Search Results (8)

Within a coordinated fiscal financial policy framework, this study combines complex network analysis with cellular automata to construct a contagion model of debt risk across industrial enterprises. It then uses numerical simulations to examine the dynamic evolution and mitigation strategies of debt risk contagion. The results show that the following: (1) As the contagion probability, immunity failure probability, and contagion probability of immune enterprises increase, debt risk contagion among industrial enterprises is strengthened, whereas higher immunity probability and recovery probability improve network stability. (2) Market noise, carbon tax rate, credit interest rate, and risk preference increase the basic reproduction number relative to the critical boundary of one, whereas fiscal subsidy intensity, green credit ratio, and risk assessment capability reduce it. Within the normalized simulation framework, a carbon tax rate around 0.3, fiscal subsidy intensity around 0.15, and green credit ratio around 0.5 serve as illustrative model-based reference values for interpreting changes in debt risk contagion pressure and risk-mitigation effects. (3) Coordinated fiscal–financial intervention can more effectively reduce $R_0$ and narrow the contagion scope than a single policy tool, suggesting that debt risk prevention should combine fiscal support, green credit allocation, risk assessment improvement, and carbon-policy rhythm management. Full article

Carbon trading and green credit interest subsidies are two typical market-based environmental regulatory tools. Whether these two policies produce synergistic effects on regional carbon emissions reduction remains an important question. Using panel data from 274 prefecture-level cities in China, this study employs a difference-in-differences model to assess the impact of policy coordination on regional carbon emissions. The mechanisms are examined from two aspects: emission reduction and efficiency gains. The results show that policy synergy has a significant effect on regional carbon reduction. This effect is achieved by reducing energy intensity and improving green total factor productivity, which reflects structural and technical efficiency effects. The carbon-reduction effect of policy synergy is more significant in coastal cities, large and medium-sized cities, and administrative centres. However, a reverse effect is observed in non-administrative centres. These findings provide guidance and support for the coordinated implementation of carbon reduction policies. Full article

This study selects Chinese A-listed non-financial and non-insurance enterprises covering the period from 2009 to 2023 as the research sample. Utilizing the green credit interest subsidy policy (GCISP) as a quasi-natural experiment, it employs a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) model to examine the policy effect and micro-level mechanisms through which GCISP—by coordinating fiscal subsidies with green finance—impacts corporate green innovation. The findings reveal that GCISP significantly promotes corporate green innovation. This enhancing effect is achieved through two pathways: alleviating financing constraints and reducing agency costs. The conclusions of this study provide valuable insights for refining green economic policies that harmonize green finance with fiscal subsidies, and offer reliable empirical evidence and policy implications to support corporate green transformation. Full article

Against the backdrop of the dual carbon goals, the construction industry—as the primary source of carbon emissions accounting for 50.9%—is increasingly relying on green technological innovation to drive its sustainable development transformation. However, construction enterprises currently face three core challenges: the significant incremental costs associated with adopting green technologies, insufficient green credit supply from financial institutions, especially banks, and inadequate policy coordination among government departments. Furthermore, misaligned interests among multiple stakeholders exacerbate the implementation challenges of green technological innovation, hindering the industry′s low-carbon transition. Therefore, systematically exploring the interaction patterns and functional mechanisms among construction enterprises, government agencies, and banks in green technology innovation decision-making is crucial. This study will provide theoretical and empirical support for the green transformation of the construction industry within the dual-carbon framework. This study establishes a tripartite game model involving construction companies, governments, and banks, centered around the decision-making phase of green technology innovation. By integrating evolutionary game theory with system dynamics (SD) approaches, it uncovers the evolutionary trajectories and underlying mechanisms of strategies adopted by each stakeholder. Research indicates that construction companies, governments, and banks ultimately maintain equilibrium at the (1,1,1) point. The study underscores the pivotal role of government guidance during the decision-making stage, highlighting that sustained implementation of proactive policies can foster positive interactions and a balance between construction companies’ pursuit of green technology innovation and banks’ provision of green credit. It can shorten the time required for enterprises and banks to evolve their strategies. Suppressing the probability of innovation failure moderates both parties′ strategies, and adjusting parameters such as green credit interest rates and government subsidies can optimize choices. This research not only enhances the theoretical understanding of green technology innovation in the construction sector but also offers practical insights for promoting industry-wide green innovation, improving the quality of green buildings, and regulating market order. Full article

In the global pursuit of sustainable development and climate change mitigation, reconciling export growth with environmental protection has emerged as a universal challenge. As the world’s largest developing economy, China has traditionally relied on a resource-intensive development model to fuel rapid foreign trade growth. However, this extensive growth pattern has not only led to environmental pollution domestically but has also encountered hurdles from international green trade barriers. Finance, as a key driver of stable economic growth, plays a pivotal role in achieving high-quality trade development. Against this backdrop, the Chinese government has introduced the green credit interest subsidies policy. This policy aims to coordinate government financial resources and guide capital toward green production, alleviating financing constraints and fostering the upgrading of export product quality. Utilizing data from the World Bank, China Customs statistics, and provincial panels from 2011 to 2020, this study employs a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) model to examine the causal impact of the green credit subsidies policy on efforts to upgrade the export quality of green products across China’s regions. The benchmark regression results indicate that the green credit interest subsidies policy has significantly improved the export quality of green products across China’s manufacturing industries. Heterogeneity analysis shows that this policy has had a more pronounced positive impact on green product quality in industries with quality-based competition strategies, in regions with well-coordinated local finance and financial policies, as well as in countries that have concluded environmental clauses with China. Mechanism analysis reveals that, on the export side, the policy enhances green product quality by easing financing constraints, increasing green credit, boosting productivity, and upgrading industrial structures. On the import side, the policy promotes green product quality by expanding the scale, variety, and quality of green intermediate goods. This research offers valuable insights for developing countries aiming to establish export-oriented green transformation and upgrading strategies. Full article

As a key driver of the green and low-carbon transformation of the energy sector, clean heating technology plays a crucial role in advancing sustainable energy development. However, the research and development (R&D) of clean heating technology is hindered by conflicting interests among key supply-side stakeholders, including heating enterprises, commercial banks, and government departments. These conflicts create challenges for promoting the diffusion of clean heating technology. To address this issue, this paper develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving these stakeholders, with the aim of exploring strategies to facilitate clean heating technology diffusion from the supply side. Through mathematical modeling and numerical simulations, we examine how variables such as cost, subsidies, and penalties affect the strategic decisions of these participants. The results showusing that (1) the cost of clean heating technology R&D significantly influences commercial banks’ willingness to collaborate with heating enterprises; (2) increasing credit penalties for non-compliance and enhancing returns from clean heating technology can motivate heating enterprises to engage in technology R&D; (3) enhancing economic penalties and strengthening informal regulations can improve cooperation between commercial banks and heating enterprises; (4) moderate subsidies can positively influence the strategies adopted by commercial banks and heating enterprises. Based on these findings, we propose policy recommendations to promote clean heating technology diffusion from the supply side. This study offers both theoretical support and practical guidance for advancing clean heating technology diffusion, which is strategically important for sustainable energy development. Full article

In the process of policy financing guaranteeing help to SMEs to make innovations in green technologies, multiple parties continue to play strategic games for their interests. Evolutionary game theory is a practical tool for analyzing multi-agent strategies, which can help us to explore how policy financing guarantees help to SMEs to achieve effective credit enhancement. This paper constructs a four-party evolutionary game model among SMEs, banks, guarantee agencies, and the government, and obtains four evolutionary stable strategies by analyzing various players’ replicator dynamics. In addition, we carry out numerical simulations on the key parameters affecting the stability of the game system. The findings suggest that keeping the fixed risk-ratio between guarantee agencies and banks constant reduces the government’s financial burden and strengthens the re-guarantee system’s construction at the initial stage of SME financing, which can indirectly increase the enthusiasm for cooperation between banks and guarantee agencies. The interest subsidy policy is more effective in promoting SMEs’ compliance and bank–guarantee cooperation in the short term. Meanwhile, the government should increase the supervision of defaulting SMEs and cooperate with financial institutions to improve the credit system for SMEs. Full article

In recent years, many countries have proposed various sustainable development strategies around environmental issues. The implementation of green supply chain management is an effective sustainable development approach that combines “environmental awareness” and “economic development.” Therefore, introducing the concept of “green” effectively is the main direction for the sustainable development of agriculture in the future. The impacts of green credit policies on agricultural supply chains have rarely been discussed before. Therefore, we focus on the incentive mechanism of green credit policies in the agricultural supply chain. We use the Stackelberg Leadership Model to construct a pricing model which adds the interest subsidy and required reserve ratio (RRR) cuts, and determines the pricing rules of bank loans and production decisions of the farmer in the agricultural supply chain under the incentive policy of green credit by quantifying the optimization problems of the bank and the farmer. The result shows that optimal decisions exist for both farmer and bank in the supply chain game framework. The implementation of the green credit policies contributes to both of their profits. Additionally, the green credit policies give the bank room to reduce interest rates so that the overall utility level of the supply chain could be improved. Full article