Russo-Ukrainian War and Trust or Mistrust in Information: A Snapshot of Individuals’ Perceptions in Greece

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to assess the Greek public’s perceptions of the reliability of information received about the Russo-Ukrainian war in the spring of 2022. The study was conducted through an online questionnaire survey consisting of closed-ended statements on a five-point Likert scale. Principal components analysis was performed on the collected data. The retained principal components (PCs) were subjected to non-hierarchical k-means cluster analysis to group respondents into clusters based on the similarity of perceived outcomes. A total of 840 responses were obtained. Twenty-eight original variables from the questionnaire were summarised into five PCs, explaining 63.0% of the total variance. The majority of respondents felt that the information they had received about the Russo-Ukrainian war was unreliable. Older, educated, professional people with exposure to fake news were sceptical about the reliability of information related to the war. Young adults who were active on social networks and had no detailed knowledge of the events considered information about the war to be reliable. The study found that the greater an individual’s ability to spot fake news, the lower their trust in social media and their information habits on social networks.

1. Introduction

The media are important for keeping people informed in their daily lives. This is especially true in times of crisis, such as war and pandemics, when people seek information to survive and keep themselves and their loved ones safe (Melki and Kozman 2019; Skarpa and Garoufallou 2021, 2022). It is therefore essential that the media report accurately and ethically so that people can trust the information they receive.

The biggest military conflict in Europe since the Second World War began on 24 February 2022, when Russian troops invaded Ukrainian territory. Alongside the military operations, the two adversaries engaged in an information war (Boucher 2022). Manipulating public opinion is a powerful tactic that has been used in wars throughout history (Roman et al. 2017).

The Vietnam War has been described as the first great ‘television war’ because it was the first time that television rather than print media appeared to be the dominant medium for public perception of the war (Rollins 1984; McClancy 2013).

In the 1990s, when the Internet first became publicly available, its primary purpose was to provide easy access to information. Gradually, however, false and misleading information began to proliferate and spread online to a potentially huge audience at a very low cost. Social networks are now a fertile ground for spreading misinformation. Digital technology makes it easy to alter information to misinform recipients, posing a threat to open societies around the world (Sadiku et al. 2018).

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq is seen as the first major ‘Internet war’, with blogs and personal websites gaining readership to rival the larger political opinion magazines and fact-checkers challenging the mainstream media (Reynolds 2004).

Making information available on the Internet was a new way of disseminating information directly to everyone. Currently, several developments have contributed to the rapid creation and spread of fake news, something that has not been the case until relatively recently (Burkhardt 2017). Never before has the technology been available to spread propaganda so efficiently (Nougayrède 2018).

Digital devices, social media and traditional news media provide a constant stream of images, videos and news about the ongoing war. Individuals are inundated with information about the Russo-Ukrainian war. It has been argued that the Russο-Ukrainian war is the war of smartphones, highlighting the importance of people having easy access to information and news (Stastna 2022), but also the role of the soldier as a war correspondent (Horbyk 2022). Individuals on the ground in the defending nation can share real-time reports from the front line. It has been suggested that this ability to post updates and share videos can help ensure that the first casualty of this war is not the truth. Anyone with a smartphone can play the role of “war correspondent” (Suciu 2022). Social media and mobile phone users are content producers, working together to create and improve content (Horbyk 2022). Serafin (2022) points out that more than 60% of the Ukrainian population used a smartphone in 2021, and that the ability of the average person to process and share publicly available digital data via the Internet helped Ukrainians and their allies to counter Russian claims. Also, she argues that in Europe and the United States, social media in general seems to have sided with Ukraine, whilst in China, sub-Saharan Africa and Brazil, the Russian view of the war is more prevalent. Whatever the region, it is clear that we are in the world’s first smartphone war (Serafin 2022).

In the Russo-Ukrainian war, for the first time, the battle for global digital dominance between the adversaries may determine the winner (Serafin 2022). In this information war, diametrically opposed narratives are circulated by the two sides (Serafin 2022). It has been pointed out that in Russia’s strategic narrative, US interference has emerged as a major concern and is seen as the main cause of instability in the region. The Russian state tries to promote a positive narrative about itself to domestic and international audiences (Szostek 2016). The Ukrainian strategic narrative, on the other hand, projects Russia’s behaviour as a destabilising force in global politics (Szostek 2017). Russia has been repeatedly accused internationally of attempting to manipulate public opinion, mainly through the dissemination of pro-Russian narratives and cyber-attacks, even from within Ukraine (Gama and Mozgin 2021). It has been shown that individuals in Ukraine were generally able to identify false news in favour of Russian positions. However, false news related to economic issues were more likely to be believed than those related to politics, history or the military. Moreover, individuals with political, ethnic and linguistic ties to Russia are more likely to accept pro-Russian disinformation on all topics (Erlich and Garner 2021).

People are often unable to cope with an increasing volume of information, while technology can disseminate information more rapidly than in the past (Zhang and Ghorbani 2019). There is likely to be both much misinformation (unintentional dissemination of inaccurate information) and disinformation (inaccurate information intended to mislead) (Gilchrist 2016).

Sadiku et al. (2018) state that fake news is a type of propaganda that involves deliberate misinformation and its dissemination is through print, mass and especially social media. With the increasing popularity of social media, coupled with its ease of access through mobile devices, more and more people prefer to be informed through social rather than traditional media, making it an effective source for spreading fake news (Sadiku et al. 2018).

Propaganda occurs when groups, including governments, disseminate false information or ideas to influence target audiences or individuals, omitting facts or emphasising one version over another to support an agenda (Barclay 2017, 2018). What has changed significantly in the modern era is not the message that propaganda conveys or the incentives to distort the message, but the means by which it is rapidly transmitted compared with traditional methods of disseminating information (Weiss et al. 2020).

The ability to successfully promote hate politics is related to media control, as well as the emotional content of information. Hitler and Mussolini are two examples of leaders who knew that effective propaganda required an emotional character, including elements of fear, hate and speaking with missionary excitement (Davison 2006). Currently, the multidimensional concept of hybrid warfare has emerged to describe the rapidly changing character of conflicts, integrating different aspects of warfare (military, informational, political, economic, socio-cultural) (Johnson 2017; Filimonov 2019).

The use of modern technologies to influence the mood of the target audience offers significantly better results than any traditional action (Fridman et al. 2019). In hybrid conflicts, people often face considerable difficulties in understanding current political developments. Propaganda, conflicting narratives, rumours and disinformation that dominate the information environment affect the public’s judgment and trust (Pasitselska 2022). In the case of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which undoubtedly bears the characteristics of hybrid warfare (Gama and Mozgin 2021), where the information landscape was flooded with manipulative stories (Pasitselska 2017), while conflicting narratives and widespread misinformation contributed to hindering the public’s efforts to verify the facts, it was shown that personal experience and information from trusted acquaintances were the most important criteria for Ukrainian citizens to assess the reliability of information (Szostek 2017).

Propaganda creates political apathy and distrust of the media. This leads citizens to support the regime passively rather than actively. A superficial approach to information results from political apathy. This strategy increases support for the war by exacerbating widespread distrust of the media (Alyukov 2022).

The use of social media does not necessarily lead to the spread of fake news. However, users are more likely to be exposed to fake news the more time they spend on the media. Compared with producing real news, which requires resources, journalists, editors and time, producing fake news requires little more than a creative person with an Internet connection (Nelson and Taneja 2018). Therefore, every user is a potential information producer. This makes social networks a suitable medium for the dissemination of any news. However, it is very difficult to extract real news from social media due to the lack of information evaluation and cross-checking mechanisms (Lewandowsky et al. 2012; Özgöbek and Gulla 2017). In addition, it has become easier to create manipulated videos that simulate reality by replacing faces with others, which can easily mislead a trusting audience, due to recent advances in image and video processing technology. To date, deepfake video technology has been used primarily for malicious purposes (Shu et al. 2020). This is illustrated by a fake video purporting to show Ukrainian President Zelensky ordering Ukrainian troops to disarm in early March 2022. The video was quickly debunked (Serafin 2022), having been posted on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and the Russian social network VKontakte.

A study by Pasitselska (2022) on the prevailing folk media theories of Eastern Ukrainian audiences found that trust in the media and individual attitudes were key factors in the public’s adoption of verification practices. Specifically, she concluded that the socially perceived low quality and reliability of media coverage can make validation a more convenient process if the public trusts the media. However, the perceived low reliability of the media limits verification strategies to personal experience or personally known sources if this understanding is based on cynicism and apathy towards media and political institutions (Pasitselska 2022). In addition, van der Meer and Brosius (2022) suggest that people may have a negative bias in their assessment of the reliability of information, pointing out that negative information is not by definition more reliable than positive information.

It can, therefore, be concluded that the significance of the media is emphasised both in times of crisis and for democracy overall. The media plays a crucial role in society, serving as a vital bridge between citizens and decision-makers. Its significance becomes even more evident during times of crisis, where accurate and timely information is essential for public safety and well-being. By providing a platform for exchange and dialogue, the media enables citizens to actively participate in shaping policies that affect their lives. This interactive process ensures that decision-makers are held accountable for their actions, as they are constantly reminded of the public interest they serve. Moreover, the media’s role extends beyond crisis management; it is fundamental to the functioning of democracy itself. Through investigative journalism and unbiased reporting, the media acts as a watchdog, exposing corruption and ensuring transparency in governance. By facilitating an informed citizenry, the media empowers individuals to make educated decisions and actively engage in democratic processes (Blumler and Coleman (2015). The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war has captured public attention in Greece, which has long had strong historical ties with both Russia and Ukraine (Papanikos 2022b). Pew Research reports that more than half of those surveyed in Greece have a favourable opinion of Russia (Pew Research Center 2018). According to the European Parliament’s Eurobarometer survey conducted in the autumn of 2022, Greeks ranked lowest among residents of the 27 EU member states in terms of acceptance of the EU’s activities in support of Ukraine since the war began (Parlemeter 2022). Greece has a complex relationship with the West, marked by periods of both cooperation and conflict. This has led some Greeks to view Russia as a counterbalance to Western influence (Siakas and Paschalidis 2021). In contrast, a recent content analysis study of Greek newspapers across the ideological spectrum found that they all unequivocally condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine (Papanikos 2022b). However, nothing is known about how the Greek public reacted to the news concerning the Russian–Ukrainian War. Therefore, the present study was conducted with the aim of answering the question of how reliable Greek citizens consider the information they received about the Russo-Ukrainian war.

2. Materials and Methods

In this study, an online questionnaire was designed and hosted on the Google Forms platform [https://www.google.com/forms/ (last accessed on 5 July 2022)]. The questionnaire was widely distributed throughout Greece via email and social media (Viber, Facebook and Messenger) to approximately 3000 recipients. The questionnaire was accompanied by a brief document describing the purpose of the research, a consent note, an explicit privacy statement referencing the GDPR Regulation and the names and contact information of the researchers. In order to mitigate the danger of non-response, follow-up emails were sent after 10 days or social media re-posts were made. A total of 840 completed questionnaires were received.

The survey, which ran from 17 April to 5 July 2022, aimed to gain an overview of the views and perceptions of people regarding the reliability of information about the Russo-Ukrainian war. The questionnaire was designed on the basis of previous studies on public perception of information sources (Primack et al. 2017; Skarpa and Garoufallou 2021, 2022). It was based on literature relevant to information-seeking behaviour, information overload and perceived emotions. However, it was not specific to our particular interests. For this purpose, we generated ad hoc items relevant to the specific interest with a symmetrical 5-point Likert scale structure. The questionnaire was divided into three sections: (a) demographic data, (b) sources of information and (c) respondents’ perceptions of information about the Russo-Ukrainian war. The questions on personal views and perceptions concerned participants’ beliefs about statements regarding sources of information during the first two weeks of the war and, respectively, during the subsequent phase of the war, their views on information received and fake news.

The analytical methods used in this study are described in detail in an earlier study by Simoglou and Roditakis (2022). A principal components analysis (PCA) was performed to identify the underlying information structure contained in the original interrelated variables and to summarise them into a smaller set of composite variables.

An analysis was also performed using the Mann–Whitney U criterion between the conflicting views of the research question, expressed as a dichotomous categorical outcome “for” and “against” the reliability of the information received, with respect to various statements that the participants were asked to declare their perceptions of. Τhe rank-biserial correlation was used (de la Rubia 2022) to estimate the association between the variables.

Furthermore, a non-hierarchical k-means cluster analysis was used to group respondents into clusters based on similarity for a number of characteristics. The analysis was based on the PCs that were previously retained from the PCA as clustering variables. Finally, to further describe the clusters and explore possible significant patterns of differentiation between them, a chi-squared correlation test and a Mann–Whitney U test were performed for variables with nominal and ordinal scores, respectively.

Data analyses were performed using the open-source statistical analysis software “Jamovi 2.3.18.0” with the R programming language (The Jamovi Project 2022).

3. Results

3.1. Demographics

A total of 840 completed questionnaires were received.

Table 1. Sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents (N = 840).

Demographic Variables		Frequency	Percentage
Gender	Female	491	58.50%
	Male	349	41.50%
Age	18–34	255	30.40%
	35–54	460	54.80%
	≥55	125	14.90%
Education level	High school	209	24.90%
	Technical education	37	4.40%
	Bachelor’s degree	220	26.20%
	Master’s degree	296	35.20%
	Doctoral degree	78	9.30%
Profession	Civil servants	399	45.50%
	Private employees	89	10.60%
	Self-employed	128	15.20%
	Farmers	3	0.40%
	Unemployed	24	2.90%
	University students	179	21.30%
	Retired	18	2.10%
Μarital status	Single	376	44.80%
	Married	402	47.9%
	Divorced	51	6.1 %
	Widow/-er	11	1.3 %
Minor children in the family	No	426	51.50%
	Yes	414	48.50%

shows the demographic characteristics of the respondents. The sample was reasonably gender-balanced with 58.5% female and 41.5% male. All age groups were adequately represented. The age distribution of the participants included 30.4% who were aged 18–34, 54.8% who were aged 35–54 and 14.9% who were aged ≥55. All participants had at least completed upper secondary education and were mainly employed in the public sector (45.5%), employed in the private sector (15.2%), self-employed (15.2%) and university students (21.7%) (Table 1).

3.2. The Participants’ Sources of Information

Table 2. Participants’ response frequencies for the five-point Likert scale question about information sources used about the Russo-Ukrainian war (N = 840) (IQR: Interquartile range).

Likert Scale	Phase of the war (A: First Two Weeks; B: Subsequent Phase)	1	2	3	4	5	Median	IQR
		Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Frequently	Always
Newspapers/magazines (printed press)	A	64.41%	18.93%	9.17	4.41	3.1	1	1
	B	66.99%	17.76%	8.94	4.05	2.27	1	1
Radio	A	43.74%	23.00%	12.04	13.11	8.11	2	2
	B	49.46%	22.17%	12.28	9.54	6.56	2	2
Television	A	12.28%	15.02	12.63	27.41	32.66	4	3
	B	19.31%	19.67	17.64	25.51	17.88	3	2
Electronic press (e.g., electronic newspapers)	A	11.20%	13.71	11.92	26.34	36.83	4	2
	B	17.04%	15.85	17.04	26.34	23.72	4	2
Digital-born news websites (e.g., websites with news content)	A	5.96%	11.2	11.32	30.16	41.36	4	2
	B	11.56%	11.56%	16.33	30.27	27.65	4	3
Internet (e.g., general blogs, personal pages)	A	22.77%	16.21	14.78	22.29	23.96	3	2
	B	27.65%	16.33	16.45	22.17	17.4	3	3
Facebook	A	42.79%	16.09	14.06	12.99	14.06	2	3
	B	50.78%	15.97	12.28	11.56	9.42	1	2
Twitter	A	73.42%	8.7	4.77	4.89	8.22	1	1
	B	78.07	7.87	3.81	3.34	6.91	1	0
Instagram	A	75.57	7.99	6.08	4.65	5.72	1	0
	B	79.86	8.11	5.48	3.93	2.62	1	0
YouTube	A	66.75	12.75	9.42	5.48	5.6	1	1
	B	73.18	10.73	7.15	4.89	4.05	1	1
TikTok	A	85.46	5.13	4.05	2.27	3.1	1	0
	B	88.43	5.37	2.03	2.63	1.55	1	0

displays the frequency results of the participants’ responses to the question regarding the information sources they used, either during the initial two weeks of the war or afterwards. During the first two weeks, the Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of the Likert scale items was 0.693, and during the subsequent phase, it was 0.732, indicating the scale’s high internal consistency. Table 2 reveals that 71.51% of participants followed the progress of the war primarily on digitally born news websites in the first two weeks, and this was 57.93% afterwards. Similarly, electronic press was selected by 63.17% before the war and 50.06% afterwards. The respective percentages for television viewing were 60.07% and 43.38%. This pattern suggests that, as the war progressed, all of the information sources were utilised less frequently. During the subsequent phase of the war, the frequency of selection of the remaining sources of information listed in Table 2 also decreased. Nonetheless, the corresponding selection rates for these media (Internet, Facebook and other social media, radio and printed press) were lower than for the sources previously mentioned. The Internet (blogs, personal websites, etc.) was chosen by 46.25% and 39.57%, respectively, either at the start of the war or later, while Facebook was chosen by 27.06% and 20.98%, respectively.

3.3. Participants’ Perspectives on the Veracity of Information

The frequency distribution of the participants’ answers to the research question about their opinion on the reliability of the information they received about the war was as follows: Totally disagree (med. = 1): N = 127 (15.4%); Disagree (med. = 2): N = 216 (26.2%); Neither disagree nor agree (med. = 3): N = 276 (33.5%); Agree (median = 4): N = 186 (22.6%); Strongly agree (med. = 5): N = 19 (2.3%). In accordance with Simoglou and Roditakis (2022), a binomial proportion test was applied after the division of the response rates into two levels with a binary outcome, i.e., ‘not in favour’ and ‘in favour’. A significantly higher proportion of negative responses was found, testing against the null hypothesis that the two categories were equally likely (p = 0.50). The proportion of “not in favour” responses was 0.751 (CI: 0.720–0.780), N = 631, and the corresponding proportion of “in favour” responses was 0.249 (CI: 0.220–0.280), N = 209 (p < 0.001).

In addition,

Table 3. Participants’ response frequencies for the five-point Likert scale question about information sources’ reliability concerning the Russo-Ukrainian war (N = 840) (IQR: Interquartile range).

Likert Scale	1	2	3	4	5	Median	IQR
	Strongly Disagree	Partly Disagree	Neither Disagree/nor Agree	Partly Agree	Strongly Agree
Newspapers/magazines (printed press)	15.87%	15.51%	30.67%	31.15%	6.80%	3	2
Radio	13.38%	16.13%	33.93%	32.14%	4.42%	3	2
Television	29.87%	22.46%	21.86%	22.94%	2.87%	2	3
Electronic media (e.g., electronic press and news websites)	9.20%	16.73%	29.99%	38.11%	5.97%	3	2
Internet (e.g., general blogs, personal pages)	14.93%	21.15%	33.69%	27.00%	3.23%	3	2
Facebook	41.10%	23.78%	25.69%	8.36%	1.08%	2	2
Twitter	40.26%	17.80%	29.27%	10.39%	2.27%	2	2
Instagram	48.51%	17.92%	27.72%	4.78%	1.08%	2	2
YouTube	41.82%	19.12%	28.79%	9.32%	0.96%	2	2
TikTok	52.93%	16.01%	25.57%	4.78%	0.72%	1	2

presents the frequency results of the participants’ answers to the question about their opinion on the reliability of information sources. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was 0.842. More specifically, 44.1% of the participants had a positive attitude (partly agree to strongly agree) to the reliability of the electronic press, 37.9% to the printed press, 36.4% to the radio, 30.2% to the Internet and 25.8% to television, while the corresponding percentages were even lower for social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok).

As shown in

Table 4. Results of the Mann–Whitney U-test for the differences between the responses of the participants when grouped for or against the reliability of the information received, in relation to different statements.

Items in Relation to the Information That the Participants Have Received about the War	W	p	Rank-Biserial Correlation (*)
Information about the Russo-Ukrainian war was comprehensive and complete	19,934	<0.001	0.686
The information I received about the Russo-Ukrainian war was easily understood	33,377	<0.001	0.474
Optimistic about serious media reporting on the war	41,500	<0.001	0.346
I feel a sense of uncertainty about the truth	82,092	<0.001	−0.294
I feel completeness of information	45,192.5	<0.001	0.288
I am satisfied with the way my country has responded to the developments	47,797	<0.001	0.247
I feel the truth is being withheld	78,324.5	<0.001	−0.234

(*): The rank-biserial correlation indicates effect size. Negative coefficients show a negative link between attitudes “for” and item responses. The ‘for’ attitude was used as a comparison standard.

, participants who agreed with the view that the information they received about the war was reliable reported significantly higher levels of agreement with the statements that the information was comprehensive and complete (p < 0.001), the information was easy to understand (p < 0.001), I am optimistic about serious media reporting on the war (p < 0.001), I feel completeness of information (p < 0.001) and I am satisfied with the way my country has responded to the developments (p < 0.001). In contrast, for the items I feel the truth is being withheld (p < 0.001) and I feel a sense of uncertainty about the truth (p < 0.001), supporters of information reliability reported a significantly greater disagreement.

3.4. The Reliability of Information: A Profile of Participants Based on Their Opinions

The purpose of conducting both a principal components analysis and a cluster analysis on the participants was to examine the characteristics of individuals who hold beliefs that either trust or question the reliability of information received about the Russo-Ukrainian war. Both of these analyses were conducted in an effort to determine who these individuals were.

3.4.1. Principal Components Relating to Participant Perceptions

Five principal components (PCs) were retained after applying a PCA (

Table 5. Principal components analysis results of participants’ perception on the credibility of information sources about the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Original Variables (5-Point Likert Scale Statements)	Median (*)	IQR (**)	Principal Components
			SMR	SFS	TMT	ISM	IOS
			Social Media Reliability	Spotting Fake News on Social Media	Traditional Media Trustworthiness	Information through Social Media	Information from Online Sources	Uniqueness (***)
I consider the following media to be a reliable source of information —Instagram	2	2	0.88					0.166
—Facebook	2	2	0.842					0.3
—YouTube	2	2	0.822					0.256
—Twitter	2	2	0.807					0.346
—TikTok	1	2	0.802					0.299
In which media do you often spot fake news? —Instagram	3	1		0.911				0.159
—TikTok	3	1		0.901				0.191
—YouTube	3	1		0.872				0.237
—Twitter	3	1		0.87				0.233
—Facebook	4	1		0.677				0.49
I consider the following media to be a reliable source of information —Printed Press	3	2			0.787			0.374
—Television	2	3			0.736			0.407
—Radio	3	2			0.721			0.452
In which media do you often spot fake news? —Printed Press	3	2			−0.693			0.432
—Television	4	2			−0.667			0.512
—Radio	3	2			−0.626			0.51
The information I get about the Russo-Ukrainian war is: —Objective	3	1			0.543			0.62
—Comprehensive and complete	3	1			0.529			0.626
In the first two weeks of the war I was informed by —TikTok	1	0				0.807		0.375
In the next phase of the war (after 15 March 2022) I was informed by —TikTok	1	0				0.77		0.421
In the first two weeks of the war I was informed by —Instagram	1	0				0.763		0.382
In the next phase of the war (after 15 March 2022) I was informed by —Instagram	1	0				0.743		0.39
In the first two weeks of the war I was informed by —YouTube	1	1				0.599		0.527
In the next phase of the war (after 15 March 2022) I was informed by —YouTube	1	1				0.537		0.541
In the next phase of the war (after 15 March 2022) I was informed by —Electronic Press	4	2					0.879	0.239
In the next phase of the war (after 15 March 2022) I was informed by —News websites	4	3					0.872	0.245
In the first two weeks of the war I was informed by —Electronic Press	4	2					0.846	0.295
In the first two weeks of the war I was informed by —News websites	4	2					0.826	0.334
Eigenvalue			3.85	3.77	3.65	3.3	3.07
Variance explained %			13.73	13.48	13.03	11.79	10.97
Cronbach’s α			0.91	0.915	0.827	0.829	0.88
Total variance %			13.73	27.21	40.24	52.03	63
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity
KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy (overall value)	0.755

(*): Median of the distribution of participants’ replies to the 5-point Likert scale questions. (**): IQR = Interquartile range. (***): Uniqueness = The proportion of variance that is not explained by the principal components [uniqueness is equal to (1—communality)].

). The total amount of explained variance was 63%. All the PCs had reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) greater than 0.82.

The first PC summarises variables concerning the perceived “Social Media Reliability” (SMR) as information sources regarding the war. It consists of five original variables relating to Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and TikTok and explains 13.73 percent of the variance. The second PC, “Spotting of Fake News on Social Media” (SFS), summarises five original variables related to Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook and accounts for 13.48% of the overall variance. The variables contributing to the third PC, “Traditional Media Trustworthiness” (TMT), which explains 13.03% of the total variance, are the reliability of printed press, television and radio as information sources; the detection of fake news in the same media; and the reliability and completeness of the information received. Obtaining information via social media (TikTok, Instagram and YouTube) during the first two weeks of the war and the subsequent phase was correlated with the fourth PC. This explains 11.79% of the total variance and is identified as “Information through Social Media” (IFS). Lastly, variables that contribute to the fifth PC include receiving information through electronic press and digitally born news sites during the first two weeks of the war and afterwards. It is labelled ‘Information from Online Sources’ (IFO) and accounts for 10.97% of the total variance.

The relationship between the five PCs is summarised in Figure 1. Spotting Fake News on Social Media (SFS) points to the opposite direction on the horizontal axis and is negatively correlated with Traditional Media Trustworthiness (TMT) and Social Media Reliability (SMR). It is also fundamentally orthogonal to Information from Social Media (IFS), which suggests that there is an inverse relationship between the two. There is also an evident inverse correlation between TMT and Information from Online Sources (IFO). However, TMT does not have a strong effect on the horizontal axis and, therefore, the principal components that contribute essentially on the horizontal axis are IFS and SMR.

3.4.2. Cluster Analysis

The cluster analysis was conducted based on the previously retained PCs from the PCA. A two-cluster solution was obtained for further analysis. The Mann–Whitney U test was used to characterise participants’ perceptions. Cluster 1 (N = 390) was labelled as “in favour” of the reliability of the information received, as it consisted of a greater proportion of participants with a higher intensity of views supporting the received information’s reliability (X² = 8.192; p = 0.004). Respondents in Cluster 1 tended to report higher levels of agreement with “Reliability of Social Media” (W = 5410; p < 0.001), “Traditional Media Trustworthiness” (W = 66,087; p < 0.001), “Information through Social Media” (W = 50,010; p < 0.001) and finally “Information through Online Sources” (W = 74,706; p = 0.004). Cluster 2 (N = 450) was labelled as “against” the reliability of information statement, since it consisted of a larger proportion of participants with a lower level of agreement towards the reliability of information received (X² = 8.192; p = 0.004). Compared with Cluster 1, participants in Cluster 2 declared a higher level of agreement towards “Spotting Fake News on Social Media” (W = 51,196; p < 0.001).

The demographic and perceptual profile of the participants in the clusters was established using the chi-squared test of association, as shown in

Table 6. Demographic and perceptions characterisation of the two obtained clusters of respondents regarding their view on the reliability of information sources on the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Nominal Variables		Cluster 1 (N = 390)	Cluster 2 (N = 450)	Chi-Squared Test
		‘In favour’	‘Against’
Gender	Female	44.90%	55.10%	Χ2 = 0.592; df = 1; p < 0.442
	Male	47.60%	52.40%
Age	18–34	60.10%	39.90%	Χ2 = 25.906; df = 2; p < 0.001
	35–54	41.40%	58.60%
	≥55	38.70%	61.30%
Education	Secondary education	57.50%	42.50%	Χ2 = 15.888; df = 1; p < 0.001
	Higher education	42.10%	57.90%
Profession	Civil servants	42.40%	57.60%	Χ2 = 24.517; df = 6; p < 0.001
	Private employees	43.20%	56.80%
	Self-employed	43.70%	56.30%
	Farmers	33.30%	66.70%
	Unemployed	50.00%	50.00%
	University students	62.00%	38.00%
	Retired	22.20%	77.80%
I only read news headlines	Negative perception	44.30%	55.70%	Χ2 = 6.253; df = 1; p = 0.012
	Positive perception	55.00%	45.00%
How often are you faced with fake news?	Not often	55.30%	44.70%	Χ2 = 8.160; df = 1; p = 0.004
	Often	43.70%	56.30%
Fake news is mainly spread on social media	Negative perception	59.00%	41.00%	Χ2 = 20.507; df = 1; p = 0.001
	Positive perception	41.50%	58.50%
	Negative perception	43.60%	56.40%	Χ2 = 8.192; df = 1; p = 0.004
	Positive perception	55.10%	44.90%
Sense of completeness of information	Positive perception	43.40%	56.60%	Χ2 = 10.658; df = 1; p = 0.001
	Negative perception	56.80%	43.20%

. Cluster 1 was characterised by a higher proportion of university students (p < 0.001), young respondents (18–34 years old) (p < 0.001), with a secondary education level (p < 0.001), who often only read news headlines (p = 0.012) and do not feel that the information they receive is complete (p = 0.001). They were less likely to identify fake news (p = 0.004) and less likely to agree with the statement that fake news is mainly spread on social media (p = 0.001) than respondents in Cluster 2. On the contrary, a significantly higher proportion of older participants (older than 35 years) (p < 0.001), with a higher education level (p < 0.001), civil servants, private employees and people who are self-employed (p < 0.001), who declared a higher level of agreement with the statement that fake news is mainly spread on social media (p = 0.001), were classified in Cluster 2. Respondents in Cluster 2 are often confronted with fake news (p = 0.004), do not limit themselves to reading headlines (p = 0.012) and feel that the information they receive is complete (p = 0.001). There was no significant difference between the clusters in terms of participants’ gender.

4. Discussion

The aim of this study was to provide a general insight into Greeks’ perceptions of the reliability of the information they received about the Russo-Ukrainian war. For this purpose, a survey was conducted among a sample drawn from all over Greece to find out how they perceived the reliability and accuracy of the information they received about the Russo-Ukrainian war. To our knowledge, no similar study has been conducted in Greece.

According to the results, the most popular media disseminating information in Greece at the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 were digitally born news websites, electronic press and television. However, as the war progressed, these sources were employed less frequently. The remaining sources, such as blogs, social media, radio and printed press, were also utilised less frequently. The abundance of information is likely to have played a major role in this change. Multiple sources of information, a huge amount of information, the inability to manage information and a lack of time to analyse and comprehend information are all potential causes of information overload (Eppler and Mengis 2008). Greek citizens who had access to a multitude of sources of war-related information may have experienced significant stress and fatigue. This overabundance of information meant that citizens were likely inundated with negative war reports (Newman et al. 2022), causing them to become disinterested or overwhelmed. Hence, regardless of platform, the number of information sources declined, and citizens’ reliance on a small number of sources increased. This behaviour has been previously highlighted in particular for young people who reject traditional news sources and are also prone to avoid online news (Shehata 2016).

This study demonstrates conclusively that the majority of respondents viewed the information they received about the war as unreliable. This can be inferred from the fact that 75% of respondents partly or strongly agreed with the statement in question. In a previous study by Kalogeropoulos et al. (2019), Greece ranked last out of 35 nations with the lowest level of media trust.

In addition, individual perspectives on the trustworthiness of the various sources varied greatly. Specifically, 44% of respondents believed that electronic media (press and news sites) could be trusted more than printed media (37%), radio (36%), the Internet (30%) and television (24%). It is intriguing that respondents rated blogs as more credible than traditional media like television. Despite this, only 13% of respondents to the survey believed that social networking sites could be trusted. According to Eurobarometer (2022), 34% of Greeks trust public television and radio stations, while 31% trust private stations. The printed and electronic press receives 34% of Greeks’ trust, while the Internet receives 29%, social media receives 23% and YouTube and other video platforms receive 18%.

Trust may be low in nations where the news media are perceived to be shaped by “undue” political and business influence (Kalogeropoulos et al. 2019). There is evidence that in Greece, only 7% of the population believes that the news media are free from political influence (Newman et al. 2022). At the time of this survey, Greece is emerging from a decade of severe economic and political crisis, characterised by high levels of polarisation and suspicion of unfair political and economic interference in the mainstream media (Kalogeropoulos et al. 2021), as well as the recent COVID-19 health crisis, which left the Greek public with strong feelings of doubt about the veracity of events and significant concerns about the accurate dissemination of information (Skarpa and Garoufallou 2022).

Despite the condemnation of Russian aggression in Ukraine by Greek media (Papanikos 2022b), it seems that the Greek public’s view of Russia remains largely unaffected, highlighting the complexity of public opinion and the influence of various factors on people’s perceptions. There is strong evidence of an overall positive attitude of the Greek public towards Russia (Siakas and Paschalidis 2021). As public trust in the dominant political parties declined in 2010 and 2011, coinciding with the onset of the financial crisis, the concept of Russophilia began to gain importance in public and political discourse. The increased interest in Russia coincided with a shift away from the Europhilia that dominated the early 2000s and the emergence of various shades of Euroscepticism. As a potential solution to the often-perceived arbitrariness of the West in global politics, the idea that Russia could become a more powerful global actor has gained popularity. Since the onset of the crisis, national populist discourse in Greece has chosen Orthodox Russia as a formidable ally in the ‘economic conflict’ with Germany and the EU (Petsinis 2016). Furthermore, anti-US sentiment among the Greek people stems from their belief that the US failed to prevent a dictatorship in Greece in 1967. They doubt the motives of the US in the ongoing conflicts between Greece and Turkey. Although Greece’s long-term strategic goals are aligned with those of the Ukraine conflict, a portion of Greeks, in defending the invasion despite its perceived illegality, are supporting Russia to show their antithesis to the US. (Papanikos 2022b).

Greece was the only one among the ‘old’ EU countries where a clear majority of the respondents held a favourable view of Russia (Pew Research Center 2018). Despite criticisms from some EU partners, Greece’s Russophilia reflects a complex interplay of historical legacies, economic interests and strategic considerations that shape its foreign policy choices (Petsinis 2016). However, the Russophilia of the Greek public should, in principle, be understood in terms of values and general cultural elements, rather than in terms of rational or strategic considerations (Siakas and Paschalidis 2021). Overall, these factors may have contributed to a favourable view of Russia among the Greek public, highlighting the contrast between public opinion and media portrayal.

Moreover, Kalogeropoulos et al. (2021) note that Greece has high rates of alternative digital news consumption (digitally born news websites, social media, blogs), which are frequently misinformed and sensationalist, whereas the most popular online news sources include anonymous belligerent blogs that promote conspiracy theories. The results of this survey indicate that at the beginning of the war, 72% said they frequently or always consulted digital news websites as a source of information about the war, while by the subsequent phase, that number had dropped to 58%. Blogs and personal websites were selected by 46% initially and 40% subsequently, whereas Facebook was selected by 27% and 21%, respectively. Notably, Tsfati and Ariely (2013) found that exposure to online news was negatively associated with trusting traditional media, while Kalogeropoulos et al. (2019) found that trusting news was inversely related to using social media as a primary news source.

In recent years, the role of social media has expanded, and the dissemination of information and opinions has shifted. This has been accompanied by a decline in the authority and influence of conventional media and their capacity to influence public opinion (Newman et al. 2022). One area of concern is that, despite the fact that independent journalism can provide an informed understanding of the war, disinformation campaigns are active and, via social media, audiences around the world receive a vastly distorted picture of the reality of the Ukraine war (Pavlik 2022). Accuracy and reliability are crucial aspects of information quality (Miller 1996) and vital components of information in a democracy, particularly in times of crisis such as the Ukrainian war (Papanikos 2022a; Pavlik 2022). Skarpa and Garoufallou (2021) reported a low level of public trust in social media as a source of COVID-19 information in Greece, and suggested that this result was indicative of the participants’ awareness of the dimensions of social-media-disseminated fake news. Likewise, the present study revealed a low level of trust in social media.

The results of our study indicate that perceptions of the trustworthiness of information about the war are positively associated with the perceived completeness of information provided, ease of understanding, support for serious media coverage of the war and approval of national policies and actions related to the war, with completeness showing the strongest relationship. There is also an inverse relationship between how credible individuals believe the information to be and how uncertain they feel about the actual facts. Since it has been shown that people who do not trust information are more likely to get it from unreliable sources (Kalogeropoulos et al. 2019), our findings show how important trustworthy information is in a democracy. We can see that reliable information is essential for citizens to engage in meaningful discourse and make informed decisions when participating in the democratic process. However, this is getting harder and harder to do in an era of “fake news” and a general lack of trust in the mainstream media. The fact that some people simply do not know how to assess and evaluate the credibility of information only serves to worsen this lack of trust. As can be deduced from our findings, the majority of respondents harbour widespread doubts about the truth. As a result, our findings point to a need for citizens to be equipped with better skills to verify information and combat misinformation. This means that individuals should become more critical and analytical in their approach to consuming news and other forms of information. Equipping people with the necessary skills to combat misinformation and strengthen their trust in information sources is essential.

The reliability of information is essential if citizens are to be better informed. Search engines or algorithms that filter results according to the logic of commercialisation display the results obtained by algorithms that are designed and oriented towards advertising practises, be they news, products or advertisements (Kalogeropoulos et al. 2019). This is especially true for social networks. The uniqueness of these networks lies in their structure, which is radically distinct from that of previous multimedia technologies. Without significant filtering or editorial judgement, information is transmitted between users (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). In most instances, users cannot recall the news source they have used (Kalogeropoulos et al. 2019).

Analysis of our data revealed that “Social Media Reliability” is the dominant principal component describing participants’ perceptions of social media in terms of their credibility as sources of information about the Russo-Ukrainian war (Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and TikTok). Social media has become increasingly popular, and its easy access through mobile devices has led many people to prefer getting information through social media rather than traditional media, making social media a powerful source for disseminating fake news (Sadiku et al. 2018). Social media news use is very high in Greece, with evidence that around 71% of online users receive news this way every week (Newman et al. 2022).

Fake news poses a significant threat to the credibility of information sources and has attracted the attention of the research community (Majerczak and Strzelecki 2022). Factors such as information seeking and verification abilities influence a person’s capacity to detect fake news in the information media (Khan and Idris 2019). The “Spotting of Fake News in Social Media” emerges as an important principal component describing the participants’ perspectives on the detection of fake news on Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, Twitter and Facebook based on the findings of this study.

The principal component under the heading “Traditional Media Trustworthiness” describes the traditional media press, television and radio in terms of their credibility as a source of public information, the detection of fake news in the same media, and the reliability and completeness of the information received about the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Social media can be used as a source of war-related information (Kozman and Melki 2017). Information via social media (TikTok, Instagram and YouTube) during the first two weeks of the war and during the later stages of the war is described in the principal component “Information via Social Media”.

Finally, receiving information through electronic media (the electronic press and digital-born news websites) during the first two weeks of the war and during the subsequent phase of the war are the variables represented by the “Information from Online Sources” principal component.

Our results show that there is an inverse relationship between the ability to identify fake news on social media and the perceived reliability of social media, the habits of getting information through social networks and the perceived credibility of traditional media. This is illustrated by the graph of the principal components analysis (PCA). More specifically, the PCA graph shows that the greater an individual’s ability to detect fake news, the lower their trust in social media and their information habits through social networks. This finding supports the results of Majerczak and Strzelecki (2022), who demonstrated that awareness of fake news has a negative impact on social media credibility. This suggests a link between recognising fake news and a lack of trust in social media as a reliable source of war-related information. This trade-off could potentially be explained by the fact that individuals who are able to detect fake news are more aware of the potential for manipulation and deception, leading them to distrust social media as a source of trustworthy information.

The cluster analysis revealed two distinct participant groups in terms of their perceptions of the veracity of the information they had received about the war. The first group consisted of 390 individuals who believed the information was reliable. The highest proportion of 18–34-year-olds and college students were classified in this age group. The majority of this group stated that they only read news headlines, are rarely exposed to fake news, do not believe that fake news is primarily disseminated through social networks and have a low sense of information completeness. This may indicate a growing disconnect between individuals and their news sources. Young people may not be adequately informed about the dangers of fake news and are more likely to believe misinformation if it appears credible. Moreover, they are most likely to use social media as their primary source of information and to form their opinions based on what they read online. It is interesting to note that these respondents rely heavily on news headlines as their primary source of information and may not seek out additional sources to supplement their understanding. Even though people believe they are not exposed to fake news and other forms of misinformation, they do not engage with the type of in-depth information necessary for a more comprehensive understanding.

The second group, consisting of 450 participants, disagreed with the reliability of the information they received. This group had the highest proportion of participants between the ages of 35 and 54 and over 55, as well as the vast majority of college graduates. The greatest number of public- and private-sector employees, self-employed individuals, and retirees were found in this group. In addition, participants in this group believed that they were not limited to reading only news headlines, that they frequently encountered fake news, that fake news was primarily spread through social networks and that the provided information was comprehensive. This group’s distrust of the information about the war was likely rooted in their greater knowledge and experience, as well as an educated scepticism of the narrative being presented by major media sources. This suggests that the second group was relatively knowledgeable about the events surrounding the war and aware of the problems associated with the dissemination of fake news. This group may be better informed and more engaged in political discourse than the other group; they may have understood the nuances of the war, its impact on their lives and potential misinformation sources. In addition, this group was willing to devote additional time to researching and comprehending the war by seeking reputable news sources. This group’s willingness to invest additional time and effort in research, as well as their general awareness of the issues surrounding the war, demonstrates a higher level of dedication to their political knowledge than that of the other group.

There are several limitations to the current research. Those who do not use the Internet were inevitably excluded from our survey results, which were collected via an online questionnaire; this most likely included older people. In addition, the questionnaires were distributed exclusively via email, Messenger and Viber applications. The conclusion should be extrapolated to the population level with caveats, as the sample does not accurately represent the Greek population in some respects (education, age group >55 years). Last but not least, the data were collected on the basis of self-reported opinions, without considering the veracity of the answers. The originality, the large sample size and the collection of responses from all regions of Greece are the strengths of the study.

5. Conclusions

This study addressed the question regarding the perceived reliability of information that Greek citizens received about the Russo-Ukrainian war. During the Ukraine crisis, electronic media was the most popular source of information in Greece. The majority of respondents to the survey believed electronic media to be more trustworthy than traditional media, the Internet and social media. Concerns exist among Greeks regarding the veracity of events and the accuracy of information regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war. This mistrust may be partially attributable to Greece’s recent emergence from a severe economic, political and COVID-19 health crisis. The results suggest that individuals’ perceptions of the veracity of information about the war are strongly influenced by their beliefs about the completeness and clarity of the information provided. In addition, they highlight the importance of providing comprehensive and understandable information for creating positive perceptions of national war-related policies and actions, as well as supporting serious media coverage of the events. Also, individuals’ trust in social media and their information habits via social networks decreases as their ability to detect fake news increases. Finally, two clusters of participants were identified: First, young people who believe their information about the war is accurate; they are active on social media and understand the news at the headline level. Second, older, educated, employed individuals who are exposed to fake news and are sceptical of the veracity of war-related information they receive.

The crisis in the media sector may be confirmed by the findings of this survey, which suggest that the information perceived by the Greek public is unreliable. Based on our results, a number of recommendations should be considered in relation to the Russo-Ukrainian war and distrust of information. While gathering, publishing and disseminating news, the media should embrace uniform transparency standards. This will increase the public’s awareness of the origin and veracity of news stories, allowing them to make better-informed judgments. Also, media outlets should agree on the best standards for corrections, fact-checking, anonymous sources and monitoring misinformation. This would offer the public a better level of certainty regarding the validity of news reporting, thus enhancing the overall credibility of media outlets and preventing future erosion of trust. In addition, the media industry should make an effort to ensure that the news stories are balanced, fair and present a comprehensive overview of the issue from all perspectives. Education in media and digital literacy should also be a top priority, since it will provide individuals with the knowledge necessary to assess and analyse the news they consume. This is especially crucial in light of the vast range of perspectives being conveyed in the media and the abundance of unreliable news sources.