Search Results (7)

Yaodi Pao Zhuang (Monk Yaodi Distills the Essence of the Zhuangzi, 藥地炮莊), written by Ming dynasty scholar Fang Yizhi (1611–1671), was one of the greatest annotations of Zhuangzi 庄子 in the late Ming dynasty. However, the Buddhist thought in Yaodi Pao Zhuang has scarcely been examined. Drawing on the revival of the consciousness-only (vijñaptimātratā, 唯識) theory during the Ming dynasty, this study discussed how Fang Yizhi transformed the theory to annotate Zhuangzi in Yaodi Pao Zhuang through literature comparison and logical analysis. Meanwhile, from a speculative viewpoint drawing on Yi studies (studies of the Yi Jing, 易學), Fang Yizhi demonstrated that “storehouse consciousness” (alaya-vijnana, 阿賴耶識) could have contrasting properties of defilement (samklesa, 染) and purity (suddha, 淨). Moreover, he proposed “consciousness is wisdom” to replace the consciousness-only view of “transforming consciousness into wisdom” prevailing in the Tang dynasty, thus providing the conditions for the interpenetration of the consciousness-only doctrine into Zhuangzi. This study’s results highlight the positive implications of Fang Yizhi’s mutually supportive interaction model of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism for addressing contemporary cultural conflicts. Full article

Zhiyan 智儼 (602–668) is considered the second patriarch of the Chinese Huayan 華嚴 (Jp. Kegon) school. Zhiyan gave his scholarly attention to the Dilun School 地論宗 and Shelun School 攝論宗. By his period, the reunification of the North and South had permitted the Dilun and Shelun lineages to begin to merge, and the texts on which they were based had a common origin in the Indian Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha. In this article, I focus on Zhiyan’s conceptual innovations and their background. My chief concerns are twofold: the first is to review several terms and teachings as representative examples of the creative practice of Zhiyan and the second is to identify his roots in the earlier traditions of Indian and Chinese Buddhism. I focus on the translation and understanding of the term zhenru 真如 (Skt. tathatā; suchness/thusness), which is a crucial expression used in descriptions of ultimate truth in Buddhism. By investigating the terms through the lens of the Ratnagotravibhāga (=RGV), I consider what tathatā, dhātu and gotra signified in their Indian usage and how these meanings evolved in the process of the appropriation of these concepts in China, especially in Zhiyan’s writings. Furthermore, through this analysis, I aim to explore Zhiyan’s attitude towards the Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論 (=BXL), the Chinese translation of the RGV, and examine how he absorbed and utilized this significant treatise, which was compiled in India and translated in Northern China. We cannot find even one clear interpretation defining suchness as unconditioned dharma in the Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起信論 (=AF; Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith). In the AF, it is stated that suchness is initially pure. However, due to the fumigation of ignorance, the marks and features of defilement will appear on pure suchness. Suchness, being connected with foundation consciousness, has been regarded as the foundation or origin of conditioned arising in the She dasheng lun chao 攝大乘論抄 (T2806), a significant commentary on the She dasheng lun 攝大乘論 translated by Paramārtha 真諦 (499–569), who has been associated with the AF. Building on this trend in the interpretation of suchness, Zhiyan employs both the AF and the BXL to expound his theory of suchness. He initially utilizes the theory of suchness from the AF and the BXL to argue that all phenomena, including delusion, could arise from suchness. Zhiyan asserts the fumigation/perfume of suchness. The background of Zhiyan’s theory of suchness is based on the AF. However, while the AF only mentions the fumigation/perfume of suchness, Zhiyan adds that suchness does not inherently maintain its self-nature but arises conditionally. This marks a significant difference, or development, between the theory of suchness in the AF and that in Zhiyan’s Huayan doctrinal system. In my view, the answer lies in the BXL, which Zhiyan himself regards as a key text alongside the AF as the basis for his theory of suchness. Zhiyan finds an intimation of the precious truth in the commentaries of Huiguang 慧光, who was a disciple of Ratnamati, the translator of the BXL, and the founder of the southern branch of the Dilun School. Zhiyan finds the doctrine of infinite dependent arising according to the one vehicle of the distinct teaching (Ch. biejiao yisheng 別教一乘) in Huiguang’s commentaries. It indicates that the renderings and interpretations of Ratnamati and Huiguang seem to have deeply influenced Zhiyan. For a long time, many scholars have believed that the RGV had only a minimal impact on East Asian Buddhism, and few have pointed out its influence on Zhiyan. However, through the analysis in this article, I find that Zhiyan places significant importance on the RGV and its Chinese translation BXL. Full article

In the classical philosophical landscape of India, the Advaita of Śaṅkara occupies central stage. Besides the Upaniṣadic literature, the Gauḍapāda-kārikā (GK) of Gauḍapāda is the primary text in this school. Relying primarily on the GK, this essay explores the ways the issue of change can be addressed within the Advaita paradigm. For Advaitins, there exists only the singular reality of Brahman, of the character of non-differentiated consciousness. In this paradigm, the attributes of both being and blissfulness never change. Furthermore, the central teaching of Gauḍapāda is the doctrine of ‘non-origination’ (ajāti), that nothing is ever originated. For Advaita, change or deviation is possible only under the spell of illusion, as the absolute is changeless. By comparing the position of Gauḍapāda with other classical, non-dual philosophies, this paper explores arguments for and against change in the classical philosophical school of Advaita. Full article

The article is devoted to the analysis of the theological-academic ontological doctrine of the three types of being formulated within the framework of the Russian theological-academic philosophy of the 19th century. The study of this problem in the context of the general analysis of the phenomenon of theological-academic philosophy allows expanding our understanding of the genesis of Russian philosophy and its religious-philosophical component. The main aim of the article is the historical-philosophical analysis (on the material of philosophical courses of Russian theological academies and original works of professors of academies) of the doctrine about three types of being, which was developed within the framework of the theological-academic philosophy in Russia in the 19th century. The set goal is achieved by means of textual and religious analysis methods, as well as historical-functional, historical-genetic, and comparative research methods. The authors conclude that the specificity of theological-academic philosophizing was determined by confessional affiliation and consisted in its theistic form: the transversal theme of all theological-academic interpretations was the problem of being. Thus, theological-academic ontology took the form of the doctrine of God as an absolute being and the world as its derivative. The theological-academic doctrine of the three types of being and the synthesizing function of the absolute in relation to theological and material being cannot be characterized as quite logical and consistent. The notion of God as an absolute being is conditioned by the aspiration of theological-academic philosophers not to go beyond traditional orthodoxy and is one of the main specific features of theological-academic philosophical interpretations of religious consciousness. At the same time, the historical and philosophical analysis of the works of professors from Russian theological academies allows tracing how the powerful ideological and theoretical potential accumulated in Russian theological academies after their reforms in the 19th century contributed to the development of professional philosophy in Russia, the development of a philosophical categorical apparatus and the systematic formation of Russian philosophical thought. The development of this theme responds to the urgent research tasks of the history of philosophy. Further, this topic is very interesting not only for historians of philosophy but also for historians of religion, historians of orthodoxy, and culturologists. Full article

This article proposes to examine in detail Aurobindo’s searching—and often quite original—criticisms of Advaita Vedānta, which have not yet received the sustained scholarly attention they deserve. After discussing his early spiritual experiences and the formative influence of Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda on his thought, I outline Aurobindo’s philosophy of “realistic Adwaita”. According to Aurobindo, the sole reality is the Divine Saccidānanda, which is not only the static impersonal Brahman but also the personal, dynamic Cit-Śakti (Consciousness-Force), which manifests as everything in this universe. At various points in his corpus, Aurobindo criticizes Advaita Vedānta on three fronts. From the standpoint of spiritual experience, Aurobindo argues that Śaṅkara’s philosophy is based on a genuine, but partial, experience of the Infinite Divine Reality: namely, the experience of the impersonal nondual Absolute and the corresponding conviction of the unreality of everything else. Aurobindo claims, on the basis of his own spiritual experiences, that there is a further stage of spiritual experience, when one realizes that the impersonal-personal Divine Reality manifests as everything in the universe. From a philosophical standpoint, Aurobindo questions the logical tenability of key Advaitic doctrines, including māyā, the exclusively impersonal nature of Brahman, and the metaphysics of an illusory bondage and liberation. Finally, from a scriptural standpoint, Aurobindo argues that the ancient Vedic hymns, the Upaniṣads, and the Bhagavad-Gītā, propound an all-encompassing Advaita philosophy rather than the world-denying Advaita philosophy Śaṅkara claims to find in them. This article focuses on Aurobindo’s experiential and philosophical critiques of Advaita Vedānta, as I have already discussed his new interpretations of the Vedāntic scriptures in detail elsewhere. The article’s final section explores the implications of Aurobindo’s life-affirming Advaitic philosophy for our current ecological crisis. Full article

Abhinavagupta is widely viewed to be a cautious, perceptive, and sympathetic reader (even of his opponents), with some researchers even celebrating him as a pre-modern intellectual historian. But scholars all too often underestimate how and why Abhinava misreads many of his rivals. Abhinava’s treatment of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā (SK) illustrates this. Abhinava and Sāṃkhya alike hold to the doctrine that effects share identity with or reside within their cause (satkāryavāda). But according to Abhinava, Īśvarakṛṣṇa (and other Sāṃkhya thinkers) fails to explain how a cause (sat) can give rise to its effects (kārya, including the manifestations of effects) without ceasing to be itself, since the underlying material cause (mūlaprakṛti), e.g., a square, changes its identity from one manifestation (vyaktaprakṛti) to the next, e.g., a triangle. In place of this, Abhinava argues that only the Pratyabhijñā approach can account for satkārya and abhivyakti (manifestation). Causes and effects, Abhinava tells us, are but expressions of how divine super-consciousness (Śiva) appears to itself through the playful manifestation of a seemingly material other (Śakti). However, a closer reading of the canonical Sāṃkhya text, the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, reveals that this system originally advocated a metaphysics of living nature, not inanimate matter. From this basic yet important correction, Sāṃkhya could explain the very same playful interface between cause and manifest effect described by Abhinava, since the manifest procreativity (vyaktaprakṛti) of organic nature exhibits constancy in the midst of its self-transformations. I draw this out through a critique of the modern scientific assumptions that underlie much Sāṃkhya research, and in its place I develop an organicist reading that is informed by Goethe’s phenomenological science of life. This approach helps to resuscitate core Sāṃkhya metaphysical categories in terms of their directed and intelligent aliveness (not just their materiality). Moreover, it offers clues to why Pratyabhijñā misinterpreted the SK: (1) it gave allegiance to classical Sāṃkhya commentaries (many of which misconstrued Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s views), and (2) its organizing philosophical narrative precluded metaphysical dualism and the self-sufficient power of nature to conceal itself. Full article

1. Nature has its own logic, which does not follow the human will. Nature is itself; it exists, moves, changes, and evolves according to its own intrinsic ways. Human and human society, as a product of a specific stage of natural development, can only be a concrete manifestation of the logic of nature. 2. In the broad sense, nature refers to all, both phenomena and processes, in the universe. It includes human society spiritual phenomena. In a narrow sense, nature refers to the world outside the society and opposed to society as well, or refers to the research objects of natural sciences 3. The narrow natural philosophy is in the intermediary position between the natural sciences and the overall philosophy (the supreme philosophy, an advocation of Kun Wu’s philosophy of information. For further detail, please refer to the subscript in the following.). Furthermore, it is an independent sub-level philosophical discipline; the broad natural philosophy is a meta-philosophy or supreme philosophy, stipulating the entire world from the dimensions of nature itself. 4. Natural philosophy reveals the laws of nature’s own existence, movement, change, and evolution. This determines that the way of expressing natural philosophy is necessarily natural ontology. The construction of the theoretical system of natural philosophy is inevitably a process of abandoning cognitive mediums of human beings through reflection. It is necessary for us to conclude that natural philosophy is the stipulation of nature itself, which comes out of the nature itself. So, we must explain the nature from the standpoint of the nature itself. 5. The true philosophy should move from the human world to the nature, finding back Husserl’s suspended things, and establish a brand-new philosophy in which man and nature, substance, information, and spirit are united. This kind of philosophy is able to provide contemporary ecological civilization with a reasonable philosophical foundation, rebuilding natural philosophy in a new era, which is a very urgent task for contemporary philosophers. 6. The unity of philosophy and science cannot be seen merely as an external convergence, but also as an intrinsic fusion; a true philosophy should have a scientific character, and science itself must have a philosophical basis. The unity of such an intrinsic fusion of science and philosophy can be fully demonstrated by the practical relationship of development between human philosophy and science. 7. In addition to the narrow path along epistemology, linguistics, and phenomenology, the development of human philosophy has another path. This is the development of philosophy itself that has been nurtured and demonstrated during the development of general science: On the one hand, the construction of scientific rationality requires philosophical thinking and exploration; On the other hand, the progress of science opens the way for the development of philosophy. 8. In the real process of the development of human knowledge, science and philosophy are regulated, contained, and merged with each other in the process of interaction. The two are inlaid together internally to form an interactive dynamic feedback loop. The unified relationship of mutual influence, regulation, promotion and transformation presented in the intrinsic interplay of interaction between science and philosophy profoundly breeds and demonstrates the general way of human knowledge development: the philosophicalization (a term used in Kun Wu’s philosophy of information. For more details please see in Kun Wu, 2016, The Interaction and Convergence of the Philosophy and Science of Information, https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies1030228) of science and scientification (a term used in Kun Wu’s philosophy of information. For more detail, please see in Kun Wu, 2016, The Interaction and Convergence of the Philosophy and Science of Information, https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies1030228) of philosophy. 9. We face two types of dogmatism: one is the dogmatism of naturalism, and the other is the dogmatism of the philosophy of consciousness. One of the best ways to overcome these tendencies of dogmatism is to unite natural ontology, and epistemic constructivism. The crisis of contemporary philosophy induced by the western consciousness philosophy seems like belonging to the field of epistemology, but the root of this crisis is deeply buried in the ontology. The key to solving the crisis of contemporary philosophy lies precisely in the reconstruction of the doctrine of natural philosophy centering to the nature itself and excluding God. The task to be accomplished by this new natural philosophy is how to regain the natural foundation of human consciousness after the God has left the field. 10. Since the 1980s, the philosophy of information established and developed in China has proposed a theory of objective information, as well as the dual existence and dual evolution of matter and information (a key advocation in the ontological theory of Kun Wu’s philosophy of information). It is this theory that has made up for the vacancy existing between matter and mind, which apparently exists in Cartesian dualism, after the withdrawal of the God’s from the field. Philosophy of information in China is first and foremost a natural philosophy that adheres to naturalistic attitudes. Second, this natural philosophy explains the human, human mind and human society in the interpretation of the process and mechanism of natural evolution. In this connection, philosophy of information (a key advocation of Kun Wu’s philosophy of information) in China is a system of meta-philosophy or supreme philosophy. This system undoubtedly has the nature of a new natural philosophy. At the same time, this philosophy can better reflect the philosophical spirit of the information age. Full article