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13 pages, 204 KB

Open AccessArticle

Does Providence Entail Divine Temporality? Maybe

by R. T. Mullins

Religions 2024, 15(6), 702; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15060702 - 6 Jun 2024

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2635

Within contemporary Christian philosophical theology, there are three broad theories of providence being debated. These are theological determinism, Molinism, and open theism. Of course, there are nuances amongst proponents of each theory, but the nuances are not terribly important for my purposes in [...] Read more.

Within contemporary Christian philosophical theology, there are three broad theories of providence being debated. These are theological determinism, Molinism, and open theism. Of course, there are nuances amongst proponents of each theory, but the nuances are not terribly important for my purposes in this essay. I will argue that the basic conceptual machinery of each theory seems to entail divine temporality. Since open theists are already committed to divine temporality, there is nothing for me to argue there. Things get interesting when I consider theological determinism and Molinism. There are proponents of each view who already affirm divine temporality, but there are also proponents of each view who affirm divine timelessness. What I will argue is that theological determinism and Molinism are incompatible with divine timelessness. In order to make my case, I will start by defining some terms. Then, I will offer some arguments related to acting for a reason, divine freedom, and so-called logical moments in the life of a timeless God. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Concept of God: The Intersection of Classical Theism and Relational Theism)

20 pages, 817 KB

Open AccessArticle

Laozi’s Conception of Justice in the Daodejing: Distinguishing the Constant Dao from the Dao of Heaven

by Thomas Michael

Religions 2023, 14(6), 771; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14060771 - 12 Jun 2023

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 4414

Abstract

Throughout the pages of the Daodejing, Laozi reveals a complex conception of justice. Understanding it demands that we strictly distinguish the four central notions around which it is structured: the Constant Dao, the Dao of Humans, the Dao of Heaven, and Heaven [...] Read more.

Throughout the pages of the Daodejing, Laozi reveals a complex conception of justice. Understanding it demands that we strictly distinguish the four central notions around which it is structured: the Constant Dao, the Dao of Humans, the Dao of Heaven, and Heaven and Earth. After situating Laozi’s conception of justice in the opening section, this study then examines the ancient ritual background from which he injected innovative content into these four notions before moving on to a textual analysis of their deployment throughout the Daodejing. In contrast to other modern Western analyses of the text’s philosophy that focus on the naturalism of the Constant Dao while disregarding the theism of the Dao of Heaven, this study attempts to re-envision the text’s complementarity of the religious and the philosophical. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Pathways into Early Daoist Philosophy)

9 pages, 213 KB

Open AccessArticle

Logical Argument from Evil and Theism

by Andrea Aguti

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1007; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13111007 - 22 Oct 2022

Viewed by 2517

Abstract

The article argues that the logical argument from evil is dead, and the new version presented by James Sterba cannot resurrect it. In the first part, I say that the logical argument from evil is dead either because, in the version given by [...] Read more.

The article argues that the logical argument from evil is dead, and the new version presented by James Sterba cannot resurrect it. In the first part, I say that the logical argument from evil is dead either because, in the version given by Mackie, it was successfully refuted by Plantinga and other theists or because, by inviting a reformulation of theistic doctrines, it was nevertheless superseded by contemporary versions of theism, such as open theism. In the second part, I argue that the two significant moves made by Sterba to resurrect the logical argument from evil fail in their intent either because the premise they start does not necessarily give rise to an atheistic conclusion or because the premise is unacceptable for the theist. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

7 pages, 181 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Argument from Evil, the Argument from Hiddenness, and Supernaturalistic Alternatives to Theism

by Raphael Lataster

Religions 2022, 13(10), 938; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13100938 - 9 Oct 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1907

Abstract

In this brief article, I consider James Sterba’s logical argument from evil, finding it to be ultimately unsuccessful. Not for the various issues Sterba raises, which do seem to be problematic if God exists, but for the logical approach itself. I encourage Sterba [...] Read more.

In this brief article, I consider James Sterba’s logical argument from evil, finding it to be ultimately unsuccessful. Not for the various issues Sterba raises, which do seem to be problematic if God exists, but for the logical approach itself. I encourage Sterba to shift tack, to embrace the evidential argument from evil, which is not at all concessionary, as he seems to think, and is an extremely powerful argument against the probability of theism, especially when we open the debate to the supernaturalistic alternatives to theism. I also encourage Sterba to reconsider his dismissive attitude towards the argument from hiddenness, which, in its evidential form, is also a very powerful argument against God’s existence, either employed independently or incorporated into the argument from evil. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

15 pages, 250 KB

Open AccessArticle

God’s Prime Directive: Non-Interference and Why There Is No (Viable) Free Will Defense

by David Kyle Johnson

Religions 2022, 13(9), 871; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13090871 - 16 Sep 2022

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 4224

Abstract

In a recent book and article, James Sterba has argued that there is no free will defense. It is the purpose of this article to show that, in the most technical sense, he is wrong. There is a version of the free will [...] Read more.

In a recent book and article, James Sterba has argued that there is no free will defense. It is the purpose of this article to show that, in the most technical sense, he is wrong. There is a version of the free will defense that can solve what Sterba (rightly) takes to be the most interesting and severe version of the logical problem of moral evil. However, I will also argue that, in effect (or, we might say, in practice), Sterba is correct. The only working version of the free will defense requires embracing a view that entails consequences theists traditionally have not and cannot accept. Consequently, the one and only free will solution is not viable. Unless some other solution can be found (Sterba argues there is none), the logical problem of evil, as Sterba understands it, either commits one to atheism, or a version of theism that practically all theists would regard as a heresy. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

14 pages, 260 KB

Open AccessArticle

Charismatic Pneumatology as Ecumenical Opportunity: Orthopraxy, Subjectivity, and Relational Ontologies of the Holy Spirit

by Jason Wesley Alvis

Religions 2022, 13(8), 712; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13080712 - 3 Aug 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 3501

Abstract

The majority of new Christian communities have been appearing in Charismatic and Pentecostal movements, especially in the Global South. Along with these shifts emerge new possibilities to better understand the diversity of Christian perspectives and to rethink what it means to be “in [...] Read more.

The majority of new Christian communities have been appearing in Charismatic and Pentecostal movements, especially in the Global South. Along with these shifts emerge new possibilities to better understand the diversity of Christian perspectives and to rethink what it means to be “in relation” to a global Christian community. After opening connections between pneumatology and relational ontology, this article engages the work of three emerging Pentecostal/Charismatic thinkers in particular, whose pneumatologies provide novel opportunities to think more carefully about “relationality” and ecumenical unity: Nimi Wariboko, Amos Yong, and Clark Pinnock. Wariboko’s pneumatology helps us acknowledge the very kind of relational ontology God has with Godself, as a split subject, thereby disrupting not only our all-too-human meaning-making process, but also the way God signifies the world for us. Yong’s pneumatology emphasizes human practice or an “orthopraxy” that is polyphonous, historically rooted, and oriented around spiritual gifts not only for sanctification but also for worldwide witness. Finally, Pinnock emphasizes the connections between creativity and relationality, pointing to how at-one-ment is also the telic work of the Spirit. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Intercultural Theology vis-à-vis Ecumenical and Interreligious Dialogue)

16 pages, 282 KB

Open AccessArticle

Why Open Theism Is Natural and Classical Theism Is Not

by Lari Launonen and R. T. Mullins

Religions 2021, 12(11), 956; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12110956 - 2 Nov 2021

Cited by 5 | Viewed by 7613

Abstract

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, is underpinned by maturationally natural cognitive biases and systems (Natural Religion). It is unclear, however, whether theism is natural. Does the god concept that our cognitive biases and systems [...] Read more.

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, is underpinned by maturationally natural cognitive biases and systems (Natural Religion). It is unclear, however, whether theism is natural. Does the god concept that our cognitive biases and systems give rise to approximate theism? In other words, is Natural Religion “theism-tracking”? As Christian theologians have different views of what God is like, we argue that the answer depends partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but the classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural Religion tracks open theism. The possibility that we are “born idolaters” rather than “born believers” might undermine the Christian doctrine of general revelation and attempts to make CSR compatible with theology. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Theodicy and Challenges of Science: Understanding God, Evil and Evolution)

8 pages, 300 KB

Open AccessArticle

God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds

by Cheryl K. Chen

Religions 2021, 12(4), 266; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12040266 - 12 Apr 2021

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3031

Abstract

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why [...] Read more.

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

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