Classifications of Sociological Paradigms

Definition

In this entry paper, we propose a brief analysis of the use of the notion of “paradigm” in sciences in general and in social sciences and sociology in particular. A “paradigm” expresses a worldview and/or a unified perspective—at the level of the scientific community—on a given situation. Paradigms represent a collection of beliefs shared by the scientific community or a set of agreements through which social issues should be understood and interpreted.

1. Introduction

From an etymological perspective, the term paradigm originates from the Greek word paradeigma, which can be translated as “example” or “model” [1].

The concept of the paradigm was developed in the 1960s and 1970s with the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [2], a highly influential work in the scientific world that has accumulated over 100,000 citations to date [3].

In a broad sense, Kuhn defined paradigms as “universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” [2] (p. VIII). In a narrower sense, the concept of “paradigm” refers to a dominant theory and describes a set of practices applied in science—a collection of methods and methodologies used in research [4].

Thus, paradigms are composed of fundamental ideas, methods, languages, and theories accepted by the members of a scientific community, playing a crucial role in the evolution of science [3].

In his book, Kuhn [2] advances the idea that a scientific field progresses through shifts in theory theoretical frameworks rather than through the accumulation of empirical data without theoretical integration. The primary task of researchers, he argues, is to bring existing theories and accepted facts into closer and closer agreement (p. 27). In other words, the progress of a mature science occurs through a cyclical process consisting of alternating stages, specifically phases of normal science and scientific revolutions. Preceding the normal science stage, there is a pre-scientific phase, characterized by the absence of a dominant theory or consensus among the members of a scientific community. During this phase, multiple incomplete and mutually incompatible theories emerge. However, once a particular theory becomes dominant and is widely accepted within a scientific field, the stage of normal science is reached. In this so-called normal science period, key theories, tools, values, and philosophical assumptions embedded in the disciplinary matrix (or paradigm) remain fixed and stable. This stability enables the cumulative generation of solutions to emerging puzzle-solving problems [2], a concept that differs from Popper’s notion of problem-solving, which emphasizes falsifiability [5]. The members of the scientific community unanimously accept the dominant theory or paradigm and operate within its framework [6]. Thus, in the development of a mature science, scientific revolutions may occur, during which the disciplinary matrix is challenged due to the emergence of puzzle problems that cannot be resolved within the existing framework or due to discrepancies, often referred to in Kuhnian terms as anomalies. In such cases, the paradigm enters a phase of continuous revision as scientists attempt to find solutions to the unresolved puzzle problems that disrupted the previous normal science phase [7]. These so-called anomalies—deviations from the expectations established by a paradigm that governs normal science—arise from empirical studies and have been the foundation of many discoveries in the natural sciences. The identification of such discrepancies often serves as the catalyst for a paradigm shift within a particular field of study. In summary, what Kuhn defines as an anomaly is an empirical difficulty that highlights discrepancies between observed data and theoretically expected results [8].

Ultimately, following a scientific revolution, the old paradigm may be replaced by a new dominant paradigm. When a paradigm shift occurs, the world of a scientist is qualitatively transformed [and] quantitatively enriched by fundamental novelties of fact or theory [4].

In conclusion, a paradigm can be understood as a universally recognized scientific achievement that, for a time, provides model problems and solutions to a scientific community. Scientists accept a dominant paradigm until significant empirical discrepancies—often termed anomalies in the Kuhnian framework—begin to challenge its validity, paving the way for a potential paradigm shift. Against this backdrop of emerging discrepancies, scientists may begin to question the foundations of the initially accepted paradigm, formulating new theories that challenge the dominant framework. Eventually, one of these new theories gains unanimous acceptance within the scientific community and develops into a new dominant paradigm [9]. However, some discrepancies or paradoxes may be met with resistance from scientists, who might be reluctant to abandon the established paradigm [10].

2. Overview of Paradigmatic Classifications in Sociology: Ritzer and Burrell and Morgan

Kuhn’s attempts to define the notion of paradigm have been, and still are, considered relatively vague. For instance, M. Masterman [11] identified no fewer than 21 different meanings of the term in Kuhn’s work. Similarly, Lincoln and Guba [4] point out as many as 25 distinct definitions within his writings. However, this ambiguity has only amplified the concept’s influence on scientific communities, as the term paradigm has been interpreted and applied in numerous ways, including within the social sciences [12]. In this context, Eckberg and Hill Jr. [13] highlight that the 1970s were a decade in which sociologists attempted to define the paradigmatic status of sociology. The two authors highlighted twelve sets of sociological paradigms, of which only one has endured over the decades until today—the paradigm classification proposed by George Ritzer.

According to sociologist George Ritzer [14], a paradigm serves to distinguish one scientific community from another, helping to differentiate, for example, physics from chemistry or sociology from psychology. Each field of scientific knowledge has its own set of paradigms, which also help distinguish different historical stages of a science’s development. For instance, the dominant paradigm in a given scientific field in the 19th century may be, or indeed is, different from the one that prevailed in the first or second half of the 20th century. Moreover, paradigms can vary across different knowledge groups and even within the same scientific field. Contemporary psychoanalysis, sociology, and various other disciplines, for example, contain multiple competing paradigms. By proposing this definition, Ritzer highlights an essential characteristic: the connection between paradigms and theories, with theories being components of paradigms. In other words, a paradigm can encompass two or more theories, just as it can include different images of the subject matter, methods (and tools), as well as exemplars—specific elements of scientific work that serve as models for researchers who follow them. Building on this idea, Ritzer [14] argues that sociology is a multi-paradigmatic science and identifies three major paradigms within the field: The Social Facts Paradigm, The Social Definition Paradigm, and The Social Behavior Paradigm. In his considerable effort to distinguish the three sociological paradigms, George Ritzer employed a conceptual, analytical, and epistemological approach, relying on a meta-theoretical classification that focused on the comparative study of existing sociological theories. The two-dimensional axes used by Ritzer—which, through their intersection, supported the classification of sociological theories into paradigms—were objective–subjective (whether social reality exists independently of individual interpretation or, conversely, is a construct resulting from individual interactions) and order–conflict (distinguishing between theories that portray society as stable and coherent, and critical theories that highlight the dynamics of social change generated by conflicts and contradictions within society).

In summary, The Social Facts Paradigm is built around the idea that a social fact can be explained by another social fact and that any sociological analysis should be grounded in social facts, as emphasized by Émile Durkheim. Sociologists within this paradigm argue that the object of sociology includes social institutions and structures, which can be explained through other social facts. Furthermore, individual behavior, social actions, and activities are shaped by social structures and institutions. The dominant theories within The Social Facts Paradigm are considered to be structural functionalism (particularly systems theory) and conflict theory [14] (p. A-11).

In The Social Definition Paradigm, the central concept is social action, a notion widely explored by Max Weber. In this framework, sociology is seen as a discipline that closely examines social action—specifically, individual behaviors directed toward others. This paradigm emphasizes the idea that humans are active creators of their own social reality, focusing on theories related to action and the construction of mental processes. Under The Social Definition Paradigm, we can group sociological perspectives such as symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and ethnomethodology—all of which highlight the subjective and interpretative aspects of social life [14] (p. A-11).

The third paradigm proposed by Ritzer [14] (p. A-12), The Social Behavior Paradigm, is centered around the contributions of B. F. Skinner. While it also focuses on understanding social interaction, it portrays individuals as social actors with a lower degree of freedom compared to how they are conceptualized in The Social Definition Paradigm. In this framework, individuals’ responses are determined by the nature of external stimuli, depicting human behavior in a more mechanistic manner. This perspective aligns with behaviorist theories, which emphasize the role of conditioning and reinforcement in shaping social actions.

Another influential framework for defining paradigms in sociology, which has endured for over four decades, is the model developed by G. Burrell and G. Morgan [15]. They argued that analyzing the social sciences requires a conceptual operationalization of four sets of assumptions related to the following:

a.

Ontology (Nominalism vs. Realism);

b.

Epistemology (Anti-positivism vs. Positivism);

c.

Human Nature (Voluntarism vs. Social Determinism);

d.

Methodology (Idiographic vs. Nomothetic Approaches).

Even though the paradigmatic perspective developed by Burrell and Morgan was constructed in the context of organizational analysis—with the authors providing numerous examples predominantly from the organizational and management fields—it stands out for the clarity and rigor with which it classifies sociological theories. This creates the possibility of extending it to the general analysis of the paradigmatic status within sociology. Similar to G. Ritzer’s approach, the authors employed a deeply analytical, comparative, and conceptual method, relying on a meta-theoretical classification of sociological theories. Their analysis can also be considered epistemological in the way it addresses the question of how social reality can be known and what the nature of social science itself is.

According to Hassard and Cox [16], Burrell and Morgan started from the premise that all social science researchers operate—either explicitly or implicitly—within particular approaches that shape their understanding of the social world and how it should be studied. From this perspective, they distinguished between two broad types of sociology:

• Sociology of Regulation—concerned with the orderly functioning of social life, social stability maintained through control of individual behaviors, and social interactions that reproduce and sustain order, making society intelligible and meaningful;
• Sociology of Radical Change—focused on viewing social reality from a dynamic perspective of transformation, emphasizing that change is both possible (as society is inherently shaped by conflictual relationships) and necessary (as the world is marked by inequalities and social injustice).

As outlined by Burrell and Morgan [15], theories that view society as a real, concrete, and organized system—one oriented toward maintaining order and rules—fall under the functionalist paradigm. This paradigm strongly supports the objectivity of the social sciences, arguing that they should be free from subjective influences or value judgments. The researcher is thus distanced from subjective content, relying on rigorous scientific methods in their analyses. Moreover, due to its pragmatic orientation, the functionalist approach emphasizes how knowledge can be applied in an objective and practical manner, reinforcing the stability and continuity of social structures.

A second paradigm developed by Burrell and Morgan [15] is the interpretive paradigm, which encompasses theories that argue that the social world is a result of individuals’ experiences and interactions in everyday life. In fact, social reality is a product of intersubjective experience—in simpler terms, a social construct. Even though social reality is analyzed from the perspective of order and rules, it can only be understood subjectively. For the researcher, the social world is best understood from the perspective of the participant in action. Thus, consideration is given to individuals’ interests and ideas, as well as the meanings they attribute to the social world. In other words, the social world is viewed and analyzed from the perspective of individuals as the product of their interactions. Against this backdrop, social equilibrium is formed through the relative agreement on intersubjective meanings assigned to the social world. Furthermore, in such a context, the interpretive researcher seeks to deconstruct (and explore various underlying meanings of) the phenomenological processes through which shared realities are created, agreed upon, and transformed. Consequently, attempts to construct a purely “objective” social science are considered fragile, as social reality cannot be entirely separated from the subjectivity of those who experience it.

Another paradigm that emphasizes the idea that everyday social reality is a social construct is the paradigm of radical humanism [15]. However, this paradigm differs significantly from the interpretive paradigm in that it argues for the inclusion of a critical dimension in social analysis, which is tied to the concept of the “pathology of consciousness” [17]. This critical perspective highlights a fundamental paradox of social existence: although social actors create the social world through their daily interactions, they ultimately become prisoners of the very structures and norms they themselves have constructed. This leads to a form of alienated thinking, characteristic of modern life and industrial societies, which compels individuals to accept imposed realities without the ability to challenge them. For example, a key area of analysis within the radical humanism paradigm is capitalist society, viewed as a dominant system that subtly subjugates human consciousness.

The final paradigm proposed by Burrell and Morgan [15] is the radical structuralist paradigm. Like the radical humanist paradigm, it promotes a radical social critique but differs in its conception of social reality. Theories within the radical structuralist paradigm view social reality as a “fact”, existing objectively and independently of how individuals construct it. The social world is seen as dynamic, dominated by internal tensions and contradictions that drive structural changes and transformations. Thus, social conflict is brought into focus as the driving force of social evolution, leading to the restructuring of power relations.

As can be observed, the definition of the four previously mentioned paradigms takes into account major theoretical positions from economics, philosophy, political science, psychology, and sociology. It is constructed by intersecting two key debates specific to the social sciences [18]:

• The subject–object debate, characteristic of the “theory of social sciences”;
• The consensus–conflict debate, specific to the “theory of society”.

Against the backdrop of these debates, Burrell and Morgan [15] distinguished between the sociology of regulation—dominated by an objectivist and scientific approach—and the sociology of radical change, which emphasizes a more subjectivist perspective.

The paradigms classified under the sociology of regulation include the functionalist paradigm (considered conservative) and the interpretive paradigm, whereas the radical humanist paradigm and the radical structuralist paradigm belong to the sociology of radical change. The authors emphasized that while the four paradigms may appear “adjacent” due to shared characteristics, they are fundamentally distinct and should be treated as separate entities, each offering a unique perspective for analyzing social phenomena [15]. Essentially, each paradigm comes with its own conceptual framework and distinct analytical tools.

3. Critical Perspectives on the Use of the Notion of Paradigm in Sociology

As highlighted so far, some sociologists like George Ritzer, Gareth Morgan, or Gibson Burrell have attempted to classify or group sociological theories into various paradigms that offer multiple perspectives on social reality, leading to different research strategies associated with each paradigm. However, critical perspectives on such attempts should not be overlooked.

Jonathan Turner [19] argued that sociology is still a “pre-paradigmatic” science, suggesting that there is no theoretical approach that is sufficiently coherent, comprehensive, and precise to constitute a true paradigm—one based on abstract concepts and laws that can be empirically tested. Furthermore, Turner believed that the term “paradigm” is overused in the scientific community, which has led to a dilution of its fundamental meaning [19] (p. 29). The pre-paradigmatic status of sociology has also been highlighted by Harvey [20], who, in addition to addressing the improper application of Kuhn’s concept of paradigm within the field, also discusses the contributions of Ritzer, Burrell, and Morgan, identifying them as inconsistent. Furthermore, the same author criticizes the use of the notion of a multi-paradigmatic science as applied to sociology, arguing that such an approach merely masks the lack of epistemological consensus that should lead to the construction of a unified theoretical structure. The coexistence of multiple dominant paradigms within a single discipline, he contends, is not possible.

Other two authors who are rather skeptical about the use of the notion of “paradigm” in social sciences are Dogan and Pahre [21]. Their skepticism is related to the fact that social sciences are heterogeneous and that there is a polysemy of concepts used in the field, thus developing a multitude of schools of thought that can sustain a form of “mutual ignorance” among researchers. They consider that the central element that would ensure the progress of science in the social domain is, in fact, “social innovation.” According to Dogan and Pahre [21], the researcher in the social domain should focus more on studying the peripheral areas of the field, those considered specialized, and less on research centered on the core area of the field. Among the factors that could ensure innovation are transdisciplinary exchange of theories, transformations of concepts, borrowing of methods, technology, and interaction between paradigms [22].

A more radical opinion is formulated by the sociologist M. Dogan [23], who argues that the concept of “paradigms” cannot be applied to the social sciences. Dogan emphasizes that there is a sine qua non condition for a theory or multiple theories to form a paradigm: they must address the essential aspects of social reality. The French sociologist argues that the social sciences cannot speak of “fundamental discoveries” as they sometimes occur in the natural sciences. Instead, sociological theories that are often unverifiable are continuously developed, as social reality is in a state of constant change.

Against this background, Dogan [23] notes that the natural sciences provide a fertile ground for the development of paradigmatic frameworks because, in this domain, truth becomes universally valid. In contrast, in the social sciences, truth is contextual, requiring an understanding of contextual diversity and social change—two crucial parameters that resist paradigmatic generalizations, unlike in the natural sciences. For example, chemical substances have the same composition worldwide, whereas social concepts and theories cannot be equally valid or applicable in both Western Europe and Tropical Africa. In the natural sciences, an experiment can be replicated under identical conditions anywhere in the world, whereas social realities are constantly evolving.

4. Conclusions

In this entry paper, we have briefly highlighted two different, though both condensed, views on how sociological theories can be classified into paradigms. On the one hand, we described how sociological paradigms are defined based on a conception tied to general theoretical sociology (as in the case of George Ritzer), and on the other hand, we emphasized a paradigmatic approach more closely aligned with the philosophy of social sciences, due to the emphasis Burrell and Morgan placed on the epistemological and ontological classification of sociological theories. As a future direction, we aim to compare these two views with more pluralistic perspectives, such as the one offered by Inglis [24].

Undoubtedly, Thomas Kuhn’s work has had and continues to have a remarkable impact on the entire scientific community, enriching the lexicon of the philosophy of science by introducing a contemporary approach to the concepts of “paradigm”, “paradigm shift”, and “scientific revolution”. The term “paradigm” continues to be widely used but also contested in the field of social research [4]. Paradigms might help the scientific sociological approach, serving as guides for the efforts of researchers and scientific communities in particular. Moreover, in the recent sociological literature, the notion of paradigm is increasingly being closely associated with social research methodology. We are gradually witnessing the emergence of a debate concerning the heuristic frameworks that support researchers in selecting appropriate study methodologies aligned with theoretical interpretations of social phenomena. For instance, Chafe [25,26] discusses various classifications of paradigms, including the one proposed by Burrell and Morgan, which may facilitate qualitative research. Similarly, Blaikie and Priest [27] emphasize the importance of choosing a research paradigm in the development of social research. In addition, Berrell [28] highlights that Ritzer’s classification of sociological paradigms brings together seemingly divergent perspectives yet provides a diverse framework that could lead to identifying points of convergence in how sociologists study social processes and phenomena.

Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that sociology, as a discipline marked by pronounced theoretical diversity, does not exhibit universally accepted paradigms in the strict sense proposed by Thomas Kuhn. Nonetheless, the notion of paradigm continues to provide a productive conceptual lens for scholars aiming to structure and classify the multitude of sociological theories. The two classifications presented in this entry paper—developed by George Ritzer and by Gareth Morgan and Gibson Burrell—represent reflective, enduring, and influential attempts to adapt the paradigm concept to a field characterized by persistent theoretical pluralism. Their value lies precisely in their effort to render intelligible the fragmented landscape of sociological thought through meta-theoretical structuring. Furthermore, the theoretical pluralism that characterizes sociology—a consequence of the multitude and diversity of the social realities it seeks to understand—may give rise to questions regarding the epistemological coherence of the discipline and the potential for cumulative knowledge. In this regard, future meta-theoretical investigations into the paradigmatic status of sociology may offer valuable insights by examining this issue in greater depth.

Also, in recent decades, there has been an undeniable increase in the use of the concept of “paradigm shift”, demonstrating that members of the scientific community have become more attentive and receptive to the deep transformations that a paradigm can undergo over time. From Kuhn’s perspective, a paradigm embodies the consensus of a scientific community on a particular idea or theory, and the acceptance or rejection of a paradigm is both a social process and a logical process. Kuhn argued that scientific revolutions always lead to new theories that are more precise, representing the true progress of science. However, he also noted that new theories are incommensurable and cannot simply be evaluated as “better” than previous ones; rather, new and old paradigms are just different. Scientific revolutions that replace one paradigm with another can be seen as a form of epistemic progress as they bring the scientific community closer to a shared understanding of the world. In this context, several philosophical criticisms of the Kuhnian perspective can be brought into the discussion, which could themselves become the subject of future standalone studies: on the one hand, Kuhn was considered through his ideas to be a relativist and a radical [29], while on the other hand, there is talk of a rather conservative vision due to his attempts to isolate the scientific approach from political and industrial pressures [30].

Additionally, Thomas Kuhn emphasized that modern philosophers cannot separate the history of science from the social context in which it is produced. In other words, science is a product of the society in which it is practiced, and the transition to a new paradigm is a scientific revolution [9]. As noted, novelty in the sociological field emerges with great difficulty, often facing resistance from the scientific community. Scientists may ignore research findings that generate “discrepancies” or “paradoxes”, which could challenge the legitimacy of an existing and widely accepted paradigm. Such findings, however, could also support the ongoing debates regarding the applicability of Kuhn’s concept of paradigms in sociology, particularly in relation to the emergence of competing paradigms that challenge the old ones.

In conclusion, although substantial criticisms have been directed at the use of the notion of paradigm in sociology—raising rigorous arguments about the potential trivialization of Kuhn’s theory (which is itself subject to critique)—the contributions of Ritzer, Burrell, and Morgan remain highly significant within sociological debates on this topic. While their approaches may not fully align with the original Kuhnian sense of the term, they nonetheless provide a valuable framework for understanding theoretical pluralism in sociology and for exploring the ways in which multiple perspectives can coexist. For this reason, we consider it essential to continue such efforts, grounded in a more nuanced and reflective use of the paradigm concept within the discipline.