Search Results (7)

To address the output volatility of distributed photovoltaics, the low utilization efficiency of energy storage resources, and the challenge of optimal revenue for PV-storage virtual power plants (VPPs) in multi-market environments, this paper proposes a three-stage stochastic optimal operation strategy for PV-storage VPPs under multi-market synergy and develops a benefit allocation model based on the Nash–Harsanyi bargaining game. A Monte Carlo simulation was adopted to capture the uncertainties of market electricity prices and PV power output, and the stochastic dual-dynamic-programming (SDDP) algorithm was employed to solve the three-stage optimization framework consisting of day-ahead bidding, real-time optimization, and real-time frequency regulation. Bargaining power was quantified from four dimensions—the marginal contribution rate, PV prediction accuracy, energy storage capacity, and utilization rate—to establish a fair and reasonable internal benefit allocation mechanism. Case studies verified that the proposed method improved the single-day market revenue by up to 20.79% compared with traditional operation modes, achieved a near-zero curtailment rate for distributed PV, and maintained frequency regulation performance scores above 0.4 at all times. The benefits of all investment entities in the alliance increased by 3.36–99.43%, significantly enhancing the multi-market profitability of PV-storage VPPs and the stability of alliance cooperation. Full article

In the joint operation of multiple virtual power plants, after day-ahead optimal dispatch is completed, some participants may engage in speculative behaviors such as misreporting profit contribution data to obtain greater benefits during profit distribution, thereby undermining fairness. To address this issue, this paper constructs a profit distribution model designed to prevent speculation. An improved Nash bargaining equilibrium algorithm based on a third-party trading intermediary is proposed to curb speculative actions. Furthermore, a dual-layer monitoring mechanism centered on profit deviation is established, which can effectively identify both single-day speculative behaviors and long-term systematic speculative trends, thereby triggering verification procedures. This forms a closed-loop management mechanism for speculation prevention—“detection, monitoring, analysis, verification”—ensuring fair profit distribution among participants within virtual power plants. Case study results demonstrate that the proposed method achieves an average deviation of only 2.32% compared to the profit distribution outcome under non-speculative conditions. In contrast, commonly used methods such as the Shapley value method, nucleolus method, and Nash–Harsanyi bargaining solution exhibit an average deviation as high as 18.44%. The research presented in this paper enables the detection of speculative behaviors among participants and facilitates verification, significantly enhancing the fairness and rationality of profit distribution. Full article

To improve the stable operation and promote the energy sharing of the integrated energy system (IES), a comprehensive energy trading strategy considering uncertainty is proposed. Firstly, an IES model incorporating power-to-gas (P2G) and a carbon capture system (CCS) is established to reduce carbon emissions. Secondly, this model is integrated into a four-level robust optimization to address the fluctuation of renewable energy sources in IES operations. This not only considers probability distribution scenarios of renewable energy and the uncertainty of its output, but also effectively reduces the model’s conservatism by constructing a multi-interval uncertainty set. On this basis, a Nash–Harsanyi bargaining method is used to solve the issue of benefit allocation among multiple IESs. Finally, the energy trading model is solved using a distributed algorithm that ensures an equitable distribution of benefits while protecting the privacy of each IES. The simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed strategy. Full article

Cooperative game theory provides an appropriate framework to assess the likelihood of conflict resolution, encourage cooperation among parties, and determine each party’s share in resource sharing conflicts. In calculating the fair and efficient allocation of the incremental benefits of cooperation, cooperative game theory methods often do not consider the exogenous bargaining powers of the players based on factors, that are external to the game, such as their political, economic, and military powers. This study reformulates three well-known cooperative game theory methods, namely, Nash-Harsanyi, Shapley, and Nucleolus, to account for the exogenous bargaining powers of the players in cooperative games. Using the Caspian Sea international conflict as an example, this paper shows how the negotiators’ exogenous bargaining power can change the outcome of resource sharing games. The proposed weighted cooperative game theory approach can help determine practical resolutions for real-world conflicts in which the exogenous powers of players can have a significant influence on the outcome of negotiations. Full article

Competitions and disputes between various human water sectors and environmental flow of the river are exacerbated due to the rapid growth of the economy in Yellow River basin as well as the limited supply of available water resources in recent decades. It is necessary to implement rational and effective management and allocation to alleviate the pressure of water shortage. In order to promote economic development and maintain the ecological balance of the river, both the water allocation to the river environmental system and different human needs should be of concern when making the allocation polices. This study developed a water allocation model based on Nash–Harsanyi bargaining game theory for optimal water resources allocation among agricultural, industrial, domestic, public, and urban ecological water (watering for urban green space) sectors while ensuring the environmental flow requirements of lower reaches. A comprehensive economic evaluation framework is built to assess the economic benefits of different water uses that were taken as the basis of water allocation model. The annual environmental base flow is 7.50 billion m³ in the lower reaches of Yellow River. Moreover, the optimal annual allocations for agricultural, industrial, domestic, public, and urban ecological water use sectors are estimated as 33.7, 6.42, 3.96, 1.75 and 2.68 billion m³, respectively. Full article

The coordinated operation for hydropower generation in cascade reservoirs is critical to resolve the conflicts in hydropower needs between upstream and downstream reservoirs. Due to the individual rationality and collective rationality highlighted by game theory, we propose an integrated game-theoretical model to simulate the coordination behaviors among cascade reservoirs for hydropower generation. In the case study of a cascade-reservoir system in the Yangtze River of China, three operation models are compared and analyzed: the non-cooperative model, centralized model, and integrated game-theoretical model. The factors influencing the coordination efficiency of the integrated game-theoretical model are also explored in this study. The results indicate that the system’s hydropower generation obtained by the integrated game-theoretical model is closer to the ideal solution obtained by the centralized model compared to that obtained by the non-cooperative model. Moreover, individual hydropower generation in non-cooperation (rational individual gains) is guaranteed by the integrated game-theoretical model, which is neglected by the centralized model. Furthermore, the coordination efficiency of the integrated game-theoretical model is influenced by the water availability variation and regulation capacities of cascade reservoirs. Full article

Transboundary river water resources allocation is important in water resources management. Conflicts often arise when different water users compete for a limited water supply. This study proposes a two-level asymmetric Nash–Harsanyi Leader–Follower game model to resolve conflicts of interest in transboundary river water resources allocation problems. In the proposed model, we use bankruptcy theory to derive disagreement points and determine the bargaining weights considering the principles of equity and efficiency. For comparison, a model that does not consider disagreement points and bargaining weights are also used to demonstrate the importance of disagreement points and bargaining weights. The proposed model is applied to a real case of the Huaihe River basin in China, which is facing water shortages. In the case study, the watershed management agency serves as the leader, three provinces (Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu) serve as followers, and successive linear programming is used to solve the model for followers. The results show that the proposed disagreement points can guarantee basic water demand, and the bargaining weights can better balance the economic development levels among followers. Full article