Real-world IoT network security generates traffic at big-data scale with extreme class imbalance, temporal non-stationarity, and continuously evolving attack strategies that overwhelm static supervised classifiers. This paper presents a cognitive computing framework for network intrusion detection: a CNN–LSTM–DQN architecture with Prioritized Experience Replay
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Real-world IoT network security generates traffic at big-data scale with extreme class imbalance, temporal non-stationarity, and continuously evolving attack strategies that overwhelm static supervised classifiers. This paper presents a cognitive computing framework for network intrusion detection: a CNN–LSTM–DQN architecture with Prioritized Experience Replay (PER) evaluated on a 5,000,000-flow naturalistic sample of the TON_IoT Processed_Network dataset (4,000,000 training/1,000,000 temporally held-out test flows; 94.5% attack ratio) under a strict temporal split. The cognitive agent optimizes detection decisions using an Alerts per Million Flows (ARMF)-aware reward function that encodes both alert-fatigue cost and missed-attack penalty. We conduct a cross-attack-family generalization study: the methodology—architecture template, reward design, and hyperparameter calibration—is inherited from a framework previously validated on CSE-CIC-IDS2018, re-instantiated and retrained on the structurally different TON_IoT environment, and compared against the previously published benchmark. Initialization sensitivity is characterized across five independent random seeds using paired Wilcoxon signed-rank and
t-tests. Across the five seeds, the proposed X2 model attains recall 0.833 ± 0.306 and F1 0.874 ± 0.241 (mean ± sample SD), versus the supervised X1 baseline at 0.858 ± 0.178 and 0.912 ± 0.116; the best-performing seed (42) achieves 97.52% accuracy, 98.02% attack recall, 99.46% precision, and 98.73% F1-score on 1,000,000 held-out XSS flows—an attack family entirely absent from training—with temporal stability variances of 4.63 × 10
−7 (recall) and 1.38 × 10
−7 (F1). The X2 advantage observed among the four stable seeds is not statistically demonstrated at
n = 5 (statistical power ≈ 5.1%); the initialization-sensitivity finding itself, including one degenerate alert-suppression seed, is reported as a primary contribution. A formal, exactly additive ARMF decomposition distinguishes the detected-attack (structural) component (99.46%) from the model-induced false-positive component (0.54%), and we report a multi-seed, ARMF-aware cognitive IDS evaluation on naturalistic TON_IoT traffic under an unseen-attack-family test condition that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been reported in the surveyed RL-based NIDS literature.
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