What Does It Take to Belong? A Decolonial Interrogation of Xenophobia in South Africa

Abstract

This article examines the xenophobic orientation of social media reactions, as captured in mainstream South African media, around the Miss South Africa 2024 case of Chidimma Adetshina. It will perform a decolonial interrogation of the South African digital public’s reaction to Adetshina’s participation in and eligibility for the pageant. It will also unpack how xenophobia—defined as the fear or hatred of foreigners—is evident in the backlash that encapsulated Adetshina’s story. The xenophobic utterances that circulated on social media platforms such as X and across different digital media outlets suggest an intriguing intra-black component that is intertwined with the three dimensions of coloniality: power, knowledge and being. The concept of coloniality is understood as the lingering impact of inequalities and power dynamics resulting from the colonial encounter long after the end of administrative and historical colonialism and serves as this article’s theoretical framework. It draws on the work of several decolonial scholars to identify and explore how coloniality presents itself in the Adetshina case. The research objectives are to examine how xenophobic sentiments reflect the coloniality of power, knowledge and, specifically, the coloniality of being. The methodology includes an open, flexible combination of content and textual analysis of online media articles from major news outlets operating within the South African mediasphere. This inquiry found that there is a link between the tension-filled xenophobic reactions to Adetshina’s Miss SA 2024 case and the legacy of exploitation and oppression inherited from South Africa’s still-difficult-to-navigate colonial and apartheid eras. This investigation also found complicated hierarchies between different types of humanity—indicative of the most pervasive dimension, in this case, the coloniality of being.

1. Introduction

Facebook and X (formerly Twitter) are dynamic social media spaces that have played the part of a seemingly ‘open’ digital playground for constructive debates about xenophobia between South African locals and foreign nationals from different parts of Africa. Between 2008 and 2019, what happened was there was a spate of xenophobic utterances on Facebook and X, particularly within niche online groups such as ‘Black Twitter’ on the latter platform. Fast forward to 2024, and xenophobia was still a sensitive topic within South Africa’s social, economic, political, digital and media landscapes. The loaded online debates that have generated many interesting hashtags, such as #WeWantOurCountryBack, #ForeignersGoHome, #ForeignersVacateOurJobs and #ForeignersMustLeaveSA, have exposed and inspired a few controversial questions. Who does and does not belong in South Africa? Is citizenship a simple matter? What are the legitimate markers of nationhood? What are the limits of legality and illegality regarding South African (and African) identity?

With xenophobia as an overarching theme and many such questions still bubbling below the surface in everyday life in South Africa (both online and offline), the public’s social media reaction to Chidimma Adetshina in the run-up to the Miss South Africa (Miss SA) pageant 2024 galvanised the topic once more. This is an illuminating case in which to observe and study issues about how xenophobia, citizenship, nationhood, identity and belonging are discussed and fought over in the context of a still-juvenile African digital public sphere. In this article, I will unpack Adetshina’s Miss SA case using the concept of coloniality as an investigative lens, focusing specifically on one of its three dimensions—the coloniality of being. I will use this dimension to unpack the complexities of negotiating what it means to belong to a group, a community, a nation, or a people by drawing on the work of decolonial scholars to explore the key dimensions of belonging in postcolonial countries.

The article shows that the coloniality of power, knowledge and being is present in difficult but real ways—both on and offline—in post-apartheid South Africa. It argues that there is a link between the strong xenophobic reactions to cases like Adetshina’s and the legacy of exploitation and oppression as inherited from South Africa’s devastating colonial and apartheid eras. I opted for a qualitative research orientation by studying various online media stories across some of South Africa’s top online media outlets to achieve a better sense of (i) online users and mainstream media’s subjective and objective insights, respectively, and (ii) how everyday South Africans were making sense of a significant moment in their digital and social worlds. I also chose to adopt a qualitative research approach to gauge how South Africans were using the Adetshina case to collaboratively construct an agreed-upon reality through their online interactions.

By performing a decolonial interrogation of xenophobia in South Africa and zooming into the online media coverage of public reactions in the Adetshina Miss SA 2024 case, I hope to show that the complex perceptions in this particular story are indicative of a South African understanding of citizenship and belonging that is still very volatile but undoubtedly full of promise as we further navigate our democratic potential. There are deep divisions between South African citizens and some foreign national groups, pointing to the necessity for more truly free and fair public discourses on many issues, xenophobia being just one of them, that affect citizens most urgently in everyday life.

2. Background and Context

Xenophobia in South Africa on Popular Social Media Platforms (Particularly X)

In 2008, 2013, 2015 and 2019, we saw rising tensions and demonstrations of xenophobia in South Africa on social media platforms like Facebook and, most predominantly, on X (formerly called Twitter). Strong anti-foreigner sentiments were expressed and amplified on niche X groups like ‘Black (South African) Twitter’. These online flare-ups were not isolated but closely tied to real-world pressures, including rising unemployment, poor service delivery, and perceptions that immigrants were competing with locals for scarce jobs and housing. Online platforms such as VOA News shed extensive light on periods of heightened economic strain, such as the global financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent downturns in South Africa’s economy, which often coincided with surges of online xenophobic rhetoric directly thereafter. Localized incidents of crime were also frequently attributed to foreign nationals, further fuelling digital scapegoating and collective anxieties so often spotlighted by media voices from outlets such as The Conversation. Some of the xenophobic expressions on social media led to instances of violence in the real world, particularly in parts of two of the most highly populated provinces in the country—Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. In 2008 alone, more than 60 people died in violent clashes between locals and foreign nationals. After the violent 2019 xenophobic attacks in Johannesburg, in which Nigerian-owned businesses were targeted, the South African government (South African Government, 2025) had to send a special envoy to Nigeria to offer formal national apologies. These events gained international news coverage, including major media outlets such as Al Jazeera and the BBC. Between 2008 and 2019, online media from outlets like DFR Lab, Defence Web and WWMP reported on hashtags such as #PutSouthAfricansFirst, #WeWantOurCountryBack, #ForeignersGoHome, #ForeignersVacateOurJobs, #ZimbabweansMustFall, #NigeriansMustGo, #InfluxOfImmigrantsMustStop and #ForeignersMustLeaveSA—all trending on X. These hashtags generated heated online conversations that involved contentious subjective notions and cloudy definitions for nationality, identity, legality, illegality, citizenship, and belonging (South African Legal Information Institute, 2025). Social media (particularly X) conversations in South Africa about these concepts have only intensified over the years, continuing all the way into the present moment.

This has further exposed the complex layers of socioeconomic tension and politically influenced sparring between different members of the South African digital media public—particularly on social media’s most wide-reaching platforms. Hashtags on X, such as #OperationDudula, #ForeignersMustGo and #ForeignersMustLeaveMangaung, took centre stage in the past six years. Stronger opinions have formed and have been shared on digital platforms about who does and does not belong in South Africa. Although drawing a lot of attention and eliciting mass audience engagement, it would seem that the South African public has not gotten any closer to resolving this question. In fact, some observers, journalists and political figures like Hannatu Musawa have expressed concern that continual focus on xenophobia might risk entrenching division rather than healing it—calling for cultural exchange, dialogue, and appreciation of diversity as ways forward, suggesting that emphasis on unity rather than division can help mitigate xenophobic tension.

3. Chidimma Adetshina and Miss South Africa 2024

According to The Guardian, aspirant Miss SA Chidimma Adetshina was born in Soweto, South Africa, in 2001. She is said to have a Nigerian father and a South African mother of Mozambican descent. At face value, this should not be a contentious issue or invite any criticism or scepticism. However, a social media storm blazed through platforms like X when her nationality was questioned, when media stories by the likes of The Guardian and EWN reported on the allegations that her mother had been involved in fraud and identity theft when Adetshina was born. These left members of the public asking: What is Adetshina’s ‘true’ nationality, where does she belong, and is she eligible to be considered a South African citizen, with all the benefits and perks associated with citizenship, such as involvement in Miss SA pageantry? Of course, these are complex questions that themselves present as problematic in that they purport to frame complex notions like nationality, citizenship, and belonging as though easily examinable along simple distinctions. When Adetshina was announced as a Miss SA 2024 finalist in early July 2024, her inclusion was immediately followed by mounting negative social media reactions. With subtle factors like her surname piquing interests and faceless social media keyboard warriors hard at work clicking away as they searched her online accounts, it did not take long for the Miss SA pageant organisers to request an investigation from Home Affairs into her credentials after mounting negative social media reactions and subsequent pressure.

With consent from Adetshina and her mother, the initial Home Affairs-led inquiry uncovered Prima Facie indications that suggested Adetshina’s mother could have been involved in fraud and the identity theft of a South African woman after Adetshina’s birth in 2001. The accusation entailed a falsification of documents that would bring into question the citizenship or permanent residency status of Adetshina’s mother and her right to be in South Africa. While Adetshina herself could not have been involved in the alleged crime, as she was an infant at the time, her mother’s uncertain citizenship status raised questions about Adetshina’s eligibility for consideration as a rightful South African identity document holder. According to South African media reporting, Adetshina held both a South African ID and a passport, and met all eligibility criteria for Miss SA before the controversy erupted.

According to the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995, which came into effect on 6 October 1995, there are three ways one acquires South African citizenship legally:

• Automatic: Automatic qualification when you are born in South Africa to at least one parent who is a South African citizen or a permanent residency permit holder, or if you are adopted by a South African citizen.
• Descent or Naturalisation: Citizenship by application courtesy of descent or naturalisation.
• Permanent Residency: Citizenship by permanent residency application as per the terms of Section 26 (Direct Residency Permits) and Section 27 (Residency-on-Other-Grounds Permits) of the Immigration Act 2002 (Act No 13 of 2002), and read with Regulation 33 of the Immigration Regulations. This permit emphasises qualification for immigrants who can and will make a “meaningful contribution to broadening the economic base of South Africa” (Department of Home Affairs, 2025).

To be eligible to compete in a Miss SA pageant, an applicant must be a South African citizen, have a valid South African identity document or passport, and be between the ages of 20 and 30 years old. For applicants who hold dual citizenship, both sets of national details are required (Miss South Africa, 2025). For Adetshina, who met these criteria, what then becomes of her eligibility to compete if one of her parents’ citizenship statuses is questioned and possibly found unlawful? Would it suffice that Adetshina could still be considered a naturalised citizen (above the age of 18 and born in South Africa after 1995), despite her parents’ dubious status? These are the very questions that bring into the spotlight complicated ideas of nationhood, citizenship, and ultimately, belonging, all of which provide a fascinating area of academic study. Adetshina’s inclusion in the selection of finalists for Miss SA 2024 and the South African public’s hostile anti-foreigner reactions to questions about the legitimacy of her citizenship intensified so gravely that she decided to withdraw from the competition on 8 August 2024. She was promptly invited to compete in Miss Universe Nigeria (MUN) on 9 August 2024 (to pay homage to her father’s native land). The formal invitation from Guy Murray-Bruce, National Director of Miss Universe Nigeria, included the following excerpt in the official press release:

Your journey in the world of pageantry is far from over … As a Nigerian by heritage, we would like to formally invite you to participate in the Miss Universe Nigeria 2024 pageant. This is an opportunity to represent your father’s native land on an international stage, and I believe you would be an outstanding contender.

As covered by outlets like Reuters and The Guardian, Adetshina went on to win Miss Universe Nigeria 2024 on 31 August 2024 at the Eko Convention Centre in Lagos, Nigeria. Furthermore, Adetshina’s MUN win qualified her to represent Nigeria at the 73rd annual instalment of the prestigious Miss Universe pageant in Mexico on 16 November 2024. Here, she came second to the ultimate crown-holder, Victoria Kjær Theilvig of Denmark. As the highest-ranking African contestant, Adetshina’s 1st Runner-Up performance also secured her the celebrated title of Miss Universe Africa and Oceania 2024.

4. Literature Review

Social Media (and Particularly X) and Mainstream Media as Sites of Conflict

Social media platforms like X can be considered ‘open’ spaces for debate and discussion on a range of topical issues (Bosch, 2021), where members of the South African digital public gather online to share their opinions and thoughts, with the promise of shaping and disseminating different discourses (Bouvier & Machin, 2018). Social media often allows increased visibility for marginalised or silenced groups, thus enabling what Bosch calls “participatory citizenship” (Bosch, 2016, p. 159), but social inequalities can and are reproduced online, as seen in the case of the social media reactions to Adethsina’s Miss SA 2024 case. As is the case with conflict-riddled issues such as immigration, illegal immigrants, and xenophobia in South Africa, we start to see how “networked communication does not eliminate hierarchy… [but, in fact,] … entrenches it” Dean (2014). While reactions on social media and the media coverage thereafter do have the effect of inviting more voices to speak, not every voice carries equal weight. In this way, social media and mainstream media play a dual role: offering platforms that inspire free speech and liberation while also reinforcing structures of inequality. Technology and digitisation have “reweaved” (Webb, 2017, p. 5) a new kind of digital public sphere, where identities can be performed.

With social media platforms like X existing as a sort of uncontrollable life force of their own, these can become negative spaces of disinformation and misinformation—where the court of public opinion takes precedence in real-life matters that cannot and should not be decided by a hashtag. While it may be justifiable to argue that much of the social media uproar in the Adetshina case had a considerable amount of fake news attached to it to spread anti-immigrant sentiments which triggered xenophobia (Chenzi, 2021), it is important to remember that “xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa is not simply a consequence of fake news. Instead, it is primarily driven by broader politics of autochthony, migration, and belonging” (Chenzi, 2021, p. 2). Watanabe et al. (2018, p. 13825) write that with “the rapid growth of social networks and microblogging websites, communication between people from different backgrounds has become more direct, resulting in more and more ‘cyber’ conflicts between these people”. Online users can get behind a keyboard and perform hate speech while relying on the protection that their anonymity affords them on the internet.

Even though social networks and microblogging sites forbid hate speech and discrimination, social media etiquette and content policing are hotly contested and are governed by a “politics of inclusion and exclusion” (Bosch, 2021, pp. 134–135)—with the sheer size of digital social networks presenting major challenges for controlling what content makes it onto these platforms (Watanabe et al., 2018). Even mainstream media is a contested terrain, filled with different “communities of opinion” (Bosch, 2021, p. 134). While newspapers, media websites, online publications, and radio shows are an incredibly vital part of making social life visible (Bosch, 2021), real-life conflicts are reflected on social media as impossible “cyber conflicts” between people from different cultural and psychological backgrounds (Watanabe et al., 2018, p. 13825). The social media reaction to Adesthina’s Miss SA 2024 case revealed the impact of echo chambers and filter bubbles online, which, of course, are breeding grounds for hashtags with a xenophobic orientation, such as #PutSouthAfricansFirst, #WeWantOurCountryBack, #ForeignersGoHome, #ForeignersVacateOurJobs and #ForeignersMustLeaveSA, to become popular.

5. Xenophobia in South Africa

South Africa’s long and complex history regarding migration, race and politics has been informed by hundreds of years of settler colonialism and 46 years (1948 to 1994) of apartheid rule. After 31 years since the first democratic elections, this is a country still young in its navigation of a truly equal society where the rights of all are upheld and protected. Despite the promise of a rainbow nation that has proven challenging to make a full reality from its brilliant conceptual base, South African society is still made up of fractured communities desperately trying to overcome the country’s socio-political and racial tensions. The social, political and economic complexities of everyday life in South Africa have not been made easier by the ever-increasing influx of African migrants into the country. Resentment against migrants has profound historical roots. In the African context, xenophobia “is associated with the politics of the dominant groups in the period following independence … where the unfulfilled expectations of a new democracy result in the foreigner coming to embody unemployment, poverty and deprivation” (Solomon & Kosaka, 2013, p. 6). Since 1994, xenophobia has been a major issue in South Africa—despite the support South Africa enjoyed from other African countries during the apartheid years. An increase in xenophobic hostility has been directed at non-citizens, culminating in violence and abuses in some instances.

Landau et al. (2005, pp. 6–9) outline four rationales for xenophobia in South Africa:

Rationale 1: Foreigners are perceived to represent a threat to economic security. Citizens see foreigners as a source of competition for employment, grants and social services. Migrants’ attempts to secure economic survival are often criminalised (Neocosmos, 2010) as migrants are often accused of occupying jobs illegally. Their attempts to find work are met with resistance and calls for them not to be granted permits (Sharp, 2008). The lack of economic resources has created a situation in which migrants become scapegoats for the deprivation and poverty experienced by millions of South Africans across the country.

Rationale 2: Many media discourses rely on stereotypical representations of migrants as inherent criminals. Such discourse is evident in the Adetshina case, which involves an accusation of serious criminality against her mother. Media coverage tends to amplify the blurred definitions and categorisations of migrants and does not do enough to educate and inform on the distinction between ‘criminal’, ‘illegal immigrant’ and ‘undocumented foreign national’.

Rationale 3: Politicians play their part in the confusion and chaos online by seeking to capitalise on the negative sentiments and reactions surrounding migrants for political gain. This was seen, in part, by the hasty comments of South African Sport, Arts and Culture Minister, Gayton McKenzie. Solomon and Kosaka (2013) note that xenophobic rhetoric is not limited to the ruling party at any one moment but spans an entire political spectrum. Mpofu (2019) writes that anti-immigrant claims are part of some political parties’ manifestos, as would be the case with McKenzie’s Patriotic Alliance and Herman Mashaba’s ActionSA.

Rationale 4: It has long been said that South Africa is considered a separate and different country from the rest of the continent. Neocosmos (2010) writes that nationalism is a component of xenophobia, which is not difficult to appreciate if we remember that South Africa’s long history of racial politics and segregation has a direct influence on how citizens view foreign nationals—as outsiders who do not belong to or in South Africa.

Xenophobia is driven by questions of nationality and belonging. Strong sentiments of citizenship are bound to the idea of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, in which an ‘other’ is created and vilified (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012a). According to the isolation hypothesis, “the interface between previously isolated South Africans and unknown foreigners creates a space for hostility to develop” (Harris, 2002, p. 172). Tensions grow as citizens come into contact with an unrecognised other. One can therefore “understand xenophobia as a consequence of apartheid South Africa’s seclusion from the [continental and] international community” (Harris, 2002, p. 172). Unlike in some other countries, xenophobia in South Africa seems to be primarily directed at migrants from other parts of Africa, meaning that xenophobia appears to overlap with afrophobia. As stated by Harris, the “generalisations and stereotypes that are commonly offered regarding Africa and African immigrants offer insight into the hostility that meets this group” (Harris, 2002, p. 175). Mainstream media play a major role in steering the conversation about foreigners based on the coverage of newsworthy stories. The Miss SA 2024 case of Adetshina was no different. There were instances of exacerbation and perpetuation of certain stereotypes, depicting a set news angle on the coverage of stories regarding immigrants.

Sibanda (2014, p. 2) writes that “[m]edia is identified as one of the formulators, agenda setters and articulators of xenophobia in South Africa”. Mtwana and Bird (2006, p. 2) foreground the relationship between xenophobia and race when they remark that there is a “tendency of the South African media to cover issues of both racism and xenophobia in simplistic, non-analytical fashion, without due recognition of the complexities and diversities inherent in unpacking these complex phenomena”. Apartheid’s isolation and fear (Brown, 1987) have created a lived and reproduced scenario where African foreigners have come to represent a dangerous unknown to South African citizens (Harris, 2002). The legacy of racism inherited from colonialism and apartheid, together with all the strained dynamics of coloniality, may explain why it is mainly black Africans from countries outside South Africa who carry the automatic status of illegal immigrant and subsequently, criminal, with the threat of targeted xenophobic attacks when tensions rise and completely boil over.

6. Theoretical Framework

Coloniality and Its Three Dimensions

Coloniality is understood as the lingering impacts of the power dynamics and inequalities that result from colonialism long after the end of a historical period of colonial administration (Maldonado-Torres, 2007). Coloniality has three dimensions: (i) coloniality of power, represented by modern forms of domination and exploitation; (ii) coloniality of knowledge, represented by the assumed superiority of Eurocentric worldviews and Western systems of knowledge-making- and sharing; (iii) coloniality of being, represented by the complicated and tension-filled understandings and representations of selfhood for previously colonised peoples (i.e., the lasting impacts on their sense of selves and who they are in the world). To understand how coloniality and citizenship are intertwined, we have to make space for understanding how contemporary reality has been shaped by colonisation (Mignolo, 2007). Coloniality defines “culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations” (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 243). Coloniality is both a condition and a legacy that “survived” the collapse of formalised colonial empires, leading to the formation of deep cracks in the way the world was organised (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 242). Coloniality, then, pervades different arenas of post-colonial society and thus becomes a new, tightly woven web of modern oppression. Nowhere is this more visible than in social and digital media and the mainstream media. The case of Adetshina is only one such example of the continued colonial legacies in “books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience” (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 243).

Grosfoguel (2007, p. 219) provides more depth and contextualises coloniality in the following excerpt:

One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonisation of the world. This led to the myths of a “postcolonial” world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonisation of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same “colonial power matrix.” With juridical-political decolonisation, we moved from a period of ‘global colonialism’ to the current period of “global coloniality”.

Coloniality has a crippling effect on the peoples of previously colonised nations because it affects almost all spheres of their lives. Citizenship is one of the most crucial aspects of post-colonial and democratic life where coloniality plays out. We are referring here to the deep political, economic and social impacts that remain long after there has been the initial institutionalisation of colonial invasion, exploitation and domination. Coloniality is one of the specific and constitutive elements of the global model of capitalist power. It is based on the imposition of racial and ethnic classification of the global population as the cornerstone of that model of power, and it operates on every level, in every arena and dimension (both material and subjective) of everyday social existence, and does so on a societal scale. Benyera (2018, p. 148) writes that “xenophobia is a colonial hangover which continues to haunt Africa”. He also states that “xenophobia remains a reproduced form of colonial violence” (Benyera, 2018, p. 148). There are three preconditions for the existence and execution of xenophobia: “colonially constructed and reinforced identities, land and migration” (Benyera, 2018, p. 148).

Mbembe (2001) notes that Apartheid South Africa represented a colonialism of a special kind, where race and citizenship were key instruments of institutionalised segregation. The Bantustan system (semi-independent states where black South Africans could claim legitimate citizenship) was devised as part of a strategy to make members of the oppressed black South African majority strangers in their own country (Dassah, 2015). While the South African Constitution of 1996 states that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, citizenship still plays an undeniable role in determining and perpetuating social inequalities. Boatcă and Roth (2016, p. 1) identify coloniality of citizenship as “the structural distribution of unequal citizenship rights as a crucial component of modernity/coloniality”. Kamugisha (2007, p. 21) defines the coloniality of citizenship as the “complex amalgam of elite domination, neoliberalism and the legacy of colonial authoritarianism”.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012a, p. 80) notes that:

One puzzle in the development of African nationalism is why it has increasingly abandoned its original slogan of ‘diverse people unite’ and metamorphosed into nativism and xenophobia in recent years. In such countries as Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya and others, nationalism has revealed its narrower conceptions, its complex imbrications with ethnicity, its violence, its nativist and xenophobic potential with terrible consequences for those ‘othered’ as aliens.

Coloniality includes the inescapable internalisations ingrained in commonly accepted ways of knowing, doing, and being. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) writes that Africa is trapped within a global colonial matrix of power. Coloniality is encapsulated in the colonial power structures (coloniality of power) that privilege Western ways of knowing (coloniality of knowledge) and shape the once colonised’s sense of being in the world (coloniality of being).

7. Research Approach

The research approach I applied in this article, concerning the tools and procedures used to conduct the research (Babbie et al., 2009), includes the “methods, techniques and procedures” Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 649) that I coupled with relevant assumptions and principles in the research methodology process. The assumption I am making is that coloniality is reflected in xenophobic and anti-foreigner sentiments that were captured in mainstream media as a social media response to Adetshina’s inclusion in the Miss SA 2024 pageant. As noted earlier, coloniality—understood as the lingering legacy of colonial and apartheid power relationships, epistemologies and ways of being in the world—pervades every aspect of daily life, including our online interactions. With the available literature as a foundational launching pad upon which to build our academic inquiries, it would be reasonable to assume that the xenophobic content that was shared by online users on platforms like X and cited in online media as part of mainstream coverage does indeed reflect coloniality, particularly the coloniality of being. I believe that, as per this observation, we are not examining whether or not coloniality is in effect within xenophobic reactions to Adetshina’s story, but rather how the coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being permeate this poignant social media moment.

8. Data Collection and Analysis

I employed a combination of content and textual analysis by looking at several media reports from leading media outlets. I read and unpacked various online articles as a way of honouring the 20th-century study of mass communication, which “employs a wide range of analytical techniques to generate findings and put them into context” (White & Marsh, 2006, p. 22). The media articles I examined act as “cultural texts” (see Kellner, 1995) that can be seen as a reflection of their current and historical context. In interpreting the relationship between mainstream media’s coverage of the social media reaction to Adetshina’s Miss SA 2024 case and xenophobia as informed by coloniality, I was able to lean on content analysis as a flexible methodology (White & Marsh, 2006) that enables general observation and scanning.

The 18 mainstream media outlets I chose to study, whose xenophobia coverage and related topic reflections span the period 2019–2024, right through to the Adetshina story, were the following:

• Al Jazeera [1 online article] (Al Jazeera, 2019)
• BBC [3 online articles] (BBC, 2019a, 2019b, 2024)
• Defence Web [1 online article] (Defence Web, 2022)
• Digital Forensic Research (DFR) Lab [1 online article] (DFR Lab, 2020)
• Eyewitness News (EWN) [3 online articles] (EWN, 2024a, 2024b, 2024c)
• Pulse Nigeria [1 online article] (Pulse Nigeria, 2019)
• Reuters [1 online article] (Reuters, 2024)
• The Abuja Inquirer [1 online article] (The Abuja Inquirer, 2024)
• The Conversation [1 online article] (The Conversation, 2023)
• The Guardian [3 online articles] (The Guardian, 2024a, 2024b, 2024c)
• VOA News [1 online article] (VOA News, 2010)
• Workers World Media Productions (WWMP) [1 online article] (WWMP, 2024)

9. Discussion

9.1. Crime

The link between foreigners and crime in South Africa features prominently among online content with a clear xenophobic orientation. In an August 2019 online article, titled “Letter From Africa: Nigerian Anger Over South African Xenophobia”, the BBC reported that United Nations data confirms that almost four million immigrants live in South Africa. In a country of nearly 60 million people, this figure might not raise alarm, unless social media consensus labels this population group of 6.67% as predominantly illegal in status and highly inclined to criminal activity.

Nigerian novelist and journalist, Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani, was reported in the same 2019 BBC article as saying: “We hear that South Africans detest Nigerians because they believe we are criminals, are too loud, and our men steal their women”. This comment alludes to some stereotypes that fuel tensions between South African locals and Nigerian foreign nationals who live and work in the country. Treating (African) foreigners as an undifferentiated mass of interchangeable (and potentially dangerous) bodies resonates with colonial and apartheid constructions of the ‘other’ (see Maldonado-Torres, 2016). Such generalisations are then employed as a rationale to invoke the removal of all foreigners. A call for indiscriminate mass deportation, though seemingly appealing to the rule of law, is reminiscent of past criminal apartheid practices such as the forced removals of 3.5 million black South Africans and their relocation to designated areas and semi-independent Bantustans between 1960 and 1983 (Abel, 2019, pp. 915–953).

9.2. Politics and Economy

Politics and economy are major talking points when social media and online users debate the impacts of African immigrants on the quality of life in South Africa. The political dimension of immigration as a problem is discussed either as a duty by the government to protect its citizens or as a failure thereof. Constructing and promoting narratives which portray foreigners in a negative light is a common strategy in xenophobic attacks online. Political discussions online reveal deeply held fears. This is consistent with a worldview in which civilised subjects are threatened by violent “savages” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012b), a viewpoint that was reflected in the apartheid-era fear of “die swart gevaar”—meaning “the black danger” (Brown, 1987). This is also evident in other contexts, such as the over-representation of African Americans in the prison population in the United States of America (Free, 1997). There is a “perception of outsiders as competitors for scarce jobs, resources, living space and services”, said Michael Morris, head of media at the South African Institute of Race Relations, in an August 2024 BBC online article titled “Beauty Contest Sparks Row Over Who Counts as South African”. He notes that the growing number of Africans from outside the country who relocate and seem to be succeeding in South Africa could “easily trigger resentment and violence”. Morris comments: “There are black South Africans who will argue that Africans from elsewhere in the continent don’t belong in South Africa”.

Xenophobia is weaponised in politics, either to attract voters or to discredit political opponents. Politicians are very vocal on the matter of foreign nationals in South Africa, with Economic Freedom Fighters party leader Julius Malema weighing in on the Adetshina case and lamenting: “Why do people want to say she’s from Nigeria or Mozambique? She was born here.” Whether this comment is a genuine question from a concerned citizen or part of the usual political chess-playing is unknown and could be, in fact, its own social media debate. Maldonado-Torres (2007) states that, as subalterns, foreigners are understood as naturally living in a condition of suspension of ethics and a constant state of war. In the South African context, this may be why it is so challenging for locals to afford foreign nationals a degree of consideration and empathy, which we may like to refer to more casually as the benefit of the doubt. The result is a group of people deemed too unfit to belong and too different to integrate into the fabric of South African society.

9.3. Belonging

A prominent theme in the xenophobic reactions shared on social media and captured in the media coverage of Adetshina’s Miss SA 2024 case is the call for foreigners to go back to their home countries—where they supposedly belong. But what does it take to belong? That has been one of the central questions in this research article. It is at the very heart of trying to understand the complexities of the Adetshina Miss SA 2024 case. In an August 2024 BBC online article titled “Beauty contest sparks row over who counts as South African”, a social media user was quoted as sharing the following on the X platform: “On behalf of South Africans, we don’t recognise her and that name! She’d better start packing and go home.” In an August 2024 EWN online article titled “McKenzie Says He’ll Apologise if Miss SA Finalist Adetshina Has Legitimate Citizenship”, Gayton McKenzie, Minister of Sport, Arts and Culture, was quoted as saying on X: “We truly cannot have Nigerians compete in our Miss SA competition. I wanna get all facts before I comment, but it gives funny vibes already.”

In the same BBC online article noted above, University of the Free State sociologist Dr Nombulelo Shange said that South Africa is still reeling from a “sad apartheid mentality that we are struggling to shake as a country”. “It shows the deep self-hate that we as black South Africans carry with us,” she said. As for how Adetshina herself has felt and what she has expressed in the media, she commented as follows on the Sowetan Live news site: “I am representing a country, but I don’t feel the love from the people I’m representing,” Her comments hark back to the black-on-black hate that Shange speaks about above and the afrophobia overlap that was mentioned earlier. In August 2024, the BBC reached out to Melissa Nayimuli, a 2023 Miss SA contestant who identifies with Adetshina’s story. As the child of a now-naturalised South African from Uganda (father) and a South African citizen (mother), she knows all too well the difficult dichotomy of dual citizenship and the pain of not being deemed South African enough to belong. “[Adetshina] is not just a trending topic. She is a human being. She is a young woman getting bullied online—it’s wrong, hurtful, and so dangerous,” said Nayimuli. When Adetshina was invited to and successfully competed in Miss Universe Nigeria (MUN) after her withdrawal from Miss SA—which, as stated before, she went on to win, there were mixed reactions from even the Nigerian online audience. Two comments (what would formerly be referred to as tweets) on X—as reported in an August 2024 EWN online article titled “Former Miss SA Finalist Invited to Miss Universe Nigeria Pageant After Citizenship Controversy”—read as follows:

User 1: I’m sorry, this is so not fair!!!! She did not audition!! So because you have international drama you’ve earned your spot to compete??? No, not fair at all!!!!

Because social media and particularly the X platform are instantaneous and highly reactive communication spaces, a direct reply to the above tweet from another X user read:

User 2: Nigerians are already complaining about Chidimma being parachuted to Miss Nigeria[’s T]op 10. 😭😭

Below is a different example of a similar exchange between four X users, as shared in the same EWN news article above—from a section spotlighting the issue of Adetshina’s eligibility for MUN 2024:

User 1: They should send her funds. They can even do it publicly, but this move is a disgrace. She’s not a citizen of Nigeria, does not hold a Nigerian passport, [and] cannot legally vote in Nigeria. Life happens to everyone, but she should be consoled some other way; this is trash.

User 2: Girl, this is your African sister.

User 3: How do you know she doesn’t have [a] Naija passport?

User 4: Well [w]ell [w]ell. Nigerians are now up in arms regarding Chidimma. Apparently, she is not a Nigerian [either]. [The j]okes write themselves. 😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂 These xenophobes! 🤡

As evidenced in the social media snippets above, Adetshina’s story was made more complex and revealed further layers when her MUN invitation also raised questions about her Nigerian citizenship status and the possible unfairness of granting automatic pageantry participation to a contestant who had not been part of the competition proceedings from the very beginning. Xenophobic narratives seem to reflect the European romantic ideal of one nation, one people as a guarantee of purity and harmony (see Summerton, 1996). This supports the idealised view of pre-colonial Africa as united and homogeneous, which itself is a fruit of European imagination (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012b), as though there is a history in which South Africa belongs to South Africans only. At the same time, xenophobia creates a continued “absence of social cohesion, disunity and mistrust” (Benyera, 2018, p. 149). It might be an oversimplification to blame xenophobia purely on Western influences. As noted by Benyera (2018, p. 149), “[x]enophobia derails regional integration and perpetuates coloniality”. The coloniality of being is related to nationality and extends to denying the very humanity of migrants. Thus, xenophobia can be understood as a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, closely intertwined with broader notions of citizenship and belonging.

10. Conclusions

Key Findings

The findings in this article confirm a link between xenophobic sentiments as shared in the social media reactions and media coverage of the Adetshina Miss SA 2024 case and a persisting legacy of exploitation and oppression as inherited from colonialism and apartheid. We can understand this as indicative of the coloniality of power. When xenophobia turns violent, be it physical (e.g., calls for forced removals), structural (e.g., exclusion from services, perks or privileges due to lack of proper documentation) or symbolic (e.g., insults and threats), this calls for instruments of state power and control. A more nuanced analysis reveals blurred boundaries between illegality and criminality and some contradictions between calls to uphold the rule of law and willingness to act outside it to deny or expel foreigners. Despite a history of common struggle against white minority rule, African migrants from neighbouring countries appear to be the main targets of xenophobia due to the deep socio-political and economic strains of a young democracy that operates in tandem with coloniality.

In terms of the coloniality of knowledge, the findings in this article reveal that understandings of concepts such as ‘state’ and ‘nation’ are still very much Eurocentric in their application, and pose dire entanglements in a post-colonial African context where national borders no longer seem to suffice as strict markers of nationhood and belonging. The appeal of Western scientific discourse as inherently superior and intrinsically valid contributes to conflict-riddled stereotyping and generalisations that are common to xenophobic narratives and hate speech globally. The assumed meaning within an African context is that black Africans demonise and vilify their individuality and deny each other their rightful humanity along contradictory and arbitrary criteria.

Findings also reflect hierarchies between different types of humanity that are indicative of the coloniality of being. Migration and the movement of people, where people are placed spatially and what identity constructions they are subjected to, are central to the question of who belongs and who does not. Colonially constructed and reinforced identities were established under colonialism and apartheid, where races were separated into a hierarchical order based on racist categories. Contemporary xenophobia has a strong black-on-black component which reflects a global hierarchy of humanity based on race, nationality and citizenship. The case of Adetshina provides a fascinating example of exactly how this phenomenon plays out both online and offline. The social media backlash to Adetshina’s participation in Miss SA 2024 was an attack on her selfhood and sense of being, a rejection of her dignity as a human being first, before we can ascribe nationality and citizenship.

Perhaps there is also a considerable amount of irony in (inter)national beauty pageantry and its portrayal of beauty, representation and belonging as legitimate acceptance of a contestant’s place in the world. Nevertheless, despite a shared history of struggle against oppression and a largely common positionality as subaltern subjects within a global system of coloniality, some black locals on social media appear to consider South Africa as a country that is different and separate from the rest of Africa. This translates into calls for African migrants to go back ‘where they belong’. The findings suggest that there is an overlap with afrophobia in the Adetshina case—a complication for ideas such as citizenship, identity, inequality, selfhood and nationhood that have not brought us any closer to being able to agree, freely and functionally on who truly belongs where