A Comparative Study of News Framing of COVID-19 Crisis Management in South Korea and China
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Characteristics of COVID-19 Prevention and Control Systems in South Korea, China, and Hong Kong
2.2. News Frame
- Crisis response frame—examines how the government and institutions handled the pandemic.
- Responsibility attribution frame—analyzes whether the media assigned blame to specific entities.
- International relations frame—assesses how the media portrayed COVID-19 in the context of global interactions.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Data Collection
3.2. Data Analysis
4. Results
4.1. Phase 1 (January 2020–April 2020)
“The COVID-19 economic crisis is just beginning; without treating underlying conditions, survival in the long run will be impossible.
On the 19th, President Moon Jae-in chaired the first emergency economic meeting, where a 50 trillion won financial support plan was announced, yet the financial market continues to face shocks, with the KOSPI index dropping by 8%. The economic crisis triggered by COVID-19 is likely to become a prolonged battle.”(The Chosun Daily, 27 March 2020)
“Emergency supplementary budget for COVID-19 response: The sooner, the better.
On the 23rd, the Democratic Party requested the government to prepare a supplementary budget to address the economic impact of COVID-19. …It seems that the current situation has exceeded the range that can be managed with the measures at hand.”(Hankyoreh, 23 February 2020)
“A great force of unity from the entire nation to overcome COVID-19.
Unity is the crucial guarantee for the Chinese people and the Chinese nation to overcome all dangerous challenges and continuously move from one victory to the next. While COVID-19 requires physical distancing, it brings people closer together emotionally.”(People’s Daily, 3 February 2020)
“Unity in Epidemic Prevention: Avoiding Internal Confusion.
With the continued spread of COVID-19 in mainland China and concerns for the new year, Hong Kong faces a pessimistic outlook for its economy and livelihoods. In the face of the COVID-19 threat, Hong Kong must unite to tackle the epidemic. Prevention measures should be based on science, avoiding the politicization of the situation.”(Ming Pao, 27 January 2020)
“Spreading COVID-19: Explain the Reason for Ignoring the Influx of Infected People from China.
The South Korean government neglected the influx of infected people from China. While countries around the world, seeing the catastrophic situation in China, implemented measures such as banning visitors from China and closing borders, we kept ignoring the situation, looking to China for guidance.”(The Chosun Daily, 20 February 2020)
“We are concerned about the ‘fake news’ and ‘hate speech’ that fuel the fear of the novel coronavirus.
The flood of baseless fake news and distorted information, along with the emergence of Sinophobia, is concerning. The spread of hatred towards Wuhan, the epicenter of the outbreak, and China as a whole, is an undesirable development.”(Hankyoreh, 28 January 2020)
“China’s pandemic response demonstrates its role as a responsible major power.
China’s efforts to fight COVID-19 are receiving support from the international community. Many countries have swiftly provided medical supplies and other aid to China, and the Chinese people will forever be grateful for the assistance given during critical moments.”(People’s Daily, 19 March 2020)
“G20’s first step in pandemic response: U.S.-China relations still marked by external easing and internal tensions.
The G20 meeting took the first step toward international cooperation in responding to COVID-19 by committing to measures for pandemic control.”(Ming Pao, 27 March 2020)
“Using COVID-19 relief funds during elections and now shifting the responsibility to the opposition?
President Moon Jae-in, one day before the election, said, ‘Notify the recipients of the emergency disaster relief fund in advance and accept applications.’ … Yet, the Democratic Party is now pushing the opposition party regarding the emergency disaster relief fund. It seems they are shifting the difficult issues onto the opposition.”(The Chosun Daily, 23 April 2020)
“President, ruling and opposition parties’ ‘COVID-19 meeting’, an opportunity to pool national resources.
On the 28th, President Moon Jae-in and the leaders of the four major political parties met at the National Assembly to discuss bipartisan measures to address the COVID-19 crisis. It is hoped that this meeting will serve as an opportunity to restrain excessive political conflict and quickly establish effective solutions.”(Hankyoreh, 28 February 2020)
“Strengthen a sense of responsibility and bravely fulfill the duties entrusted.
President Xi Jinping emphasized that officials at all levels should strengthen their sense of responsibility and, under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee, prioritize COVID-19 prevention and control efforts as the most important task.”(People’s Daily, 3 March 2020)
“The death of Dr. Li Wenliang has been mourned, and there has been strong criticism of public officials for dereliction of duty and evasion of responsibility.
Dr. Li Wenliang did not perform any actions that would shake the world, but he faithfully fulfilled his responsibilities by alerting the public about the COVID-19 situation and diligently treating patients. The reason the public was moved was that they pointed out that the officials of Wuhan and Hubei province had concealed the situation and failed to fulfill their duties.”(Ming Pao, 8 February 2020)
4.2. Phase 2 (May 2020–October 2021)
“The third round of relief funds won’t be the last—reduce wasteful spending and secure financial reserves.
It is a proven fact that the indiscriminate distribution of relief funds, regardless of the extent of damage, has failed to produce effective results. … As a result of providing relief funds to all citizens, more than 10 trillion won in public funds were wasted.”(The Chosun Daily, 28 December 2020)
“Rather than universal disaster relief funds, measures to address COVID-19-driven polarization are needed.
Universal disaster relief funds can be considered as one way to stimulate the economy in overcoming COVID-19. However, it is not too late to review this measure after the urgent crisis of the third wave of COVID-19 has been brought under control. … There is no need to rush.”(Hankyoreh, 5 January 2021)
“Build a strong public health system.
At the national strategic level, President Xi Jinping deeply summarized the experiences and lessons learned from the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic in order to build a strong public health system. He systematically discussed a series of key issues, such as promoting the legalization of public health safety and epidemic prevention measures.”(People’s Daily, 15 September 2020)
“Third COVID-19 Wave Declared ‘Zero’, Easing of Epidemic Prevention Measures Difficult Ahead of Mid-Autumn Festival
Although the fact that new COVID-19 cases have finally returned to ‘zero’ yesterday and there are signs that the epidemic is under control is good news, it is still too early to assert that the third wave will soon come to an end.”(Ming Pao, 16 September 2020)
“After COVID-19, US-China ‘Full-Scale Conflict’ Over Hong Kong: Is There Strategy and Wisdom?
Under pressure from the spread of COVID-19, President Trump seeks to achieve results through the reshaping of a US-led anti-China world order. Among America’s major allies, only the South Korean government remains silent. However, if this prolonged indecision leads to missing the golden opportunity for choice, the worst-case scenario of being left out of a new US-led economic bloc could become a reality.”(The Chosun Daily, 1 June 2020)
“Instead of cooperating on COVID-19, the irresponsible US-China conflict continues.
It is highly irresponsible that the US and China are not cooperating on COVID-19 but instead heading towards confrontation and conflict. Overcoming the COVID-19 virus requires international cooperation, and the responsibility of these two superpowers is particularly significant.”(Hankyoreh, 5 May 2020)
“They cannot hide their failure in epidemic control by shifting the blame.
The United States referred to COVID-19 as a ‘major flu,’ missing the optimal time for prevention and control. … The number of confirmed COVID-19 cases surpassed 39 million, and the death toll exceeded 630,000, making it the highest in the world.”(People’s Daily, 1 September 2021)
“U.S. Stocks Detach from Pandemic Reality, Economic V-Shaped Recovery a Mirage
Although the United States resumed economic activities, the Dow Jones index plummeted nearly 7% on Thursday, marking the largest single-day drop since the outbreak of the pandemic.”(Ming Pao, 13 June 2020)
“While the world secured COVID-19 vaccines in advance, the government is only now convening an advisory committee.
The government has shown an oddly passive attitude towards securing vaccines. The Ministry of Economy and Finance was reluctant to allocate budgets, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the responsible department, was not particularly proactive in securing funds for advance purchases.”(The Chosun Daily, 13 November 2020)
“Chuseok ‘COVID-19 Resurgence’ Crisis: Let’s Unite and Overcome Together
In the fight against the epidemic, the outcome inevitably depends on the will and cooperation of the community. If the government’s meticulous response and the cooperation of the people come together, we can certainly overcome this resurgence crisis.”(Hankyoreh, 27 September 2020)
“Extensively promote the great epidemic prevention spirit.
In the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, the Communist Party of China united the people of various ethnic groups across the country, making tremendous efforts to achieve significant strategic success in epidemic prevention. It has realized the great epidemic prevention spirit of prioritizing life, national unity, selfless dedication, respect for science, and a shared community of destiny.”(People’s Daily, 11 September 2020)
“Delay in COVID-19 Return to Normalcy, Lack of Testing Capacity as a Barrier.
The new COVID-19 outbreak has revealed that there are still significant shortcomings in epidemic prevention efforts. … In particular, improving virus testing capacity as soon as possible is an urgent issue, and further delays cannot be tolerated.”(Ming Pao, 9 July 2020)
4.3. Phase 3 (November 2021–March 2023)
“K-Quarantine Turning Even Simple COVID-19 Tests into a Struggle Amid Severe Cold
Over the weekend, citizens who visited COVID-19 screening stations experienced significant inconvenience amid the severe cold. … Why should the public, who have actively cooperated with the government’s quarantine measures at the cost of their daily lives, have to endure such discomfort? The number of screening stations should be significantly increased, and a queue number system should be actively implemented to reduce waiting times.”(The Chosun Daily, 20 December 2021)
“Hospital Beds at Full Capacity—Was ‘With-COVID’ Initiated with This Level of Preparedness?
As of 5 PM on the 25th, the ICU bed occupancy rate in the Seoul metropolitan area had reached 84.5%. … If this trend continues, there will be no ground left for the ‘With-COVID’ strategy. Despite this situation, the government has effectively taken no action to increase the number of ICU beds.”(Hankyoreh, 26 November 2021)
“Dynamic Zero-COVID is currently China’s best choice for pandemic control.
From the perspective of the virus’s characteristics, the Omicron variant has a fast transmission rate, a high proportion of mild infections, and a greater likelihood of causing widespread transmission. … Only by adhering to the ‘Dynamic Zero-COVID’ policy can we win the battle against the virus.”(People’s Daily, 13 April 2022)
“While citizens are happy about the easing of social distancing measures, the return to normalcy amid COVID-19 should proceed with caution.
With the gradual easing of social distancing measures starting yesterday and the reopening of many facilities, citizens are excited, and shops are pleased with the increase in business. … We must cooperate with the next phase of social distancing measures to inject even more vitality into the recovery of people’s livelihoods.”(Ming Pao, 22 April 2022)
“Amid the serious economic impact of COVID-19, senior ministers are taking consecutive overseas trips at the end of their terms.
Minister Park Beom-gyu and other officials from the Ministry of Justice are reported to have made 10 overseas trips since the end of last year. The total expenditure for these trips, including airfare of approximately 200 million won, amounted to 380 million won. … Recently, the wife of President Moon Jae-in was also criticized for privately visiting the Pyramids in Egypt.”(The Chosun Daily, 31 March 2022)
“How will presidential candidates address the income gap widened by COVID-19?
The COVID-19 virus has deeply wounded our economy and society, and the pandemic continues to this day. With the presidential election on March 9, we would like to hear concrete solutions from the candidates who will be responsible for running the country for the next five years.”(Hankyoreh, 15 February 2022)
“Our quarantine measures are the most economical and effective approach.
In response to the rapidly spreading Omicron variant, through the joint efforts of various regions and departments, there have been slight changes in some areas, but the nationwide COVID-19 situation remains generally stable. Positive changes are also appearing in the national economy, with the economic recovery continuing to strengthen.”(People’s Daily, 14 July 2022)
“The distortions caused by COVID-19 remain, and the significant salary increases for senior officials are inappropriate.
The government’s failure in pandemic response and the significant salary increases for senior officials not only provoke criticism of ‘a top-heavy, impoverished lower class’ but also raise concerns about diminishing public trust. … The new government should seriously consider how to link the performance of senior officials to their salary levels.”(Ming Pao, 19 May 2022)
5. Discussion
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
- Carter, M. J. (2013). The hermeneutics of frames and framing: An examination of the media’s construction of reality. Sage Open, 3(2), 1–12. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Cucinotta, D., & Vanelli, M. (2020). WHO declares COVID-19 a pandemic. Acta Biomedica: Atenei Parmensis, 91(1), 157–160. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- De Vreese, C. H. (2005). News framing: Theory and typology. Information Design Journal+Document Design, 13(1), 51–62. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Engler, S., Brunner, P., Loviat, R., Abou-Chadi, T., Leemann, L., Glaser, A., & Kübler, D. (2021). Democracy in times of the pandemic: Explaining the variation of COVID-19 policies across European democracies. West European Politics, 44(5–6), 1077–1102. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51–58. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Fox, C. A. (2021). Media in a time of crisis: Newspaper coverage of COVID-19 in East Asia. Journalism Studies, 22(13), 1853. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Gitlin, T. (1980). The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making & unmaking the new left. University of California Press. [Google Scholar]
- Guo, F. (2020). Discussion on the construction of China’s legal system for epidemic prevention and control. Finance and Economic Law, (3), 3–19. [Google Scholar]
- Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., & Roberts, B. (1978). Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state, and law and order. Macmillan Education Ltd. [Google Scholar]
- Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (1988). Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media (pp. 198–206). Pantheon Books. [Google Scholar]
- Hong, S. K. (2004). Corporatistic class politics and the press. Media & Society, 12(4), 3–33. [Google Scholar]
- Kim, B. Y., & Kang, J. H. (2024). Characteristics and discourse of economic news in local media during the COVID-19 period: Content analysis of economic news in Busan-based media. Journal of Media and Communication Studies, 24(1), 5–54. [Google Scholar]
- Kim, H. (2022). A study on the COVID-19 news frame as a regional issue: Focusing on newspaper editorials of the Chosun Daily, Hankyoreh, and Maeil Shinmun. Journal of Social Science, 61(3), 563–592. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Kim, S. A. (2024). K-quarantine recognized as a model case for COVID-19 response by the World Health Organization. Korea Net News. Available online: https://www.kocis.go.kr/koreanet/view.do?seq=1047850 (accessed on 20 March 2025).
- Kim, W., Nam, Y., & Shin, J. (2015). Editorial tone of Korean newspapers toward enterprises: Emphasis on ‘The Hankyoreh’, ‘The Chosunilbo’. Korean Society, 16(2), 51–86. [Google Scholar]
- Ko, D., & Lee, C. (2022). A comparative study of the news frame of The Chosun Daily and Hankyoreh Newspaper on China after the outbreak of COVID-19. Korean Journal of Communication & Information, 111, 43–74. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Lin, F. (2017). Hong Kong after 2047: “One country, two systems” or “One country, one system”? Journal of Shenzhen University (Humanities & Social Sciences Edition), 34(1), 37–43. [Google Scholar]
- Madabhavi, I., Sarkar, M., & Kadakol, N. (2020). COVID-19: A review. Monaldi Archives for Chest Disease, 90(2), 248–258. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Maniou, T. A. (2022). The dynamics of influence on press freedom in different media systems: A comparative study. Journalism Practice, 17(9), 1937–1961. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Nae, E. K. (1998). The impact of differences in news framing methods on attitudes and responses to social reality [Master’s thesis, Seoul National University]. [Google Scholar]
- Scherling, J., & Foltz, A. (2023). The use of certainty in COVID-19 reporting in two Austrian newspapers. Journalism and Media, 4(2), 530–546. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Sotirovic, M. (2000). Effects of media use on audience framing and support for welfare. Mass Communication & Society, 3(2–3), 269–296. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Speech by President Moon Jae-in. (2020, September 11). Available online: https://www.korea.kr/briefing/speechView.do?newsId=132032433 (accessed on 1 April 2025).
- Tuchman, G. (1978). The news net. Social Research, 45, 253–276. [Google Scholar]
- Westerman, D., Spence, P. R., & Van Der Heide, B. (2014). Social media as information source: Recency of updates and credibility of information. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 19(2), 171–183. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Xu, Y. C. (2015). Exploration of the middle ground and the rise of Hong Kong’s ming pao (1960–1970). Academic Exchange, (7), 199–203. [Google Scholar]
- Ye, L. (2022, December 15). Hong Kong implements five new COVID-19 prevention policies. Global Times. Available online: https://m.huanqiu.com/article/4AsJcNV7Bjn (accessed on 24 October 2024).
- Yun, C. S., & Kim, G. H. (2017). An analysis of media discourse on the manipulation of state affairs by secret heavyweight: Focusing on the structures of editorial frames of five daily newspapers. Korean Political Communication Association, (45), 69–101. [Google Scholar]
- Zhang, B. (2020). Research on the report of “11.28” deflagration in Zhangjiakou from the Perspective of News Framework [Master’s thesis, Hebei Normal University]. [Google Scholar]
- Zhuo, J. T. (2022). Reasons and effectiveness of China’s firm adherence to the “dynamic zero-COVID” policy in COVID-19 prevention and control. Shanghai Journal of Preventive Medicine, 34(12), 1257–1260. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
Newspaper | Number of News Articles | Number of Editorials | % |
---|---|---|---|
The Chosun Daily | 4527 | 73 | 1.61 |
Hankyoreh | 3215 | 129 | 4.01 |
People’s Daily | 6746 | 145 | 2.15 |
Ming Pao | 8782 | 231 | 2.63 |
Total | 23,270 | 578 | 2.48 |
Variable Name | Detailed Classification | Consistency Index |
---|---|---|
v1 Country | ① South Korea ② China | 1 |
v2 Newspaper | ① The Chosun Daily ② Hankyoreh ③ People’s Daily ④ Ming Pao | 1 |
v3 Period classification | ① Phase 1 ② Phase 2 ③ Phase 3 | 1 |
v4 Tone | ① Positive ② Neutral ③ Critical | 0.9 |
v5 News frame | ① Crisis response ② International relations ③ Responsibility attribution | 0.93 |
Phase 1 | News Frame | Total | x2 (p-Value) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Crisis Response | International Relations | Responsibility Attribution | |||
South Korea | 20 (42.6%) | 13 (27.7%) | 14 (29.8%) | 47 (100%) | 6.913 |
China | 79 (64.8%) | 20 (16.4%) | 23 (18.9%) | 122 (100%) | (<0.05) |
Total | 99 (58.6%) | 33 (19.5%) | 37 (21.9%) | 169 (100%) |
Phase | Frame | South Korea | China | Total | x2 (p-Value) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The Chosun Daily | Hankyoreh | People’s Daily | Ming Pao | ||||
1 | Crisis response | 5 (27.8%) | 15 (51.7%) | 44 (75.9%) | 35 (54.7%) | 99 (58.6%) | 31.373 |
International relations | 9 (50.0%) | 4 (13.8%) | 1 (1.7%) | 19 (29.7%) | 33 (19.5%) | (<0.01) | |
Responsibility attribution | 4 (22.2%) | 10 (34.5%) | 13 (22.4%) | 10 (15.6%) | 37 (21.9%) | ||
Total | 18 (100%) | 29 (100%) | 58 (100%) | 64 (100%) | 169 (100%) |
Phase | Editorial Tone | South Korea | China | Total | x2 (p-Value) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The Chosun Daily | Hankyoreh | People’s Daily | Ming Pao | ||||
1 | Positive | 1 (5.6%) | 5 (17.2%) | 15 (25.9%) | 1 (1.6%) | 22 (13.0%) | 41.236 |
Neutral | 8 (44.4%) | 20 (69%)) | 43 (74.1%) | 44 (68.8%) | 115 (68.0%) | (<0.01) | |
Critical | 9 (50.0%) | 4 (13.8%) | 0 (0.0%) | 19 (29.7%) | 32 (18.9%) | ||
Total | 18 (100%) | 29 (100%) | 58 (100%) | 64 (100%) | 169 (100%) |
Phase 2 | News Frame | Total | x2 (p-Value) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Crisis Response | International Relations | Responsibility Attribution | |||
South Korea | 50 (49.5%) | 9 (8.9%) | 42 (41.6%) | 101 (100%) | 9.151 |
China | 80 (65.0%) | 15 (12.2%) | 28 (22.8%) | 123 (100%) | (<0.01) |
Total | 130 (58.0%) | 24 (10.7%) | 70 (31.3%) | 224 (100%) |
Phase | Frame | South Korea | China | Total | x2 (p-Value) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The Chosun Daily | Hankyoreh | People’s Daily | Ming Pao | ||||
2 | Crisis response | 6 (22.2%) | 44 (59.5%) | 15 (45.5%) | 65 (72.2%) | 130 (58.0%) | 28.452 |
International relations | 5 (18.5%) | 4 (5.4%) | 7 (21.2%) | 8 (8.9%) | 24 (10.7%) | (<0.01) | |
Responsibility attribution | 16 (59.3%) | 26 (35.1%) | 11 (33.3%) | 17 (18.9%) | 70 (31.3%) | ||
Total | 27 (100%) | 74 (100%) | 33 (100%) | 90 (100%) | 224 (100%) |
Phase | Editorial Tone | South Korea | China | Total | x2 (p-Value) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The Chosun Daily | Hankyoreh | People’s Daily | Ming Pao | ||||
2 | Positive | 0 (0.0%) | 5 (6.8%) | 16 (48.5%) | 3 (3.3%) | 24 (10.7%) | 81.583 |
Neutral | 9 (33.3%) | 46 (62.2%) | 16 (48.5%) | 66 (73.3%) | 137 (61.2%) | (<0.01) | |
Critical | 18 (66.7%) | 23 (31.1%) | 1 (3.0%) | 21 (23.3%) | 63 (28.1%) | ||
Total | 27 (100%) | 74 (100%) | 33 (100%) | 90 (100%) | 224 (100%) |
Phase 3 | News Frame | Total | x2 (p-Value) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Crisis Response | International Relations | Responsibility Attribution | |||
South Korea | 29 (53.7%) | 7 (13.0%) | 18 (33.3%) | 54 (100%) | 17.559 |
China | 107 (81.7%) | 3 (2.3%) | 21 (16.0%) | 131 (100%) | (<0.01) |
Total | 136 (81.7%) | 10 (2.3%) | 39 (16.0%) | 185 (100%) |
Phase | Frame | South Korea | China | Total | x2 (p-Value) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The Chosun Daily | Hankyoreh | People’s Daily | Ming Pao | ||||
3 | Crisis response | 9 (32.1%) | 20 (76.9%) | 42 (77.8%) | 65 (84.4%) | 136 (73.5%) | 34.229 |
International relations | 5 (17.9%) | 2 (7.7%) | 0 (0.0%) | 3 (3.9%) | 10 (5.4%) | (<0.01) | |
Responsibility attribution | 14 (50.0%) | 4 (15.4%) | 12 (22.2%) | 9 (11.7%) | 39 (21.1%) | ||
Total | 28 (100%) | 26 (100%) | 54 (100%) | 77 (100%) | 185 (100%) |
Phase | Editorial Tone | South Korea | China | Total | x2 (p-Value) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
The Chosun Daily | Hankyoreh | People’s Daily | Ming Pao | ||||
3 | Positive | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (3.8%) | 10 (18.5%) | 2 (2.6%) | 13 (7.0%) | 61.41 |
Neutral | 10 (35.7%) | 16 (61.5%) | 44 (81.5%) | 63 (81.8%) | 133 (71.9%) | (<0.01) | |
Critical | 18 (64.3%) | 9 (34.6%) | 0 (0.0%) | 12 (15.6%) | 39 (21.1%) | ||
Total | 28 (100%) | 26 (100%) | 54 (100%) | 77 (100%) | 185 (100%) |
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content. |
© 2025 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Share and Cite
Jin, Y.; Hong, S.; Kang, H. A Comparative Study of News Framing of COVID-19 Crisis Management in South Korea and China. Journal. Media 2025, 6, 93. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6020093
Jin Y, Hong S, Kang H. A Comparative Study of News Framing of COVID-19 Crisis Management in South Korea and China. Journalism and Media. 2025; 6(2):93. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6020093
Chicago/Turabian StyleJin, Yue, Seongku Hong, and Hyunju Kang. 2025. "A Comparative Study of News Framing of COVID-19 Crisis Management in South Korea and China" Journalism and Media 6, no. 2: 93. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6020093
APA StyleJin, Y., Hong, S., & Kang, H. (2025). A Comparative Study of News Framing of COVID-19 Crisis Management in South Korea and China. Journalism and Media, 6(2), 93. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6020093