1. Introduction
On 3 January 2026, the capture of Venezuelan ruler Nicolás Maduro by U.S. special forces as part of Operation “Absolute Resolution” triggered an unprecedented international media crisis characterized by deep polarization of public opinion: while several governments condemned the alleged violation of Venezuelan sovereignty and an intense debate over the legality of the intervention under international law ensued, other political actors and segments of the citizenry celebrated the event as a step forward in accountability and the eventual end of the regime (
Scheffer, 2026;
Muggah, 2026).
This event generated an extraordinary volume of social media activity that within hours consolidated as one of the most intense digital conversations surrounding a recent Latin American political event (
Paternoster & Nilsson-Julien, 2026). In this context, governments, media outlets, public figures, political leaders, and ordinary citizens simultaneously competed for visibility within a highly saturated information ecosystem, deploying antagonistic frames, divergent emotional tones, and heterogeneous formats in their attempts to capture the attention of millions of users (
Al Jazeera, 2026). Understanding which message attributes influence the generation of digital interaction in high-intensity information environments thus emerges as a question of considerable empirical and practical relevance for the study of digital communication, user behavior, and engagement dynamics in platform-mediated social environments.
The answer to this question extends beyond a specific communicative analysis. In the information age, digital engagement—expressed through metrics such as likes, comments, and reposts—is not merely an indicator of popularity but a central visibility mechanism that determines which crisis narratives achieve widespread diffusion and which remain marginal (
Ballerini et al., 2023). In this context, crisis communication in digital environments ceases to be a unidirectional process and becomes an interactive flow in which institutional actors, media, and citizens intervene simultaneously before fragmented and highly reactive audiences (
Eriksson, 2018;
Du Plessis, 2018). Consequently, the digital ecosystem constitutes an environment in which the technical and discursive attributes of a message decisively influence its capacity to generate interaction beyond its substantive content (
Kleer & Kunz, 2023). Identifying those attributes and understanding how they operate across platforms governed by different logics is precisely the purpose of this study.
In light of the foregoing, this study examines the determinants of digital engagement through the analysis of a corpus of 1000 posts (500 from Instagram and 500 from X) collected during the first seven days following Maduro’s capture, with a balanced distribution between Spanish- and English-language content. Through quantitative content analysis and the estimation of negative binomial regression models, the effect of five variable blocks—message frames, responsibility attribution (SCCT), functional content type, source type, and format—on the interaction metrics of likes and comments on both platforms, and additionally reposts on X, is assessed, comparing their dynamics across both digital ecosystems.
Despite the abundant literature on digital communication, crisis communication, and user behavior on social media, empirical research on digital engagement during events of institutional rupture in Latin America presents significant gaps that this study seeks to address. First, most existing studies have focused on public health crises—particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic—or on electoral processes in Northern Hemisphere countries, with scant attention to geopolitical crises in the region (
Parveen et al., 2025). This gap is especially relevant considering that Latin America had not previously experienced an event of this nature in a social media-mediated environment: although precedents exist, such as the capture of Manuel Noriega following the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 (
Gilboa, 1995), those episodes occurred within a pre-digital media ecosystem lacking platforms capable of amplifying citizen interaction in real time. Second, studies on crisis engagement rarely compare in a systematic manner platforms with differentiated architectures and usage cultures, such as Instagram and X, often treating them as equivalent environments despite their distinct interaction dynamics (
X. Zhang & Zhu, 2022). Third, the literature has examined variables such as framing, emotional tone, and source type in isolation, without considering their combined effect as predictors of engagement, thereby limiting understanding of the mechanisms that drive interaction (
Castillo & Peña y Lillo, 2024;
Ho et al., 2024). Accordingly, this study contributes to the literature in three respects: it demonstrates that Instagram and X respond differently to message attributes, it challenges the applicability of Situational Crisis Communication Theory in highly polarized contexts, and it reveals the persistence of news media as central sources of engagement during geopolitical crises.
4. Results
4.2. Instagram Model Results
The results of the negative binomial regression model for Instagram are presented in
Table 6. Format, source type, responsibility attribution, functional message type, and language constitute the most relevant predictors, while news frames show limited explanatory capacity.
Regarding format, image collections significantly reduce likes (IRR = 0.473, p < 0.001) and comments (IRR = 0.325, p < 0.001) relative to individual images, while video does not reach statistical significance on any metric. Source type is the predictor of greatest magnitude. Compared to official sources (reference category), political leaders show the most pronounced declines, with reductions of 67% in likes (IRR = 0.333, p < 0.001) and 73% in comments (IRR = 0.275, p < 0.001). Media outlets also generate significantly fewer likes (IRR = 0.466, p < 0.01) and comments (IRR = 0.575, p < 0.10). Influencers do not differ from the reference category. In contrast, citizens exhibit the most pronounced positive effect in the model, generating approximately four times more likes (IRR = 3.901, p < 0.001) and more than eight times more comments (IRR = 8.335, p < 0.001) than government sources.
Of the news frames, only the geopolitical consequences frame reaches significance, showing a negative effect on likes (IRR = 0.695, p < 0.10). Conflict, human interest, and legality frames are not significant. Regarding responsibility attribution, both positionings penalize interaction: the victim frame reduces likes by 61% (IRR = 0.394, p < 0.001) and the direct responsibility frame reduces them by 54% (IRR = 0.459, p < 0.001), with an additional negative effect on comments (IRR = 0.590, p < 0.10).
In terms of functional message type, shock drastically reduces likes (IRR = 0.402, p < 0.001) and comments (IRR = 0.382, p < 0.001), while collective identity penalizes likes (IRR = 0.432, p < 0.001) without affecting comments. Humor is the only positive effect in this block, increasing likes by 125% (IRR = 2.249, p < 0.001) with no significant effects on comments.
Among control variables, language is the most powerful predictor: English-language posts receive 77% fewer likes (IRR = 0.231, p < 0.001) and 91% fewer comments (IRR = 0.093, p < 0.001). Hashtags reduce comments by 38% (IRR = 0.621, p < 0.05). Each additional day elapsed reduces comments by 36% (IRR = 0.637, p < 0.001), confirming a linear decay in conversation. Text length and the quadratic days term do not reach significance. The likes model yields LR chi2(20) = 228.93 (p = 0.000) with pseudo R2 = 0.0236, and the comments model LR chi2(20) = 315.20 (p = 0.000) with pseudo R2 = 0.0463.
4.3. X Model Results
The results for X are presented in
Table 7. Unlike Instagram, news frames, shock, and video format emerge as central predictors, while responsibility attribution and humor lose relevance.
Video multiplies likes by 4.2 (IRR = 4.209, p < 0.001), increases comments by 55% (IRR = 1.550, p < 0.10), and multiplies reposts by 3.3 (IRR = 3.338, p < 0.001). Image collections do not reach significance on any metric. Source type presents the largest coefficients. Citizens multiply likes by 43 (IRR = 43.007, p < 0.001), comments by 22.3 (IRR = 22.316, p < 0.001), and reposts by 22.8 (IRR = 22.774, p < 0.001) relative to official sources. Influencers generate more than six times more likes (IRR = 6.336, p < 0.001) and triple comments and reposts. Political leaders show a positive effect exclusively on comments (IRR = 5.505, p < 0.001). Media outlets do not reach statistical significance.
News frames show greater relevance than on Instagram. The conflict frame increases likes by 80% (IRR = 1.795, p < 0.10) and doubles comments (IRR = 2.148, p < 0.001). The geopolitical consequences frame increases likes by 93% (IRR = 1.925, p < 0.05) and comments by 64% (IRR = 1.639, p < 0.10). The legality frame increases likes (IRR = 1.669, p < 0.10) and reposts by 115% (IRR = 2.151, p < 0.001). The human interest frame and both responsibility attribution categories do not reach statistical significance.
Shock and fear constitute the most robust positive predictor: they quadruple likes (IRR = 4.073, p < 0.001), double comments (IRR = 2.229, p < 0.01), and nearly quadruple reposts (IRR = 3.744, p < 0.001)—a pattern opposite to that observed on Instagram. Humor and collective identity are not significant.
Among control variables, language maintains negative effects across all three metrics, with reductions between 65% and 68% for English-language posts. Hashtags significantly reduce all three metrics by between 45% and 57%. Text length shows marginal negative effects on likes and comments. Temporality exhibits a curvilinear dynamic: days elapsed initially increase comments (IRR = 1.814, p < 0.001) and reposts (IRR = 1.520, p < 0.001), but the quadratic term confirms a subsequent decay (p < 0.001 for both metrics). The likes model reports LR chi2(20) = 270.91 (p = 0.000) with pseudo R2 = 0.0276, the comments model LR chi2(20) = 254.29 (p = 0.000) with pseudo R2 = 0.0382, and the reposts model LR chi2(20) = 236.07 (p = 0.000) with pseudo R2 = 0.0285.
Finally, it is pertinent to note that the McFadden pseudo R
2 values reported in the results tables do not admit the same interpretation as the coefficient of determination R
2 in Ordinary Least Squares linear regression. In nonlinear models for count data, such as negative binomial regression, the pseudo R
2 constitutes a relative goodness-of-fit indicator whose primary function is comparison between alternative models, and its absolute values should not be interpreted as percentages of explained variance (
Long, 1997;
Long & Freese, 2006).
5. Discussion
The results of this study demonstrate that Instagram and X operate as distinct engagement ecosystems during geopolitical crises, a finding that challenges the frequent practice in the literature of treating platforms as functionally equivalent environments (
X. Zhang & Zhu, 2022). While on X the news frames of conflict, consequences, and legality act as significant amplifiers of interaction, on Instagram these same frames lack relevant explanatory capacity, with the marginal exception of the consequences frame on likes. This pattern suggests that X’s microblogging architecture—oriented toward public debate and brief argumentation—favors the cognitive activation that news frames promote, in line with
Semetko and Valkenburg’s (
2000) observations on the capacity of framing to shape audience interpretation. On Instagram, by contrast, the platform’s visual and algorithmic logic appears to subordinate the effect of discursive framing to other message attributes, offering partial support for H1 and revealing that framing efficacy is conditioned by the media infrastructure in which it operates.
The divergent behavior of shock and fear across platforms constitutes one of the study’s most noteworthy findings. On X, this message type quadruples likes and triples reposts, whereas on Instagram it reduces both metrics by more than 60%. This asymmetry can be interpreted in light of differences in the usage culture of each platform: X functions as a space for alerting and immediate diffusion where urgency acts as a catalyst for virality (
Ma et al., 2024), while Instagram, by privileging aesthetically elaborated and emotionally gratifying content, penalizes messages perceived as disruptive or threatening (
Hermida & Mellado, 2020). Humor, for its part, shows the inverse pattern: it increases likes by 125% exclusively on Instagram without reaching significance on X, confirming that emotional gratification mechanisms operate in a platform-dependent manner (
Galița & Bonta, 2022). These results offer partial support for H3 and underscore the need to disaggregate message type analysis by platform.
The results regarding responsibility attribution pose a significant challenge to SCCT. Contrary to what this perspective predicts (
Coombs, 2007), both victim positioning and direct responsibility attribution significantly reduce engagement on Instagram, while on X neither reaches statistical significance. This finding suggests that in contexts of high geopolitical polarization—where audiences already possess consolidated interpretive frameworks—explicit causal attribution does not function as an interaction activator but may instead generate discursive fatigue or rejection. In any case, the results invite questioning the direct applicability of SCCT to political crises of this nature (
Buse et al., 2024;
Tian & Yang, 2022). H2 therefore receives only partial support, restricted to Instagram.
The effect of format partially confirms H4, but exclusively on X, where video multiplies interaction across all metrics, consistent with Media Richness Theory (
Lengel & Daft, 1984). On Instagram, however, image collections penalize engagement and video shows no significant effects, indicating that media richness does not operate as a universal predictor but rather that its efficacy depends on the visual grammar of each platform (
Y. Zhu et al., 2023). Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider that X’s algorithm actively prioritizes video-format content within users’ feeds (
Metzler & Garcia, 2024), which constitutes a confounding variable that could artificially amplify the participation metrics associated with this format. Consequently, the observed effect of video on X cannot be attributed exclusively to media richness but likely reflects the interaction between the format’s intrinsic properties and the platform’s algorithmic amplification—an aspect that the observational design of the present study does not allow to disentangle.
Source type emerges as the predictor of greatest magnitude on both platforms, confirming H5. Citizens generate extraordinarily higher interaction rates than institutional sources, especially on X, where they multiply likes by 43% relative to government accounts. This result can be attributed to the fact that citizen accounts establish a direct emotional connection with the audience by sharing personal experiences, opinions, and reactions to the crisis, whereas government sources are confined to institutional communiqués that prioritize official information over interaction (
Jia et al., 2024). This asymmetry in the capacity to generate identification and emotional proximity amplifies citizens’ engagement metrics relative to institutional sources, whose role is oriented more toward providing informational frameworks that other actors subsequently amplify. Nevertheless, media outlets maintain a structural role as providers of informational frameworks that other actors amplify, which nuances interpretations of total disintermediation within the information ecosystem (
Mellado et al., 2021).
Language constitutes the most potent control predictor on both platforms: English-language posts receive between 65% and 91% less interaction than Spanish-language posts, a result that transcends the mere linguistic composition of the sample and reflects the concentration of the event’s perceived relevance among Spanish-speaking audiences directly affected by the crisis (
Parveen et al., 2025). This finding should be interpreted in light of the sociolinguistics of digital platform use in Latin America and, particularly, the transnational character of Venezuelan diaspora audiences.
Esberg and Siegel (
2023), drawing on an analysis of more than five million tweets by Venezuelan activists, demonstrate that exile transforms digital communicative practices: activists abroad increase their use of English and reorient their discourse toward international audiences, while those who remain in Venezuela maintain Spanish as the predominant language linked to local concerns. In this context, the crisis surrounding Maduro’s capture constitutes an event of high identity relevance for Spanish-speaking communities both within and outside Venezuela, which would explain why Spanish-language content functions as a marker of cultural proximity that activates higher levels of engagement. This dynamic is consistent with evidence on the digital political engagement of Latino communities, where language operates not only as a vehicle for information but as an indicator of belonging to a shared discursive space (
Abrajano et al., 2025), generating cross-border information environments in which Spanish-speaking audiences interact with greater intensity in response to events that directly affect their communities of origin.
6. Conclusions
The findings of this study suggest that the message attributes driving digital engagement during geopolitical crises are not universal but rather mediated by the architecture and usage culture of each platform—a finding with implications for communicative practice that must nonetheless be interpreted with caution given the singularly polarizing nature of the case analyzed. For governments and international organizations seeking to position narratives in highly polarized contexts, the results suggest that communication strategies could benefit from platform-specific design: on X, the data indicate that video formats and messages that activate urgency may favor interaction, while on Instagram, humor and simple visual formats appear to facilitate passive interaction. Strategies based on explicit responsibility attribution—common in governmental crisis communication—show a significant reduction in participation on Instagram in the context analyzed, which invites a rethinking of institutional communication protocols derived from SCCT, although the generalization of this finding requires validation in other crisis contexts.
For media outlets and digital journalism professionals, the data indicate that citizen accounts and influencers substantially outperform institutional sources in their capacity to generate interaction, which does not imply media irrelevance but rather a possible shift in their function: from direct generators of engagement to providers of informational frameworks that other actors reinterpret and amplify. Nevertheless, it is essential to distinguish between the maximization of engagement as a legitimate objective for activist or citizen actors and the essential functions of journalism—accuracy, contextualization, and accountability—which should not be subordinated to the logic of virality. In this regard, the recommendations for media outlets should not be interpreted as an invitation to adapt journalistic content to interaction metrics, but rather to understand each platform’s dynamics in order to distribute verified information more effectively. Likewise, the recommendation to employ humor as a communicative resource during geopolitical crises must be weighed against the risks of trivializing suffering and decontextualizing complex events.
The study presents limitations that should be considered. First, the seven-day observation window captures the acute phase of the crisis but does not allow for the evaluation of medium-term engagement dynamics. Second, the cross-sectional design precludes establishing causal relationships, and manual coding, although validated through Krippendorff’s alpha, inevitably introduces a certain degree of interpretive subjectivity. Future lines of research should incorporate longitudinal analyses that allow tracking the evolution of engagement beyond the acute phase, integrate natural language processing techniques to scale the analysis to larger corpora, and explore the role of recommendation algorithms as mediators between message attributes and observed interaction. It would also be valuable to replicate this design in geopolitical crises in other regions to assess the generalizability of the findings and examine whether the platform asymmetries identified here reflect structural patterns or particularities of the case analyzed.
Additionally, the sampling strategy based on hashtags and keywords introduces an inherent selection bias by excluding posts that, without employing such markers, may have achieved significant levels of participation. This approach may overrepresent activist and partisan content, potentially inflating the apparent effects of the collective identity frame and citizen sources. Future research should complement this strategy with random sampling or platform API-based sampling to capture a broader spectrum of the digital conversation.
Regarding Instagram reposts, the model does not incorporate this dependent variable because the platform did not consistently provide repost counts during the study period. While reposts constitute a relevant indicator of participation, their availability depends on both the platform and the data collection tool employed. In this regard, future studies could incorporate Instagram reposts and sends as additional dependent variables once these metrics are fully accessible, which would enable a more comprehensive measurement of digital engagement in its amplification and private distribution dimensions. Furthermore, the study’s observational design precludes isolating the effect of media richness from the effect of algorithmic amplification. In particular, X’s algorithm prioritizes video-format content within users’ feeds, which represents a confounding variable that could artificially amplify the participation metrics associated with this format. Future research employing experimental or quasi-experimental designs would make it possible to disentangle both mechanisms. Finally, it would also be pertinent for future studies to integrate specialized deepfake and synthetic content detection techniques to more precisely quantify the presence of artificial intelligence and assess its impact on digital engagement dynamics.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization, C.F.O.-A.; methodology, C.F.O.-A. and P.A.L.H.; software, P.A.L.H.; validation, C.F.O.-A. and E.A.E.; formal analysis, P.A.L.H.; investigation, C.F.O.-A., P.A.L.H. and E.A.E.; resources, E.A.E.; data curation, P.A.L.H.; writing—original draft preparation, P.A.L.H.; writing—review and editing, C.F.O.-A. and E.A.E.; visualization, P.A.L.H.; supervision, C.F.O.-A.; project administration, E.A.E.; funding acquisition, E.A.E. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding
This research was funded by Universidad del Valle, grant number CI 9211.
Institutional Review Board Statement
Ethical review and approval were waived for this study due to: The study has been classified as low-risk research, in accordance with the current ethical regulations in Colombia (Resolution 8430 of 1993 from the Ministry of Health Chapter I, Article 11). The study was based on the content analysis of publicly available information on social media, without direct intervention with individuals or collection of personal or sensitive data. The information used was secondary and publicly accessible, and the data on user interaction (e.g., number of likes or comments) were collected completely anonymously, without recording or using usernames or any personal identifiers.
Informed Consent Statement
Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
In the creation of this article, Anthropic’s Claude 4.7 Opus generative artificial intelligence was used to improve the orthotypographic quality of the manuscript content in English.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
References
- Abrajano, M., Garcia, M., Pope, A., Kamau, E., Vidigal, R., Tucker, J. A., & Nagler, J. (2025). Understanding Latino political engagement and activity on social media. Political Research Quarterly, 78(2), 635–650. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Aguila Sánchez, J. C., Llano Guibarra, N. I., & Pereyra-Zamora, P. (2021). Media agenda and press conferences on COVID-19 in Mexico: An analysis of journalists’ questions. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(22), 12067. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Al Jazeera. (2026, January 3). World reacts to US bombing of Venezuela, ‘capture’ of Maduro. Available online: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/3/world-reacts-to-reported-us-bombing-of-venezuela (accessed on 1 May 2026).
- Andrade, E. L., Abroms, L. C., González, A. I., Favetto, C., Gomez, V., Díaz-Ramírez, M., & Edberg, M. C. (2023). Assessing Brigada digital de Salud audience reach and engagement: A digital community health worker model to address COVID-19 misinformation in Spanish on social media. Vaccines, 11(8), 1346. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Ballerini, J., Alam, G. M., Zvarikova, K., & Santoro, G. (2023). How emotions from content social relevance mediate social media engagement: Evidence from European supermarkets during the COVID-19 pandemic. British Food Journal, 125(5), 1698–1715. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Bramonte, J. I. (2026, January 3). Venezuela at a crossroads: The perplexing desire for US intervention and the future of our political imagination. Security in Context. Available online: https://www.securityincontext.org/posts/venezuela-at-a-crossroads-the-perplexing-desire-for-us-intervention-and-the-future-of-our-political-imagination (accessed on 1 May 2026).
- Buse, C., Meissner, F., & Sievert, H. (2024). Understanding what is at stake: Challenges and opportunities for corporate communication during the COVID-19 crisis. In Risk and crisis communication in Europe: Towards integrating theory and practice in unstable and turbulent times (pp. 292–310). Springer. [Google Scholar]
- Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2013). Regression analysis of count data (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Castillo, G., & Peña y Lillo, M. (2024). Depression framings on Twitter: Stigmas and attributes of responsibility. Cuadernos.Info, (59), 118–137. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Coombs, W. T. (2007). Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: The development and application of situational crisis communication theory. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), 163–176. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Daft, R. L., & Lengel, R. H. (1986). Organizational information requirements, media richness and structural design. Management Science, 32(5), 554–571. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Dewantara, M. H., Jin, X., & Gardiner, S. (2025). What makes a travel vlog attractive? Parasocial interactions between travel vloggers and viewers. Journal of Vacation Marketing, 31(1), 113–129. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Du Plessis, C. (2018). Social media crisis communication: Enhancing a discourse of renewal through dialogic content. Public Relations Review, 44(5), 829–838. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Eriksson, M. (2018). Lessons for crisis communication on social media: A systematic review of what research tells the practice. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 12(5), 526–551. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Esberg, J., & Siegel, A. A. (2023). How exile shapes online opposition: Evidence from Venezuela. American Political Science Review, 117(4), 1361–1378. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Galița, R., & Bonta, E. (2022). Humour and laughter: Theoretical and practical approaches. Cultural Perspectives, (27), 61–82. [Google Scholar]
- Gilboa, E. (1995). The Panama invasion revisited: Lessons for the use of force in the post cold war era. Political Science Quarterly, 110(4), 539–562. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Guo, J., Zawawi, J. W. M., & Kamarudin, S. (2025). Identifying determinants for promoting public engagement via Chinese E-government TikTok in public health emergencies. PLoS ONE, 20(6), e0325967. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Hermida, A., & Mellado, C. (2020). Dimensions of social media logics: Mapping forms of journalistic norms and practices on Twitter and Instagram. Digital Journalism, 8(7), 864–884. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Ho, S. S., Chuah, A. S. F., Ho, V. S., Rosenthal, S., Kim, H. K., & Soh, S. S. H. (2024). Crisis and emergency risk communication and emotional appeals in COVID-19 public health messaging: Quantitative content analysis. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 26, e56854. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Hovland, C. I., & Weiss, W. (1951). The influence of source credibility on communication effectiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly, 15(4), 635–650. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Hsu, J. T. H., & Tsai, R. T. H. (2022). Increased online aggression during COVID-19 lockdowns: Two-stage study of deep text mining and difference-in-differences analysis. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 24(8), e38776. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Hussain, A., Ting, D., & Mazhar, M. (2022). Driving consumer value co-creation and purchase intention by social media advertising value. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, 800206. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Hutchinson, A. (2025, December 12). Meta announces updates for the Instagram marketing API. Social Media Today. Available online: https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/meta-announces-updates-for-the-instagram-marketing-api/807083/ (accessed on 1 May 2026).
- Jia, X., Ahn, S., Seelig, M. I., & Morgan, S. E. (2024). The role of health belief model constructs and content creator characteristics in social media engagement: Insights from COVID-19 vaccine tweets. Healthcare, 12(18), 1845. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Kaur, S. P. (2017). Variables in research. Indian Journal of Research and Reports in Medical Sciences, 3(4), 36–38. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Kleer, N., & Kunz, R. E. (2023). The impact of company-generated posts with crisis-related content on online engagement behavior. Journal of Business Research, 164, 114021. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Krippendorff, K. (2018). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology (4th ed.). Sage. [Google Scholar]
- Lee, S., Kim, J., & Sung, Y. H. (2022). When infographics work better: The interplay between temporal frame and message format in e-health communication. Psychology & Health, 37(7), 917–931. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Lengel, R. H., & Daft, R. L. (1984). An exploratory analysis of the relationship between media richness and managerial information processing. In B. M. Staw, & L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 6, pp. 191–233). JAI Press. [Google Scholar]
- Lin, X., & Wu, H. (2025). Science-brokers or sense-givers: How experts participate in public crisis communication on social media. Natural Hazards Review, 26(2), 04025008. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Lo, W. H., Lam, B. S. Y., & Cheung, M. M. F. (2021). The dynamics of political elections: A big data analysis of intermedia framing between social media and news media. Social Science Computer Review, 39(4), 627–647. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Lombard, M., Snyder-Duch, J., & Bracken, C. C. (2022). Practical resources for assessing and reporting intercoder reliability in content analysis research projects. Temple University. Available online: https://matthewlombard.com/reliability/ (accessed on 1 May 2026).
- Long, J. S. (1997). Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. Sage Publications. [Google Scholar]
- Long, J. S., & Freese, J. (2006). Regression models for categorical dependent variables using Stata (2nd ed.). Stata Press. [Google Scholar]
- Lu, W., & Ngai, S. B. C. (2024). Social media communication and public engagement in different health crisis stages: The framing of COVID-19 in Chinese official media. Communication and the Public, 9(2), 216–243. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Ma, X., Yang, Y., Qian, S., Ding, Y., Lin, Q., & Wang, N. (2024). Social media users’ engagement with fear appeal elements in government’s health crisis communication via state-owned media. Journal of Health Communication, 29(8), 524–537. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Marczak, J. (2026, January 3). Experts react: The US just captured Maduro. What’s next for Venezuela and the region? Atlantic Council. Available online: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/us-just-captured-maduro-whats-next-for-venezuela-and-the-region/ (accessed on 1 May 2026).
- McNeil, K. (1997). The directionality of research hypotheses. Nurse Researcher, 5(2), 73–80. Available online: https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED409374.pdf (accessed on 1 May 2026).
- Mellado, C., Hallin, D., Cárcamo, L., Alfaro, R., Jackson, D., Humanes, M. L., & Ramos, A. (2021). Sourcing pandemic news: A cross-national computational analysis of mainstream media coverage of COVID-19 on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. Digital Journalism, 9(9), 1271–1295. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Meta Newsroom. (2025, August 6). New Instagram features to help you connect. Meta. Available online: https://about.fb.com/news/2025/08/new-instagram-features-help-you-connect/ (accessed on 1 May 2026).
- Metzler, H., & Garcia, D. (2024). Social drivers and algorithmic mechanisms on digital media. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 19(2), 417–435. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Muggah, R. (2026, January 6). 5 Scenarios for a post-Maduro Venezuela—And what they could signal to the wider region. The Conversation. Available online: https://theconversation.com/5-scenarios-for-a-post-maduro-venezuela-and-what-they-could-signal-to-the-wider-region-272675 (accessed on 1 May 2026).
- Ndone, J., & Carpenter, N. (2026). Hashtags, protests, and polycrisis: A machine learning analysis of Kenyans’ sentiments on the 2024 finance bill protests using X data. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 20(2), 1–27. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Ngai, C. S. B., Singh, R. G., Lu, W., & Koon, A. C. (2020). Grappling with the COVID-19 health crisis: Content analysis of communication strategies and their effects on public engagement on social media. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 22(8), e21360. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Nguyen, D., Nguyen, S., Le, P. H., Oomen, T., & Wang, Y. (2024). Utilizing computational methods for analysing media framing of organizational crises: The ‘Datalek’ scandal during the COVID-19 pandemic in the Netherlands. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 32(3), e12595. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Ohanian, R. (1990). Construction and validation of a scale to measure celebrity endorsers’ perceived expertise, trustworthiness, and attractiveness. Journal of Advertising, 19(3), 39–52. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Ope-Davies, T., & Shodipe, M. (2023). A multimodal discourse study of selected COVID-19 online public health campaign texts in Nigeria. Discourse & Society, 34(1), 96–119. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Parveen, S., Pereira, A. G., Garzon-Orjuela, N., McHugh, P., Surendran, A., Vornhagen, H., & Vellinga, A. (2025). COVID-19 public health communication on X (formerly Twitter): Cross-sectional study of message type, sentiment, and source. JMIR Formative Research, 9, e59687. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Paternoster, T., & Nilsson-Julien, E. (2026, January 7). How an information vacuum about Maduro’s capture was filled with deepfakes and AI. Euronews. Available online: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/01/07/how-an-information-vacuum-about-maduros-capture-was-filled-with-deepfakes-and-ai (accessed on 1 May 2026).
- RedSocial. (2026). How to see who reposted your Instagram post. Available online: https://www.redsocial.com/blog/how-to-see-who-reposted-your-instagram-post/ (accessed on 1 May 2026).
- Ritchart, A., & Britt, R. K. (2024, January 3–6). Pro-social framing and sentiment in U.S. broadcast networks’ Instagram posts about the COVID-19 vaccine. Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (pp. 3837–3846), Honolulu, HI, USA. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Ruiz Incertis, R., Sánchez del Vas, R., & Tuñón Navarro, J. (2024). Comparative analysis on the disinformation regarding the death of queen Elizabeth II in Europe [Análisis comparado de la desinformación difundida en Europa sobre la muerte de la reina Isabel II]. Revista de Comunicación, 23(1), 507–534. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Rúas Araújo, J., Rodríguez-Martelo, T., & Fontenla-Pedreira, J. (2021). Memes distribution during COVID-19 third wave. Cultura, Lenguaje y Representación, 26, 209–227. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Scheffer, D. J. (2026, January 6). Maduro’s capture and international law: The Noriega precedent. Council on Foreign Relations. Available online: https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/maduros-capture-and-international-law-noriega-precedent (accessed on 1 May 2026).
- Semetko, H. A., & Valkenburg, P. M. (2000). Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news. Journal of Communication, 50(2), 93–109. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Sergidou, N. M., Triga, V., & Tsapatsoulis, N. (2024). Media battles in the cybersphere: Analyzing news and social media agendas during the 2015 Greek bailout referendum. Frontiers in Political Science, 6, 1477767. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Shahbaznezhad, H., Dolan, R., & Rashidirad, M. (2021). The role of social media content format and platform in users’ engagement behavior. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 53, 47–65. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Souza, C. S. E. (2024). The evidence of populism in the narratives of the president of Brazil during the COVID-19 pandemic. KOME, 12(1), 111–140. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Su, C., & Liu, J. (2026). Digital nationalism in comparative perspective: Trump blaming China on social media in the United States and China. Nations and Nationalism, 32(1), 57–74. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Sui, M., Hawkins, I., & Wang, R. (2023). When falsehood wins? Varied effects of sensational elements on users’ engagement with real and fake posts. Computers in Human Behavior, 142, 107654. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Tenenboim, O. (2022). Comments, shares, or likes: What makes news posts engaging in different ways. Social Media + Society, 8(4). [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Tian, Y., & Yang, J. (2022). Deny or bolster? A comparative study of crisis communication strategies between Trump and Cuomo in COVID-19. Public Relations Review, 48(2), 102182. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Uzunoğlu, S. (2025). Digital voices, discursive power: The siege of Turkey’s digital news media by interpretive journalism. Electronic News, 19(4), 233–259. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Wu, H., & Gao, H. (2026). Cultural and political dimensions of crisis management: The Chinese government’s information governance and response to COVID-19 rumors. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 34, e70132. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Yang, Y., Wang, S., & Shi, W. (2025). Balancing authority and accessibility: Configurational communication strategies of Chinese provincial heritage institutions on social media. SAGE Open, 15(4), 21582440251409587. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Yousaf, M., Hassan Raza, S., Mahmood, N., Core, R., Zaman, U., & Malik, A. (2022). Immunity debt or vaccination crisis? A multi-method evidence on vaccine acceptance and media framing for emerging COVID-19 variants. Vaccine, 40(12), 1855–1863. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Yu, J., & Zhao, Y. (2025). Health messages that engage audiences after the COVID-19 pandemic: Content analysis of Chinese posts on social media. Frontiers in Public Health, 13, 1533390. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit] [PubMed]
- Zhang, P., Wei, Z., & Kong, F. (2026). Reconfiguring responsibility: An empirical analysis of crisis discourse and situational crisis communication on Douyin. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 17(1), 16–32. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Zhang, X., & Zhu, R. (2022). How source-level and message-level factors influence journalists’ social media visibility during a public health crisis. Journalism, 23(12), 2627–2645. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Zhu, K., Tan, C. S. L., & Panwar, T. (2024). Assessing the influence mechanism of media richness on customer experience, trust and swift guanxi in social commerce. In HCI in Business, Government and Organizations (Lecture Notes in Computer Science) (Vol. 14720, pp. 127–142). Springer. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
- Zhu, Y., Wang, Y., Wei, J., & Hao, A. (2023). Effects of vividness, information and aesthetic design on the appeal of pay-per-click ads. Journal of Research in Interactive Marketing, 17(6), 848–864. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Scilit]
| Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content. |