Analysis of Safety Metrics Supporting Air Traffic Management Risk Models †
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Safety Definitions
Key Standards, Guidelines, and Processes
3. Safety Performance Metrics in Aviation
3.1. Safety Performance Indicators
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- Lagging indicators, to measure events (e.g., safety occurrences, such as accidents, incidents, system outages, etc.) that have happened. They also measure whether safety improvement activities have been effective in mitigating identified risks. Lagging indicators measure the outcome of the service’s delivery.
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- Leading indicators, identified principally through the comprehensive analysis of the organizations (providers, regulators, and states). They are designed to help identify whether the providers and regulators are taking action or have processes that are effective in lowering the risk.
3.2. EASA Aviation Safety Report
3.3. EUROCONTROL Integrated Risk Picture (IRP)
- Assessing safety performance and trends over time.
- Identifying ATM risk areas and taking corrective action.
- Investigating ATM contributions to safety incidents and addressing them.
- Improving safety in areas beyond ATM-related accidents.
- Monitoring whether operational or technical changes meet safety requirements.
4. Proposal for Risk Assessment Tailored to New Entrants
4.1. Proposed Approach and Application of the Risk Model to New Entrants
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- Flight Profile: Suborbital flights typically involve a very steep trajectory, reaching altitudes above the Kármán line (~100 km), and may not follow standard airways or airspace routes.
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- Airspace Usage: Suborbital vehicles may operate in less congested or entirely segregated airspace, potentially overlapping with space traffic or above typical commercial air traffic levels.
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- Speed and Trajectory: The speed and ballistic nature of suborbital flights are significantly different from the relatively steady, predictable trajectories of commercial aircraft.
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- Return to Earth: Suborbital flights re-enter the atmosphere, which can create different risks such as heat management, aerodynamics, and uncontrolled descent if not managed properly.
4.2. Gaps Analysis Framework
- The regulatory framework for conventional aviation does not consider the unique characteristics of suborbital flights. Gap: The collaboration between CAAs, ANSPs, and HAO stakeholders to define new regulatory frameworks and procedures to accommodate HAOs into conventional airspace.
- Spaceports currently operate separately from traditional airports. Gap: The coordination between airports and spaceports for integrated takeoff and landing operations.
- ATM system technologies focus on traditional aircraft operations. Gap: Satellite-based navigation integration, real-time tracking, the development of communication protocols for high-speed, high-altitude vehicles, and real-time data sharing.
- Human factor. Gap: A specialized training program on new operational profiles of suborbital flights.
- Safety protocols focus on preventing collisions for traditional air traffic. Gap: A new safety culture considering new separation standards and new safety buffers for recovering operations.
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Precursors for the Existing Mid-Air Collisions | Precursors for Mid-Air Collisions of Suborbital Vehicles with Traditional Aircrafts |
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Strategic conflict | Diversion from nominal trajectory of the suborbital vehicle. |
Tactical conflict | Mismatched speeds and altitudes of the suborbital vehicle. |
Loss of separation | Turbulence and wind shear at high altitude or during the transition phase from high altitude to lower altitude. |
Air proximity event | |
Imminent collision |
Barriers Against Existing Mid-Air Collisions | Barriers Against Mid-Air Collisions of Suborbital Vehicles with Traditional Aircrafts |
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Strategic conflict prevention | Definition of strategic diversion areas (safe buffers) where readdress traffic. |
Tactical traffic separation | Fast detection of diversion and tactical separation management in the sectors. |
Conflict warnings | Appropriate allocation of responsibility of sectors and diversion sectors to traffic controllers. |
Collision avoidance warnings | Appropriate definition of communication protocols and related info to traffic controllers. |
Weather forecasting and monitoring at the boundary of the transition area |
Mission Phases | Precursors and Induced Events Identification | Circumstantial Factors | Orange Barriers | DCB (Demand Capacity Balance) Events |
---|---|---|---|---|
Launch | System malfunctions | MAC Mid-air collision | Temporary segregated airspace | Integration trajectory prediction and conflict resolution |
Communication errors | ||||
Operational hazards | ||||
Re-entry | Inadequate pilot experience | MAC Mid-air collision | Data sharing | Performance-based operations |
Cognitive overload | ||||
Lack of situational awareness | ||||
Air–ground miscommunication | ||||
Bad weather conditions | ||||
Overloaded ATC instructions |
Key Factors |
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Risk Model Framework: Lack of Standardized Procedures: Unlike commercial aviation, suborbital operations do not yet have well-defined, globally agreed-upon procedures, thus making the process of risk assessment more difficult and less robust. Space Traffic Management (STM): As suborbital operations move higher into the atmosphere, there is an increasing overlap with space traffic management, requiring models that integrate both air traffic and space operations. Hazard Identification: New hazards, such as the risk of debris, impact-controlled airspace, or new sources of collision (spacecraft with aircraft), need to be integrated into the risk framework. |
Safety and Risk Mitigation: Geographic and Temporal Segregation: Suborbital flights may need exclusive or highly restricted airspace zones at specific times, minimizing the chance of interaction with conventional aircraft. This segregation could be temporary, requiring precise coordination. Safety Zones and Buffering: Establishing safety zones for suborbital trajectories (e.g., no-fly zones) is necessary. These zones would need to be accounted for in the risk model, which may require dynamic spatial modeling of air and space traffic. Real-time Monitoring: To improve risk assessment, there is a need for real-time tracking and monitoring of suborbital vehicles, which may necessitate the use of advanced satellite systems and ground-based tracking stations. |
Flight Safety and Emergency Scenarios: Emergency Landings or Failures: In the event of a failure, suborbital flights may need specific emergency protocols, such as identifying areas where a suborbital vehicle can safely descend or land. The risk model would need to account for such contingency operations. Collision Risk with Air Traffic: Even though suborbital flights occur outside the typical commercial flight corridors, there remains a risk of collision with other air traffic, particularly if suborbital flights operate in or near heavily used airspace. |
Modeling Tools and Data Inputs: Real-time Flight Data: Accurate modeling for suborbital operations would require high-fidelity data, such as precise trajectories, speed, and altitude data. EUROCONTROL would need to collaborate with suborbital flight operators to integrate this information into the risk model. Environmental Factors: Suborbital flights may be affected by atmospheric conditions at high altitudes, which are not always well modeled in conventional air traffic operations. These factors could influence trajectory predictions and flight safety. |
Gaps |
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Risk assessment to cover space-specific hazards like space debris. |
Cooperation between ATM and STM to ensure safe coordination during the launch and re-entry phases. |
Risks like system failures during space operations, abort scenarios, and extreme G-forces during re-entry. |
Suborbital-specific KPIs, including metrics for vehicle integrity during high-stress phases (launch/re-entry). |
Incident reporting systems to handle spaceflight-related anomalies, such as microgravity operations or emergency recovery procedures for atmospheric re-entry. |
Involvement of specific human factors challenges, including astronaut crew training, human performance under high G-forces, and the role of ground control in space mission management. |
Procedures for risk assessment of debris from rocket launches and possible failure scenarios. |
Emergency response planning for ground-level risks posed by potential failures during the ascent or re-entry phases of suborbital flight. |
Step | Process | Output |
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1. Define the Risk Scenarios. | Identify the primary hazard categories. | List of hazards |
2. Define Deviation Parameters. | Identify failure modes. | Differences in identified causes of hazards |
3. Identify Causes, Consequences, and safety measures. | Determine the causes, consequences, and safety measures. | Differences in potential consequences |
4. Gap Analysis. | Compare the probabilities, impacts, and mitigations between the two models. | Recommendations for risk mitigation |
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Errico, A.; Travascio, L.; Vozella, A. Analysis of Safety Metrics Supporting Air Traffic Management Risk Models. Eng. Proc. 2025, 90, 43. https://doi.org/10.3390/engproc2025090043
Errico A, Travascio L, Vozella A. Analysis of Safety Metrics Supporting Air Traffic Management Risk Models. Engineering Proceedings. 2025; 90(1):43. https://doi.org/10.3390/engproc2025090043
Chicago/Turabian StyleErrico, Angela, Lidia Travascio, and Angela Vozella. 2025. "Analysis of Safety Metrics Supporting Air Traffic Management Risk Models" Engineering Proceedings 90, no. 1: 43. https://doi.org/10.3390/engproc2025090043
APA StyleErrico, A., Travascio, L., & Vozella, A. (2025). Analysis of Safety Metrics Supporting Air Traffic Management Risk Models. Engineering Proceedings, 90(1), 43. https://doi.org/10.3390/engproc2025090043