Digital Substations: Optimization Opportunities from Communication Architectures and Emerging Technologies
Abstract
1. Introduction
- The work provides a comprehensive and objective analysis of emerging technological trends and communication architectures in DESs, identifying optimization opportunities from both technical and operational perspectives. This study benefits from a collaborative approach between academia, research institutions, and industry experts, ensuring a balanced and practice-oriented vision.
- Qualitative and quantitative analyses of communication architectures in DESs are performed, demonstrating a potential reduction of up to 50% in communication equipment through a proposed universal bus architecture, validated by laboratory tests.
- An empirical evaluation of centralized protection and control (CPC) systems reveals response times up to 60% faster (e.g., <1 ms for GOOSE messaging) than some distributed IEDs in multivendor setups, improving scalability and efficiency.
- Traffic optimization strategies using Software-Defined Networking (SDN) are identified, reducing bandwidth saturation risks under high traffic conditions, and introducing cybersecurity improvements that would support the development of universal buses.
2. Background
2.1. Conventional Technologies in DES
2.2. Communication Architectures
2.3. Emerging Technologies for DES
- Flexibility in management: It allows centralized and dynamic network reconfiguration according to traffic needs.
- Enhanced security: It facilitates network segmentation and automatic real-time responses to possible cyberattacks.
- Resource optimization: It reduces hardware complexity and minimizes operating costs by eliminating complex local configurations.
- High availability and resilience: It detects failures and automatically redirects traffic, ensuring operational continuity.
- Real-time monitoring: it allows continuous network monitoring, identifying potential failures and bottlenecks.
- Interoperability: It promotes compatibility between devices from different manufacturers, simplifying integration.
- Integration of new technologies: It facilitates the adoption of new technologies without disrupting the existing infrastructure.
- Equipment reduction: It decreases the number of physical devices in the substation.
- Space optimization: It allows the reduction of physical space and simpler installations.
- Simplified maintenance: It facilitates lower maintenance costs and more efficient management.
- Increased flexibility: It facilitates adaptation to operational or technological changes through software, without the need to modify the hardware.
- Improved resilience: It enables faster response to failures and more efficient system recovery.
- Interoperability: It provides an improved integration of devices and technologies from multiple manufacturers by standardizing communications and functions.
- Scalability: It enables faster growth without large investments in physical infrastructure.
3. Methodology
- Integration and interoperability (according to IEC 61850) between protection, control, and supervision devices, focusing on multivendor systems.
- Performance evaluation of protection and control equipment (IEC 61850-10).
- Evaluation of protocol conversion to supervisory systems.
- Evaluation of interoperability and performance in communication systems.
- Evaluation of the performance of the CPC system.
- Traffic analysis, packet loss, or anomalies in information transfer.
- Application of traffic management (Quality of Service—QoS) through segmentation using VLAN and MAC-Multicast filtering.
4. Results and Analysis
4.1. Lab Test—Preliminary Results
4.2. Initial Optimization Alternatives
4.3. Proposed Architectures
5. Discussion
Impacts and Risks Derived from the Proposed Alternatives
- Greater simplicity of the system: In the proposed architectures, by integrating all devices with connection to a universal communication bus, their integration is considerably simplified, and their accessibility is improved, from the same central point that can be any of the communication equipment (LAN A or LAN B) proposed in the architecture.
- Greater flexibility: By combining the information with the DES, it becomes feasible to improve protection, control, and measurement systems. This includes incorporating new bays or parallel technologies for performance assessment or integration with the current system.
- Cost reduction: Leaving aside the separation of process and station buses in the DES implies a decrease in equipment and communication channels and spaces in boards destined for the infrastructure. In turn, this can have a greater impact, if a centralized protection system is implemented or, as shown in Figure 14, a main protection server with its corresponding backup.
- Greater volume of traffic: A common point for integrating all devices into the system implies that the information from this equipment converges at that point. This is why the volume of traffic increases considerably in space if the integration of multiple bays with the process bus in a DES is considered. In this case, it is required that the communication infrastructure used be able to tolerate and process the levels of information that it will face.
- Greater information management: A large traffic volume requires greater control, particularly when its totality is not necessarily relevant for all devices that are part of the DES infrastructure. Therefore, it is necessary to perform engineering work that optimally guides the information to be exchanged exclusively between the devices that require it. This reduces the processing load and mitigates the risks of loss or saturation in the network due to high volumes of data.
- Greater IT security management: The simplicity of the system and its accessibility to its devices also imply a risk that must be controlled in DESs. Therefore, it is necessary to implement effective cybersecurity and access control policies for the different devices to mitigate the risks of vulnerability or unwanted actions in the operation of DESs.
- Cybersecurity: By centralizing control and using programmable networks, substations become more vulnerable to cyberattacks, which could compromise critical protection and control systems.
- Single point of failure: Consolidating functions on a single device or server (CPC or SDN) means that a failure in the centralized system could affect multiple protections and controls simultaneously.
- Implementation complexity: SDN networks and programming protections in CPC require advanced architecture and trained personnel, which can initially increase the complexity of deployment and maintenance.
- Latency: In solutions such as SDN and CPC or VPAC, network latency can affect the response time of protection systems, compromising the speed of actions in the event of power grid failures.
- Interoperability: Although SDN and CPC improve interoperability, the integration of technologies from multiple manufacturers can generate incompatibilities or communication problems if standards are not met adequately.
- Virtualization reliability: Virtual environments could generate risks related to the stability and performance of the underlying hardware, compromising critical operations if infrastructure failures occur.
6. Conclusions
- The study and characterization of communication technologies and architectures currently applied to DESs show that companies incur significant costs associated with excessive redundancies in communication equipment and protocols. Limitations of this research include reliance on laboratory tests, limiting generalizability, and cost estimates based on average vendor data.
- DESs require experts to design, operate, and maintain facilities. Knowledge of the communication component is relevant for selecting technologies, designing, and configuring different elements of DESs. Therefore, specialized courses are required to qualify people for employment in these facilities.
- The appropriate use of technology and knowledge on topics such as SDN or centralized protections can represent an important advance in optimizing the use and performance of these systems.
- Communication architectures for DESs, which integrate conventional architectures with redundancy protocols, efficient traffic management, and technologies for centralized protection in electrical substations, reduce costs in new implementations, and evaluate the performance of the different components of a DES to make implementation viable.
- It is crucial to communicate the knowledge gained from the experience in utilities to regulatory entities. These entities are important in incentivizing investments in such topologies, leading to improved service quality, CO2 emission indicators, cybersecurity, and overall profitability of companies. These findings support improved service quality and profitability through optimized DES designs.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Architecture Type (Conventional Digital Systems) | |||
---|---|---|---|
DES Infrastructure requirements per bay | Basic star—simple (non-redundant) | Double star—PRP redundancy | Ring—HSR redundancy |
Gateways | at least 2 * | ||
IEDs | at least 2 or 3 * | ||
Merging Units | at least 2 * | ||
GPS | at least 1 | ||
Switches | at least 2 | at least 4 | none |
Communication channels | at least 8 | at least 16 | at least 8 |
Architecture Type (Conventional Digital Systems) | |||
---|---|---|---|
DES Infrastructure requirements per bay | Basic star—simple (non-redundant) | Double star—PRP redundancy | Ring—HSR redundancy |
Gateways | US$21,000 | ||
IEDs | US$19,000–US$28,000 | ||
MUs | US$12,000 | ||
GPS | US$8000 | ||
Switches | US$8000 | US$16,000 | none |
Communication channels | US$2000 | US$4000 | US$2500 |
Architecture Type (Conventional Digital Systems) | |||
---|---|---|---|
DES Infrastructure requirements per bay | Basic star—simple (non-redundant) | Double star–PRP redundancy | Ring—HSR redundancy |
Gateways | 150 W | ||
IEDs | 160–240 W | ||
MUs | 90 W | ||
GPS | 40 W | ||
Switches | 140 W | 280 W | none |
Communication channels | none | none | none |
Communication Protocol | Size [Bytes/s] * | |
---|---|---|
MMS | 12.5 k | |
GOOSE | Heavy (burst/Trips) (e.g., “during fault events”) | 125 k |
GOOSE | Lite (steady state) | 125 |
Sampled Values | 4.8–6.2 M |
Approach | Traditional Architecture | Substation Centralized Equipment |
---|---|---|
Relay Asset Management Device Management | Many relays must be identified, specified, configured, tested, and maintained separately, along with separate records for each device. Each protection IED in a substation usually has numerous configuration options to enable various features. | A limited number of devices need to be identified, specified, configured, tested, and maintained, along with separate records for each device. A small number of devices makes it easy to manage, and also the feature set is reduced and limited compared to traditional methods. |
Maintenance | Routine maintenance can be frequent and require experienced and well-trained personnel along with expensive calibrated test equipment. P&C IED maintenance per bay is easily accomplished due to the bay-separated IEDs. | Limited maintenance is required as the entire substation P&C system uses fewer physical devices, although experienced personnel are still required for maintenance. More robust and reliable systems can be designed at a lower cost. |
Security | Multitude of protection IEDs Provides more access points for cyber threats. | Very limited number of access points that can also be better managed. |
Interoperability | Disparate protocols that are difficult to standardize. Substation Automation System modifications can be complicated. | It primarily leverages IEC 61850 technology and can be more easily adopted than the distributed protection IED model. Substation engineers are required to have networking knowledge. |
Substation Master Interface | Depending on the technology, the protection IED may not be able to be monitored by an RTU or data concentrator. Newer technologies have protective IEDs with limited computation and communication interfaces to transfer data in and out of the substation. | The CPC becomes the “Gatekeeper” of dynamic device models. Relays are ubiquitous. This provides a master smart node for interaction between substations and control centers. Tremendous reduction in communication needs. |
Approach | Current Architecture | Architecture 1 Optimization Alternative | Architecture 2 Universal Bus | Architecture 3 Universal Bus and CPC |
---|---|---|---|---|
Relay Asset Management Device Management | Reduced | Reduced only in communications | Reduced single bus process | Significantly reduced |
Maintenance | Low | Low | Low | Very low |
Security | High | Medium | Medium | High |
Interoperability | Medium | Medium | Medium | High |
Substation Master Interface | Unique | It depends on the technology of each IED | It depends on the technology of each IED | Unique |
Built area | High | High | Medium | Low |
IED quantity | Medium | Medium–high | Medium | Low |
Implementation time * | 6 to 8 months | 6 to 8 months | 4 to 7 months | 1 to 3 months |
Deenergization is required for maintenance | Yes | No (redundant protection) | No (redundant protection) | No |
Implementation Cost | Middle | Medium–High | Medium–Low | Very Low |
Architecture | Cost Reduction (US$/bay) | Resource Improvement | Trade-Off Considerations |
---|---|---|---|
Current (PRP) | Baseline (US$70,000) | High redundancy | High equipment count |
Universal Bus | ∼US$8000 (switches) | Up to 50% less equipment | Higher traffic load |
Universal Bus + CPC | ∼US$27,000 (IEDs) | 50% faster response | Centralized failure risk |
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Tobar-Rosero, O.A.; Díaz-Mendoza, O.D.; Díaz-Vargas, P.A.; Candelo-Becerra, J.E.; Florez-Célis, H.A.; Quintero-Henao, L.F. Digital Substations: Optimization Opportunities from Communication Architectures and Emerging Technologies. Sci 2025, 7, 63. https://doi.org/10.3390/sci7020063
Tobar-Rosero OA, Díaz-Mendoza OD, Díaz-Vargas PA, Candelo-Becerra JE, Florez-Célis HA, Quintero-Henao LF. Digital Substations: Optimization Opportunities from Communication Architectures and Emerging Technologies. Sci. 2025; 7(2):63. https://doi.org/10.3390/sci7020063
Chicago/Turabian StyleTobar-Rosero, Oscar Andrés, Octavio David Díaz-Mendoza, Paola Andréa Díaz-Vargas, John E. Candelo-Becerra, Héctor Andrés Florez-Célis, and Luis Fernando Quintero-Henao. 2025. "Digital Substations: Optimization Opportunities from Communication Architectures and Emerging Technologies" Sci 7, no. 2: 63. https://doi.org/10.3390/sci7020063
APA StyleTobar-Rosero, O. A., Díaz-Mendoza, O. D., Díaz-Vargas, P. A., Candelo-Becerra, J. E., Florez-Célis, H. A., & Quintero-Henao, L. F. (2025). Digital Substations: Optimization Opportunities from Communication Architectures and Emerging Technologies. Sci, 7(2), 63. https://doi.org/10.3390/sci7020063