The Impact of Organizational Resilience Development on Traffic Safety ^†

Abstract

This paper focuses on the goal of the Zero Vision initiative, which aims to reduce fatal traffic accidents to zero, and demonstrates how resilient operations and the continuous improvement of transportation systems can contribute to achieving this goal. It analyzes the tools for developing transportation resilience from various perspectives, including human factors, technology, regulation, and organizational culture. Additionally, it provides a detailed overview of the practical implementation of organizational resilience across different transport sectors, with particular attention paid to aviation and integrated disaster management. The development of organizational resilience contributes to strengthening safety culture, fostering innovation, managing risks, and reducing the number and severity of accidents.

1. Introduction

The Zero Vision initiative, launched in 1997 [1], which has since been incorporated into the safety strategies of several industries, set the primary goal of reducing fatalities from traffic accidents to zero. This presents a far greater challenge compared to areas where the number of stakeholders involved in transportation (e.g., drivers and operators, infrastructure managers, service providers, etc.) is smaller and more favorably distributed. Achieving the desired outcomes requires new research and a shift in perspective. Traffic safety improvement can be analyzed from various perspectives, including human factors, technical–technological, regulatory–political, social and economic, business perceptions, environmental, disaster and risk management, and psychological aspects. Developing organizational resilience alone does not provide a complete solution to this challenge, but it certainly contributes to making efforts more effective. The capacity for resilience, like a “jack-in-the-box” effect, helps individuals or organizations affected by an event to recover more quickly. In transportation, the aviation industry is currently considered the most prepared to implement a resilient operational approach. While this study approaches different modes of transportation in varied ways, the examination of aviation, railways, above-ground and underground systems, passenger and freight vehicles, and river and sea transport solutions is fundamentally similar. The target groups for developing organizational resilience are companies responsible for public transportation and logistics, which can already have a positive impact on traffic safety through partial results. For the rest of the road transport participants, deterrent regulations and consistent enforcement—that is, inescapable consequences and sanctions based on equal existential impact—could bring results.

2. Resilient Processes

While the similar-sounding English terms recovery and resilience refer to the same topic, a fundamental difference can be drawn between them. Recovery is a one-time process, whereas resilience is a dynamic ability that exists and can be continuously developed and improved. Resistance is a static characteristic that is part of resilient functioning. Cimellaro et al. [2], in their study of community behavior, distinguish between three types of resilient event trajectories: linear (a), trigonometric (b), and exponential (c) functions. Each of these functions is associated with a corresponding level of resilient preparedness: average, weak, and adequately prepared. Serdar et al. [3], in their examination of network resilience in urban transportation, use the resilience triangle model, where each phase of the event timeline is built from linear segments, resulting in easy interpretability.

In Figure 1, the moment of the event occurrence is t₀, the endpoint of the external event is t₁, the completion of recovery is t₂, and the system’s performance over time is denoted as Q(t).

The performance values corresponding to the three key time points, A, B, and C, form a resilience triangle. The ratio of the system’s planned performance to the expectation represents reliability; the slope of the performance decrease during a negative event represents vulnerability; the performance drop at the end of the event signifies survivability; the recovery speed—calculated as the ratio of the performance drop to the time taken to return to the original performance—indicates robustness; and the range of recovery time (t₂ − t₁) reflects flexibility. However, this theoretical approach can be significantly criticized from one point of view: immediate recovery does not actually occur when the event ends. The common shortcoming of previous approaches is the assumption that resilient processes begin recovery immediately after the event ends, and that the system’s capacity increases toward the expected performance level. In the approach of Godazgar et al. [4], the event unfolds as an impulse, and they introduce the concept of idle time, which refers to the interval between the occurrence of the event and the start of recovery efforts.

In transportation events, it is clear that the situation can worsen before actual intervention begins after the initial disaster; for instance, because of the inattention or recklessness of those arriving later to the scene of an accident, environmental contamination in the case of ADR shipments, or further losses occurring before warnings are issued and detected in cases of infrastructure failure due to earthquakes or architectural reasons. Thus, the approach of Godazgar et al. [4] requires further refinement.

The resilient event trajectory proposed in our model already takes into account collateral damage. In Figure 2, which approximates reality, the organization affected by the impact continues to show a decline in performance even after the end of the event. The speed of recovery depends on the magnitude of the external impact, the adequacy of the organization’s response to the event, and additional effects experienced by the environment.

3. General Considerations

Several notable studies have addressed the resilience-based description of safe processes, though there are significant differences in the interpretation of events. Due to the multidisciplinary nature of the issue, many scientific fields have dedicated considerable resources to identifying the key elements and defining the relevant parameters, with the intensity of this research visibly increasing during the COVID-19 pandemic [5,6,7,8]. The origins of individual resilience research are tied to the developmental psychology studies of Garmezy and Werner [9,10]. Today, the measurement and development of individual resilience are most prominently seen in the selection and training of personnel for elite military units [11,12]. The sources of organizational resilience include risk management, disaster recovery, organizational behavior, organizational culture, strategic management, leadership awareness and behavior development, employee behavior improvement, occupational safety, an omnipresent and all-encompassing safety mindset, supplier risk management, legal culture, and financial risk management. While these elements may evolve over time, they are constantly present in the life of a resilient organization. The current level of development in traffic safety and organizational resilience has been significantly shaped by Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model [13], Dekker’s Just Culture [14], Hollnagel et al.’s Resilience Engineering concept [15], Woods’ research on accident dynamics and resilience [16], and Hopkins’ work on the relationship between organizational culture and workplace safety [17].

In aviation, the most recent collaboration between EUROCONTROL and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in the field of organizational resilience covers several key areas. In 2024, the two organizations strengthened their cooperation through a new Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC), focusing on four main topics: training; cybersecurity; research and innovation; and communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) [18]. One of the primary objectives is the development of cybersecurity and resilience. As part of this, the two organizations are conducting joint research and innovation activities for European aviation safety and sustainability, while also sharing information on handling cyber events and incidents. Furthermore, they are developing simulation exercises to enhance cybersecurity in air traffic control and aviation systems. In 1999, two comprehensive exercises were conducted at Budapest’s Ferihegy Airport as part of the Y2K millennium project, which can already be considered resilience-oriented preparedness [19].

EASA and EUROCONTROL are also active in examining the impacts of climate change. A joint study analyzing the effects of climate change on European aviation revealed that extreme weather events—such as severe storms and floods—pose an increasing risk to aviation, leading to more delays and a rise in fuel consumption and emissions [20]. In 2024, EUROCONTROL conducted a resilience exercise focused on cybersecurity [21]. In maritime transport, the “Coherent Resilience 2023 Baltic” tabletop exercise was held in Riga in November 2023 [22]. This exercise aimed to protect the maritime and offshore energy infrastructure of the Baltic Sea, particularly against hybrid threats and terrorist activities. Another such event was MARSEC EU 24, which took place in May 2024 and involved the navies and coast guards of seven European Union member states. In addition to military elements, several civilian organizations were involved, including the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The exercise aimed to enhance maritime security cooperation between the EU member states’ civilian and military organizations, with a focus on protecting civilian maritime infrastructure, such as ports and shipping routes [23].

In conclusion, it can be observed that in the past decade, there has not been a fully civilian, holistic resilience exercise in Europe focused on transportation beyond cybersecurity that provides a comprehensive view of the industry’s disaster resilience capabilities.

4. Case Study—Preparation for Resilient Operations

Between 1998 and 2000, the former Directorate of Air Traffic and Airport Administration, responsible for Hungarian aviation, prepared to address the Y2K computer problem [19]. The core issue was that the BIOS of computers and embedded systems could only handle dates up to 31 December 1999. It soon became apparent that GPS date handling, based on weekly cycles, would reach 1023 in August 1999, after which the week register would reset to zero. Hungary, due to the low prevalence of embedded systems, did not face this problem directly, but the threat posed by GPS and BIOS seemed real. Testing one small system demonstrated that the system would indeed become inoperative at the turn of the millennium, prompting a need to test the functionality of as many systems as possible.

The design of the power supply system was adequate: devices nearby were equipped with uninterrupted power supply units that provided 20 min of backup power to ensure continuous operation. The airport had two independent 10 kV city power inputs. These two inputs connected to a power station with eight computer-controlled gas turbines, each with a capacity of 0.5 MW, which would activate if both external power sources failed. The Y2K exercise simulated a scenario where two independent and simultaneous failures occurred, testing the action plan. The computer-controlled start-up of the gas turbines and synchronization of their frequencies were completed within a few minutes. In the exercise simulating computer failure, the process took significantly longer due to manual synchronization. Overall, 20 min was needed to restore external power without computer support, which was in line with the capacity of the backup power units. Barely two weeks after the successful exercise, a severe error by an external contractor resulted in both power cables being cut at the common power input point. The situation was complicated by simultaneous high-voltage maintenance, during which safety protocols required the computer control system to be shut down. The successful repeat of the previous exercise was entirely effective: despite what initially appeared to be a catastrophic failure, critical consumers did not experience any disruption.

The resilient process within the organization followed the model shown in Figure 2 of Serdar et al., [3] with the added element that the organization’s externally observable performance remained unchanged. These events validated the importance of the lessons learned during the exercise and the combined significance of personal and organizational preparedness.

5. Can Fatal Traffic Accidents Be Avoided?

5.1. Zero Vision on the Roads

Traffic accidents are Bayesian probabilistic events, meaning their occurrence cannot be completely assured or entirely ruled out. However, with a realistic approach and the establishment of a resilient process-oriented defense system, the likelihood of fatal accidents can be significantly reduced. The reduction in risk will result in an improvement in the expected accident indicators through a decrease in the number of actual accidents, bringing the Zero Vision goal asymptotically closer. To achieve this, it is recommended to adopt methods already tested and applied in aviation. These include the High Reliability Theory, the Swiss Cheese model, continuous risk assessment, exercises, feedback, vigilant environmental observation, and quick responses to events. Resilience engineering provides an appropriate framework for this.

5.2. The Impact of Resilience Engineering on Traffic Safety

Resilience engineering, as a conceptual framework, identifies the key factors that are most likely to ensure the success of the stated goals. These include proactive risk management, the rapid response of transportation systems to changing circumstances, continuous learning from errors, improving the ability to better handle future challenges; increasing the resilience of transportation systems, increasing the flexibility of transportation systems, and establishing rapid response capabilities to prevent escalation. The integration of human factors is essential, encompassing the detection and management of stress and fatigue, as well as the creation of ergonomic workplaces. By establishing a multi-layered safety system, the safety level of the system can be maintained even if one layer fails.

In summary, resilience engineering helps transportation systems become more resistant to unexpected challenges, ultimately increasing traffic safety and reducing the risk of accidents.

5.3. The Impact of Organizational Resilience on Traffic Safety

The development of organizational resilience in the field of traffic safety can have significant positive effects. Resilient organizations are able to quickly recognize and respond to risks threatening traffic safety. This includes the swift handling of accidents, natural disasters, or other unexpected events. Efficient and timely damage control can reduce the severity and consequences of accidents, thereby improving the overall level of traffic safety. During the development of organizational resilience, organizations place greater emphasis on the proactive identification and management of risks. This helps prevent accidents and minimize their impact. Resilient organizations are also more inclined to introduce and apply new technologies and innovative solutions that support traffic safety, such as advanced safety systems or intelligent transportation systems. Strengthening organizational resilience also leads to the development of a stronger safety culture. Employees pay more attention to following safety procedures, which reduces the risk of traffic accidents. Resilient organizations place a higher priority on continuous training and increasing safety awareness, which improves traffic safety in the long term. Resilient organizations are flexible and able to adapt to changing conditions, such as new regulations or market environments. This adaptability ensures that traffic safety standards remain up-to-date and effective. Such organizations are also quick to learn from past accidents and mistakes, improving future traffic safety strategies. The development of organizational resilience can extend to the entire supply chain, including transportation partners and subcontractors. Closer cooperation and the pursuit of shared safety goals improve the traffic safety of the entire supply chain.

Resilient organizations strive to reduce dependency on individual providers or transportation routes, which increases traffic safety, especially during crises.

6. Conclusions

The development of organizational resilience directly and indirectly improves traffic safety. Resilient organizations respond more quickly and effectively to traffic risks, foresee and manage them, and continuously adapt to changing circumstances. Additionally, strengthening resilience contributes to improving safety culture, increasing awareness, and enhancing supply chain security, all of which significantly reduce the number and severity of traffic accidents. The examples given herein highlight the justification and importance of holistic problem solving.