Global Navigation Satellite Systems Signal Vulnerabilities in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations: Impact of Affordable Software-Defined Radio
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Materials and Methods
- Device configuration: the HackRF One was equipped with an external TCXO to enhance precision and performance.
- Signal generation: A GPS satellite constellation was specified through a GPS broadcast ephemeris file obtained from NASA. This file was processed to create a binary file for signal distribution using the “gps-sdr-sim” software Hack RF One.
- Signal transmission: The generated GPS signal was transmitted using the HackRF One at a specified frequency. The transmission process was observed and verified using a spectrum analyzer.
- Signal reception and analysis: The transmitted signal was analyzed using an NV08C-CSM integrated satellite navigation receiver. Measurements of signal reception, including changes in course, accuracy measures (such as 2DRMS), and interference effects on the receiver, were documented and analyzed.
- Assessment of interference power and distance: calculations and assessments were conducted to determine the interference power level, critical interference threshold, and maximum distance within which interference could disrupt the GNSS receiver.
- Documentation and comparison: results obtained from the transmitted spoof signal were compared with reference measurements taken without the artificial signal to evaluate the impact on the receiver’s performance and accuracy.
3. Results
3.1. Generation of GPS Signal
- “gps sdr-sim” is software, through which it is possible to connect the created binary file and distribute it through RTL-SDR HackRF One;
- “-e <gps_nav>” is RINEX navigation file for GPS ephemerides;
- “brdc3500.23n” is the most recent daily GPS broadcast ephemeris file published by NASA on the daily basis;
- “-l <location>” are latitudinal, longitudinal and height coordinates (static mode), e.g., 50.080759,14.437993,100.
3.2. Power and Distance of Interfering Signal Assessment
3.3. Detection and Mitigation of Spoofing
4. Discussion
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Device | Frequency Range | RF Bandwidth | Sampling Rate | Transmit Power | Price (EUR) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
HackRF One | 1 MHz–6 GHz | 20 MHz | 20 MSPS | Max 10 dBm | 280 |
BladeRF x-A4 | 47 MHz–6 GHz | 56 MHz | 61.44 MSPS | Max 8 dBm | 540 |
ADALM-PLUTO | 325–3800 MHz | 20 MHz | 61.44 MSPS | 6 dBm | 230 |
Measure | Dimensions | Probability [%] | Typical Usage |
---|---|---|---|
Root mean square [rms] | 1 | 68 | vertical |
2 | 63–68 | horizontal | |
3 | 61–68 | 3D | |
Twice distance rms [2 drms] | 2 | 95–98 | horizontal |
Circular error probable [CEP] | 2 | 50 | horizontal |
Horizontal 95 percent accuracy [R95] | 2 | 95 | horizontal |
Spherical error probable [SEP] | 3 | 50 | 3D |
3DR IRIS+ | Ublox NEO-6M-0 module, HMC5883L compass Concurrent reception of up to single GNSS up to 5 Hz-navigation rate | To combat against jamming, NEO-M6 modules include monitor for continuous wave (narrowband) jammers/interference only. This monitor reports whether jamming has been detected or suspected by the receiver. The receiver monitors the background noise and looks for significant changes. | HackRF One Jamming/spoofing detection Yes/No |
Tarot 650 v 2.2 | Ublox NEO-M8N module, IST8310 compass Concurrent reception of up to 3 GNSS single GNSS up to 10 Hz–navigation rate | To combat against spoofing, NEO-M8N modules include spoofing detection measures to alert the host when signals appear to be suspicious. The receiver combines several checks on the received signals looking for inconsistencies across several parameters. | HackRF One Jamming/spoofing detection Yes/Yes |
DJI INSPIRE 2 | Ublox M8 module, M8030 TK Concurrent reception of up to 2 GNSS up to 10 Hz -navigation rate | To combat against spoofing, NEO-M8 modules include spoofing detection measures to alert the host when signals appear to be suspicious. The receiver combines several checks on the received signals, looking for inconsistencies across several parameters. | HackRF One Jamming/spoofing detection Yes/Yes |
SKY HUNTER | MATEKSYS M8Q-5883 Concurrent reception of up to 2 GNSS up to 10 Hz, single GNSS up to 18 Hz–navigation rate | To combat against spoofing, NEO-M8Q modules include spoofing detection measures to alert the host when signals appear to be suspicious. The receiver combines several checks on the received signals looking for inconsistencies across several parameters | HackRF One Jamming/spoofing detection Yes/Yes |
Distance d [m] | Attenuation [dB] |
---|---|
10 | 56 |
100 | 76 |
1000 | 96 |
10,000 | 116 |
Signal | Frequency [MHz] | Wavelength [m] |
---|---|---|
GPS L1 C/A | 1575.42 | 0.19 |
GPS L2 C | 1227.6 | 0.244 |
GPS L5 | 1176.45 | 0.254 |
Galileo E5a E5b | 1191.795 | 0.251 |
Galileo E1 O/S | 1575.42 | 0.19 |
Galileo E6 PRS + CS | 1278.75 | 0.234 |
GLONASS G1 SP | 1589.0625–1605.375 | 0.189–0.186 |
GLONASS G3 CDMA | 1202 | 0.249 |
Beidou B1 | 1561 | 0.192 |
Beidou B2 | 1207 | 0.248 |
Detection | Mitigation |
---|---|
Pre-correlation | |
AGC, ADC monitoring | Blanking/channel exclusion |
Signal spectrum analysis | Chanel exclusion |
- | Multi antenna elements |
Post-correlation | |
Correlator’s spectral analysis | Notch, SEDLL |
SQM, channel cross correlation analysis | Channel exclusion |
INS integration | GNSS exclusion, Channel exclusion (tight), spoofing signal removal (ultra-thing) |
C/N0, PR noise, PVT, RAIM clock monitoring | Channel exclusion |
- | Multi antenna elements |
σy/σx | 1 drms | p (1 drms) | 2 drms | p (2 drms) |
---|---|---|---|---|
0.0 | 1.0 | 0.6827 | 2.0 | 0.9545 |
0.25 | 1.0308 | 0.6815 | 2.0616 | 0.9591 |
0.5 | 1.1180 | 0.6629 | 2.2361 | 0.9697 |
0.75 | 1.25 | 0.6392 | 2.5 | 0.9787 |
1.0 | 1.4142 | 0.6320 | 2.8284 | 0.9816 |
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Novák, A.; Kováčiková, K.; Kandera, B.; Sedláčková, A.N. Global Navigation Satellite Systems Signal Vulnerabilities in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations: Impact of Affordable Software-Defined Radio. Drones 2024, 8, 109. https://doi.org/10.3390/drones8030109
Novák A, Kováčiková K, Kandera B, Sedláčková AN. Global Navigation Satellite Systems Signal Vulnerabilities in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations: Impact of Affordable Software-Defined Radio. Drones. 2024; 8(3):109. https://doi.org/10.3390/drones8030109
Chicago/Turabian StyleNovák, Andrej, Kristína Kováčiková, Branislav Kandera, and Alena Novák Sedláčková. 2024. "Global Navigation Satellite Systems Signal Vulnerabilities in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations: Impact of Affordable Software-Defined Radio" Drones 8, no. 3: 109. https://doi.org/10.3390/drones8030109