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Article

City-Region Strategic Coupling in China: Central–Local State Interactions and the Geopolitical Processes of Kunming

by
Qike Yang
1,
Zhiding Hu
1,*,
Zhe Zhang
2 and
Yingxin Li
3
1
School of Geographic Sciences, East China Normal University, Shanghai 201100, China
2
College of Urban and Environmental Sciences, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
3
Faculty of Geography, Yunnan Normal University, Kunming 650500, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Land 2026, 15(6), 933; https://doi.org/10.3390/land15060933 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 21 April 2026 / Revised: 19 May 2026 / Accepted: 25 May 2026 / Published: 29 May 2026
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Abstract

Existing studies on city-regionalism as geopolitical processes tend to overuse the concept of the “state” or conflate the roles of the state and the central government. To explore the joint operation of central and local governments in city-regionalism as geopolitical processes, this paper proposes an analytical framework of city-region strategic coupling. This framework emphasizes that although the interests and objectives of the central and local governments are not completely identical, both sides realize strategic coupling through dynamic adjustment and strategic interaction under changing contexts. In this way, the city-region can both serve national strategies and meet local developmental demands, thereby advancing city-regionalism as geopolitical processes. Taking the Kunming city-region in China as a case study, this paper shows that the central government has supported the Kunming city-region through infrastructure investment so that it may become a radiation center facing Southeast Asia, thereby strengthening geopolitical and geoeconomic relations with Southeast Asian countries. The Yunnan government has not merely acted as a passive executor but has also used national strategies to achieve its own local development goals.

1. Introduction

A city-region generally refers to one or more cities together with their extensive hinterlands [1]. Compared with the city-region as a spatial phenomenon that actually exists, city-regionalism is a discourse that promotes the construction of city-regions [2]. City-regionalism has become crucial to national state geopolitical experimentation. The state can use the city-region as an instrument to achieve national geopolitical goals, thereby reworking state capacities in both international competition and domestic governance [3]. Existing studies on city-regionalism as geopolitical processes have adopted different perspectives. These include the incorporation of city-regions into national strategic agendas [3], national governmental support for champion city-regions [4], state spatial selection [5], the shaping of city-regions by geopolitical visions at different stages of the state [6], state-led rescaling [7], and the specific construction of geopolitics in border city-regions [8]. A shared feature of these perspectives is that they emphasize the dominant role of the central government over city-regions, while reducing local governments to passive instruments or policy implementers. Their limitation is that they fail to regard the central and local governments as equally important actors and to analyze how the two operate collaboratively in city-regionalism as geopolitical processes when their goals and interests are not entirely aligned. In fact, the development of city-regions in China is jointly shaped by interventions by multilevel governments [9], and local governments are not merely instruments. They also pursue their own goals and interests. This requires close examination of how central–local relations move toward coupling in geopolitical processes.
To address this theoretical limitation, we propose a framework for city-region strategic coupling. Through the interrelated dimensions of strategic cooperation, the instrumentalization of the city-region, and spatial interest practices, this framework analyzes the operation of central and local governments in city-regionalism as geopolitical processes. It emphasizes that the interests and objectives of the central and local governments are not naturally identical. The central government must respond to changes in international geopolitical conditions and to nationwide comprehensive governance, whereas local governments must consider both the implementation of central directives and the promotion of local governance and development. Driven by changes in their institutional, economic, political, and geopolitical environments, the two sides realize strategic coupling through dynamic relational adjustment. Through material support for the city-region, its development can both serve national strategies and satisfy local developmental demands, thereby advancing city-regionalism as geopolitical processes. This framework does not suggest that the central and local governments have equal status or identical roles. Rather, it emphasizes that both are indispensable.
This paper makes a theoretical contribution to the study of city-regionalism as geopolitical processes. It disaggregates state actors into central governments and local governments and emphasizes how these two actors achieve coordination when their goals and interests diverge, an approach that highlights the agency of local governments. In previous studies, the concept of strategic coupling has mainly been used in research on global production networks. Building on this concept, Zhang and Xu proposed the notion of central–local state strategic coupling [5]. Although it was used to analyze city-regionalism as geopolitical processes in China, it placed excessive emphasis on central government regulation over localities and did not sufficiently analyze the role of local governments. Zhang et al. proposed the concept of city strategic coupling, emphasizing the city itself as an agent in the process of urban development, but they did not fully consider how the city operates as a geopolitical process [10]. Inspired by these studies, this paper proposes the concept of city-region strategic coupling and offers a new perspective for understanding the joint operation of China’s multilevel governments in city-regionalism as geopolitical processes.
This paper conducts an empirical study of the Kunming city-region. Kunming is the capital of Yunnan Province in southwestern China. Because of its extensive and dynamic cross-border relations, it is regarded as both a border city and the operational core of Yunnan’s cross-border agenda [11]. In the context of China’s comprehensive promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Yunnan has become a key space for China’s opening-up toward Southeast Asia, and nearly all policy and material agendas related to Yunnan’s outward engagement revolve around the Kunming city-region. The Kunming city-region provides a dynamic field in which to examine the complex relations, struggles over interests, and joint operations in territorial space between the central government and local governments, thus offering an excellent window for observing how the city-region functions as a geopolitical process. In the following sections, we first review the literature on city-regionalism as geopolitical processes, in order to develop new theoretical insights and an analytical framework, and then explain the methodology. We then analyze the strategic activities of China’s central government and the Yunnan local government through the case of the Kunming city-region, followed by conclusions and discussion.

2. Rethinking City-Regionalism as Geopolitical Processes in China

2.1. Literature Review

In recent years, city-regions have gradually become one of the core scales of state spatial governance, attracting scholarly attention to the relationship between city-regions and geopolitics. Jonas and Moisio proposed the idea of city-regionalism as a set of geopolitical processes, treating the city-region as a core space for national geopolitical experimentation and reterritorialization and emphasizing the central role of top-down state planning in this process [3]. Moisio and Jonas argued that the geopolitics of city-regionalism should stress how city-regions generate international influence for the state [12]. Moisio proposed the notion of the geopolitical growth of city-regions, arguing that national governments pursuing competitiveness tend to support outstanding city-regions so that these city-regions can play strategic roles in reorganizing national territorial space [4]. In related studies, the state is widely framed as the principal actor shaping city-region development, with analysis consistently grounded in the theoretical perspectives of state spatial selectivity or state rescaling. State spatial selectivity emphasizes that the state does not support all territorial spaces at the same time but selectively supports particular spaces through policies, finance, or institutions [13]. State rescaling focuses on the production of new scales in order to realize national strategic goals [14].
Research on city-regionalism as geopolitical processes in China has become quite rich. For example, studies of the Yangtze River Delta city-region emphasize the influence of the national state’s geopolitical vision on the development of Shanghai, while local governments of other cities that did not receive support from the central government could only express dissatisfaction [6]. Research on Chengdu emphasizes that the reason for city-regional development lies in state-led spatial reorganization and state spatial selectivity [7]. Song et al. stress the impact of state planning and state rescaling on the construction of border city-regions in China [8]. However, the limitation of these studies is that they rely too heavily on the abstract concept of the “state,” conflate state actors with the central government, and regard local governments as passive implementation authorities or growth-oriented institutions [15], thereby overlooking the indispensable role of local governments as state actors in shaping the city-region process.
When discussing the influence of the state on city-regions, the term “state” is useful for describing state-scale strategies, plans, and interests, but action is always carried out by specific actors. In this sense, the state should not be blurred into a homogeneous or singular actor. In concrete policy implementation and strategic operations, the state actors need to be further disaggregated. More specifically, does “state actor” refer to the central government or to a multilevel governance system extending from the central government to localities? Should it also include private actors indispensable to state entrepreneurialism [16]? In studies of city-regionalism, because the power relations among governments and between governments and nongovernmental actors vary considerably across countries, the specific referents of state actors need to be analyzed in relation to the national context. Li and Wu argue that city-regionalism in the United States is mainly led by businesses, with relatively weak governmental actors; in the UK, city-regionalism is mainly led by the central government, although there are also cases led by nonpublic sectors; in China, city-regionalism is primarily government-led, with relatively limited participation by nonpublic sectors [17]. It is therefore clear that the meaning of “state actors” differs across countries, which requires corresponding analytical frameworks for different types of states. This paper offers a preliminary discussion of this issue in the Chinese context.
Before China’s reform and opening-up, local governments mainly implemented central policies passively [18]. Since reform and opening-up, however, the decentralization of power has changed central–local relations. Although the central government remains the highest authority, local governments may lag behind in implementing central policies or interpret them differently [19], and they possess a certain degree of power to shape implementation outcomes at the local level [20]. They may even deviate from the original intent of national policies [21]. In addition, local governments in China are often more concerned with their own economic development and may show little interest in, or even ignore, the central government’s geopolitical considerations [19,22]. Yet without the implementation of central policies by local governments, the geopolitical agenda of the state still cannot be realized in practice. Given the operational characteristics of city-regionalism in China, state actors can be disaggregated into the central government and local governments [17], and neither side can be ignored in city-regionalism as geopolitical processes.
Because a lack of coordination among governments often leads to the failure of city-region building [5,17,23], we argue that the coordinated operation of the central and local governments is crucial to the successful functioning of this process. In city-regionalism as geopolitical processes in China, Zhang and Liu argue that strategic coupling is a powerful concept for analyzing relations between the central and local governments [24]. Strategic coupling originally emerged from research on the global production network and emphasizes how regional assets are strategically integrated into global firms and coordinated with them [25]. In recent years, the concept has been extended to urban strategic analysis. Zhang et al. argue that neither urban entrepreneurialism from an economic perspective nor theories emphasizing the state perspective, such as state spatial selectivity and state entrepreneurialism, sufficiently recognize the agency of the city [10]. They therefore propose the concept of city strategic coupling to discuss the strategic agency of multiple actors within the city in shaping urban development. However, this study does not adequately consider how the city operates as a geopolitical process.
Zhang and Xu proposed the concept of central–local state strategic coupling, emphasizing negotiation between the central and local governments over the realization of geopolitical goals through the city-region [5]. Yet, they highlight the influence of the central government’s spatial selectivity and regulatory power on the city-region and do not sufficiently explain how local governments accept and strategically participate in coupling. We believe that Zhang and Liu’s view that the central government aligns local governments with its geopolitical interests is insufficient [24]. In fact, even when local governments and the central government reach consensus on strategic direction, their underlying motivations may still differ [26,27]. While a city-region may strategically emphasize certain functions in order to align with national strategies, its fundamental goal is not merely to implement national policies but rather to utilize central support for its own development [28]. Thus, even if the central and local governments achieve strategic coupling in actual action, their goals and interests may still differ.
In sum, existing research on city-regionalism as geopolitical processes has not adequately explained how and why the central and local governments form a collaborative coupled relationship in this process. Drawing on the concept of strategic coupling, we propose an analytical framework of city-region strategic coupling. This concept emphasizes that the central and local governments adjust their relations and engage in strategic interaction dynamically so that the city-region can serve both national and local goals. Although the central and local governments occupy different positions and play different roles, both are indispensable. The development of the city-region is the product of their cooperation, struggles over interests, and strategic interaction, rather than the result of a single government acting alone. This theoretical perspective provides a framework for analyzing the complex entanglements among geopolitics, the city-region, the central government, and local governments in the Chinese context.

2.2. Analytical Framework

This paper proposes an analytical framework of city-region strategic coupling. The framework emphasizes that the interests and objectives of the central and local governments are not naturally identical. Driven by changes in the domestic and international context of the state, both sides adjust their relations according to their own objectives or needs and realize strategic coupling. Through material and discursive support for the city-region, they endow it with specific functions so that its development can simultaneously serve the different interests of the central and local governments. This framework is designed to analyze the operation of the central and local governments in city-regionalism as geopolitical processes in China. The following section explains in detail the three interrelated components of the framework (Figure 1).
First, strategic cooperation. Strategic cooperation refers to how central and local governments coordinate strategically and achieve cooperation in supporting the city-region. In the Chinese context, the central government must respond to international geopolitics and comprehensive nationwide governance, while local governments are concerned with local development and policy implementation. Their interests and objectives are not naturally identical [6], yet coordination in ideas and practices is realized through continuous dynamic struggles [19]. Such strategic cooperation includes not only the central government’s spatial selectivity toward the city-region but also local governments’ adjustments in their responses to central policies according to their own developmental needs, thereby forming a coupling relationship [28]. The core of strategic cooperation is that city-regional development must account for both national strategies and local developmental demands. It is through a consensus formed around the geopolitical value of the city-region that strategic interaction becomes possible.
Second, the instrumentalization of the city-region. This refers to the way the city-region becomes linked with national strategic agendas through infrastructure construction, functional positioning, and institutional support from central and local governments, thereby functioning as a geopolitical instrument. As an instrument of national strategy, the city-region requires both material and nonmaterial support from the state, encompassing infrastructure investment, spatial planning, and construction [3,5]. Support from the central government often provides crucial additional momentum for city-regional development. In this process, local governments are not merely policy implementers but actively scale up local infrastructure agendas to elevate them into national projects. The essence of the instrumentalization of the city-region lies in selectively supporting specific city-regions and targeted development projects within them, thereby endowing the city-region with specific functions [7].
Third, spatial interest practices. Spatial interest practices focus on how central and local governments realize their respective goals through the development of the city-region. The city-region serves not only as a policy instrument for the central government but also as a platform through which local governments acquire resources and promote development [28]. City-region strategic coupling emphasizes coordination in action rather than a perfect alignment of interests and goals. Although this paper divides state actors into central and local governments, the primary purpose of central government action is to advance strategic and planning agendas at the national scale. Consequently, the central government primarily secures national interests. Local governments may emphasize certain functions of the city-region when seeking support from the central government, yet their ultimate objective is to advance their own development agendas [28]. The central government acquires a geopolitical advantage at the national scale through the city-region, while local governments realize local territorial interests through the city-region as they implement national strategies, thereby making the city-region serve statecraft [29]. Through this process, the city-region becomes a spatial instrument that facilitates the coexistence of multilevel interests. In the following sections, we apply this framework to analyze the geopolitical processes of the Kunming city-region.
We argue that the analytical framework of city-region strategic coupling is applicable to states or regions within specific political-economic contexts. First, capital and social forces are controlled, granting the state system greater power and capacity to shape the geographical landscape. Second, the central state remains centralized but has also decentralized power to a certain degree, enabling the central and local states to interact flexibly. Such states include post-reform China, as well as contemporary Vietnam, France, Thailand, and Kazakhstan.

3. Methodology

3.1. Methods and Data

To conduct this research, the lead author lived in Kunming for three years, from 2022 to 2025, and carried out long-term fieldwork in the Kunming city-region. Because this study concerns not only the Kunming city-region but also cross-border connectivity between Kunming and neighboring countries, the research team collected a massive amount of data and documentary materials and conducted multiple rounds of field investigations along the Yunnan border (Table 1).
Governments at different levels in China formulate the Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development every five years. We reviewed these planning documents from 2011 to 2026 to understand the focus and interests of different governments across various periods. We also collected extensive documents, reports, and books related to Kunming urban planning. The collection period ended in late 2025. These materials cover themes including foreign trade, border development, the BRI, international corridor construction, urban planning strategies, the Central Yunnan Urban Agglomeration, urban history, logistics and transportation, and transportation infrastructure construction. Throughout 2025, we continuously monitored official news and newspaper platforms of different governments in Yunnan. We collected and organized news relevant to this paper. We also gathered important news published before 2025. We further collected numerous statistical yearbooks to provide data support. These include the China Statistical Yearbook from 2000 to 2022, the Yunnan Statistical Yearbook from 2007 to 2023, and the Port Statistical Yearbook from 2001 to 2022.
Our fieldwork in Yunnan spanned several periods. These periods were 12–22 July 2022, 15–27 August 2022, one week in December 2023, 20–22 September 2024, 16–25 October 2024, and 24 November–4 December 2025. This schedule allowed us to personally observe the changes taking place in Yunnan. During this time, we conducted multiple interviews with numerous government officials, staff members, businesspeople, and residents in Yunnan. Each interview lasted 20 to 40 min to obtain diverse perspectives (Appendix A). We ensured the privacy and anonymity of all participants. We held group meetings and focus group interviews with certain officials. This method enabled us to discuss issues with multiple government officials together. Regarding the selection of interviewees, we first contacted officials from the Party School of Lincang City in Yunnan. They also desired to conduct research on international corridors. We then reached out to more government officials through a snowballing method. For residents, staff members, and businesspeople, we established contact through on-site visits. We combined this diverse collection of data and materials with a longitudinal case study approach. This approach enabled us to understand the multiple impacts of major Chinese policies during their actual implementation in Yunnan and Kunming. It also helped us to understand the connections between multiple events and conduct cross-validation. This process ultimately supported us in drawing reasonable analytical results.

3.2. Study Area

This paper takes the administrative area of Kunming Municipality as the spatial extent of the Kunming city-region, which accords with Rodríguez-Pose’s definition of a city-region as a city and its hinterland [1]. Because of the central position of the Kunming city-region within Yunnan Province, it carries the main functions of Yunnan’s opening-up to the outside world, concentrates Yunnan’s major economic, political, and human resources, and has become the hub of Yunnan’s cross-border flows [11] (Figure 2). In the process of incorporating the Kunming city-region into China’s geopolitics, the central government of China and the Yunnan provincial government are the principal actors in this study.

4. City-Region Strategic Coupling of Kunming: Central–Local State Negotiation and Cooperation

For some time after the founding of the PRC, the Kunming city-region was not a priority target of support from the central government. Faced with military pressure and nuclear threats from the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies, China was compelled to prepare for war. This led to the Third Front Construction, through which some industrial equipment and scientific and technical personnel were relocated to central and western China, accompanied by infrastructure investment. Because Yunnan was situated on the frontline of the Vietnam War, Kunming received relatively few Third Front projects. At this stage, the Yunnan government functioned mainly as a passive implementing actor [18], with little room to pursue distinctive local interests in the process.
After reform and opening-up, China’s core objective shifted toward national economic development. The Chinese state began to rely on coastal city-regions as windows for opening-up and started to foster global city-regions. During this period, China increasingly embraced the idea of promoting and relying on urban development in order to compete internationally [6]. Yunnan, however, remained on the frontline of the so-called “Self-Defensive Counterattack against Vietnam”, and border conflict continued from 1979 to 1989. Yunnan’s inland location, together with its role as a security space rather than a space of exchange and trade, caused the Kunming city-region to miss a crucial window for outward-oriented development.
In the 1990s, Yunnan attempted to reorient its opening-up strategy toward South Asia and Southeast Asia, with Kunming as the center. Even then, however, the central government continued to prioritize coastal city-regions, and the strategic significance of the Kunming city-region remained limited [30]. After the turn of the twenty-first century, the central government adopted measures such as the Going-out Strategy and the Western Development Strategy, signaling greater attention to the development and opening-up of western China and creating a potential opportunity for Kunming. This did not mean, however, that the Kunming city-region received adequate support. In 2007, Yunnan proposed the Third Eurasian Continental Bridge, envisioning a transportation and trade corridor from Kunming to Rotterdam, but the project was shelved because it failed to gain central approval. During this period, the Yunnan government gradually began to display agency and to pursue development interests based on local conditions, but the central government still paid only limited strategic attention to Kunming.
Since the 2010s, the central government has gradually come to recognize the important geopolitical significance of inland city-regions. Economically, the problems of overaccumulation and overproduction in eastern China provided momentum for city-regional development in Yunnan [31]. Investment in connectivity infrastructure in Yunnan could absorb substantial amounts of capital and, once completed, provide a more efficient foundation for the outward-oriented economic activities of western China. At the same time, China’s economic competition and great-power rivalry with countries such as the United States and Japan in Southeast Asia also led the central government to recognize the strategic significance of the Kunming city-region. On this basis, the development of the Kunming city-region was gradually incorporated into China’s geopolitical processes.
The central government’s strategic positioning of Yunnan indicates that strategic coupling between the central and Yunnan governments began to take shape. After visiting Yunnan in 2009, Hu Jintao proposed building Yunnan into an important bridgehead for China’s opening-up toward the southwest [32]. Since 2013, the central government has launched initiatives such as the BRI. More importantly, Xi Jinping visited Yunnan twice, in 2015 and 2020, and positioned the province as a radiation center facing South Asia and Southeast Asia, a model zone of ethnic unity and progress, and a frontrunner in ecological civilization construction. This reflects how the central government has dynamically adjusted its spatial selectivity and support for city-regions in response to changing domestic and international strategic circumstances. Although central leaders did not directly assign this positioning to Kunming itself, both the central government and the Yunnan government understood that the notions of “bridgehead” and “radiation center” indicated a desire to integrate Yunnan into China’s wider international strategic agenda.
Faced with this historically significant strategic opportunity, the Yunnan government did not remain a passive implementing tool. Rather, it gradually embedded itself in national strategy and achieved coupling with the central government on the basis of its own assessment of Yunnan’s and Kunming’s characteristics and development interests. Yunnan already had a relatively strong foundation for international regional cooperation and was highly receptive to the upgrading of local opening-up policies into initiatives at the state scale [33]. Summers argues that Yunnan’s initial understanding of the BRI was relatively vague but that after 2015, alongside Xi’s strategic positioning of Yunnan, the province’s response became increasingly concrete [19].
Further evidence of strategic coupling between Yunnan and the central government can be found in Yunnan Province’s Five-Year Plans. In the 2011 Twelfth Five-Year Plan, content related to the “bridgehead” was placed near the end of the document. In the 2016 Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, content related to Xi’s positioning of Yunnan was placed in the middle. In the 2021 Fourteenth Five-Year Plan, this content was moved to the very beginning. In the 2026 Fifteenth Five-Year Plan, content concerning the further deepening of the construction of a radiation center facing South Asia and Southeast Asia still appears at the beginning, whereas content on ethnic affairs and ecology is placed near the end. This suggests that mobilizing the Kunming city-region to serve the national state’s strategy remains a top priority over the long term and that its importance has continued to grow rather than decline.
The central government and the Yunnan government did not naturally share a common development agenda for the Kunming city-region from the outset. Rather, this convergence has been closely related to China’s external geopolitical setting and to state spatial selectivity across multiple levels of government. Over the past decade, the central government has sought to make Yunnan a radiation center facing South Asia and Southeast Asia, enhancing China’s international competitiveness and influence in Southeast Asia through the Kunming city-region, while Yunnan has increasingly realized that integration into national strategy and the international arena offers a faster route to development.

5. The Kunming City-Region as a Geopolitical Instrument of Opening-Up

5.1. Material Support for Connectivity Infrastructure

Although the central government and the Yunnan government reached a broad agreement on the idea of opening-up toward Southeast Asia, Yunnan and the Kunming city-region remained relatively closed and underdeveloped in the early phase of BRI implementation. Most outbound freight from Yunnan still depended on road transport; logistics costs remained above the national average; transportation infrastructure developed slowly; Kunming Airport had limited hub capacity and few international routes; and both energy and internet infrastructure lagged behind. The absence of connectivity infrastructure in Yunnan made it difficult to sustain the vision of becoming a radiation center facing Southeast Asia. To address this problem, under the coordinated planning of the central government and the Yunnan government, international transportation infrastructure with Kunming as its hub has advanced rapidly over the past decade. Since the 2010s, the international transportation network centered on Kunming has developed rapidly.
The length of expressways in Yunnan has increased rapidly. In 2012, Yunnan ranked around the national median, but since 2022, it has ranked second nationwide. At present, expressways linking China with Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar are fully connected within Yunnan. There are two railway lines between Yunnan and Vietnam. One is the century-old Yunnan–Vietnam Railway: the Yunnan–Vietnam meter-gauge railway opened the Kunming–Haiphong route in 1910, but after the turn of the twenty-first century, most of the Yunnan section was suspended because of aging facilities, technological backwardness, and frequent natural hazards along the route. In response to the BRI, however, freight transport between China and Vietnam on the Yunnan–Vietnam meter-gauge railway resumed in 2017. Because the carrying capacity of this railway was limited, China constructed another railway to Vietnam, namely the Kunming–Yuxi–Hekou Railway, which opened the Kunming-to-Hekou route in December 2014. On the Laos side, the China–Laos Railway opened in December 2021; it was built by China using Chinese technical standards. In addition, a railway from Kunming to the China–Myanmar border is currently under construction.
The coordinated interaction between the central and local states has significantly advanced infrastructure construction in the Kunming city-region. The central government has allowed local governments a certain degree of autonomy and flexibility in order to promote infrastructure and urban development, while also exercising a role in top-level design [34]. The China–Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, now China’s fourth-largest energy import corridor, were initially proposed and planned from below by the Yunnan government; the central government then participated from above in design and coordination and reached an agreement with Myanmar at the national level, thereby ensuring the smooth implementation of the cross-border project. Completed in 2013, the project shows that when major national interests such as energy security and geopolitically significant strategic infrastructure are involved, the central government actively intervenes as an actor in the national economy. The pipelines also enabled the commissioning of a refinery in Kunming with an annual capacity of 10 million tons, thereby promoting the expansion of the city-region [35]. Located in Kunming, Changshui International Airport was the only major gateway hub airport approved in China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, and it entered service in 2012. In 2022, it ranked fourth nationwide in passenger throughput and tenth in cargo throughput, served the largest number of South and Southeast Asian destinations in China, maintained intercontinental routes, and became one of China’s top ten international aviation hubs. The construction of the Kunming urban rail transit system has linked the city’s functional zones of economic activity, residential areas, and transportation, thereby strengthening internal connectivity within the Kunming city-region.
Because investment in major interconnectivity infrastructure is extremely costly, it would have been difficult for the Yunnan government alone to complete these projects. Some were first proposed by the Yunnan government and then approved and supported by the central government, while others were planned and led by the central government and locally coordinated by the Yunnan government. Moreover, some infrastructure investments have clear strategic significance. As one government official in Lincang, Yunnan, observed:
“Although the conditions for interconnectivity in Myanmar remain immature, infrastructure, industrial parks, and other facilities in China’s domestic border regions have been built to a high standard. This kind of strategic investment takes into account Myanmar’s significance in great-power rivalry”
(foreign affairs official, 2025).
These geopolitical practices of spatial planning, layout, investment, and construction in Yunnan have turned Kunming into a hub linking domestic regions such as the Chengdu–Chongqing Economic Circle, the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area, and the Yangtze River Delta with external regions including Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar.

5.2. The External Flow Role of the Kunming City-Region

Constrained by Sino–Indian relations and the geopolitical configuration of the Indo-Pacific, China’s infrastructure connectivity with South Asian countries has made little practical progress [33]. As a result, Yunnan’s outward flows are oriented more toward Southeast Asia than South Asia. Existing interconnectivity infrastructure with Southeast Asian countries mainly covers Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar on the Indochina Peninsula and has formed the China–Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor. These four countries have therefore become Yunnan’s principal trading partners. Their combined share of Yunnan’s total imports and exports increased markedly after the construction of interconnectivity infrastructure and continued to rise before the COVID-19 pandemic, especially after the launch of the BRI in 2013 (Figure 3). This reflects Yunnan’s growing radiation capacity toward Southeast Asia.
Kunming has long accounted for a substantial share of Yunnan’s total import and export trade. Although the expansion of opening-up in Yunnan’s border areas after the launch of the BRI caused Kunming’s share of the provincial total to fall rapidly, the construction of international corridors centered on Kunming subsequently reconcentrated international flows in the city, reflecting the enhanced centrality and radiation capacity of the Kunming city-region. Kunming Airport, Hekou Railway Port, Hekou Highway Port, Mohan, and Ruili are Yunnan’s most important ports, and these correspond to the province’s three major international corridor projects. The China–Myanmar international corridor, represented by the planned China–Myanmar Railway and the China–Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, mainly passes through Ruili. The China–Laos–Thailand international corridor, represented by the China–Laos Railway, mainly passes through Mohan. The Yunnan–Vietnam international corridor, represented by the Kunming–Yuxi–Hekou Railway and the Yunnan–Vietnam Railway, mainly passes through Hekou. Yunnan’s expressways to these countries also pass through these principal ports. Yunnan’s major outward flows depend on these international corridors and economic corridors, while the Kunming city-region occupies a dominant position within these flows, demonstrating the close relationship between the international corridors and Kunming.
The transportation hub function of the Kunming city-region is also evident in changes in traffic volumes across all of Yunnan’s ports (Figure 4). Cross-border traffic volumes continued to rise, except during periods affected by the pandemic. In 2021, when COVID-19 caused declines in motor vehicle and air traffic, rail traffic increased against the trend, reflecting the significant effect of interconnectivity infrastructure such as the China–Laos Railway in enhancing the outward flows of Kunming and Yunnan. Since the launch of the BRI, rail freight services have expanded substantially. International freight trains with Kunming as the hub have improved connectivity among Europe, Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia, thereby strengthening both Kunming’s and China’s radiation capacity and influence toward South Asia and Southeast Asia.

6. Spatial Interest Practices of Central and Local Governments

6.1. China’s Geopolitical Gains

The strengthening of interconnectivity and flows centered on the Kunming city-region has generated corresponding geopolitical benefits for China. The rise of the Kunming city-region has altered Yunnan’s geostrategic position. Historically, Yunnan occupied a marginal frontier position within China, far from the country’s core regions and characterized by limited internal and external flows. Since the twenty-first century, however, the Kunming city-region and the development it has driven have transformed Yunnan from a remote and underdeveloped frontier into a frontline of opening-up [35]. Yunnan has become a land bridge linking East Asia with South Asia and Southeast Asia. Although Yunnan’s geographic location has not changed, interactions among multiple actors—including the Chinese state across multiple scales, the US, and Southeast Asian states—have made this place important [34]. Yunnan’s strategic position has thus shifted from margin to gateway and then to center [36], thereby enhancing China’s outward connectivity and international standing [11].
The development of the Kunming city-region and the construction of interconnectivity infrastructure have helped form and consolidate international corridors, making it possible to circumvent geopolitical containment directed at China’s eastern seaboard. The United States has long sought to contain China from the east by constructing three island chains in the Pacific [37]. Building international corridors toward South Asia and Southeast Asia through Yunnan can alleviate geopolitical pressure from the east and create additional options for China’s external connections. International corridors that combine sea and land transport can effectively shorten transport times, strengthen the outward connectivity of inland regions, and raise the level of internationalization in the Kunming area. In addition, energy security and overseas trade security pose real risks for contemporary China. Through projects such as the China–Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, China has laid out diversified import routes for oil, natural gas, minerals, and other resources.
The development of the Kunming city-region and its construction as a transportation hub facing South Asia and Southeast Asia have accelerated the building of the Pan-Asia railway network, thereby advancing China’s high-speed rail diplomacy, strengthening its geopolitical and geoeconomic relations with Southeast Asian countries, and enhancing its international competitiveness. The China–Laos Railway aligns China’s BRI with Laos’s strategy of transforming itself from a land-locked country into a land-linked one [38]. Through Kunming, Laos can connect with the railway networks of all of China and the wider Eurasian continent. This has strengthened the geopolitical relationship between China and Laos while also transforming Laos’s geostrategic position, turning it from a peripheral state on the Indochina Peninsula into a frontline state of infrastructure connectivity between ASEAN and China, thereby enhancing Laos’s initiative and discursive power in regional affairs. The rapid and high-standard construction of the China–Laos Railway, together with the considerable economic benefits it has brought to Laos, has, in turn, accelerated construction of the China–Thailand Railway and the planning of high-speed rail in Vietnam [39]. Thailand and Vietnam both initially hoped that Japan would build their high-speed rail systems, but because of high costs and slow progress, Thailand ultimately decided to let China build the China–Thailand Railway, while Vietnam has also considered allowing China and Japan to compete for participation in Vietnam’s high-speed rail development. This suggests that China’s international competitiveness in Southeast Asia is growing and that geopolitical wariness toward China in Thailand and Vietnam may be gradually easing.

6.2. Yunnan’s Realization of Local Development Goals

Although the Yunnan government has embedded itself in China’s geopolitical processes through strategic coupling, and the benefits gained by China are partially shared by Yunnan, this does not mean that the goals of the Yunnan government and the central government are fully aligned. Differing from the goals of the central government, the Yunnan government seeks to use central support as an instrument to realize the development goals of the Kunming city-region and Yunnan more broadly. According to the China Statistical Yearbook, as late as 2010, Yunnan still ranked third from the bottom nationally in per capita GDP. Faced with this developmental predicament, the Yunnan government has regarded the development of the Kunming city-region as a key priority to drive provincial growth as a whole.
This developmental thinking can also be seen in the Five-Year Plans of Kunming Municipality. Kunming’s Fourteenth Five-Year Plan explicitly states that building a “regional international center city” is the city’s most central objective and identifies high-quality development as the core pathway to achieving that objective. In substantive terms, this is precisely about strengthening the functions of the Kunming city-region. Since the development of city-regions in lagging areas has been shown to be an effective means of reducing regional, urban–rural, and ethnic development disparities [7], the Kunming city-region is crucial to Yunnan’s development. The rapid growth of Kunming’s GDP and the sharp increase in its total import and export trade indicate that Kunming has risen to become an important nodal city within the BRI (Figure 5).
Mohan Town originally fell under Mengla County, Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, but in 2022, it was placed under Kunming’s administrative trusteeship. Kunming’s trusteeship marks the first time that a provincial capital has directly administered a national first-class border port. It exemplifies how the Yunnan government has used spatial selectivity to promote development. Since the opening of the China–Laos Railway, it has become China’s largest rail port facing Southeast Asia. It can channel substantial resources and policy advantages from the central government and eastern China into Mohan more directly than other border ports in Yunnan can, in order to promote outward economic flows beneficial to Kunming. Since 2022, Mohan’s population has roughly doubled, while rural per capita disposable income has increased to approximately ten times its pre-trusteeship level. Although Mohan is still only a small town, it has the potential to develop into an international port city.
As a crucial node of national spatial governance in Yunnan, the Kunming city-region has drawn on multiscalar geopolitical processes beyond the city-region itself to construct multiple cross-border economic corridors for factor flows, thereby reshaping Yunnan’s frontier geography and landscape. As Harvey argued, the state invests in infrastructure through city-regions as intermediaries in order to consolidate territorial integrity, generate regional cohesion, and strengthen borders that were once porous and unstable [40]. By driving the development of the Kunming city-region, they raise the socioeconomic level of frontier areas, attract population and industry, stimulate border-area development, and maintain border vitality so as to safeguard border security and stability. This rescaling strategy cultivates transnational economic zones with geopolitical competitiveness [8].
Although the construction of the Kunming city-region has generally achieved positive results, it still has some shortcomings. The central and local governments have not yet reached an agreement on certain issues. For instance, Kunming plans to build 635 km of subway lines by 2035; however, only 165 km are currently in operation. The slow pace of construction is due to warnings regarding Kunming’s debt situation and a lack of fiscal funds. Consequently, the central government did not approve Kunming’s continued subway construction, as the project aligns more closely with Kunming’s local governmental interests than with national priorities.
Moreover, the realization of Mohan’s cross-border connectivity relies on the Mohan–Boten cross-border cooperation zone. The central government, Yunnan Province, Kunming City, and Mengla County all participate in the governance of Mohan. This joint participation creates highly complex power and responsibility dynamics in this zone. While Laos’s central government grants Boten ample decentralization and policy support, China’s central government offers Mohan far less. Although the geopolitical process of the Kunming city-region is not perfect, it is still the result of careful planning by both central and local governments.

7. Conclusions

This paper constructs an analytical framework for city-region strategic coupling in the Chinese context. The framework consists of three parts, namely strategic cooperation, the instrumentalization of the city-region, and spatial interest practices. These respectively emphasize the joint operation of the central and local governments in achieving coordinated cooperative relations, supporting the specific functions of the city-region, and obtaining different interests through these processes. Its contribution lies in treating the central and local governments as indispensable and important state actors, thereby providing a new perspective for understanding the operation of city-regionalism as geopolitical processes in the Chinese context. It also offers a new way to move beyond the binary treatment of local governments as either passive implementing tools or purely growth-oriented institutions [15]. Compared to existing studies, this approach can better address the core question of what role local governments play in the geopolitical construction of city-regions and effectively demonstrate their agency. To some extent, this paper also responds to Jonas’s question regarding the extent to which the geopolitical interests of the state align with urban development strategies when city-regions do not operate independently of the state [41]. We argue that strategic coupling in the city-region is not the result of a pre-given identity of interests but rather a process in which governments at different levels achieve coordination in action through dynamic struggle. Although the city-region can bring different benefits to the central and local governments, its rapid development still depends on responding to the geopolitical needs of the state.
Through the case analysis of the Kunming city-region, this paper finds that changes in the geopolitical environment faced by China have driven strategic coupling between the central government and the Yunnan local government. Through infrastructure support and policy guidance from both sides, they have linked the development of the Kunming city-region with the national vision of building a radiation center facing South Asia and Southeast Asia. Through material practices such as the construction of cross-border connectivity infrastructure, the arrangement of ports and economic corridors, and the building of energy corridors, together with discursive and institutional practices such as multilevel strategic planning, coordinated policy discourse, and administrative rescaling, these efforts have generated multiple geopolitical advantages for China while also enabling the Yunnan local government to achieve its goals of frontier development and governance.
In addition, the framework of city-region strategic coupling requires adjustment when applied transnationally. City-regionalism differs significantly across countries. Yet, whether in the Global North or the Global South [42], city-regionalism as geopolitical processes depends on the coordination and strategic operation of actors at multiple scales. The central government shapes national visions and geographical imaginaries, while diverse actors at the local scale participate in the pursuit of their own interests and connect with neighboring countries or the wider world, thereby inscribing the operation of state power into the territorial and spatial geographical processes of the city-region.
A final reminder is that different city-regions within a single country do not carry identical geopolitical significance. In China, for example, global city-regions such as the Yangtze River Delta and the Greater Bay Area are better positioned to participate in global competition [6], while the Ruili city-region is more responsible for border security as a geopolitical function [8], and Kunming plays the core role in building a radiation center facing South Asia and Southeast Asia. It is not sufficient to focus only on differences in national context when studying city-regionalism. In countries with vast territories and uneven regional development, city-regions in different areas often have their own distinctive developmental backgrounds and processes, but this situation is still easily overlooked. For example, Li’s periodization of the development stages of city-regionalism in China under geopolitical conditions is in fact applicable primarily to eastern China [43] and not to the development of western city-regions such as Chengdu and Kunming. This calls for more fine-grained analysis of strategic coupling and actor agency across different city-regions within the state.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, Q.Y. and Z.Z.; Methodology, Q.Y., Z.Z., Z.H. and Y.L.; Writing—Original Draft Preparation, Q.Y.; Writing—Review and Editing, Z.Z., Z.H. and Y.L.; Visualization, Y.L.; Supervision, Z.H.; Funding Acquisition, Z.H. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This work was supported by the Major Program of the National Social Science Foundation of China under Grant 25&ZD221, the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 42371230 and 42501272, and the Postdoctoral Fellowship Program of the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (CPSF) under Grant GZC20240020.

Data Availability Statement

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors on request.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Appendix A

Table A1. Main perspectives from interviews.
Table A1. Main perspectives from interviews.
Interview DateType of IntervieweeInterview FormatMain Perspectives
July 2022Government official of Lincang Border Economic Cooperation Zone, YunnanGroup meetingThe construction of the China–Myanmar international corridor has significant strategic value. Goods shipped to China from the Indian Ocean direction can bypass the Strait of Malacca. This route can save more than 20 days in transportation time.
July 2022A resident in Ruili, YunnanSemi-structured interviewIn the past, border residents could easily cross the border illegally through mountains or rivers. Yunnan built a border wall during the COVID-19 pandemic. This wall essentially stopped illegal cross-border flows.
December 2023Government official of Jinghong Industrial Park, YunnanGroup meetingJinghong is the main hinterland city for the Mohan port. The industrial park has developed rapidly with the support of the China–Laos Railway and policies from various levels of government in China.
December 2023Government official of Mohan–Boten Economic Cooperation Zone, YunnanGroup meeting The development of Mohan mainly comes from the strong support of the central governments of China and Laos, as well as the Kunming government. Mohan is one of the transportation hub centers between China and Southeast Asia.
September 2024Yunnan government officialGroup meeting The construction of Yunnan international corridors will form a new pattern for an international transportation system. This system links land and sea while enabling mutual assistance between the east and west. Yunnan is located at the central node of a transportation network that connects the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean from east to west, as well as the Yangtze River Economic Belt in China and Southeast Asia.
October 2024A businessperson in Wanding, YunnanSemi-structured interviewThe impact of Myanmar’s geopolitics is significant. Border residents of the two countries interacted frequently when the Myanmar government controlled the border. Now, ethnic minority armed forces occupy the Myanmar border, and the border is rarely open.
October 2024A postal staff member in Wanding, YunnanSemi-structured interviewAlthough Wanding is a border port, most of its commercial activities and young people have relocated to places like Ruili.
October 2024A Myanmar staff member at a coffee shop in Ruili, YunnanUnstructured interviewDue to the domestic war in Myanmar, she and her family struggled to maintain their livelihood. Therefore, she came to Ruili for work.
October 2024A transportation staff member in Ruili, YunnanUnstructured interviewRuili was extremely bustling before the COVID-19 pandemic and was known as a sleepless city. However, almost everyone left during the pandemic.
October 2024A resident at the Houqiao port, YunnanSemi-structured interviewIf the port can remain open long-term in the future and the economy develops, local residents will not have to go elsewhere for work.
October 2024A resident at the Houqiao port, YunnanSemi-structured interviewEngaging solely in local agricultural production cannot lead to wealth. They hope Kunming or border cities in Yunnan can develop better to provide more jobs.
October 2024An enterprise manager at the Diantan port, YunnanSemi-structured interviewMyanmar border residents cannot enter China through the Diantan port, but they can enter through Ruili.
October 2024An enterprise manager at the Diantan port, YunnanSemi-structured interviewMyanmar’s rare earth is an important strategic resource. It is not exported to countries like the United States. Instead, it is entirely exported to China.
November 2025An archaeological museum staff member in YunnanUnstructured interviewThe historical Ancient Tea Horse Road in Yunnan was an important corridor for communication between Yunnan and the outside world. Kunming was already a crucial node in the eastern region of Yunnan at that time.
November 2025A staff member of the Lincang Urban Planning Exhibition Hall, YunnanUnstructured interviewLincang City connects with Kunming and core cities in Myanmar, such as Mandalay and Yangon. It achieves this connection through cross-border economic cooperation zones and cross-border transportation infrastructure.
November 2025An official at the Qingshuihe port, YunnanSemi-structured interviewAlthough the various connectivity conditions in Myanmar are immature, the construction of infrastructure and industrial parks in China’s domestic border areas is quite complete.
November 2025An official of the Lincang Border Economic Cooperation Zone, YunnanSemi-structured interviewNansan Park has created a three-tier commercial system consisting of mutual trade among border residents, professional markets, and cross-border e-commerce.
December 2025An official of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission in YunnanSemi-structured interviewThe construction of international corridors has driven border economic development. It has promoted the construction of border ethnic minority unity demonstration zones. It has also advanced border stability and grassroots governance.
December 2025An official of the Commerce Bureau in YunnanSemi-structured interviewThe turbulent geopolitical situation in Myanmar is the primary risk to international corridor construction.
December 2025An official of the Foreign Affairs Office in YunnanSemi-structured interviewThe construction of the China–Myanmar international corridor is a key node for China’s opening to the Indian Ocean. Some areas opposite the ports are controlled by ethnic minority armed forces in Myanmar.
December 2025An official of the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Bureau in YunnanSemi-structured interviewRoads have been built in all border villages to connect with international corridors. Through agricultural product trading, they have become the hinterland of major cities.
December 2025An official of the Culture and Tourism Bureau in YunnanSemi-structured interviewThe construction of transportation infrastructure in Yunnan in recent years has greatly encouraged people from the Central Yunnan Urban Agglomeration and other provinces to travel to border areas for distinctive cultural tourism.

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Figure 1. City-region strategic coupling analysis framework.
Figure 1. City-region strategic coupling analysis framework.
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Figure 2. Location map of the Kunming city-region.
Figure 2. Location map of the Kunming city-region.
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Figure 3. Yunnan’s import and export trade with neighboring countries.
Figure 3. Yunnan’s import and export trade with neighboring countries.
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Figure 4. Import and export freight volume and traffic flow at ports in Yunnan Province.
Figure 4. Import and export freight volume and traffic flow at ports in Yunnan Province.
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Figure 5. Kunming’s total import and export trade and per capita GDP.
Figure 5. Kunming’s total import and export trade and per capita GDP.
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Table 1. Data collection.
Table 1. Data collection.
Data SourceCollection PeriodNumber of Documents/Interviews
Five-year plans for the National Economic and Social Development issued by multi-level governments (national, provincial, municipal, county) related to Kunming20259
Documents and reports on Kunming urban planning202510
Official news or newspaper platforms of governments in Yunnan202545
Statistical yearbooks of China, Yunnan, and ports of entry202555
Interviews with Yunnan government officialsJuly 2022; December 2023; October 2024; November 202516
Interviews with Yunnan residents and businesspeopleJuly 2022; December 2023; October 202447
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Yang, Q.; Hu, Z.; Zhang, Z.; Li, Y. City-Region Strategic Coupling in China: Central–Local State Interactions and the Geopolitical Processes of Kunming. Land 2026, 15, 933. https://doi.org/10.3390/land15060933

AMA Style

Yang Q, Hu Z, Zhang Z, Li Y. City-Region Strategic Coupling in China: Central–Local State Interactions and the Geopolitical Processes of Kunming. Land. 2026; 15(6):933. https://doi.org/10.3390/land15060933

Chicago/Turabian Style

Yang, Qike, Zhiding Hu, Zhe Zhang, and Yingxin Li. 2026. "City-Region Strategic Coupling in China: Central–Local State Interactions and the Geopolitical Processes of Kunming" Land 15, no. 6: 933. https://doi.org/10.3390/land15060933

APA Style

Yang, Q., Hu, Z., Zhang, Z., & Li, Y. (2026). City-Region Strategic Coupling in China: Central–Local State Interactions and the Geopolitical Processes of Kunming. Land, 15(6), 933. https://doi.org/10.3390/land15060933

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