Search Results (133)

Given the continued relevance of perceived scarcity, understanding how a scarcity mindset influences human cooperation remains critical. However, previous research has yielded mixed results regarding this relationship. To clarify these inconsistencies, this study examined the impact of a scarcity mindset on cooperation within various social normative contexts. Participants were randomly assigned to either a scarcity or abundance mindset and engaged in a Public Goods Game under descriptive or injunctive normative conditions, each with high or low prosocial expectations. The results revealed that in both normative contexts, individuals with a scarcity mindset exhibited greater cooperation than those with an abundance mindset. Individuals also cooperated more under high prosocial norms compared to low ones. Importantly, the interaction effect revealed that while cooperation did not differ between the two mindsets under low prosocial norms, the scarcity mindset led to significantly greater cooperation under high prosocial norms. These findings provide new insights into the scarcity–cooperation dynamic and suggest that robust prosocial norms can amplify the cooperative tendencies associated with a scarcity mindset, highlighting the importance of leveraging social norms to enhance cooperation in resource-scarce situations. Full article

Human cooperation is ubiquitous and instinctive. We are among the most cooperative species on Earth. Still, research mostly focuses on why we cooperate, instead of understanding why some of us do not do so. The public goods game can be used to map human cooperation as well as to study free riding. We acquired data through an online, unincentivized questionnaire which prompted respondents to choose how much of an initial endowment to contribute to a common pool. The respondents contributed, on average, 54% of their initial endowment to the common pool. The usual categorization scheme of the elicited conditional contribution pattern discerns unconditional free riders who do not contribute irrespective of the contributions of others and calls everyone a conditional cooperator who correlates their contribution with that of the others. However, someone consistently offering less than the others should not be called a cooperator. Consequently, based on the conditional contribution patterns among our respondents, we suggest a recategorization of contribution patterns into the following categories: unconditional cooperator (1.5%), unconditional free rider (10.6%), perfect conditional cooperator (42.6%), hump-shaped contributor (0.7%), V-shaped contributor (0.4%), conditional cooperator (16.6%), conditional free rider (13.6%), conditional contributor (6.4%), negative conditional contributor (0%), and others (7.6%). We only call someone a cooperator if the respondent at least matches others’ contribution, and call everyone consistently offering less a free rider. Furthermore, we found no difference between the contributions of women and men. No correlation of contribution with age, educational attainment, and size of the residential settlement was found. Students’ contributions were not different from non-students’ contributions. We found a significant correlation of the contribution to the common pool with hypercompetitive orientation (negative correlation) and the self-assessed willingness to take risks in general (positive correlation). Full article

Media content is an important privately supplied public good. While it has been shown that contributions to a public good crowd out other contributions in many cases, the issue has not been thoroughly studied for media markets yet. We show that in a standard model of commercial media bias, qualities of media content are strategic complements, whereby investments into quality can crowd in further investments and engage competitors in a race to the top. Therefore, financially strong public service media can mitigate commercial media bias: the content of commercial media can be more in line with the preferences of the audience and less advertiser-friendly in a dual (mixed public and commercial) media system than in a purely commercial media market. Full article

We experimentally study how leadership selection mechanisms affect public goods provision. Introducing leadership does not raise contribution. Voluntary leadership performs the worst, primarily because the absence of leadership signals uncooperative play, and candidates free-ride on other leaders. Voluntary leadership from a randomly selected candidate is a promising endogenous leadership selection mechanism, primarily because assuming leadership by revealed preference signals cooperative play, the absence of leadership leaves the possibility of unlucky cooperative candidates, and sole leadership removes the leader’s free-riding incentives. Full article

Obtaining significant levels of cooperation in public goods and environmental games, under the assumption of players being purely selfish, is usually prevented by the problem of free riding. Coalitions, in fact, generally fail to be internally stable, and this causes a serious under-provision of the public good, together with a significant welfare loss. The assumption of relational preferences, capable of better explaining economic behaviours in laboratory experiments, helps to foster cooperation, but, without adequate transfer scheme, no substantial improvements are reached. The present paper proposes a cooperation-enhancing transfer scheme under the assumption of players having Fehr and Schmidt utility functions, whose objectives are to guarantee internal stability and to maximize the sum of the utilities of coalition members. The transfer scheme is tested on a public goods contribution game parameterized on the data provided by the RICE model and benchmarked with other popular transfer schemes in environmental economics. The proposed scheme outperforms its benchmarking counterparts in stabilizing coalitions, and sensibly increases cooperation compared to the absence of transfers. Furthermore, for high but not extreme values of the parameter governing the intensity of dis-utility from disadvantageous inequality, it manages to support very large coalitions. Full article

The fact that data can be privately possessed yet contain the attributes of public goods leads to the “Arrow’s Information Paradox” in data trading. If left unchecked, supply-side deception about data quality and demand-side data leakage can seriously undermine the trust between suppliers and demanders. Inspired by the ideas of reputation and punishment, this paper combines a risk compensation mechanism, which is widely available in the financial sector, with data trading. Specifically, we propose a data trading model with risk compensation and study the evolutionary dynamics of the population using evolutionary game theory. We define $\lambda$ as the demander’s compensation share that the supplier has to bear for data quality cheating and $\eta$ as the supplier’s compensation share that the demander has to bear for data leakage. Through numerical solution and simulation, we analyze the evolutionary stable states of the population and find that the risk compensation mechanism in some data trading scenarios can limit the supply side from cheating on data quality or the demand side from leaking data. The results show that $\lambda$ and $\eta$ act asymmetrically, with $\lambda$ being able to affect both supply-side and demand-side strategies, while $\eta$ affects only the demand-side strategy. This work reveals chaos and asymmetry in data trading with risk compensation, and the proposed model and replication dynamic equations may have implications for future research. Full article

In spatial public goods games, groups consisting solely of defectors do not benefit. Consequently, intelligent defectors are inclined to incur the cost of punishing other defectors to enable cooperators to flourish within the group, thereby safeguarding their own advantages. Drawing from real-world observations where early preparation often dictates future success, we integrated probabilistic punishment into the public goods game and analyzed two scenarios. In the first scenario, a probabilistic punishment mechanism was established, wherein the higher the cost was of monitoring and enforcement, the greater was the probability of punishment. In the second scenario, a compensation and fine distribution mechanism was introduced alongside probabilistic punishment, where the outcome of the punishment determined whether the smart defector recovered part of the fine or rewarded cooperators with additional benefits. This incentivized smart defectors to judiciously assess the punishment cost required to effectively protect their interests. The study demonstrated that both mechanisms significantly enhanced cooperation, with the probabilistic punishment model involving fine distribution and compensation proving more effective than simple probabilistic punishment alone. These results offer novel insights into the dynamics of probabilistic punishment and the role of fine distribution in fostering cooperation. Full article

There is limited understanding of what constitutes public benefit from the perspective of the public, and none that we are aware of related to food consumer science. The purpose of this study is to contribute towards a better understanding of public benefit as a whole and its connection to food choice, essential to driving progress towards responsible consumption and healthier diets. Public benefit, associated trade-offs and responsible actors were investigated via written questions, and food choice was explored during group discussions using the PlayDecide methodology. Adults (n = 105) were recruited in six European countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Spain and the UK) and stratified by attained education. Our findings indicate that assumptions should not be made that there is general consensus about what constitutes public benefit, especially with regard to consumer food choice. Group discussions around food-related freedom of choice, education, agency and responsibility suggested that private and public benefit are neither mutually exclusive nor automatically complementary. The serious game approach employed affected a change in participants’ public benefit perceptions, demonstrating its potential to better evaluate the connections between private interests and the common good through meaningful public deliberation. Full article

This paper investigates the impact of cognitive load on the formation and maintenance of cooperation within a public goods game experiment featuring a punishment option. By integrating the experimental designs of prior studies and manipulating cognitive load through the memorization of numbers with varying digits, we reveal that high cognitive load accelerates the breakdown of cooperation, irrespective of the presence of a punishment system. Furthermore, under high cognitive load, participants are more likely to engage in antisocial punishment, while the punishment of free riders remains unaffected. These findings suggest that increased cognitive load depletes the cognitive resources needed for deliberative decision-making, leading to a higher propensity for antisocial punishment. Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the significant influence of cognitive load on cooperative behavior and providing new insights into the causes of antisocial punishment. Full article

Cooperation is essential for the survival of human society. Understanding the nature of cooperation and its underlying mechanisms is crucial for studying human behavior. This paper investigates the impact of leadership on public cooperation by employing repeated sequential public goods games, as well as by examining whether leading by example (through rewards and punishments) can promote cooperation and organizational success. The leaders were assigned randomly and were given the authority to reward or punish. As a result, (1) the leaders showed a strong tendency toward reciprocity by punishing free riders and rewarding cooperators at their own expense, which enhanced the intrinsic motivation for others to follow their example; and (2) both rewards and punishments were effective in promoting cooperation, but punishment was more effective in sustaining a high level of collaboration. Additionally, leaders preferred using rewards and were more reluctant to use punishments. These findings are crucial for creating organizational structures that foster cooperation. Full article

Previous research has primarily focused on static factors influencing cooperative behavior in social dilemmas, with less attention given to dynamic factors within group social interactions, such as positive feedback received during interactions, i.e., praise. This study, through a between-subjects online experiment with a single-factor, two-level design (praise: public praise/no praise), investigates the impact of praise on cooperative behavior changes across two rounds of a three-player public goods problem. Results revealed the following: (1) A positive correlation between individuals’ contributions across two rounds and a negative correlation with the number of correct answers in rule comprehension questions were evident; for men, a correlation between rule comprehension and first-round contributions was observed. (2) Multilevel model results showed that praise, role, and rule comprehension significantly positively affected contribution changes across two rounds; gender did not significantly affect contribution changes. Specifically, under public-praise conditions, contribution changes were greater. Publicly praised individuals showed positive or negative behavior changes, while those not praised in the same group showed positive changes. Men contributed significantly more in the first round than women, with no gender difference found in contribution changes. Rule comprehension positively predicted contribution changes, indicating that more correct answers led to greater positive changes in contributions. These results not only support the inferential social learning perspective, suggesting that through praise, individuals can infer external world perceptions and self-evaluations, affecting both the praised (positively or negatively) and positively influencing non-praised individuals in the same group, but also provide a theoretical basis and intervention strategies for team and organizational management in groups. Full article

Acquiring fundamental movement skills (FMS) in early childhood is linked to long-term engagement in physical activity, promoting lifelong health. Concurrently, the development of self-regulation contributes to fostering socially responsible and empathetic individuals. This study aims to contribute to the sustainable development goals of Good Health and Well-being (Goal 3) and Quality Education (Goal 4) by promoting early education practices that enhance children’s physical and socio-emotional development. This quasi-experimental study, employing a pre/post-test control design, examined the influence of different kindergarten physical education programs on FMS and self-regulation. Participants from a sports-themed kindergarten, ordinary public kindergarten, and non-profit private kindergarten were equally divided into three groups. The “Hello Sunshine” (HS) group followed a ball game-based program; the ordinary physical education (OPE) group’s curriculum had multi-themed physical activities; and the free-play (FP) group as a comparison group (free play) spent their activity time freely playing. Data from a total of 239 children were analyzed, all of whom received identical assessments of fundamental movement skills and self-regulation by the Test of Gross Motor Development-3 (TGMD-3) and the head–toes–knees–shoulders (HTKS) test at baseline and after 10 weeks of the PE curriculum. There was a significant effect of grouping on TGMD-3 composite scores after controlling for the pre-test score (F(2, 235) = 65.232, p < 0.001, Partial η² = 0.357). The composite score of the HS group was clearly higher than that of the OPE (95% CI:10.72~16.45) and FP (95% CI: 4.16~9.98) groups. A significant group time effect was observed for self-regulation (F(2, 236) = 4.588, p = 0.011, Partial η² = 0.037). After 10 weeks, the HS group displayed a more significant increase in self-regulation (14.8%) than that in the OPE (9.7%) and FP (14.6%) groups. The ball game-based program exhibited more advantages in promoting fundamental movement skills and self-regulation among the kindergarteners. Overall, this study’s findings highlight the potential benefits of kindergarten physical education programs and underscore the importance of early childhood development, emphasizing its potential to contribute to holistic child development and align with sustainability goals. Full article

In this paper, we study cooperation and coordination in a threshold public goods game with asymmetric players where players have different endowments $e_i$, productivities $p_i$, and rewards $r_i$. In general, this game has a defective Nash equilibrium (NE), in which no one contributes, and multiple cooperative NEs, in which the group’s collective contribution equals the threshold. We then study how multiple dimensions of inequality influence people’s cooperation and coordination. We show that heterogeneity in $e_i{p}_i$ can promote cooperation in the sense that the existence condition of the defective NE becomes stricter. Furthermore, players with higher $e_i{p}_i$ are likely to contribute more at a cooperative NE in terms of collective contribution (i.e., absolute contribution multiplied by productivity). Full article

A necessary condition for agriculture to provide environmental public goods at the level desired by the society is the existence and compliance with appropriate “rules of the game” (institutions). Undoubtedly, institutions are of fundamental importance for agriculture in areas with natural or other specific constraints (ANCs), the new delimitation of which was recommended by the European Commission to all EU member states under the CAP 2014–2020 and which is valid under the CAP 2023–2027. The aim of the study is to indicate the role of institutions in the new institutional economics (NIE) approach in the context of supporting agriculture in ANCs. The specific goals consist of indicating a method for determining the current ANCs in the EU, including Poland; characterizing their current state in Poland, as compared to other EU countries; determining their role in the implementation of the agri-environment-climate (AECM) and organic farming measure under the EU CAP (they are particularly predestined to provide environmental public goods) and also specify the determinants encouraging farmers in ANCs to participate in these measures; assessing the production and economic situation of agriculture in these areas in individual EU countries. The data source was data from the Institute of Soil Science and Plant Cultivation—State Research Institute in Puławy and the Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics—National Research Institute, Agency for Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture, European Commission FADN—FSDN. Descriptive methods were used to analyze and present the materials. Tabular graphic logistic regression model, the Wald test, the Cox–Snell pseudo-R2 measure and its additional variant proposed by Nagelkerke were used. The study is intended to fill the research gap regarding the determination of the ability of agriculture in ANCs to reconcile the market function, which is reflected in its economic situation, with the provision of environmental public goods to the society. It was determined that in communes with a high saturation of lowland ANCs, farms achieving worse production results in the form of lower wheat yields and lower net income calculated without subsidies per 1 ha of utilized agricultural area (UAA) had a greater tendency to implement AECM and organic farming measure. In most EU countries, agriculture in ANCs is characterized by extensification of agricultural production compared to other agriculture. It generally incurs lower costs and, as a result, obtains lower production effects and income from agricultural activities per 1 ha of UAA. The study provides arguments supporting the thesis that for agriculture in ANCs to achieve satisfactory economic effects and at the same time be able to provide the public with environmental public goods to a wide extent, it is necessary to have public financial incentives in the form of subsidies from the EU CAP. Full article

We developed a repeated quantum game of public goods by using quantum entanglement and strong reciprocity mechanisms. Utilizing the framework of quantum game analysis, a comparative investigation incorporating both entangled and non-entangled states reveals that the player will choose a fully cooperative strategy when the expected cooperation strategy of the competitor exceeds a certain threshold. When the entanglement of states is not considered, the prisoner’s dilemma still exists, and the cooperating party must bear the cost of defactoring the quantum strategy themselves; when considering the entanglement of states, the benefits of both parties in the game are closely related, forming a community of benefits. By signing a strong reciprocity contract, the degree of cooperation between the game parties can be considered using the strong reciprocity entanglement contract mechanism. The party striving to cooperate does not have to bear the risk of the other party’s defector, and to some extent, it can solve the prisoner’s dilemma problem. Finally, taking the public goods green planting industry project as an example, by jointly entrusting a third party to determine and sign a strong reciprocity entanglement contract, both parties can ensure a complete quantum strategy to maximize cooperation and achieve Pareto optimality, ultimately enabling the long-term and stable development of the public goods industry project. Full article