1. Introduction
The rapid development of information processing technologies over the past two decades—particularly in the field of artificial intelligence systems—has prompted philosophers to revisit fundamental concepts. Ideas such as information, intelligence, cognition, understanding, and consciousness have become the focus of intense interest, sparking numerous fascinating debates and profound philosophical inquiries (see e.g., [
1,
2,
3]), as well as raising pressing ethical questions.
In this brief study, I address the relationship between selected concepts of information and intelligence and their relevance to the transmission of aesthetic experience. At first glance, this may seem like a marginal or secondary issue. However, in light of AI-powered systems winning artistic competitions and, more broadly, the growing presence of AI technologies across diverse domains of human activity, I argue that the problem acquires particular significance. Moreover, this significance and its consequences are closely tied to the way particular concepts are understood and applied in such considerations.
Although research on the relationship between intelligence, aesthetic sensitivity, and artistic abilities is steadily advancing and the literature on the subject continues to expand, a theoretical attempt to describe the transmission of the experience of beauty in relation to information and intelligence still appears relatively novel. At the same time, such an undertaking proves particularly demanding, not least because all three notions are inherently polysemantic. The methodology of this study is as follows: first, I will present selected concepts of intelligence and information and indicate how they are related to one another. Next, I will establish a link between these concepts and a designated account of aesthetic experience, together with its transmission in the work of art. Particular attention will also be given to the context of AI-based systems. Finally, I will formulate the conclusions.
2. Information and Intelligence
The problem of transmitting the experience of beauty—while acknowledging the inevitable limitations of such representation—appears, to some extent, analogous to the reception, processing, and dissemination of information. Accordingly, an important question arises as to whether and how the understanding and description of this process can be meaningfully related to the notions of information and intelligence. The latter is particularly significant, as it concerns the cognitive capacities through which individuals engage with the reality in which they are situated. Any attempt to delineate the possible connections between information and intelligence is, however, complicated by the fact that both notions are inherently ambiguous. At the same time, their relationship is constitutive, especially if one assumes, in simplified terms, that intelligence includes the capacity to operate on information. From this perspective, one of the most general properties of intelligence may be described as the ability to independently apprehend the structures of the surrounding reality, interpret them, and respond to them in a constructive manner. The constructive character of such responses is reflected in their autonomous quality and in the creative (or, depending on the context, reproductive) dimension characteristic of human activity. In this light, and particularly in view of the distinction between the creative and aesthetic aspects of intelligence, the attempt to link intelligence and information proves fruitful if information is associated with structure and with one-to-many relations. The interpretive element inherent in human cognition suggests that, despite its high level of abstraction, the proposals of Krzanowski [
4] and Schroeder [
5,
6,
7] are especially relevant. Krzanowski conceives ontological information as the potential for the generation of structures, which discloses itself within them. Schroeder, by contrast, emphasises the extraction of relations among objects and sensitivity to the unity of structures and their composition from multiple elements and dynamics of reality. In this context, intelligence can be understood as the capacity to apprehend complex structural relations, as well as—following Krzanowski’s account—the properties of objects in the very act (or series of acts) of cognition. Both proposals also appear to correspond to two seemingly obvious observations: (a) that we are able to distinguish and perceive particular entities, and (b) that we are able to identify structures. This perspective, however, seems to exclude both quantitative and semantic conceptions of information from consideration.
In this perspective, intelligence may be understood as the capacity to apprehend complex structural relations and—following Krzanowski’s proposal—the properties of objects in the very act (or series of acts) of cognition. Such an approach, however, appears to exclude both quantitative and semantic conceptions of information, as these seem insufficiently attentive to the structural dimension of reality.
It should be emphasised, however, that human cognition of structures does not cognitively exhaust reality. Rather, the value of the aforementioned definitions lies in their complementarity: they permit a treatment of aesthetic communication as a form of information communication, while still leaving space for the profound complexity inherent in such information. Moreover, they do not presuppose the existence of a conscious recipient. This may be illustrated by analogy through the case of the Moon, which ‘knows’ how to ‘exist’ and function even in the absence of any direct or indirect observer.
3. Connecting to Beauty
Disputes over the definition and essence of beauty date back to antiquity, and it appears almost impossible to formulate a single, satisfactory account [
8]. Certain decisions are therefore unavoidable. If one assumes the existence of an external, structured reality and at the same time seeks to reconcile this with the subjectivity of human cognitive capacities, Scruton’s account of beauty seems particularly relevant. Beauty, in this view, is inherent in the surrounding reality while also being deeply bound up with human cognitive abilities [
9] (pp. 1–33). In the context of the present inquiry, it is precisely this dual connection that proves significant.
Taking this background into account, one may introduce the notion of transmitting the experience of beauty through a work of art created by an artist. Such an approach suggests that perceiving something as beautiful is the act of apprehending reality as it appears to a particular individual and subsequently conveying this experience through a concrete artistic medium (musical composition, painting, literary work, etc.). This process involves an interaction between the objectively existing—often highly complex—structures of reality and the specific sensitivity and capacities of the individual. The latter enables the subject to perceive certain elements of external reality and to interpret them in a distinctive manner, ultimately leading to a decision to express them in a particular form. These two dimensions—the apprehension of reality and the communication of that apprehension—constitute a distinctive mode of intellectual activity, encompassing both analytical and creative aspects in Sternberg’s taxonomy [
10], and are inseparably bound to a particular sensitivity.
In this context, and assuming that external reality is structured by the information inherent within it, attention should be drawn to the following issue. If an individual perceives the surrounding reality with the full range of their faculties, it may be expected that their apprehension of this structured reality will become increasingly complete as their engagement with it deepens. This process can be distinguished in two dimensions: the material—through direct contact with material reality—and the abstract—through progressively refined means of describing reality (for example, by formulating more adequate theories of its functioning). In the abstract dimension, the development of intelligence may be understood as a growing sensitivity to increasingly subtle structures (such as mathematical ones), and thus, in a sense, to ontological information. Such sensitivity provides an explanation for one of Poincaré’s most intriguing theses: namely, that aesthetic sensitivity can serve as a pathway to progressively more adequate accounts of reality, at least at the physical level. For Poincaré, the decisive factor in this respect is the fascination with the harmony objectively present in nature. In light of the preceding reflections on information and beauty, this suggestion acquires a clear theoretical grounding.
With regard to the material dimension, it is important to emphasise an apparently obvious fact: to experience a work in its material form—for instance, a painting in a gallery or museum—is something quite different from encountering its digital reproduction, such as an image displayed on a screen. The development of human cognitive capacities appears to favour the former mode of experience. A more detailed discussion of the progressive distancing from the natural world through successive technological mediations, together with the consequences of this phenomenon, would, however, go far beyond the scope of this study and requires separate investigation.
4. In the Context of AI
Scruton’s account of beauty, according to which truth becomes sensuously accessible to human beings and in which individuals perceive themselves not merely as observers but also as recipients, entails several important consequences. First, reality is disclosed to the artist (or researcher), who may then seek to communicate this experience to others. Second, the perception of reality itself is broadened, encompassing the author of the work as well. Third, it is the human being who experiences the beauty present in reality. This last point underscores that the experience of reality is inseparable from human embodiment and from the entirety of the human endowment.
In this context, it should be emphasised that the perception of beauty, as a cognitive activity linked to the apprehension of a structured reality—marked by the tension between unity and multiplicity as well as by differentiation—is necessarily grounded in the body. This embodied experience also contributes to the development of sensitivity to abstract structures, including mathematical ones. The emergence of AI-based systems, however, raises the question of whether a comparable effect is possible when a numerical representation is transformed into an experience of beauty approximating embodied perception—a problem reminiscent of the “uncanny valley.” What, then, would such AI-trained sensitivity amount to?
This question remains unanswered for the time being. However, several observations may prove useful in approaching it.
Firstly, regardless of their sophistication, the usefulness of AI systems is conditioned by the data on which they operate. This data is external to the system and, in the case of art, is rooted in human creativity. Consequently, what such a system ultimately generates is not a purely synthetic product, since it relies on information originally produced—when a particular work of art is created—by a specific human being, shaped by their personal sensitivity, talent, life history, and other individual endowments.
Secondly, the capacity of the latest AI systems to process information is undeniably impressive. This includes a remarkable ability to detect structures, understood as patterns or regularities, which, for example, results in high effectiveness in diagnostic screening. However, when it comes to creativity, the generation or identification of certain patterns, despite the efficiency of their subsequent recognition in individual cases, may lead to a phenomenon of assimilation—a kind of averaging. What is often absent here is a distinctive specificity, even when the patterns are based on known structures of creative individualism. In humans, such specificity is enhanced by personal endowments. A compelling example is the work of Chopin, which, while grounded in established compositional canons, is simultaneously shaped by the composer’s unique sensitivity, creative inventiveness, and virtuosity.
Thirdly, in light of these observations, AI systems may best be understood as highly advanced tools capable of supporting creative work. Moreover, in an era of overwhelming information overproduction, they may prove invaluable as forms of “interactive inspiration.” This does not, however, alter the fundamental fact that, if the creation of a work of art is to be taken seriously, it is incumbent upon human creators to remain aware of both the possibilities and the limitations of such tools. It therefore seems reasonable to argue that artists should continually cultivate their creative capacities—primarily within their own individual domains—by shaping their embodied sensitivity and distinctly human creativity. It is particularly noteworthy that, in the age of AI, the creation of art—if it is to be regarded as genuine art—seems to demand ever higher levels of competence, regardless of the impressive capabilities of these systems. Technical skills, although undeniably important today, should remain subordinate to the individual and to their unique approach to communicating their perception of reality to others through artistic means.
5. Conclusions
At this point, attention should be drawn to a specifically human factor, which is of particular importance in conveying the experience of beauty. Following Scruton’s perspective, it may be said that the transmission of beauty—especially within the sphere of high culture—consists of communicating reality as the author of the work experiences it.
It should also be emphasised that such communication may serve three functions. The first, already well known from various conceptions of intelligence, is the study of reality and its transformation—ideally for the benefit of others—and this, in turn, can open up new approaches to the study of beauty and the creative process of art.
The second function, drawing on Poincaré, is that the cultivation of aesthetic sensitivity can shape intuition through the factor of beauty, enabling us to identify the most adequate description among several mathematically equivalent accounts of reality (as also suggested by Dirac).
A third, more individual, function is existential in nature and is emphasised by Scruton: the transmission of beauty can lead to the conviction that life is worth living—and worth living, among other things, because of the beauty it contains.
These considerations gain special relevance in the present context, as systems based on artificial intelligence permeate ever more dimensions of human life and increasingly influence the ways in which people think and perceive reality [
11]. The distinctively human manner of perceiving reality—anchored in sensitivity—and of communicating this experience must therefore be protected and cultivated, along with the preservation of human sensitivity to aesthetic experience. Neglecting or disregarding the protection and cultivation of human capacities may bring about far-reaching negative consequences, including threats to rational functioning [
12,
13]. This task thus acquires particular urgency in view of the possibility that AI-generated content may shape aesthetic sensitivity in ways that diminish receptivity to abstract phenomena, such as beauty in mathematics.