraint of both initial and final boundary conditions to construct equations of motion from a Lagrangian, and is a natural setting for a perspectival interventionist account of causality. Wharton treats external measurements as physical constraints imposed on a system in the same way that boundary constraints are imposed on the action integral of Hamilton’s principle; the final measurement does not simply reveal preexisting values of the parameters, but constrains those values (just as the initial boundary condition would). Wharton’s model has been described as an “all-at-once” approach, since the dynamics of physical systems between an initial and final boundary emerges en bloc as the solution to a two-time boundary value problem.

While Wharton’s “all-at-once” or “Lagrangian” model goes some way toward relinquishing said bias, as noted above, it still falls within the causal processes account and the interventionist/perspectivalist account of causal explanation. After all, one goal of Wharton’s retrocausal Lagrangian method is to “fill in” the classical field between initial (source) and final boundary conditions (detector). The Lagrangian method begins describing the space of possible space-time trajectories of the system between two boundary conditions, and then a least action principle such as the path of least time—a global constraint—is used to fix which of these trajectories is actual. More recently Wharton has focused on constructing ignorance-based interpretations of the path integral formalism [15]. The bottom line is that Reichenbach’s Principle is still the “axiom of choice” even when it comes to “all-at-once” or “Lagrangian” models of EPR correlations.On this interpretation, one considers reality exclusively between two temporal boundaries as being described by a classical field $\varphi $ that is a solution to the Klein-Gordon equation: specification of field values at both an initial and final boundary (as opposed to field values and their rate of change at only the initial boundary) constrains the field solutions between the boundaries.

The idea is to give up the search for forward-acting and backward- acting dynamical laws that can somehow “fit together” in a consistent way to yield quantum phenomena. Rather, we derive quantum phenomena directly from a global constraint, without any appeal to the dynamical evolution of particle properties or wave functions.

But the way is not altogether clear. Classical adynamical techniques, such as least-action calculations, output a determinate trajectory between two points. But quantum adynamical techniques, such as Feynman’s path-integral calculation, output a probability value based on a sum over all possible trajectories between the two points. Which trajectory does the particle take? And what does the probability represent?

Take the following even more telling reaction to our book [31] (p. 344):Silberstein, Stuckey and McDevitt take this situation to point to direct action between the source and the detector: But what of the probability? A global constraint that rules out non-parabolic baseball trajectories is easy to comprehend. But it is harder to figure out how to understand a probabilistic global constraint. What is constrained, exactly? The frequency of this kind of event?

In the preceding passage, Allori beautifully expresses the aforementioned recalcitrance of the dynamical and causal explanatory bias. However, more importantly, Allori suggests another way to conceive of our project in terms of providing a principle versus constructive account of QM generally and EPR correlations specifically. This is precisely what we have done in recent subsequent work [32,33,34], and we will expand upon those results herein.I am not sold that the adynamical picture is truly explanatory. Philosophers of science have proposed objective accounts of explanation, but they all recognize there’s a strong sense in which explanation is ‘explanation for us,’ and any account should capture our intuition that explanation is fundamentally dynamical. This is connected with causation: intuitively, we explain an event because we find its causes; causes happen before their effects and ‘bring them about.’ An empiricist will be skeptical of causation, like presumably SSM. However, as is well known, one can dispense of causation and propose models of explanations in which laws of nature and unification of phenomena play an important role. Should I think of SSM’s adynamical view in this sense? Or should I connect their view with the distinction between constructive and principle theories, proposed by Einstein (1919)? According to Einstein, principle theories (like thermodynamics) are formulated in terms of principles that systematize the phenomena; so that one has explained an event if it follows from the principles. In contrast, in a constructive theory (as kinetic theory) a phenomenon is explained when it fits into the ‘mechanical’ model of the theory. Should I understand SSM’s view as a principle theory? (But if so, which are the principles?).

## 2. Principle Versus Constructive Explanation

We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics. Most of them are constructive. They attempt to build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they start out. [Statistical mechanics is an example.]...

Along with this most important class of theories there exists a second, which I will call “principle-theories.” These employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements which form their basis and starting point are not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy. [Thermodynamics is an example.]...

Concerning his decision to produce a principle theory instead of a constructive theory of SR, Einstein writes [37] (pp. 51–52):The advantages of the constructive theory are completeness, adaptability, and clearness, those of the principle theory are logical perfection and security of the foundations. The theory of relativity belongs to the latter class.

That is, “there is no mention in relativity of exactly how clocks slow, or why meter sticks shrink” (no “constructive efforts”), nonetheless the principles of SR are so compelling that “physicists always seem so sure about the particular theory of Special Relativity, when so many others have been superseded in the meantime” [38].By and by I despaired of the possibility of discovering the true laws by means of constructive efforts based on known facts. The longer and the more despairingly I tried, the more I came to the conviction that only the discovery of a universal formal principle could lead us to assured results.

Fuchs writes [41] (p. 285):So, my conclusion is that we need to back off from our models, postpone conjectures about constituents, and begin talking about principles.

And, Hardy writes [42]:Compare [quantum mechanics] to one of our other great physical theories, special relativity. One could make the statement of it in terms of some very crisp and clear physical principles: The speed of light is constant in all inertial frames, and the laws of physics are the same in all inertial frames. And it struck me that if we couldn’t take the structure of quantum theory and change it from this very overt mathematical speak..., then the debate would go on forever and ever. And it seemed like a worthwhile exercise to try to reduce the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics to some crisp physical statements.

The standard axioms of [quantum theory] are rather ad hoc. Where does this structure come from? Can we write down natural axioms, principles, laws, or postulates from which we can derive this structure? Compare with the Lorentz transformations and Einstein’s two postulates for special relativity. Or compare with Kepler’s Laws and Newton’s Laws. The standard axioms of quantum theory look rather ad hoc like the Lorentz transformations or Kepler’s laws. Can we find a natural set of postulates for quantum theory that are akin to Einstein’s or Newton’s laws?

The vast majority of attempts to find physical principles behind quantum theory either fail to single out the theory uniquely or are based on highly abstract mathematical assumptions without an immediate physical meaning (e.g., [18]). ...

While [the instrumentalist] reconstructions are based on a short set of simple axioms, they still partially use mathematical language in their formulation. ...

Another problem with the reconstructions of QIT is noted by Van Camp [44]:It is clear from the previous discussion that the question on basis of which physical principles quantum theory can be separated from the multitude of possible generalized probability theories is still open.

Moreover, Fuchs quotes Wheeler, “If one really understood the central point and its necessity in the construction of the world, one ought to state it in one clear, simple sentence” [41] (p. 302). Asked if he had such a sentence, Fuchs responded, “No, that’s my big failure at this point” [41] (p. 302). Herein, we answer the desideratum of QIT explicitly by showing how the relativity principle, aka “no preferred reference frame” (NPRF), is the physical principle corresponding to the reconstructions of QM, just as it is for the Lorentz transformations of SR.However, nothing additional has been shown to be incorporated into an information-theoretic reformulation of QM beyond what is contained in QM itself. It is hard to see how it could offer more unification of the phenomena than QM already does since they are equivalent, and so it is not offering any explanatory value on this front.

- The principle explanation on offer is compatible with a number of different constructive interpretations of QM and will not be nullified or made redundant by any of them, just as with SR and thermodynamics. Thus, the principle explanation on offer is fundamental in the sense that it is more general, universal and autonomous than any particular constructive explanation or interpretation.
- As with the case of SR, the principle explanation on offer suggests the possibility that there will never be and need never be, any constructive theory to underwrite it or subsume it. Dynamical and causal bias aside, there is no reason to rule out this possibility a priori, and SR looks to be such a case already. Thus, the principle explanation herein would be fundamental in the sense that it does not even in principle reduce to some constructive theory or explanation.

If statistical mechanics is the paradigm example of constructive explanation, then it is hard to imagine Einstein would approve of any mainstream interpretations of QM.The interpretive work that must be done is less in coming up with a constructive theory and thereby explaining puzzling quantum phenomena, but more in explaining why the interpretation counts as explanatory at all given that it must sacrifice some key aspect of the traditional understanding of causal-mechanical explanation.

But as a mere analogy, it lacks explanatory power. Herein we complete their explanatory project by showing why both aspects of their analogy follow from a common principle, NPRF.Hilbert space as a projective geometry (i.e., the subspace structure of Hilbert space) represents the structure of the space of possibilities and determines the kinematic part of quantum mechanics. ... The possibility space is a non-Boolean space in which there are built-in, structural probabilistic constraints on correlations between events (associated with the angles between the rays representing extremal events) – just as in special relativity the geometry of Minkowski space-time represents spatio-temporal constraints on events. These are kinematic, i.e., pre-dynamic, objective probabilistic or information-theoretic constraints on events to which a quantum dynamics of matter and fields conforms, through its symmetries, just as the structure of Minkowski space-time imposes spatio-temporal kinematic constraints on events to which a relativistic dynamics conforms.

## 3. QM from NPRF Whence Bell State Entanglement

So, we have answered Lewis’ question cited earlier, “What does the probability represent?” [30] (p. 188). Of course, these “average-only” results due to “no fractional outcomes per NPRF” hold precisely for the qubit Hilbert space structure of QM.Quantum mechanics is, after all, the first physical theory in which probability is explicitly not a way of dealing with ignorance of the precise values of existing quantities.

#### 3.1. The Bell Spin States

#### 3.2. NPRF and the Bell State Correlation Function

## 4. Discussion

Obviously QM (non-relativistic quantum mechanics) is not Lorentz invariant, so it certainly differs from SR in that regard. QM follows from Lorentz invariant quantum field theory only in the low energy approximation [70] (p. 173). However, claiming that SR and QM are somehow at odds based on quantum entanglement has empirical consequences, because we have experimental evidence verifying the violation of the Bell inequality in accord with quantum entanglement. Thus, if the violation of the Bell inequality is problematic for SR, then SR is being empirically challenged in some sense, hence Bell’s unease.Quantum mechanics, which does not allow us to transmit signals faster than light, preserves relativistic causality. But quantum mechanics does not always allow us to consider distant systems as separate, as Einstein assumed. The failure of Einstein separability violates, not the letter, but the spirit of special relativity, and left many physicists (including Bell) deeply unsettled.

And, Albert Michelson said [74]:Einstein simply postulates what we have deduced, with some difficulty and not altogether satisfactorily, from the fundamental equations of the electromagnetic field.

In other words, neither was convinced that NPRF was sufficient to explain time dilation and Lorentz contraction. More recently Brown has made a similar claim [46] (p. 76):It must be admitted, these experiments are not sufficient to justify the hypothesis of an ether. But then, how can the negative result be explained?

In other words, the assumption is that the true or fundamental “explanation” of EPR correlations must be a constructive one in the sense of adverting to causal processes or causal mechanisms. Apparently for people with such a Reichenbachian or constructive mind-set, any principle explanation must be accounted for by some such story, e.g., the luminiferous ether. Indeed, contrary to all accepted physics, Brown and Pooley [46] have recently called for such a constructive explanation even in SR. Brown and Pooley like to make this a debate about constructive versus “geometric” explanation. They believe that the principle explanation of Lorentz contractions in SR is underwritten only by the geometry of Minkowski spacetime.What has been shown is that rods and clocks must behave in quite particular ways in order for the two postulates to be true together. But this hardly amounts to an explanation of such behaviour. Rather things go the other way around. It is because rods and clocks behave as they do, in a way that is consistent with the relativity principle, that light is measured to have the same speed in each inertial frame.

Thus, 85 years after the publication of the EPR paper without a consensus constructive or causal account of EPR correlations, perhaps it is time to consider the possibility that physicists will eventually likewise stop looking for constructive accounts of EPR correlations. After all, we now know that the widely accepted relativity principle is precisely the principle that resolves a plethora of QM mysteries. And, as Pauli once stated [75] (p. 33):By doing so, [Einstein] may certainly take credit for making us see in the negative result of experiments like those of Michelson, Rayleigh, and Brace, not a fortuitous compensation of opposing effects but the manifestation of a general and fundamental principle.

One could hardly ask for a “simple common principle” or “one clear, simple sentence” more compelling than “no preferred reference frame” to convey “the central point and its necessity in the construction of the world.” Perhaps causal accounts of quantum entanglement and quantum contextuality are destined to share the same fate as theories of the luminiferous ether. Perhaps this principle account will finally cause us to let go of the Reichenbachian past, and go back to the future with Einstein’s insights about principle explanation.‘Understanding’ nature surely means taking a close look at its connections, being certain of its inner workings. Such knowledge cannot be gained by understanding an isolated phenomenon or a single group of phenomena, even if one discovers some order in them. It comes from the recognition that a wealth of experiential facts are interconnected and can therefore be reduced to a common principle. In that case, certainty rests precisely on this wealth of facts. The danger of making mistakes is the smaller, the richer and more complex the phenomena are, and the simpler is the common principle to which they can all be brought back. ... ‘Understanding’ probably means nothing more than having whatever ideas and concepts are needed to recognize that a great many different phenomena are part of a coherent whole. [Italics ours.]

**Postscript**

## Author Contributions

## Funding

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## Informed Consent Statement

## Data Availability Statement

## Conflicts of Interest

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**Figure 1.**A pair of Stern–Gerlach (SG) spin measurements each showing the two possible outcomes, up ($+\frac{\hslash}{2}$) and down ($-\frac{\hslash}{2}$) or $+1$ and $-1$, for short. In this set up, the first SG magnets (oriented at $\widehat{z}$) are being used to produce an initial state $|\psi \rangle =|u\rangle $ for measurement by the second SG magnets (oriented at $\widehat{b}$). An important point to note here is that the classical analysis predicts all possible deflections between the target points on the detector, not just the two that are observed. The difference between the classical prediction and the quantum reality uniquely distinguishes the quantum joint distribution from the classical joint distribution for the Bell spin states [50].

**Figure 2.**The spin angular momentum of Bob’s particle $\overrightarrow{S}$ projected along his measurement direction $\widehat{b}$. This does not happen with spin angular momentum due to no preferred reference frame (NPRF).

**Figure 3.**A spatiotemporal ensemble of 8 SG measurement trials. The blue arrows depict SG magnet orientations and the yellow dots represent the two possible measurement outcomes for each trial, up (located at arrow tip) or down (located at bottom of arrow). The vertical arrow can represent an initial state $|\psi \rangle =|u\rangle $ in which case the other arrow represents an SG measurement at $\theta ={60}^{\circ}$ of $|\psi \rangle $. In that case, we see that the average of the $\pm 1$ outcomes equals the projection of the initial spin angular momentum vector $\overrightarrow{S}=+1\widehat{z}$ in the measurement direction $\widehat{b}$, i.e., $\overrightarrow{S}\xb7\widehat{b}=cos\left({60}^{\circ}\right)=\frac{1}{2}$. The figure can also depict two SG measurements of a spin triplet state showing Bob’s(Alice’s) outcomes corresponding to Alice’s(Bob’s) $+1$ outcomes when $\theta ={60}^{\circ}$. For the triplet state measurements, spin angular momentum is not conserved in any given trial, because there are two different measurements being made, i.e., outcomes are in two different reference frames, but it is conserved on average for all 8 trials (six up outcomes and two down outcomes average to $cos\left({60}^{\circ}\right)=\frac{1}{2}$). It is impossible for spin angular momentum to be conserved explicitly in each trial since the measurement outcomes are binary (quantum) with values of $+1$ (up) or $-1$ (down) per NPRF. The “SO(3) conservation” at work here does not assume Alice and Bob’s measured values of spin angular momentum are mere components of some hidden angular momentum (Figure 2). That is, the measured values of spin angular momentum are the angular momenta contributing to this “SO(3) conservation.”

**Figure 4.**Alice and Bob making spin measurements on a pair of spin-entangled particles with their Stern–Gerlach (SG) magnets and detectors.

**Figure 5.**

**Average View for the Spin Singlet State**. Reading from left to right, as Bob rotates his SG magnets relative to Alice’s SG magnets for her $+1$ outcome, the average value of his outcome varies from $-1$ (totally down, arrow bottom) to 0 to +1 (totally up, arrow tip). This obtains per conservation of spin angular momentum on average in accord with NPRF. Bob can say exactly the same about Alice’s outcomes as she rotates her SG magnets relative to his SG magnets for his $+1$ outcome. That is, their outcomes can only satisfy conservation of spin angular momentum on average in different reference frames, because they only measure $\pm 1$, never a fractional result. Thus, just as NPRF in SR leads to a principle explanation of time dilation and Lorentz contraction, we see that NPRF in quantum mechanics (QM) requires quantum outcomes $\pm 1\left(\frac{\hslash}{2}\right)$ for all measurements leading to a principle explanation of Bell state entanglement.

**Figure 6.**

**Average View for the Spin Triplet States**. Reading from the left, as Bob(Alice) rotates his(her) SG magnets relative to Alice’s(Bob’s) SG magnets for her(his) $+1$ outcome, the average value of his(her) outcome varies from $+1$ (totally up, arrow tip) to 0 to $-1$ (totally down, arrow bottom).

**Table 1.**

**Joint probabilities for Alice and Bob’s outcome pairs for the entangled particle experiment in Figure 4.**The table is symmetric due to NPRF.

Bob | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|

+1 | −1 | Total | ||

Alice | +1 | P(+1,+1 $\mid \theta $) | P(+1,−1 $\mid \theta $) | 1/2 |

−1 | P(+1,−1 $\mid \theta $) | P(−1,−1 $\mid \theta $) | 1/2 | |

Total | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1 |

**Table 2.**

**Comparing special relativity with quantum mechanics according to no preferred reference frame (NPRF)**. Because Alice and Bob both measure the same speed of light c, regardless of their motion relative to the source per NPRF, Alice (Bob) may claim that Bob’s (Alice’s) length and time measurements are erroneous and need to be corrected (Lorentz contraction and time dilation). Likewise, because Alice and Bob both measure the same values for spin angular momentum $\pm 1$$\left(\frac{\hslash}{2}\right)$, regardless of their SG magnet orientation relative to the source per NPRF, Alice (Bob) may claim that Bob’s (Alice’s) individual $\pm 1$ values are erroneous and need to be corrected (averaged, Figure 3, Figure 5 and Figure 6). In both cases, NPRF resolves the mystery it creates. In SR, the apparently inconsistent results can be reconciled via the relativity of simultaneity. That is, Alice and Bob each partition spacetime per their own equivalence relations (per their own reference frames), so that equivalence classes are their own surfaces of simultaneity and these partitions are equally valid per NPRF. This is completely analogous to QM, where the apparently inconsistent results per the Bell spin states arising because of NPRF can be reconciled by NPRF via the “relativity of data partition.” That is, Alice and Bob each partition the data per their own equivalence relations (per their own reference frames), so that equivalence classes are their own $+1$ and $-1$ data events and these partitions are equally valid per NPRF.

Special Relativity | Quantum Mechanics |
---|---|

Empirical Fact: Alice and Bob both measure c, | Empirical Fact: Alice and Bob both measure $\pm 1\left(\frac{\hslash}{2}\right)$, |

regardless of their motion relative to the source | regardless of their SG orientation relative to the source |

Alice(Bob) says of Bob(Alice): Must correct his(her) | Alice(Bob) says of Bob(Alice): Must average his(her) |

length and time measurements | $\pm 1$ outcomes for projection/conservation |

NPRF: Relativity of simultaneity | NPRF: Relativity of data partition |

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**MDPI and ACS Style**

Silberstein, M.; Stuckey, W.M.; McDevitt, T.
Beyond Causal Explanation: Einstein’s Principle Not Reichenbach’s. *Entropy* **2021**, *23*, 114.
https://doi.org/10.3390/e23010114

**AMA Style**

Silberstein M, Stuckey WM, McDevitt T.
Beyond Causal Explanation: Einstein’s Principle Not Reichenbach’s. *Entropy*. 2021; 23(1):114.
https://doi.org/10.3390/e23010114

**Chicago/Turabian Style**

Silberstein, Michael, William Mark Stuckey, and Timothy McDevitt.
2021. "Beyond Causal Explanation: Einstein’s Principle Not Reichenbach’s" *Entropy* 23, no. 1: 114.
https://doi.org/10.3390/e23010114