Search Results (30)

This article offers a comparative analysis of authoritarian governance in Egypt and Türkiye through the lens of two pivotal state–Islamist alliances: the early partnership and eventual rupture between Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and the strategic collaboration followed by confrontation between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Gülen Movement (GM). Despite operating in different historical and institutional settings—a postcolonial military regime in Egypt and an electoral, hybrid regime in Türkiye—both leaders allied with influential religious actors during moments of transition to gain popular support and dismantle entrenched power structures. These alliances were instrumental and temporary: once religious movements developed autonomous influence, they were recast as threats and suppressed through legal, institutional, and religious mechanisms. This study traces how religious institutions like Egypt’s al-Azhar and Türkiye’s Diyanet were co-opted to delegitimize these former allies and justify state repression. While the MB pursued overt political goals and the GM functioned through civic and technocratic channels, both were ultimately excluded from the political order once they had been considered as threats to the central authority of the regime. This comparison underscores the strategic use of religion in authoritarian statecraft and the enduring tension between religious autonomy and centralized political control in Muslim-majority polities. Full article

This study examines the strategic deployment of religion as a political tool in contemporary Turkey through a comparative analysis of two ideologically distinct Islamic movements: the Gülen movement (Hizmet) and the movement of Adnan Oktar. Despite their divergent theological premises and organizational structures, both movements articulate religious worldviews that diverge significantly from dominant Islamist narratives—particularly in their surprisingly affirmative positions toward Israel. Rather than treating religion as a fixed doctrinal corpus, this article conceptualizes it as a flexible repertoire shaped by political context and rhetorical need. In this light, Israel emerges not as a diplomatic partner but as a symbolic site through which broader ideological positions are negotiated. The contrast between the two movements sheds light on how religious language can serve as both a boundary marker and a strategic resource in the articulation of identity, authority, and ideological distinctiveness. This article contributes to a deeper understanding of how Islamic movements in Turkey—often perceived as monolithic in their opposition to Zionism—can, under certain conditions, reframe religion to support non-hostile, and even sympathetic, positions. It offers a framework for analyzing the political uses of religion without overlooking theological nuance or disregarding intra-Islamic plurality. Full article

The Alevis of Anatolia and the Balkans and the Alawites of Syria and southeastern Turkey are two distinct ethnoreligious communities frequently conflated in both media and scholarly literature, despite their divergent historical origins, theological differences, and varying sociocultural formations. While their shared histories of marginalization and persecution, certain theological parallels, and cognate ethnonyms contribute to this conflation, it largely stems from a broader tendency within mainstream Islamic frameworks to homogenize so-called heterodox communities without sufficient attention to their doctrinal and cultural specificities. This paper, grounded in a synthetic analysis of current scholarship, maps the key historical, theological, and sociocultural intersections and divergences between Alawite and Alevi communities. Situated within the broader framework of intra-Islamic diversity, it seeks to move beyond essentialist and homogenizing paradigms by foregrounding the distinct genealogies of each tradition, rooted, respectively, in the early pro-Alid movements of Iraq and Syria and in Anatolian Sufism. In addition, the study examines the communities’ overlapping political trajectories in the modern era, particularly their alignments with leftist and secular–nationalist currents, as well as their evolving relationship—from mutual unawareness to a recent political rapprochement—prompted by the growing existential threats posed by the rise of Sunni-Salafi Islamist movements. Full article

This study explores the role of religion as a state-promoted tool for political assimilation in Pakistan’s border provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. The study is based on five phases of fieldwork (2016–2024) combined with a thematic literature review. The research explores how religious strategies were deployed to forge a unified national identity in these regions. The findings reveal significant disparities in the effectiveness of these strategies. In KP, historical factors, cultural alignment, and geopolitical influences—particularly the Afghan conflict—largely facilitated the integration of Pashtun identity into Pakistan’s broader Islamic-national framework. Tools such as madrassa networks, education reforms, religious slogans, and state-backed Islamist parties effectively promoted religious nationalism. In contrast, religious assimilation efforts in Balochistan largely failed due to entrenched ethnic nationalism, economic exclusion, and political marginalization. Attempts to expand madrassas, delegitimize nationalist leaders as “anti-Islamic,” and support religious movements have been met with resistance, deepening distrust between the Baloch population and the state. The study found that religion alone cannot sustain national cohesion, particularly in regions with longstanding grievances and systemic inequalities. This research emphasizes the limitations of top-down, coercive assimilationist policies and underscores the necessity for more inclusive approaches, such as addressing economic disparities, recognizing regional identities, and promoting political participation as essential components for building a sustainable and unified nation. The study provides critical insights for policymakers, advocating for a shift from religious assimilation to strategies that prioritize justice, equity, and cultural accommodation, particularly in KPK and Balochistan. Full article

The Tunisian uprisings projected an elusive surrealistic scene that was an aberration in a part of the world where Islamic ideology had been considered the only rallying force and a midwife for regime change. However, this sense of exceptionalism was short-lived, as the religiously zealous Islamist expats and their militant executive wings infiltrated the power vacuum to resume their suspended Islamization project of the 1980s. Brandishing electoral “legitimacy”, they attempted to reframe the bourgeoning indigenous democratization project, rooted in an evolving Tunisian intellectual and cultural heritage, along the neocolonial ideological underpinnings of the “Arab Spring” metanarrative, which proffers the thesis that democracy can be promoted in the Muslim world through so-called “Moderate Muslims”. This paper challenges this dominant narrative by offering a counter-narrative about the political transition in Tunisia. It takes stock of the multidisciplinary conceptual and analytical frameworks elaborated upon in postcolonial theory, social movement theory, cognitive neuroscience theories, and digital communication theories. It draws heavily on socio-narrative translation theory. The corpus analyzed in this work consists of disparate yet corroborating narratives cutting across modes, genres, and cultural and linguistic boundaries, and is grounded in insider participant observation. This work opens an alternative inquiry into how the processes of cross-cultural knowledge production and the power dynamics they sustain have helped shape the course of the transition since 2011. Full article

For various religious and political reasons, the idea of divine sovereignty (ḥākimiyya) has found support in many Islamic movements and discourses between the 1940s and the 1980s throughout the Muslim world. Nonetheless, in the 1990s, the consolidation of contemporary nation-states, the appeal of liberal democracy, and human rights in the Muslim world, along with the failure of Islamism, paved the way for a turn towards popular sovereignty in Islamic political thought. The emergence of a post-Islamist age in the Arab world and Iran, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (2011), has changed the perspectives of many Islamic intellectuals and jurists, who now place a higher emphasis on popular sovereignty, depoliticizing divine sovereignty. This article offers an intellectual history of the shift from divine to popular sovereignty in modern Islamic political ethics, as well as a discussion of the factors that led to this change. Few critical voices on sovereignty highlight the ethical aspects of sharia’s governance and challenge the popular sovereignty narrative as authoritarian. Full article

Before the Arab Spring erupted at the turn of 2010 and 2011, Islamic fundamentalism had long played a significant role in the political and social landscapes of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Often associated with groups advocating for a return to a strict and literal interpretation of Islamic principles, Islamic fundamentalism manifested in various movements, ideologies and violent insurgencies. These movements aimed to shape governance, challenge existing regimes and resist Western influence. The decades leading up to the Arab Spring saw a rise in both peaceful political Islamist movements and militant groups with more radical objectives. Islamic fundamentalist organisations have played varied and significant roles in the political systems of North African states. From the peaceful reformist agendas of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia to the radical insurgencies of the LIFG in Libya and the GIA in Algeria, these organisations have shaped political discourse, challenged authoritarian regimes and represented the discontent of marginalised populations. In some cases, such as in Morocco, Islamist groups have found ways to work within the political system, while in others, they have been pushed into violent opposition. The impact of Islamic fundamentalist organisations before and after the Arab Spring reveals their enduring influence on North Africa’s political landscape. Full article

This article examines Fatah’s strategic and ideological evolution during the 1970s and early 1980s, focusing on its adoption of Islamic discourse to strengthen internal cohesion and broaden its influence. It explores how this shift shaped Fatah’s political and military strategies, contributing to its identity formation and support within the Palestinian and Arab public. The findings underscore the role of ideological flexibility in navigating geopolitical dynamics and forging alliances with Islamist factions, including Hezbollah, highlighting the nuanced interplay between pragmatism and ideology in national liberation movements. The study focuses on understanding how Fatah’s adoption of Islamic discourse influenced its political and military strategies during this period. By incorporating Islamic myths and symbols, Fatah not only strengthened internal cohesion but also expanded its influence among young Islamists eager to engage in the Palestinian struggle. This research addresses the central question: How did the adoption of Islamic discourse shape Fatah’s political and military strategies during its transition from Jordan to Lebanon, and how did it contribute to the movement’s identity formation and its success in garnering support among the Palestinian and broader Arab public? Full article

This article examines the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, tracing its transformation from a social movement into a political party. This study investigates the conditions and dynamics that compelled the organization to engage in the political sphere and its efforts to distance itself from armed strategies. It explores the factors that have driven these changes and offers insights into potential future trajectories, especially in the context of the challenges faced by the Brotherhood following the military coup on 3 July 2013. Employing theoretical frameworks from studies on the transformation processes of similar movements and utilizing a process tracing methodology and in-depth interviews, the article seeks to understand how both historical and contemporary contexts have shaped the Brotherhood’s evolution and strategies. The findings suggest that, much like during previous periods of repression, the Brotherhood is likely to endure the current crisis and sustain its organizational presence. However, in doing so, it is expected to temporarily withdraw from political engagement. The article posits that, after completing this period of exile and resuming its activities in Egypt, the Brotherhood will likely continue as a social movement, stepping away from political involvement for a significant period. Full article

Bringing rightist movement studies into the Iranian context, this study advances a generalizable understanding of the ideological, moral, and cultural activism of Islamist movements and their rightist counterparts. While numerous studies have discussed the economic explanation of rightist movements, I integrate Islamist movements in the Muslim world and rightist movements in the West to develop a generalizable cultural and moral explanation of rightist movements. Value and ideological conflicts, as well as moral outrage, drive this integrated understanding of rightist movements. The rise of innovative and contentious forms of millennialism in Iran—especially the increasing salience of the Jamkaran mosque, the rise of new media outlets and millennial discourses, and pertinent policies—provide evidence for proposing this generalizable understanding. I argue that the rise of performative contentions surrounding millennialism, known as Mahdaviat, within the pro-regime revolutionary rightist movement in Iran was Islamists’ ideological response to liberal threat perceptions. These threat perceptions were activated before the liberal Reform era (1997–2005). After the ascent of Ahmadinejad to power in 2005, ideological millennialism became the dominant discursive field in Iran’s state politics. Drawing on narratives of prominent Islamist figures and media personalities in Iran and events surrounding Mahdaviat, this paper advances a generalizable argument of the moral and cultural explanation of rightist movements. Full article

This article explores the idea of political Islam as a discursive tradition within the context of Iranian Kurdistan. It challenges the prevailing essentialist and universalist approaches commonly used in the analysis of political Islam, advocating for a more adaptable and comprehensive interpretation. By conceptualizing political Islam as a discursive tradition, this study sheds light on the complex interconnections, configurations, and historical contingencies influencing Islamist discourses and movements. The paper argues that political Islam should be examined in relation to other phenomena and discourses, acknowledging its dynamic nature within specific temporal and spatial contexts. Focusing on an influential yet underexplored Islamist discursive tradition in Iranian Kurdistan during the 1970s and 1980s, the research acknowledges the hybrid nature of Islamist discourses, drawing from diverse traditions to fulfill particular objectives. In particular, it explores the perspectives of Ahmad Moftizadeh, a Sunni Kurdish Islamist and the founder of the Maktab Quran (MQ). This study investigates Moftizadeh’s views on the Islamic government, positioning it within the framework of discursive tradition. It analyzes his core categories and inquiries within Islamist thought, notably emphasizing Moftizadeh’s alignment of the Islamic government with the Islamic tradition of the Shura, highlighting its central role in the Islamist discursive tradition. Full article

The power of the “moderate” branch of the Islamic Movement (Alharaka al-Islamiyya, subsequently referred to as IM) Southern Faction (IMSF) in Israel stems from its ability to adapt to different situations, reconcile with the complex reality of being an indigenous minority in a state that defines itself a “Jewish state”, and operate within the state structure accepting democratic processes that have long been debated to clash with Islamism. Besides being represented in the Israeli Knesset since 1996, the culmination of this adaptation was the joining of the movement to the short-lived Zionist coalition government on 2 June 2021 (the government collapsed in July 2022). This historic entry of an Arab Party into a Jewish/Zionist government coalition for the first time in Israel’s history was a shocking surprise to many, not only due to the IM being an Arab–Palestinian movement but also an Islamist movement. My analysis shows that despite this reconciliation, the IM continues to emphasize religiosity, binding it to the national political struggle and identity of Israel’s Palestinian minority. For its supporters, the IMSF is seen as a meeting point of spiritual/religious needs on the one hand and material needs in the social, political, and cultural spheres on the other. However, for its opponents, mainly from the other Arab political parties, the IM had deviated from the national consensus and accepted strategies and tools to deal with the challenges facing them as a minority in Israel. And, for some others, the IM had even deviated from Islam itself. I draw on a field study that spanned several years. It is based on qualitative, extensive interviews with senior Islamist and non-Islamist leaders in Israel, as well as primary sources of the IM, including publications, leaders’ speeches, and social media. All quotes in this article are based on the author’s interviews during 2022–2024. Interviews with the following leaders and activists: IM leader Abdul-Malik Dahamsheh, sheik Ibrahim Sarsour, former MK Muhammad Hasan Ken`an, Nosiba Darwish `Issa, IM MK Eman Yassin Khatib, NDA’ chairman Sami Abu Shehadeh, secretary general of Abnaa al-Balad (Sons of the Country) Muhammad Kana`neh, and with Kufr Qare` former mayor Zuhair Yahya were conducted by in-person or by phone during summer–fall 2023. The interviews with former IMNF activist Aisha Hajjar, activist Zuhriyyeh ‘Azab, journalist Abd el-Rahman Magadleh, and DFPE member Elias Abu Oksa were conducted via What’s App, Messenger, and e-mail in 2022. The interview with political analyst Ameer Makhoul was conducted in December 2023 via Messenger. Follow-up communication was mainly through What’s App to clarify certain points. The interview questions focused on the reasons for the Islamic Movement’s division into two wings, the religious and political justifications for entering the Knesset and the coalition, the relationship between the southern wing and the main Arab parties active in the Israeli Knesset, the experience of unity with them, and the experience of its members while in the Zionist coalition. This article examines how the Islamic Movement in Israel uses religion as a tool to influence the national, cultural, political, economic, and social lives of the Arab minority in Israel. It asks: How does the Islamic Movement, religiously and politically, justify its involvement in the political game and in a Zionist government coalition, and how do Arab parties perceive this involvement? Moreover, it raises an important question about the nature of the movement: to what extent is the Islamic Movement a political Islam movement, and whether it has abandoned the basic goals of political Islam for the sake of becoming a democratic Islamic party? This article will provide significant insight into crucial aspects of the IM that have been previously overlooked. While being in a Zionist coalition gave hardly any latitude in decision making about policies, budgets were an attractive avenue for the Islamic Movement to guide public opinion and gain political support. The article comes during the ongoing war on Gaza, which will undoubtedly cast a shadow on the political climate and the political map in Israel in general and on the political work of Arab parties and the Islamic Movement in particular. Although it is too early to predict the impact of this war on the Islamic Movement and its political future, it can be assumed that the impact will be profound. Full article

Radical/extremist Islamist actors use social media to disseminate uncompromising stories of monist religious political orders and identities. As a reaction, counter-movements to online Islamist radicalism/extremism emerged in Western societies (and beyond), while uncertainty about effective outcomes remains widespread. In a bid to understand how inclusionary and exclusionary discursive spaces are created, we ask: How do some Muslim actors create discursive spaces open to self-reflection, pluralism and liberal-democratic principles, while others construct illiberal, particularistic and non/anti-democratic spaces? To respond to this question, we compare two contrasting storytellers, one who agitates for exclusionary Islamist radicalism/extremism (Generation Islam) and one who offers inclusionary prevention and deradicalization work against that (Jamal al-Khatib). We draw on novel narrative approaches to the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) in Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), via which we compare text-level and context-level narratives disseminated about three Muslim-related crises: the racist terrorist attacks/genocide to represent the national, European and global level. Our two-layered, DHA-inspired narrative analysis illustrates that, at the level of text, narrative persuasion varies between both contrasting actors. While Jamal al-Khatib disseminates persuasive stories, Generation Islam is much less invested in narrative persuasion; it seems to address an already convinced audience. These two text-level strategies reveal their meaning in two antagonistic narrative genres: Jamal al-Khatib’s “self-reflexive savior” creates an inclusionary discursive space represented in a self-ironic narrative genre, while Generation Islam’s ”crusading savior” manufactures an exclusionary discursive space represented in a romance featuring a nostalgic return to the particularistic Islamic umma. Full article

Some contemporary social phenomena, despite secularization, are still linked to religion. However, this same secularization seems to have accompanied a progressive process of religious illiteracy. Therefore, the capacity to address religious inspired issues is lower than the magnitude of the problems at work, be violent right-wing movement and Islamist terrorism or ethical debates on the beginning and end of life, to name but a few. Hence, this paper aims to fulfil three goals: to revisit secularism and some liberal assumptions that might prevent a correct understanding of these phenomena, to assess some of the consequences of the critique of ideologies and to propose an alternative approach to address religious inspired social phenomena. Full article

This article examines whether a ‘civilizational turn’ has occurred among populist movements in Indonesia. It focuses on the civilizational elements in the populist discourse of the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front/FPI) in Indonesia. The article traces the FPI’s history and growing influence on politics and society in Indonesia in the 2010s. This article argues that the FPI has instrumentalized religious discourse, and through it divided Indonesian society into three groups: the virtuous ummah, corrupt elites, and immoral internal and external non-Muslim enemies, especially the civilizational bloc ‘the West’. This instrumentalization gained the group a degree of popularity in the second decade of the post-Suharto period and strengthened its political power and ability to bargain with mainstream political parties. The article uses the FPI’s actions and discourse during the Ahok affair to demonstrate the civilizational turn in Indonesian populism. The article shows how the FPI grew in power during the Ahok affair, in which a Christian Chinese politician, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, was accused of blasphemy by Indonesian Islamists and later convicted on the same charge by an Indonesian court. The FPI was a leading part of a broad coalition of Islamist groups and individuals which called for Ahok to be charged with blasphemy; charges which were eventually laid and which led to Ahok being sentenced to two years imprisonment. The FPI, the article shows, framed Ahok as a non-Muslim Christian and therefore a ‘foreign’ enemy who was spreading moral corruption in Indonesia, governing ‘elites’ as complacent in combating immorality and positioned themselves as defenders of ‘the people’ or ummah. From the security perspective of the state, the FPI presented a critical threat that required containing. As a result of the growing power of the group, the FPI was banned in 2020 and Rizieq was imprisoned, while Ahok was politically rehabilitated by the Widodo government. Although the FPI’s banning is considered the most effective nonpermanent solution for the state, there is evidence that the FPI’s discourse has been adopted by mainstream political actors. This article, then, finds that the growth of the FPI during the second decade of the post-Suharto period, and their actions in leading the persecution of Ahok, demonstrates a civilizational turn in Indonesian Islamist populism. Full article