Loyalty in Islam: A Critical Survey

Definition

Up until recently, research on loyalty and Islam—here considered as the discourses and practices of Muslims in regard to the Muslim tradition—had ignored the topic of loyalty. Interest in loyalty in Islam has just lately grown sufficiently and extensively. This entry is both bibliographical and thematic. It seeks to identify the principal themes that have dominated Muslim loyalty studies for the past thirty years or so. Additionally, it provides a thorough synopsis of over 100 studies on loyalty that were published during the same time span in Arabic and European languages. Allegiance in Muslim political ethics always had more than one connotation and the religious component of loyalty, while not strictly defined, allowed and even justified the overlap of multiple loyalties. A person’s or a family’s, ruler’s, or dynasty’s power to govern an area or defend religious institutions and symbols was intimately linked to the loyalty they could claim. Most studies agree on the diversity of political allegiance in modern Islam with regard to perceptions of religion, ethnicity, self-interest, etc.; it is also co-relative in the sense that it is mixed with other allegiances, such as those of family, tribe, leadership, or country.

1. Introduction

The concept of multiple loyalties informs the thematic structure of this entry. It reviews the literature on Islamic political allegiance with the following loyalty objects in mind: loyalty to Tribes/Ethnic Groups, loyalty to Homeland/Nation, loyalty to Islam, loyalty to leadership/state, loyalty to the Ottomans, Muslim loyalties under colonial rule, loyalty to non-Muslims, and Muslim loyalties in the West. Throughout medieval Muslim political thought, loyalty, walā’, was understood as a commitment to one’s obligations toward friends, allies, patrons, clients, rulers, and groups as early as the 7th century. Loyalty could pertain to a variety of possible objects, including God, people, political and religious groups, and those higher, lower, or equal in the social hierarchy [1]. The idea is to demonstrate that, while religion is far from being the only component that defines attitudes of loyalty or disloyalty, loyalty as a moral foundation [2] and identity commitment [3] is interwoven and dependent on different elements. For Haidt, loyalty/disloyalty is a fundamental value to social ethics, expressed in various rituals of allegiance, social practices, political alliances, group memberships, and rivalries and conflicts within societies; loyalty/disloyalty is used, among other things, to adapt to challenges, resist pressures, respond to crises, undertake individual and collective actions, and repel attacks from rival groups. This moral foundation is, thus, essential to social structuring (family, clan, community, nation, etc.), political action (party, elections, coalitions, war, etc.), and identity formation (in-group vs out-group belonging [2] (pp. 154–157).

In Muslim contexts, the multiplicity of loyalties manifests itself, on the one hand, in the objects and forms of political loyalty. On the other, depending on the situation, linkages to other categories are formed in each object of loyalty. Some Muslims may view conflicts between numerous commitments, while others may not; it also depends on the hierarchy of loyalties, the importance of the values of individuals and communities, and the personal, political, and religious factors that shape these loyalties. Up until recently, Mottahedeh (1980) has been the most authoritative work on loyalty in medieval Islam. Mottahedeh focuses on the ways in which people form allegiances with the social classes and ruling elites of the Buyid dynasty (945–1055). He makes a distinction between two kinds of loyalty: acquired loyalties and loyalties of category. The acquired loyalties are typically formal and involve an allegiance sermon (bay’a) toward the ruler, which was considered sacrosanct in theory but was frequently violated. Loyalty expressed in treaties is similar to the allegiance of bay’a in status and outcomes. Another way to gain allegiances was by gifts and sponsoring of scribes and slaves. These acquired allegiances were reliant on the ruler or the patron and perished along with him. Loyalties of a category (or group) are the second sort. Individuals’ loyalty can be ascertained by their wealth, reputation, or lineage history, all of which are typically influenced by family. Social or professional group affiliations are another type of group loyalty [4]. The mapping of religious, political, and social affiliations functions in Muslim cultures in intricate ways and is more complex than previously believed, which may have been Mottahedeh’s greatest contribution.

Studies on political loyalty in Islam have centered on salafism. It is hoped that this study will contribute to a deeper understanding of a wider range of opinions on the topic in Muslim contexts both past and present. Furthermore, Muslim counterdiscourses have challenged the theologization of allegiance in the last 10 years, developing ideas of complementarity and multiplicity of loyalties in the process, all of which are important insights I set out to investigate here. Sufi order loyalty may also have political significance as well. As a result, it is highly relevant both historically and currently and has political implications. I will not discuss it, though, as it involves a mystic and religious component unique to the Sufi order or master, and it has to be investigated in light of the Sufi understanding of knowledge, lineage, and discipleship. In any case, separate and comprehensive research covering all of these issues is required.

I acknowledge the limits of this study and that the style is practical. I envisage it as an encyclopedic approach intended to survey the literature around specific areas of research. It became more challenging to maintain a smoother transition as the piece got longer and the surveyed list of works got larger. Due to a lack of space to engage with every work in full, I also refrained from critically analyzing some of the works. Another methodological limitation of the study is that, because I used a thematic approach, I did not differentiate between studies undertaken in the 20th century and those conducted in the last 24 years, or between research on medieval Islam and studies on current Islam.

2. Loyalty to Tribes/Ethnic Groups

Political allegiance or walā’ was a system from pre-Islamic Arabia that often referred to the assistance a tribe received from another tribe in a society where tribal alliances and conflicts ruled the day. In exchange for the stronger tribe’s assistance, the weaker tribe acknowledges subordinate individuals or groups as mawālī, or recipients of support, and who usually pay a monetary recompense. Slavery and seeking safety were two further circumstances when this kind of allegiance was claimed. Under the Umayyad caliphate (661–750), the walā’ institution developed and the mawālī were non-Arab Muslims from defeated nations who sought protection and loyalty from the Arab tribes (a similar system was applied to the contracted people, ahl a-dhimma, mainly Christians and Jews who paid a tax, jizya, in exchange for protection). After peace treaties were negotiated with the vanquished, an Arab tribe or dignitary offered protection and alliance to a group or an individual Muslim non-Arab [5].

A highly elaborated historical perspective on Muslim allegiances in medieval Muslim political thought is credited to Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406). For the latter, ‘aṣabiyya (tribal solidarity) denoted a sense of unity and allegiance to a group mostly based on blood relationships. Yet, group loyalty is formed by three different kinds of relationships: alliance (ḥilf), clientship (walā’), and blood ties (nasab). The strongest bonds of solidarity are formed by blood ties. It is also the most influential and trustworthy. However, as the kinship element weakens, alliance and client-ship may assume the prominent element in group relations in weaker forms of ‘aṣabiyya [6] (p. 30). Everyone in the tribe is supposed to be loyal to each other to the extent that they see themselves as a part of the whole, and the group is what matters to each person. The main goal is protection from outside threats, and the strategy used is allegiance to a single leader. Early Islam attempted to convert blood kinship-based political loyalty into a religious fraternity. However, the history of the Arabs after the first 40 years of Islam was essentially a continuation of the tribal conflicts that existed before Islam. Ibn Khaldūn’s findings on group feeling are relevant today as the modern equivalents of Ibn Khaldūn’s ‘aṣabiyya can be encountered in national, ethnic, and ideological allegiances [7] (p. 126).

Fuad I. Khuri demonstrated, in 1972, that the sect had a minimal bearing on Lebanese village politics. Family ties would still decide loyalty in times of strife even in villages with two or more sects, regardless of how powerful each sect is compared to one another. Then, in mid-20th century, Lebanese villagers moved to the city and settled there, whereupon they started to build politics around their sect rather than their family. According to him, demonstrating sectarian loyalty is not inherently detrimental to the advancement of contemporary civil institutions; rather, it serves as a kind of civil commitment test and a transitional phase between kinship and national loyalty [8] (pp. 198–200).

Recently, Hershkovits argued how, at times during the Prophet’s lifetime, converting to Islam was viewed as an act of family loyalty and as assistance and support to a family member (the Prophet), as well as an act of social and political significance with relatively little regard to religious issues [9] (p. 55). The attitude of the Prophet’s uncle and chief enemy in Mecca, Abū Lahab, can be used as a counterexample. Numerous relatives of the Prophet or his companions have eschewed family loyalty in favor of tribe loyalty.

3. Loyalty to Homeland/Nation

Until recently, the idea of a nation or homeland in the Muslim world was eclipsed by the fact that religion served as the identity framework within which caliphates, such as the Ottoman caliphate, reigned over large areas of the Muslim world. The existence of patriotism has been refuted by proponents of traditional Islam. However, the creation of contemporary nation-states in the Middle East brought forth new circumstances including multi-national states where majority and minority communities coexist and loyalties are split. While some states have succeeded in avoiding conflicts of loyalty by highlighting national or homeland loyalty as essential to identity, others have found it difficult to do so. Zayde Antrim argues that in Syria in the 12th and 13th centuries, the word waṭan, homeland, was used to describe land territories that went beyond one’s birthplace, ancestral home, or place of residence. This was performed in conjunction with declarations of political allegiance to dynasties and Islamic convictions. Political allegiance, as opposed to sentimental devotion to a ruler or dynasty, was sustained in correlation to personal political allegiance and its spatial projection (waṭan). For example, political allegiance to the Ayyubids was validated by religious beliefs projected into the space of Jerusalem [10].

Nanes asserts that nationalist transjordanians, who wanted the Palestinians of 1967 to be loyal only to Jordan and not to Palestine, doubt the loyalty of Palestinians living in Jordan [11]. However, given that Palestine and Jordan share borders, one could wonder if a person’s position as a refugee or migrant in one of their neighboring nations cannot influence their liminal loyalties. Ruget and Usmanalieva demonstrated that while embracing dual citizenship, Kyrgyz migrants working in Russia and Kazakhstan exhibit conflicted allegiances to their home country and continue to show interest in national politics without committing to a particular political activity [12].

Tezcür and Asadzadep propose that lower levels of political representation for Sunni Kurdish people in the Islamic Republic of Iran are reflected in higher rates of recruitment for Kurdish insurgencies in Sunni than in Shiite Kurdish districts of Iran. That is to say, the blending of Iranian and Shiite national identities makes the Shiite Kurds more politically loyal to the Iranian state [13] (p. 17). Schäfers explores how Kurdish women find resources for political commitment in close-knit communities of kinship and family. She argues that close family and personal ties are important contexts in which political allegiance and loyalty demands are not just discussed and debated but also given shape and substance [14].

4. Loyalty to Islam

While traditional objects of political loyalty (religion, ethnicity, tribe, etc.) are irrelevant in the secular-liberal West, Muslim political thought nevertheless places a high value on traditional loyalties, especially loyalty to Islam. The latter is even experiencing a renaissance, despite the rivalry from nationalism [15] (p. 530). That being said, Lewis’ thesis, which aimed to highlight what he saw as the weakness of states and nations in the Muslim world—an ideological assertion of geopolitical interest—may have been pertinent in the 1980s and 1990s, but it is no longer relevant in the immediate present.

Loyalty to Islam should, however, be considered in light of other loyalties. Thus, one way to express opposition to the West’s cultural and political hegemony is through loyalty to Islam [16] (p. 231). Since the 19th century, the Wahhabi discourse has modified the religious idea of al-walā’ (loyalty to Islam, Muslims, and God) in order to justify collaboration with the Saudi government [17] (p. 104). Contemporary religious authorities in Saudi Arabia also reconciled tribalism and Islam in spite of opposition from some Salafis [18] (p. 219). According to Salafism, remaining faithful to Islam means keeping it pure and bringing back practices that closely resembled Islam during the time of the Prophet Muhammad [19] (p. 157).

One of the most crucial policies for the Saudi government in its efforts to win over the Hijazi community in the early 20th century has been religion. As demonstrated by Ochsenwald, the King of Saudi Arabia and his officials frequently opted for more practical measures, hoping to secure stability in governance by winning over the population. By utilizing both Islamic and non-Islamic policies, Saudi officials aimed to foster a sense of dynastic loyalty while avoiding overzealousness, which may have the opposite effect. Besides religion, the establishment of national symbols, patronage networks, military might, and laws defining citizenship were examples of secular elements that contributed to the development of political allegiance to the Saudi state [20] (pp. 7–8).

Outside of Saudi Arabia, the interweaving of Islam with other tribal and ethnic identities is also present in other Muslim contexts. For example, a man’s strongest allegiance in traditional Sudanese society is to his family and the tribe (qabīla). Beyond a purely religious commitment to Islam, the tribe provides its members with an identity and a foundation for this allegiance to religion [21] (p. 104). Similarly to Saudi Arabia and Sudan, society and politics in Iran are overall shaped by adherence to velāyat-e faqīh and loyalty to Islam [22] (p. 346). The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 revealed the importance of the Iranian religious establishment in shaping the nation’s policies and the extent to which a sizable portion of the Iranian population is devoted to Shia Islam [23] (p. 5). Before the 1979 Islamic revolution, the bazaar elite (traders) in Iran had shown loyalty to the clergy. Later, when the regime rewarded them by integrating them into the armed forces and administrative structures, the bazaar continued to support Khomeini and his circle [24]. Thus, adherence to a certain Islamic ideology can serve as the basis for a practical political partnership. According to Shapira, shii Lebanese loyalty to Iranian clergy is complex and involves a certain amount of autonomy. This loyalty adjusts to the Iranian Supreme Leader’s authority. Hizballah showed allegiance to and respect for the velāyat-e faqīh acting under Khomeini’s authority. With Khamenei, Hizballah was reluctant to exhibit the same loyalty. The party only expressed allegiance to Khamenei once it reached an agreement with him that Hizballah would designate a leader from among its own ranks for the first time [25]. For Shanahan, Hizballah has kept the party’s leadership in the hands of its scholars, in keeping with its jurisprudential allegiance and ideological ties to the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei [26] (p. 1).

In Indonesia, loyalty to parents or traditional education might serve as the foundation for allegiance to Islam [27] (p. 127). Thus, some Islamic schools in Indonesia use a strategy that upholds commitment to Islam while fostering tolerance and respect for other religions in order to promote pluralism among young people [28] (p. 121). Loyalty to Islam and the Indonesian nation may coexist if the idea of contemporary democratic citizenship is upheld and Islamic law is viewed as ethics and spiritual guidance rather than as official laws and regulations [29] (p. 7).

Kozlowski shows that the authority, influence, and competence of the particular mufti, as well as the petitioners’ loyalty to him and the organization he represents, are major factors in determining the force of a fatwa. By the same token, the consciences of believers and their loyalty to him or the organization he represents are crucial resources for the mufti’s authority. The Jamiah’s ulama assert that they would never disregard a fatwa issued by the mufti and Indian Muslims were shown to have a preference for personal loyalty and local organizations [30].

5. Loyalty to Leadership/State

There are regions in the Muslim world where loyalty to one’s state and religion conflict, and there are other regions where this kind of conflict is unimportant. In Egypt and Syria, for instance, Islamism and extremist salafism have exploited loyalty to Islam to overthrow secular governments; yet, political fidelity to Islam has been effectively assimilated into the state, nation, or ethnicity in many Muslim countries. Furthermore, political allegiance to Islam has undoubtedly aided in the establishment of states in Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, South Asian states such as Pakistan and North African nations such as Morocco.

Whether the sectarian division between sunnism and shiism has any bearing on how political allegiance to leadership is perceived is one of the major problems that have developed in contemporary studies regarding political loyalty in Muslim ethics. On the one hand, Afsaruddin and Hordern have opposed Sunni and Shi’i political loyalties to leadership and authority. According to them, shi’i religio-political theology is based on kinship, with the Imam’s lineage from the Prophet’s family serving as the primary reason for the faithful’s allegiance and compliance. In contrast, the Sunnis have continued to elevate the idea of individual moral brilliance as well as the many qualities of bravery, compassion, and knowledge above all else in their leader [31] (p. 367) [32] (p. 350). Loyalty to the state or community can be differentiated from loyalty to a particular leadership or figure of authority. Nonetheless, it is a representation of the state and the community and frequently captures the political climate of a given society or political structure.

On the other hand, Mottahedeh highlighted the difference between acquired loyalties (oath, gratitude for interest) and loyalties of the category (shared class or origin across groups) rather than the Sunni-Shi’i divide [4] (pp. 40–174). This causes political allegiance to become more erratic and dependent on a variety of factors, rather than just being a fixed sectarian identity. Mottahedeh makes it evident that we should approach Muslim communities from a multifaceted perspective that transcends religious identification in order to show how intricate relationships to one’s ethnicity, social class, and interests can influence a given individual or community. More recently, Muwahidah challenged the use of Shii and Sunni binary classifications as a restrictive analytical framework when examining diversity and sectarian conflicts in contemporary Indonesia as the love of Ahl al-bayt (the Prophet’s family) seems to reduce tensions between Sunnis and Shiis [33]. The Twelver Shii school of thought, as represented by the Iraqi Twelver Shii scholar Muḥammad Mahdī al-Āṣifī (1939–2015), supports principlist ethics, promoting the idea that political loyalty to people who represent legitimate religious and political authority is an expression of obedience that must be shown without exception [34]. Even so, religious authority in Twelver Shiism is based on a variety of factors, including the belief in divine selection, an individual’s innate superiority over others, or some other merit, in addition to lineage. That is to say, even while it is a requirement, bloodline is insufficient for most Shi’i groups, both historical and contemporary.

Whether Salafism and Twelver Shi’ism exhibit comparable political theologies of loyalty is another topic that might be explored here. While both emphasize loyalty and disavowal as key religious concepts, in the Shi’i case, it is not generally understood as loyalty toward God, orthodox belief, and Muslims and antipathy toward unorthodox Muslims and non-Muslims but rather, as a general sense of loyalty toward those aligned with God, the imam, and his community and separation from those who are against them. Thus, while the paradigm is the same, the results are not. They both underline how religion divides the lines between allies and enemies. In the Shii-Ismā’īlī political theology, loyalty is a fundamental tenet of the Ismā’īlī doctrine; Smoor shows that Ismā’īlīs were required to swear vows of commitment to the imam and abide by the laws of loyalty (walâ’). Ismā’īlīs took great pride in their devotion to the imam, and one of their symbols of allegiance was presenting oneself as a martyr to ensure the cause’s continuation [35] (p. 479). Most current Ismailis do not embrace martyrdom and are peaceful. Smoor’s findings were relevant exclusively in the context of medieval Ismailism in its conflict with the Abbasid caliphate. Even yet, esoteric types of martyrdom (such as witnessing rather than dying or ceremonial martyrdom) existed together with political meanings of martyrdom.

According to the Ismā’īlī jurist al-Qādī an-Nu’mān’s Da’ā’im al-Islām, walāya, or loyalty to the imām, is the most important pillar of Islam, ranking above the other pillars of purity, prayer, almsgiving, pilgrimage, fasting, and jihad [36] (p. 2). al-Qādī an-Nu’mān was the chief jurist of the Fatimids in Egypt and died in 974 CE (Dā’ā’im al-Islām is attributed to him although it contains references to later Zaydī scholars in Yemen). Belief in the imamate—a legitimate political and religious authority figure who is a descendent of ‘Alī and has been divinely appointed defines Ismaili loyalty. The Fatimids strove to reinvigorate belief in the imamate as a theocracy with a true Islamic scheme of values, in opposition to the nomocratic state of the Abbasids with ceremonial allegiance to a symbolic caliphate [37] (p. 272). Halm showed that the Ismā’īlī oath of allegiance is an act performed by initiates to preserve the esoteric meaning and secrecy (bāṭin) in a vow known as mīthāq or ‘ahd [38] (p. 91).

Personal allegiance to leadership was essential to the Mamluks’ political dominance in Egypt; in fact, the Mamluks’ bonds of formal loyalty to the sons of a single common master gave the elite slave-soldiers plenty of political opportunities. While the Mamluks took the political initiative, the master’s sons offered legitimacy for political aspirations, suggesting that the link of loyalty between a master’s sons and Mamluks was unusually strong. However, these links were susceptible to political maneuvers by the Ottoman government in Egypt, which increasingly succeeded in severing these ties of personal allegiance [39] (pp. 123–124). According to Tor’s analysis of the role played by Mamlūk loyalty in the Seljuq state, the slave system also produced its own inherent limitations on loyalty: first, a heightened level of rivalry within the slave corps and obsessive vying for the ruler’s favor that frequently led to jealousy and betrayal; and, second, the strictly personal nature of the slave’s tie to his master, which meant that even the most devoted slave-soldier’s allegiance ended with the said master’s death, after which the slave-soldier frequently became a threat to his former lord’s heirs. This calls into question the slave warriors’ revered allegiance to their lord [40].

In North Africa and Spain, loyalty to the Almohads (1121–1269) was performed ceremonially with adherence to certain doctrinal precepts. Local Andalusi and Maghribi figures of authority were required to swear an oath of loyalty to the Almohad ruler, just as the Companions pledged their oath of loyalty to Prophet Muḥammad, promising to be a hand in fighting and defending him. Almohad loyalty was devoted to both the Almohad cause (the Almohad creed of divine oneness) and the Almohad ruler. The pledge of allegiance, known as bay‘a, was articulated in a khuṭba (sermon) that was delivered after an Almohad victory or upon the coronation of a new caliph [41]. Acknowledging Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130), the founder of the Almohad movement, as a messianic figure (mahdī), was part of conveying the Almohad concept of loyalty [41] (p. 73). However, Ibn Tūmart managed to win over the steadfast allegiance of his adherents by creating an organization that was in harmony with the tribal confederation of Maṣmūda Berbers of the High Atlas, thus identifying the Almohad movement as Maṣmūda. Maṣmūda tribal chieftains made up the majority of the Jamā’a (Council of Ten) and Ahl Khamsīn (Council of Fifty), which granted advisory authority to each Maṣmūda tribe inside the organization. The Jamā’a members, sometimes referred to as the Anṣār (a clear reference to the initial followers of the Prophet Muḥammad), offered a crucial channel for the integration of many tribes into the ranks of the Almohads [42] (p. 17).The oath of allegiance, bay‘a, was an important ritual for demonstrating loyalty to the ruler, which was customary in Arabia and endorsed by the Prophet in his alliance with the Medinan tribes (bay‘at al-‘aqaba). It frequently adheres to a protocol and particular commitment to support, obedience, and alliance throughout the Muslim world [43].

Nepstad showed that, during the Arab spring, the regimes in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria tried to keep the military loyal by punishing (or threatening to punish) disloyal troops; offering economic incentives for the regime’s upkeep; and offering political incentives for the regime’s upkeep. On the other hand, civil organizations that aim to promote defections include increasing the political, moral, and honor costs of remaining loyal to the regime, as well as lowering the personal costs of leaving [44]. According to McLauchlin (2017), the Alawite regime’s ethnic exclusion of the Sunni majority in Syria puts privileged groups, such as the Alawites, in a loyalty trap. Although some members of the privileged group have more access to power than others, they are all identified as regime loyalists by virtue of their ethnic identity, which prolongs the conflict because loyalty to the regime becomes an existential and ethnic issue. This illustrates how loyalty is a social fact defined by communal identity markers like class identity or political affiliation [45]. Pachon asserted that in Tunisia, the military supported the authoritarian civilian leadership throughout the Arab Spring. However, there was defection between the National Guard and the Police, who were falsely shown as being Ben Ali’s allies [46] (p. 508).

In other situations where a minority or marginal group has exercised extreme violence or control over a contesting majority, such as the Iraqi Ba’ath party or the Algerian jihadists in the country’s mountains and deserts who fear being discovered or apprehended by Algerian authorities, loyalty can be seen as an existential issue. Because the only other option is death or complete destruction, intimate affiliation with a radical political group, a government, or a military regime typically results in this kind of connection and dedication that refuses to leave devotion until the very last minute. Loyalty, as an existential political sentiment, can take another form, namely as sub-national identities. Falk argues that when Israeli Palestinians object to their government’s policies on Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, they are expressing loyalty as an existential reality. The experiences of Kurds, Tamils, Basques, and other ethnic minorities are representative of alienation from the nationality and orientation of the state. Other examples include the diverse tribal allegiances found throughout much of Africa and the marginalized identities of indigenous peoples found throughout the Western Hemisphere and beyond [47] (p. 2).

As shown by Oldenburg, in Pakistan, a sizable “disloyal opposition” in the shape of militant Islamists from Tehrik-e-Taliban (also known as the Pakistan Taliban) and secessionists in Balochistan pose a continuing threat to Pakistan’s hybrid regime, which combines civil and military elements. The military and Islamist parties can be semi-loyal players as well as supporters of acts of violence committed by different groups, posing a threat to Pakistan’s state [48]. Cheema asserts that the conservative Islamic rhetoric in Pakistan equates Islam with national identity, resulting in closed aggressive opinions that do not allow for dissent. Conversely, liberal groups aim to foster a patriotic discourse that is anti-state [49].

In current Morocco, political life is primarily shaped by the “field of loyalty” to the king, with the government and political parties occupying a secondary position. Because of this system, the Moroccan people have mistrust for political parties, and the monarchy is increasingly appropriating non-party technocracy. This widens the chasm between the regime and large groups in society who are gradually losing faith in meaningful change, especially the youth [50].

According to Ciftci, rather than resulting in independence, more resources may be used as tools for building a network of loyal supporters. Regimes in oil-rich monarchies can purchase the loyalty of their citizens by enacting large welfare programs; but, in nations with limited resources (like Jordan), an overseas patron may supply the rent required to support patronage networks. Thus, election tampering and resource distribution go hand in hand to enable the creation of this kind of loyalty. Thus, additional resources might favor the maintenance of authoritarian regimes in Arab countries [51].

6. Oath of Allegiance (Bay’a)

Even though we touched on some of the aspects of bay’a in the preceding section, this type of political allegiance merits a brief discussion of its own given that more than 10 studies have been conducted specifically on it. Bay’a occurs when an individual or a group takes an oath of allegiance, either orally or in writing, to pledge allegiance to a political figure believed to be legitimate. It is a symbolic act of rallying around a central power figure (caliphate, sultanate, and imarate) by the community’s legitimate representatives [52]. It is designed to demonstrate obedience to this central power: a political-religious contract of loyalty that is authoritative under public Islamic law. Allegiance to groups outside the central authority is not a bay’a, as it would divide the community [53]. Even now, allegiance rites are organized in countries like Saudi Arabia and Morocco where political allegiance is still formally maintained [54,55]. Although it is also used by Islamist organizations today, especially radical ones, it is not regarded as legitimate by Islamic law as it is illegal from a normative Islamic perspective to swear allegiance to organizations [56]; bay’a is only applicable to governmental powers that the elites (religious, political, and economic notables) have recognized as legitimate. Allegiance from the point of view of Islamic law is only valid in a Muslim country governed by a Muslim authority. A few instances of non-Muslims taking an oath of allegiance to a Muslim ruler can be found in the history of Islam, such as the Jewish community of Yemen’s 11th-century vow of allegiance to Egypt [57] or the oath of allegiance given by the Christian rulers of León to al-Ḥakam II al-Mustanṣir, the Omayyad caliph in Muslim Spain [58]. In the majority of cases, the oath was really a formality, as the powerful ruler had already secured rallying at the time of the oath of allegiance. Most studies, however, concentrate on actual oaths of allegiance to monarchs or states. A further aspect that is often overlooked in studies on the oath of allegiance is the consequences of nullifying the oath, or naqḍ al-bay’a. Given the constraints of the current study, further research is needed in this area.

7. Loyalty to the Ottomans

The majority of Arab Renaissance intellectuals, according to Axel Havemann, thought that Arabism and Ottomanism (i.e., political allegiance to the Ottoman caliphate) were compatible, while Turkish nationalism—the end product of Turkification policy—would be incompatible with Arab cultural distinctiveness and cause the empire to fall apart. Although the Ottoman caliphate’s Islamic nature demanded allegiance to Arabs, it preserved the cultural distinctions between Arabs and Turks, giving each group a sense of representation [59] (p. 351). Conversely, Abdul-Karim Rafeq contends that Arab religious scholars opposed Ottoman rule with sharia law and were loyal to the Arab-Islamic umma, isolating themselves from the modernized Ottoman state [60]. In Tunisia, throughout the 18th century, Tunisia saw a competition between two loyalty discourses: Tunisian patriotism and Ottoman loyalty [61] (pp. 121–125).

James. L. Gelvin contends that the idea of divided loyalties best captures the commitment to the Arab nation and/or Ottoman caliphate. For him, competing nationalist factions in Syria in the wake of World War I reconciled “traditionalist” and “modern” faces of nationalism in different ways in order to win over the loyalty of the Syrian people. With the “total vision of the world” that they offered to their constituents, these ideological organizations were able to draw members by utilizing a variety of intricate bonds of allegiance, such as those derived from markets, families, and spatial networks that brought together horizontal and vertical linkages and enabled the creation of a new political community model [62] (pp. 12–21).

A tight analysis of the immediate postwar period centered on Palestinian attitudes toward the Turkish independence movement (1919–1922) demonstrates that Ottoman and Muslim allegiances remained strong among Turks and Arabs alike [63]. Uyar maintains that the majority of Arab officers’ continued allegiance to the Ottomans both before and after World War I, serving as an example of their effective assimilation into the Ottoman army. Thus, ethnic and/or national sympathies were subordinated to a high degree of institutional loyalty, esprit de corps, and integration [64].

Özok-Gündoğan maintains that the Ottoman Empire never used force as the only means of extending its territory. Negotiation with local power brokers, to whom the Ottomans granted administrative flexibility and concessions in exchange for loyalty, was, instead, a crucial component. Acknowledging the Kurdish elders’ inherited right to leadership was also crucial to winning their support. However, one could not take the Kurdish nobility’s loyalty in this volatile area for granted. The Ottoman state understood how important it was to keep their loyalty and used prerogatives and incentives to direct their military force toward defending this just-established border [65].

Loyalty to the Ottoman government that was developed earlier was impacted by the introduction of Tanzimat in 1839 (modernization reforms). One obvious shift was the relationship between the bureaucracy and the state, where loyalty to the latter took precedence over allegiance to a specific sultan. The modernist Ottomans believed that adherence to the state depended on good governance and that the social contract extended to all subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be. The Ottomans were committed to the vision of an all-encompassing Ottomanism that would earn the allegiance of both Muslims and non-Muslims. Ottomanism was unable to accomplish this goal because Islamic loyalty still dominated public opinion and pan-Islamism had won only limited success among the citizens of the Ottoman states. By the end of the 19th century, the Turks started to assert their unique national identity as Turks, and they also developed a deep-seated resentment of what they saw as non-Muslims’ lack of loyalty to the Ottomanist project. As a result, different nationalisms began to gain traction among Muslim, Christian, and other communities within the empire, effectively casting doubt on the notion of Ottoman loyalty [66].

8. Muslim Loyalties Under Colonial Rule

Based on an analysis of their writings, Dzanic argues that a number of significant Algerian leaders who were held captive in the colonial prison in southern France in the 1840s reinterpreted their sense of loyalty as a result of their incarceration. The majority of them gave up on their violent patriotic resistance in favor of trying to prove their allegiance to France by citing their military service and their support for the French colonial project—which they saw as the consistent expansion of the French legal system throughout Algeria—and their efforts to make peace between Islam and the French monarchy [67].

Colonial British rule in Egypt was concerned with Egyptian loyalty to the Ottoman caliphate. Thus, Egyptian nationality was denied to some Egyptians by legislation during the British colonial administration, which gave the Egyptian state the authority to include or exclude people based on their alleged allegiance to the Egyptian state [68].

As a foreign power (in terms of religion and ethnicity), the colonial impact challenges traditional loyalty, introducing a new political authority in the colonized country around the notion of a colonial powerful central state. Even though the majority of Muslims under colonial control did not recognize the legitimacy of this power, a protracted colonization process may lead to complicated loyalty situations, where certain groups enter into interest loyalties with the colonial state. This is the case involving the Harkis in French-colonial Algeria. Harkis were a group of Muslim Algerians who fought from 1954 until 1962 for the French Army against the National Liberation Front. They were part of Muslim Algerians who were recruited since 1830 in the French army as regular soldiers or auxiliaries, constituting a sizeable minority (263,000 people estimated in 1962) together with their families and who were taxed by anti-France Algerians as traitors [69] (pp. 178–180).

9. Loyalty to Non-Muslims: Discourses and Counter Discourses

In Muslim political ethics, the question of loyalty to non-Muslims is posed as follows: whom should a Muslim support and be loyal to, and who should he distance himself from and consider an enemy? The Quran uses the terms awliyā’ (loyal, friends, allies) and barā’a (dissociation, disavowal, distance) to describe this issue, highlighting the value of being trustworthy with anybody you owe fidelity to and the respect of pacts of mutual assistance [70] (p. 237). We can distinguish between two positions on loyalty and disavowal within the Sunni realm: 1. salafist absolutism, which sees no possible friendship or alliance with non-Muslims, 2. and reformist Sunnism, which supports a more nuanced position that takes into account alliance with non-Muslims in cases of peaceful and normal relations, based on values of justice and peace. The salafi approach has been the focus of academic studies on Muslim political allegiance. Since Islamist terrorism has caused instability in many countries, most research to date has focused only on the securitization of allegiance, that is, the relationship between political loyalty and extreme Islamist ideologies and terrorism [71,72]. Comparing reformist positions to salafi arguments, particularly extremist Salafism or envisioning the reformist perspective as a pursuit to adapt Islamic law to Western citizenship, has been the subject of few studies [73,74,75,76].

With Saudi Arabia’s help in the 1980s to combat shiism and communism, the salafi doctrine of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ (loyalty and disavowal) spread widely throughout the Muslim world. Thus, under the title of al-Walā’ wa-l-barā’: dirāsāt fī wujūb muwālāt al-mu’minīn wa-l-barā’a min al-kāfirīn, in 1979, the Egyptian Salafist ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Abd al-Khāliq (1936–2022) who lived in Kuwait arguably released the first book dedicated to this doctrine [77]. Muḥammad b. Sa’īd b. Sālim al-Qaḥṭānī, a Saudi Salafist, published his book al-Walā’ wa-l-barā’ fī l-Islām in 1981 [78]. These two monographs have been edited several times and formed the basis of salafi and Sunni discussions on al-Walā’ wa-l-barā’ throughout the 1980s until 1988 when Ṣāliḥ al-Fawzān published his al-Walā’ wa-l-barā’ fī l-Islām [79]. Because al-Fawzān occupies a top position in the Saudi religious establishment, and Salafism in general, his work has been widely diffused and translated into European languages to allow it a global reach. In the 1990s, several monographs on the topic were published but by less influential authors. Since the 2000s, following the terrorist attacks in the Middle East and the West, a critical discourse on al-Walā’ wa-l-barā’ started to emerge even within Salafism with authors calling against extremism such as the Saudi Salafist Ḥātim al-‘Awnī who published al-Walā’ wa-l-barā’ bayna al-ghuluww wa-l-jaf ā’ [80]. Outside Arabia, the Egyptian Azhari scholar Jumʻa ʻAlī al-Khūlī authored one of the first studies on loyalty in Islam in 1984. According to ʻAlī al-Khūlī’s al-Walā’ fī al-Islām (Loyalty in Islam), allegiance should be given to God, the Prophet, and the believers following Q. 5:55. This traditionalist approach highlights the strictly religious meaning of loyalty, taking a Quranic attitude of categorizing individuals into believers and non-believers, without providing any context to Quranic verses [81]. Hundreds of books, pamphlets, and articles that were released since then show a major influence of rising Islamism and fear from geopolitical threats that reshaped the Middle East in the same period.

Al-Walā’ wa-l-barā’ fī l-Islām by Ṣāliḥ al-Fawzān, arguably the most authoritative Saudi Salafi cleric today, constitutes a main reference in Salafism on loyalty to non-Muslims. Al-Fawzān classifies non-Muslims as persons who a sincere Muslim should hate and for whom one should have true enmity, without being tainted by any love or alliance, regardless of their faith or ideology. These are the unrepentant unbelievers, without difference, among the godless, the polytheists, the hypocrites, the rebels, and the atheists [79] (pp. 28–29). It is difficult to love, support, trust, or get along with non-Muslims according to this tenet. Al-Fawzān adds that this tenet forbids collaboration with non-Muslims in the workplace (unless Muslims hold superior positions) or in wars; this principle should forbid a Muslim from adopting a non-Muslim name, praising non-Muslims, exalting their civilization and culture, marveling at their morals and abilities, rejecting their beliefs and religion, taking part in their festivals, wishing them well or attending their celebrations, adhering to their calendars, particularly those that record their rites and celebrations like the Gregorian calendar, awarding them positions in government, hiring them, using them as confidants and advisors, supporting them, protecting them from Muslims, entertaining them, remaining in non-Muslim lands rather than emigrating to a Muslim country, and attempting to behave in a manner that is similar to them in terms of appearance, language, and behavior [79] (pp. 7–16).

Salafi Jihadist discourses promote violence against both “deviant” Muslims and non-Muslims as an application of the dogma of al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, loyalty, and disavowal. For instance, Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī (1951–2022) wrote a brief book titled al-Walā’ wa-l-barā’: ‘aqīda manqūla wa-wāqi’ mafqūd (Loyalty and Disavowal: Transmitted Creed and Lost Reality), which was released in 2002 in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan [82,83] (pp. 310–363). Al-Ẓawāhirī’s writing sparked a great deal of debate on al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ in the Arabian Peninsula, which was fueled by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. within salafism itself, division is not prevented by the doctrine of loyalty and disavowal. There is division among the salafi organizations in Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt, and they often use takfīr against one another. Salafis are also divided on their loyalty to the Saudi authorities and the king. While a significant portion of the Salafi groups remain loyal to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, other members attempt to break away from it [84] (p. 270). On occasion, they engage in combat (ISIS vs. al-Qaida). Even among a single organization like al-Qaida, Jihadi salafists differ in their allegiance to the central leadership or to regional commands [85] (p. 170).

However, after the terrorist acts of 2001, criticism of salafism increased, and moderate salafi scholars began to produce counter-discourses to reframe the idea of loyalty and disavowal. Thus, Mūsā Ibrāhīm al-Ibrāhīm, a prominent Syrian salafist contends that being a Muslim does not entail being called to withdraw oneself from forming bonds and interactions with non-Muslims. Instead, Muslims should engage in discourse, conversation, and interaction with non-Muslims in an effort to convert them to Islam. They should also be fair to them, uphold their rights, and treat them with tolerance and moderation. The doctrine of loyalty and disavowal should not preclude business or knowledge exchanges [86] (pp. 136–137).

Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, a well-known Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood figure and a prominent Sunni reformist scholar who resided in Qatar from the 1960s until his passing in 2022 argued that the Islamic faith is the cornerstone of political allegiance. Regarding the implications of this loyalty, he asserts that a Muslim’s duty to his umma is to protect its boundaries and not permit anyone to assault it, take possession of its property, desecrate any of its holy icons, or diminish the dignity of some of its children [87] (p. 25). In other words, this allegiance is divided between two domains: 1. the Muslim world as a whole is composed of states and territories that make up the physical umma and 2. loyalty to Muslims as people whose integrity and dignity should be upheld and preserved outside the actual boundaries of the Muslims world, as a larger symbolic umma [87].

Coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims is a topic that al-Qaraḍāwī discusses in his Fī fiqh al-aqalliyyāt al-muslima. According to him, Islamic ethics make a distinction between people who coexist peacefully with Muslims and people who harbor animosity toward them. Islamic morality dictates that non-Muslims who live in peace should be treated with respect and justice. While righteousness is superior to justice and denotes love and favor, justice is defined as fairness. To be just is to assert your rights, and to be righteous is to relinquish part of your rights. Giving someone their right without taking away from it is justice or fairness; giving someone more than their right while showing them compassion and favor is righteousness. And so, for al-Qaraḍāwī, the Quran prohibits association with those who are hostile to Muslims because they fought and opposed Muslims and forcibly removed them from their homes, much as the Quraysh and the Meccan polytheists did to the Messenger and his companions [88] (p. 141). In his view, the fact that it is acceptable to marry Christian and Jewish women and consume their food shows that Islamic ethics perceive no harm in friendship with non-Muslims who live in peace with Muslims. With this permission, close family and community ties are strengthened, and Muslims are encouraged to treat non-Muslims with kindness and respect in order to preserve positive social interactions [88] (p. 143).

In the wake of September 11, al-Qaraḍāwī gave the go-ahead for American Muslim soldiers to combat Muslim nations under the banner of the allegiance of these soldiers to the United States. Even in this instance, the preservation of Islam in the United States against suspicion supported this choice rather than requiring initial political loyalty to the government as such [89].

The doctrine of loyalty and disavowal, according to Egyptian Muslim liberal intellectual Jamāl al-Bannā (1920–2013), was developed as a result of how some verses were interpreted to encourage believers’ loyalty and disavowal of non-believers during a bloody and religious conflict that broke out between Mecca’s polytheists and early Muslims. These verses make sense in this context—a climate of war—but in everyday life, which ought to be the norm, they become completely meaningless because there is no longer a reason for them to be applied—that is, war—and because coexistence with other people is supposed to be the natural state [90]. According to al-Bannā’s contextualist interpretation of the Quran, non-Muslims cannot be disavowed in a normal state of affairs.

Assem Hefny, an Azhari scholar, uses a hermeneutic method to refute the salafi understanding of the Quran’s teachings on loyalty and disavowal, providing an alternate reading of the pertinent verses while taking into account the hostile attitude toward non-Muslims as a situation-and time-bound phenomenon. Furthermore, as long as they are not at war with Muslims, the vast majority of the pertinent verses from the Qur’an advocate for cordial relations with non-Muslims who live in peace [91] (p. 123).

The Tunisian reformist thinker Riḍā Ḥamdī further developed the ideas of J. al-Bannā. For him, as was the case with the Khawārij and the Shiites, periods of pressure on marginalized groups were associated with the emergence of the idea of loyalty and disavowal. The oppression spread to embrace the entire Muslim world, as it does now, and to involve large segments of the Muslim population, as was the case with the Tatar invasion. The echoes of this concept would fade and the relationship with alterity would revert to normal with the removal of these elements. As a result, disavowal and loyalty can be seen as a defensive strategy to deal with all the upcoming difficulties by igniting the internal solidarity mechanism (loyalty) and elevating the group as a whole while simultaneously stoking feelings of dislike for the other and a dislike of interacting with him (disavowal). Only a select minority, unable to effectively engage with current issues and respond to them appropriately, choose to reject alterity, regardless of how serious and all-encompassing the threat may be [92].

In this context, social exclusion from political decision-making and social inclusion is a more accurate definition of marginalization than social abandonment, though there is typically an overlap between the two. This type of siege mindset gives rise to rebellious and dissident organizations that are prepared to take drastic positions when it comes to defining their allies and enemies. For instance, the term “Khawārij” was once used to refer to Wahhabism. Presently, it is used by a number of Muslim officials to criticize extremist salafists in Saudi Arabia and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that extends beyond ISIS (a quasi-political consensus exists to regard them as Khawārij).

10. Muslim Loyalties in the West

The research conducted so far on Muslim loyalties in the West has focused exclusively on the securitization of loyalty, i.e., on the ability of Muslims to be loyal to Western societies as Islamist terrorism has destabilized these societies in recent years; accusations of Muslim disloyalty emerged at a more limited level in Britain in the aftermath of the Rushdie affair and the Gulf War (1989–1991) [93]. Perhaps the earliest study in Europe on Muslim loyalty to non-Muslim states was published by Shadid and van Koningsveld in 1996 (in the context of the Satanic Verses controversy of 1989 and the Gulf War in 1990–1991); this study highlights how Muslim jurists in Great Britain call Muslims to abide by the laws of the state and show loyalty to the land and the Crown by virtue of the citizenship contract, even if Great Britain was at war with Muslims [94] (p. 104). In 1998, Wihtol de Wenden showed how the loyalty of Muslim populations in France has been called into question on a number of occasions: during the Rushdie and scarf affairs; regarding the revision of the nationality code, during the Gulf War, and regarding the Franco–Algerian military service agreement (signed in 1983), which permits applicants to adopt French nationality even if they have served in the Algerian army and following the terrorist attacks of 1995–1996 [95] (p. 275).

It was only in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, as Islam was designated as a geopolitical “enemy” of the US foreign policy and the Salafi discourses of loyalty and disavowal of the West found visibility and more adherents within radical Muslim milieus [83] (pp. 310–363) that the first extensive research started to appear on Muslim loyalties in the West. In 2003, M. S. Seddon et al. edited the book British Muslims: Loyalty and Belonging, which includes two contributions on loyalty by Muslim thinkers Imtiaz Ahmed Hussain and Tim Winter, who both believe Muslim loyalty should be shown to the British state and society provided that the latter recognizes Muslims; both thinkers consider a “minimal loyalty” to be necessary as a starting point for Islamic reform in Western society [96]. In 2007, Volpi showed how jihadists in Europe used individualized approaches to religiosity to undermine the construction of pacts of loyalty between Muslims and European states [97]. A year later, Wagemakers explored how Salafism views Islam as religiously and politically threatened, which would require Salafists to be loyal to God and Islam and to disavow everything else [71]. Later, Grabau demonstrated that there is public and state suspicion in Germany of a Muslim loyalty conflict, indicating mistrust on the part of the host society regarding a possible Muslim defection. Muslims’ loyalty is being questioned, raising worries about their status within the host society. German politicians and the general public expect Muslims residing in Germany to identify as Germans and feel a sense of belonging to the host nation. As a result, the requirement for allegiance to the host society extends beyond merely following the law to include an emotional connection to a sense of community, which is considered a necessary condition for allegiance [98] (p. 196).

In 2014, Uriya Shavit distinguished between Salafist perceptions of loyalty that require Muslims to refrain from befriending or loving non-Muslims or imitating the beliefs and customs of reformists who hold that the dogma of covenant and disavowal applies only to non-Muslims who fight Muslims [75]. In 2015, Said Hassan identified three distinct legal positions within the fatwas of Muslim jurists on the issue of a Muslim subject’s loyalty to a non-Muslim state: the alienation position, the conciliation position, and the commitment position [76]. In 2017, Fabien Truong described how debt recognition and loyalty conflicts among young Muslims in France construct a “tacit” moral code that forms neighborhood solidarities [99]. Truong shows how Muslim youth in France learn “to become men by experiencing competing loyalties to their neighbourhood, to their friends and to the unspoken aspects of their family history. But also toward the Nation and its meritocratic ideal, and toward a capitalism that promotes individualism, virility and economic competition” [99] (p. 5). He also discusses how “the factory of loyalty conflicts works between the behaviour expected from fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, teachers, ‘big brothers’, youth workers, educators, the police, classmates, neighbourhood mates, gang mates, business partners or girls” [99] (p. 36). He adds that loyalty is constructed in connection to the acknowledgment of social debts that “bring into existence, from relative to relative, the values that end up circumscribing the perimeter of the sacred” [99] (p. 40). Thus, for Truong, young Muslims define their loyalties by their social debts to friends and family and attempt to solve the conflict of loyalties that emerges from their multiple social identities. In 2018, Imène Ajala explored the following in European Muslims and their Foreign Policy Interests: Identities and Loyalties, the loyalties of French and British Muslims in terms of foreign policy and particularly towards Palestine [100]. Ajala highlights, in particular, how “the securitization of Islam affects the perception of Muslim loyalties in France and how the context relating to Global Islam hijacks Muslim expression over foreign policy in the French setting. The 9/11 attacks have reinforced the problematization of Muslims in Europe under the security paradigm and Muslims are increasingly perceived as a threat from within and constructed as the “other”, raising questions about their loyalty” [100] (p. 79). She also draws attention to the French political system, which “rejects ethnic group politics. In a framework which is unfavorable to the expression of specific interests and characterized by a strong centralization, it is even more difficult for ethnic groups to mobilize and exert influence” [100] (p. 43). Ajala’s work helps us understand loyalty to French foreign policy as a matter of loyalty to the French state, which makes any disagreement with this policy a form of disloyalty (although French foreign policy has changed a few times in recent years). In 2019, Damir-Geilsdorf et al. investigated a group of Salafists in Germany whose ideas of individual loyalty and disavowal intersect with issues of identity, belonging, inclusion, and exclusion, which are strongly intertwined with the realities of everyday life [101] (p. 124). European policies and discourses on preventing terrorism have also portrayed Muslims as a threat, supposedly because they tend to value their religious culture over that of the majority society, singling out Muslims as suspects and designating them a “suspect community”, as a result of the media, public, and political debates [102]. According to Riwanda and Abd A’la, liberal Islam in Europe places a strong emphasis on equality and brotherhood as key tenets of creating a welcoming global umma. In this sense, fraternity embraces all people, regardless of their religion, nationality, race, or cultural background. It is not just reserved for those who hold similar religious views [103] (p. 340). At the same time, Salafis believe that being loyal to Islam means keeping oneself away from non-orthodox norms and non-believers. The urge for disavowal among salafis might be seen as a response to a perceived situation of religious or political threat [104] (p. 168).

In a democratic system, loyalty appears as citizenship, muwāṭana, beyond geographic and historical classification. Thus, we can see that citizenship in semi-democratic Muslim contexts translates into civil political commitment in a functioning, at least partially, democratic and electoral system (such as that seen in Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, and Kuwait) [105,106]. Many Muslims in the West likewise emphasize that loyalty is based on citizenship. For instance, Tariq Ramadan views the three Ls—language proficiency, adherence to the law, and loyalty to one’s society—as prerequisites for Muslim citizens living in Europe [107] (p. 153).

11. Conclusions

Analyzing the literature on loyalty in Islam reveals three key findings. First, rigid loyalties are promoted by traditionalist Islam, particularly by salafism and certain shii factions. Rigid loyalists typically respect religious authorities and view loyalty solely in terms of religious principles. Additionally, it is exclusionary since it labels everyone who is not a part of the faithful group as abnormal, heretical, or disloyal. In the most extreme cases of inflexible allegiance, killing the disavowed is advised. Rigid loyalties may eventually demand strict adherence to a particular creed or ideology or an oath of allegiance. Tribal, sectarian, or ethnic loyalties—which are typically at odds with national or state affiliations—can be examples of rigid loyalties.

Flexible loyalties are the second type of loyalty, and is mainly promoted by reformist Muslims. Compared to traditionalist Islam, it is more pragmatic and less normative. It recognizes that allegiances to one’s family, ethnicity, religion, country, and so forth are complementary, hierarchical, or situational. Reformist Muslims also have a tendency to be inclusive, treating non-Muslims fairly as neighbors or as fellow citizens of the same country. Since they can survive in vast empires, far-off places, and pluralist cultures, flexible loyalties are able to adapt to diversity. Although it is still there, the religious component is neither absolute nor separate from other types of allegiances. Here, loyalty is viewed as ethics rather than belief since it is more of a virtue with multiple facets than only a religious teaching or dogma to be blindly followed.

Social scientists and historians of Islam point out a third type of loyalty, shifting allegiances, in Islamic history and societies as a result of altered power relations. They demonstrate how different political figures, religious leaders, communities, tribes, or ethnic groups negotiate different types of allegiance based on social dynamics, networks, and self-interest, among other factors. Research from the fields of history and sociology-anthropology shows that loyalty based on religion is typically less important in local, regional, or global politics. It is a factor that needs to be considered in light of other more significant aspects, namely the social, political, and economic incentives. This academic research portrays Muslims as pragmatic decision-makers who weigh many factors while determining their loyalties.