Durkheim, Anomie, Crime, and Punishment

Abstract

Emile Durkheim is well known but poorly understood in the disciplines of criminology and criminal justice. His concept of anomie is often oversimplified to mean a state of normlessness. In fact, there are five related conceptions of the concept stated in his works. The purpose of this work is to summarize what is known about relationships between anomie, crime, and punishment. Whereas there is more evidence supporting relationships between anomie and various types of crime, the evidence with regard to the relationship between anomie and punishment is far less clear. This article attempts to provide clarity.

1. Introduction

Emile Durkheim is one of the most well-known names in criminology, yet he is one of the most understudied theorists [1]. Durkheim is likely most well-known for his discussion of anomie, although the presentation of his theory in criminology has often been oversimplified if not even misstated [2]. As noted by Jones: “Durkheim appears to have suffered the sad fate of being often cited to legitimize a study or argument which promptly goes on to pursue different or only tenuously related theories” [3].

How many of us learned, wrote, and/or presented to students his theory as related to the idea of “normlessness?” For example, Clinard defines anomie as “a state of normlessness” [4] (p. 7). And he claims that it arises with a disruption of collective order causes rising personal aspirations beyond possible fulfillment. Similarly, Collins and Menard define anomie as “a situation of normlessness, in which aspirations, normally regulated by class-specific social norms, exceed the means to satisfy them as a result of a breakdown in the regulation of those aspirations, producing a disjunction between aspirations or goals and the means to achieve them” [5] (p. 423). Such are examples of the oversimplification of his theory and conception of anomie.

Other definitions of anomie give us a better understanding of its meaning. For example, Merton defines anomie as a “breakdown of social standards governing behavior” where there is thus “little social cohesion” in society [6]. Bernard adds that anomie means “a state of deregulation” in society [7]. And Passas points out that anomie is a “pathological phenomenon,” meaning not a normal condition in society [8]. Helpfully, Adler discusses the opposite to anomie—synnomie—which suggests norm conformity in society as well as intact social controls of behavior [9].

There are, in fact, at least five unique, though related, kinds of anomie within Durkheim’s works [10]. These conceptions of anomie will be presented in the literature review of this entry.

But most understand anomie to be related to higher conditions of crime [11]. Logically, with rising levels of crime in the presence of threats to effective informal social controls normally present in a mechanical society, there is a greater need for formal social control in an organic society. Clinard summarizes Durkheimian anomie and suggests that it refers to when a complex division of labor leads to less social cohesion in society—for example, when a society moves from mechanical to organic, there is less collective consciousness. In such conditions, there are less effective contacts between members and less adequate regulation of social relationships [4] (p. 4). Presumably, this means greater enforcement of the criminal law—necessary to assure norms in society—and thus, greater use of punishment.

Yet, DiCristina makes a somewhat surprising claim about anomie and punishment:

Durkehim’s analyses of criminal law center on the variety, precision, and strength of the core sentiments of the collective consciousness. Under normal conditions, criminal law and the punishments it imposes represent and reinforce these sentiments … Therefore, it is suggested that as the core sentiments of the collective consciousness increase in variety, precision, and strength, a wider array of actions will be officially defined and punished as crimes. Conversely, when these sentiments decline in variety, precision, and strength, the number and scope of criminal laws, and the frequency of punishment, should decline. In other words, exceptionally high levels of anomie—that is, a very limited, imprecise, and weak collective consciousness—should result in less crime and less punishment because fewer acts should be defined and treated as crimes

[10] (p. 324).

This means that, as anomie increases, enforcement of the criminal law should recede. This is largely because, as the collective conscience is weak, “there would be no strong and well-defined collective sentiments to violate or threaten” [10] (p. 325). This claim is surprising because it has long been posited that conditions of anomie should be associated with higher rates of crime [1], and higher rates of crime ought to produce greater use of punishment. Later in the article, efforts will be made to clarify this issue.

2. Literature Review

As noted at the outset, many criminologists define anomie as a state of normlessness (as if such a state could ever exist). Though the concept of anomie is often attributed to Emile Durkheim, Orru outlines the history of the development of the concept of anomie from the ancient Greeks through the modern era [12]. Yet, it was Durkheim’s anomie theory that was developed into Mertonian strain theory, and it also had impacts on the development of subcultural theories, social disorganization theory, and social control theories [13,14]. An important examination of the impact of anomie theory in criminology demonstrates that much more work has been done with regard to Mertonian anomie than Durkheimian anomie [15].

According to DiCristina, Durkheim actually posited several different, though related, conceptions of anomie [10]. Each is addressed below.

In The Division of Labor (1893), Durkheim asserted that the division of labor is the source of social solidarity in a society [2]. According to DiCristina: “When it is well developed, the structure of society consists of a complex yet cohesive system of specialized and interdependent units” [10] (p. 312). Non-functional divisions of labor include the anomic, forced, and badly coordinated forms. Abrupt changes to the social system produce an anomic division of labor, resulting in different parts of a society being poorly regulated. Under conditions of rapid change in society, the prevailing norms or rules of society become less relevant and even obsolete, and rules that “sanction [functional relationships] cannot keep pace with the new transformation that is occurring” [10] (p. 313). The result is a lack of regulation of people and their behavior, or the first form of anomie. Indeed, one study of 30 nations found that rapid sociopolitical change was associated with increased rates of anomie among individuals [16].

In Suicide, Durkheim posited four types of suicide—altruistic, anomic, egoistic, and fatalistic—and in so doing, put forth a second form of anomie [17]. One can consider this the absence of moral rules to guide the desires of individuals after societal crises, including economic ones. This conception of anomie refers to an inadequate regulation of human desires [10]. Under normal conditions, human desires are regulated by a well-structured society, but in conditions of economic change, for example, our human desires can be freed, resulting in less societal regulation or social control. When people are unable to satisfy their increased desires, the result is unhappiness and sometimes suicide.

A third form of anomie is simply a state of “insufficient regulation”, whether it be of society or human desire [10] (p. 314). This can lead to problem behaviors, in conditions where there is nothing to stop out our unlimited human desires [18]. Note how similar this conception is to the first two.

A fourth conception of anomie by Durkheim is a weakening of the “collective or common consciousness” or “(t)he totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of society” [19]. Smith ([1], p. 336) refers to this term as “shared morality” or “group mind.” Taylor Walton, and Young define it as the “social morality of the time” [20] (p. 79). Anomie occurs when “these beliefs and sentiments are vague, insufficiently felt, or generally lacking” [10] (p. 314). Note that Durkheim also defined anomie as “the contradiction of all morality” or “immoral beliefs, sentiments, and behaviors” [10], (p. 314), [19].

These five conceptions of anomie are shown in

Table 1. Durkheim’s Conceptions of Anomie.

1	a lack of regulation of people and their behavior
2	an inadequate regulation of human desires
3	insufficient regulation
4	weakening of the collective or common consciousness or the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of society
5	the contradiction of all morality or immoral beliefs, sentiments, and behaviors

.

Smith also reminds us that Durkheim’s ideas cannot be removed from his focus on different forms of society—for example, primitive or solidaristic societies with well-defined roles for people in terms of labor (i.e., mechanical solidarity), and more advanced or modern societies where these roles are not as clear (i.e., organic solidarity) [1]. In the former, Durkheim believed that “people tended to think and do alike and there was little tolerance for difference.” Meanwhile, in the latter, there are “increasing levels of individualism, growing flexibility and diversities of belief” [1] (p. 336). It is in the latter conditions where the collective consciousness is threatened, anomie is higher, and thus crime is likely to rise as a result. As noted by Taylor, Walton, and Young: “Crime…is persistent precisely because it is the work of men with ideas defined as illegitimate within the existing collective conscience” [20] (p. 85). One question arises here, and that is, would this lead to more punishment? This issue will be addressed again next in the article.

3. Relation Between Crime and Punishment

The works and ideas of Durkheim have been related to both crime and to punishment. Starting with crime, Durkheim’s reasoning about the supposed causes of crime is not clear. For example, DiCristina writes that:

His views on the causes of crime are more difficult to identify. Durkheim’s suggestions concerning the causes of crime are usually brief and are scattered throughout several publications. In these works, he viewed anomie as one cause of crime, but he did not provide an extended analysis that focused specifically on the anomie/crime relationship [10] (p. 318). Yet, it is clear that, to Durkheim, crime is a sign of collective moral sensitivity rather than an act in a legal code.

DiCristina’s extensive analyses of Durkheim’s writings and the rationale behind them suggest the following findings:

Durkheim did not write about anomie and property crime. Yet, the relationship between anomie and property crime can be inferred from his work. It is presumed that anomie leads to increases in property crime through the impact of economic disturbances. Specifically, rapid changes in society can lead to people’s inability to satisfy their desires, leading to property crimes including both street crimes as well as corporate crimes. Further, economic problems can lead people to turn to property crime under conditions such as when a person suddenly loses their job

[10] (pp. 319–320).

Durkheim did discuss causes of violent crime including homicide. Anomie resulting from conditions such an unemployment can lead to negative emotions, which—as predicted by general strain theory [21]—can lead to violent acts. Further, an inability to satisfy one’s desires (a form of anomie) can lead to increased competition between people, potentially prompting acts of violence. Finally, inadequate regulation of business can lead to violent acts by corporations [10] (pp. 320–322). This may be viewed as another form of anomie.

Durkheim did not write about juvenile delinquency, but causal inferences can be drawn from his works, as well. For example, he implied a connection between anomie and juvenile misbehavior, suggesting that a weak external regulatory force (i.e., anomie) may lead to rule violations by young people. This suggests, for example, that a lack of discipline of children may lead to juvenile delinquency [10] (pp. 322–323).

DiCristina devotes significant attention to the issue of how Durkheim approached and considered the crime of homicide [2]. He reviews nine studies that assessed relationships between variables such as economic development and various types of crime, including murder. These studies found different, even contradictory results, some suggesting that measures were related to higher rates of murder and others to lower rates of murder [22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30]. Anomie was measured in some of these studies in the context of social development (e.g., population changes, industrialization, urbanization, rate of growth, gross national product [GNP], national wealth, social differentiation, and division of labor).

DiCristina reasons that Durkheim’s theory of murder revolves around “his account of the change in the content of the ‘common consciousness’ that accompanies societal development” [2] (p. 64). And his conclusion seems to be that “as the division of labor becomes more complex, the core of common consciousness generally includes fewer strong, precise sentiments related to ‘collective things’ and more related to ‘the individual’” [2] (p. 65). Collective things relate to things outside of us and things related to the individual deal with conceptions of people’s humanity [2] (p. 66). As the common consciousness becomes more concerned with individual things or the good of humanity, the likelihood of homicide should decline [2] (pp. 69–70, 73), whereas laws against homicide should increase [2] (pp. 71–73).

Yet, DiCristina also suggests that “periods of rapid social change [e.g., rapid industrialization], by elevating currents of anomie, can bring an increase in homicidal dispositions, other things being equal” [2] (p. 74). So, it seems like he is saying that anomie can both increase and decrease homicide, if this is correct.

Over the years, several efforts have been made to relate conceptions of anomie to crime. It has been argued that different forms of anomie are related to a wide variety of bad behaviors, including gang delinquency [31], drug addiction [32], alcoholism [33], mental disorders [34], white-collar crime [35], as well as some forms of corporate crime [36].

One study examined the impact of anomie on both minor and serious middle-adolescent and young adult delinquency and criminality and found that anomie was related to such behaviors [5], although the analysis focused not on Durkheim’s conception of anomie but rather that of Merton and Cloward and Ohlin [37,38]. This should not be surprising given the tendency of criminologists to resort to tests of goals-means discrepancies in their assessments of different forms of deviance and criminality [39,40]. Anomie theory has also been used to explain everything from white-collar crime to gang violence [15].

As for punishment, the ideas of Durkheim can be understood as they relate to his conception of crime in the first place. According to Durkheim, acts become crimes when they “offend the strong, well-defined states (sentiments) of the collective consciousness” [19] (p. 39). Crimes are made up of “those acts which seriously violate a society’s conscience collective … violations of the fundamental moral code which society holds sacred, and they provoke punishment for this reason” [41] (p. 29). In the words of Durkheim, “crime brings together upright consciences and concentrates them” [19] (p. 102).

DiCristina explains that, according to Durkheim, “all crimes threaten the common consciousness of a society…most threaten the common consciousness directly by violating the strong, precise, collective sentiments that comprise its core. Most crimes … contravene deep feelings concerning what is important or right, feelings that are generally connected to well-defined practices and are ‘shared by most average individuals in the same society’” [2] (pp. 71–72). Crimes “violate strong collective feelings of respect for he lives, freedom, honor, and possessions of individuals” [2] (p. 72).

Since the criminal law is the codified version of these states or sentiments, punishment stemming from the violation of the law can be seen as the reaffirmation of societal beliefs about right and wrong. To Durkheim, “punishment constitutes an emotional reaction” to rule-breaking, and it “is about the moral and cultural needs of the community. It is, in a sense, a ritual activity, one that repairs damage to the psychic tissue that holds society together and reaffirms core values” [1] (p. 336), [19] (p. 44). In the words of Durkheim, the real function of punishment is to “maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the common consciousness” [19] (pp. 62–63). Durkheim wrote that “punishment is above all designed to act upon upright people, for, since it serves to heal the wounds made upon collective sentiments, it can fill this role only where these sentiments exist, and commensurately with their vivacity” [19] (pp. 108–109). Durkheim goes on to explain: “Punishment does not give [moral] discipline its authority, but it prevents discipline from losing its authority, which infractions if they went unpunished, would progressively erode.” Punishment is an “expressive form of moral action” [42].

Punishment, to Durkheim, is “a tangible example of the ‘collective conscience’ at work in a process that both expressed and regurgitated society’s values” … they “are a manifestation of a strong conscience collective and mechanical solidarity” [41] (pp. 23–25). Punishment is both a reflection of the collective beliefs of a people, and it simultaneously reinforces those beliefs, as well. As noted by Garland, “penal law, and the common conscience which it enforces, play a central role in the cohesion of simple societies—it is in fact the very basis of mechanical solidarity” [41] (p. 34). Punishment is obviously a role of the state, representative of the people and their shared beliefs about right and wrong. Durkheim referred to it as the “symbol and living expression” of the collective conscience [19] (p. 82).

At the same time, in “modern, organic societies … the division of labour becomes the predominant source of solidarity … so that penal law and common values come to play a much reduced but nonetheless essential role.” Garland asserts that “the conscience collective of modern societies ceases to be a pervasive, intensive force which demands a religious conformity in sphere of life” [41] (p. 34). For this reason, we might expect there to be less punishment, and in particular, less imprisonment, in societies where the collective conscience is weaker.

Durkheim’s thoughts on punishment can, second, be taken from his work, Two Laws of Penal Evolution [43]. In this work, he shows that the nature of punishment depends on the level of complexity in society, and that—as society shifts from mechanical to organic—punishment goes from personal and privatized to organized and institutionalized; punishment also moves from repressive and vengeful to restitutive or rehabilitative. This occurs in the context of an organized state with strong levels of collective consciousness.

One may also infer from Durkheim’s work, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, that punishment may serve as a vital source of solidarity, consistent with the significance of religion in people’s lives [44]. Though this particular work did not focus on crime or punishment per se, one can infer from it that punishment, like religious symbols, serves a symbolic purpose in our lives relating to collective consciousness.

Yet, Garland characterizes Durkheim’s theory of punishment as “ambiguous” and “flawed in important respects” [41] (p. 23). On the one hand, Garland claims the idea of the collective conscience is “never fully elaborated in Durkheim’s work” [41] (p. 50). He also criticizes the concept itself as being an overstatement of the level of agreement in societies (especially more advanced ones), and would rather refer to it as a “ruling morality” or “dominant moral order” [41] (p. 52). Others suggest Durkheim’s definition and operationalization of anomie was “fuzzy” [18]; These and other criticisms have been stated by criminologists [45].

Given that anomie supposedly increases crime, and anomie is present when the collective consciousness is weaker, one might expect that greater anomie would be related to higher use of criminal punishments. Yet, as noted above, as well as in the introduction to this entry, some suggest that a weaker collective consciousness should result in less punishment.

Some recent studies reflect on the issue of whether anomie is related to more or less punishment. Two scholars who developed Institutional Anomie theory—meant to explain America’s exceptionally high lethal violence rate—collaborated with another scholar to examine what they called “egoistic individualism” and its relationship with punishment in society. They propose that such individualism is present in “societies in which the economy dominates the institutional structure, anomie is rampant, and levels of violent crime are high” [46] (p. 143). In these conditions, outcomes such as harsher punishment (e.g., mass imprisonment in the US) are more common. This is consistent with the idea that more crime caused by more anomie would be expected to lead to more punishment.

Other research seems to support this possibility. One study, for example, examined 41 countries and measured structural and cultural configurations in those societies to assess the extent to which institutional anomie (i.e., an imbalance in society’s institutions in favor of the economy) can account for cross-national differences in incarceration. The authors found that a positive relationship between incarceration rates and “the strength of the economic institution and the extent of institutional imbalance reflecting a dominant economic institution” when the national culture “is characterized by individualism, a competitive achievement orientation, or both” [47] (p. 454). That is, in societies where individualism and competition are celebrated, and where there is an imbalance between institutions in favor of the economy (and hence more anomie), more punishment would be expected to be found.

Consistent with this idea, a recent study of social change in China found that, with rapid economic development and social change came higher crime levels, supposedly due to more opportunities for crime and higher levels of anomie. This was accompanied by high levels of support for punishment, including the death penalty [48]. Yet, an analysis of crime in the Czech Republic as it transitioned to a more democratic society found rising crime rates and more calls for “repression of criminal offenders.” This was reportedly during low levels of accompanying unemployment and “a stable trust in government” leading the author to conclude that anomie was at a low level in the country [49] (p. 213). This latter finding calls into question the relationship between anomie and punishment, leaving an open question as to whether anomie is related to more punishment or less.

4. Conclusions

Anomie—generally understood in various ways to mean a lack of regulation of people and their desires & behavior, as well as of society & the collective consciousness—is related to various forms of crime, including property crime, violent crime, juvenile delinquency, alcohol & drug use, as well as even white-collar & corporate crime. Stated simply, we expect to see higher levels of crime in conditions of anomie. Yet, the relationship between anomie and punishment is apparently less clear. On the one hand, we expect more punishment when the collective consciousness is violated by bad behavior; on the other hand, it may be the case that less punishment results when the collective consciousness is weaker in the first place. Given these conflicting understandings, it is vital that future research be conducted into this issue, perhaps using international data, in order to provide insights into how anomie manifests in punishment across the globe.